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Abstract	
 
 The	 governance	 of	 water	 is	 of	 increasing	 concern	 to	 policy	 analysts.	 Several	property	rights	systems,	which	allow	for	ownership	of	water	by	 the	 individual,	community,	or	state	have	been	advocated,	but	no	approach	has	been	uniformly	successful	 in	 resolving	 water	 quality	 or	 scarcity	 issues.		 In	 some	 cases,	identifying	 alternative	 property	 rights	 arrangements	 for	 governing	 water	systems	 could	 be	 useful.		 This	 research	 examines	 how	 a	 river	 system	 can	 be	granted	legal	standing	and	the	institutional	economic	effects	of	doing	so.	It	is	the	first	academic	treatment	of	this	subject.	Focusing	on	the	case	of	the	Whanganui	River,	New	Zealand,	a	careful	critique	of	the	new	property	rights	arrangement	-	termed	 resource	 self-determination	 -	 is	 given.		 Using	 Ostrom’s	 Institutional	Analysis	 and	 Development	 (IAD)	 framework,	 game	 theory,	 and	 economic	experiments,	the	economic	and	socio-ecological	outcomes	observed	under	state	ownership	 are	 compared	 with	 the	 outcomes	 expected	 under	 resource	 self-determination.	 	To	understand	how	and	why	the	new	property	rights	approach	was	 identified	 for	 the	Whanganui	 River,	 a	 critical	 analysis	 of	 the	 institutional	variables	 central	 to	 the	 identification	 of	 resource	 self-determination	 is	 also	undertaken	 using	 a	 new	 dynamic	 version	 of	 the	 IAD	 framework	 developed	 as	part	of	this	research.		The	results	of	the	study	suggest	that	the	implementation	of	resource	self-determination	is	likely	to	result	in	an	increase	in	transaction	costs	and	 a	 redistribution	 of	 water	 within	 the	 system,	 but	 that	 the	 new	 framework	could	 successfully	 deliver	 on	 the	 objectives	 of	 the	 new	 legislation.	 For	 policy	makers	interested	in	replicating	the	approach	for	other	river	systems,	words	of	caution,	as	well	as	recommendations,	are	offered.	
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1	 Introducing	the	research	
	
	
1.0	 Introduction		The	question	of	how	we	can	resolve	issues	of	increasing	resource	pressures	is	of	mounting	 concern	 to	 policy	 analysts.	 Without	 well	 defined	 and	 defended	property	 rights,	 problems	 of	 overuse	 and	 underprovision	 prevail	 when	environmental	 goods	 and	 resources,	 such	 as	 water,	 are	 non-excludable.	 	 The	fundamental	 challenges	 of	 collective	 action	 necessitate	 decisions	 to	 be	 made	over	 how	 property	 rights	 should	 be	 distributed	 to	 ensure	 the	 most	 efficient	outcomes	are	reached.			Several	 property	 rights	 systems,	 which	 allow	 for	 ownership	 of	 environmental	goods	and	resources	by	the	individual,	community,	or	state	have	been	advocated,	but	no	approach	has	been	uniformly	successful	 in	resolving	 issues	of	collective	action.		As	a	result,	the	question	of	how	property	rights	should	be	distributed	and	to	 whom	 remains	 one	 of	 the	 fundamental	 questions	 in	 environmental	 and	institutional	economics.		This	research	addresses	this	question	in	the	context	of	granting	 a	 river	 legal	 standing	 to	 evaluate	 the	 institutional	 economic	 effects	 of	granting	 rights	 to	 environmental	 goods	 and	 resources	 –	 a	 property	 rights	arrangement	termed	resource	self-determination.		This	 is	 the	 first	 academic	 treatment	 of	 this	 question	 in	 this	 context.	 	 No	 other	body	 of	 research	 has	 examined	 how	 granting	 a	 river	 legal	 standing	will	 affect	institutional	economic	outcomes.		Further,	no-one	has	shown	how	this	change	of	status	will	affect	existing	 theories,	particularly	 in	 institutional	economics.	 	This	research	does	both.		It	argues	that	resource	self-determination	will	impact	both	economic	and	environmental	outcomes	but	that	it	could	be	a	robust	alternative	arrangement	 for	 governing	 river	 systems	 when	 the	 property	 rights	 system	 is	integrated	into	broader	legislative	frameworks.				
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Because	 the	 effects	 of	 an	 institutional	 arrangement	 is	 context	 dependent,	 the	discussion	 of	 the	 central	 research	 question	 is	 focused	 on	 the	 application	 of	resource	 self-determination	 to	 the	 Whanganui	 River,	 New	 Zealand.	 The	methodological	 advances	 made	 here	 and	 some	 aspects	 of	 the	 findings	 are	relevant	 and	 applicable	 to	 other	 areas	 of	 environmental	 policy	 development,	however.	Property	 rights	 are	 the	principal	mechanisms	 through	which	policies	regarding	 resource	 management	 work.	 	 As	 a	 result,	 understanding	 the	institutional	economic	impacts	of	granting	a	river	property	rights	has	relevance	to	all	areas	of	environmental	policy.				In	 broad	 terms,	 the	 research	 questions	 addressed	 in	 this	 study	 embrace	 the	challenges	faced	in	evaluating	the	institutional	economic	outcomes	of	alternative	institutional	 arrangements	 designed	 to	 solve	 environmental	 and	 natural	resource	 problems	 –	 challenges	 that	 remain	 at	 the	 core	 of	 environmental	economics,	institutional	economics,	and	public	policy.			
1.1	 Why	this	study?	Articulating	the	research	problem		Increasing	pressures	on	environmental	goods	and	resources	are	heightening	the	demand	 for	 new	 institutional	 solutions.	 	 Conventional	 property	 rights	approaches	 of	 individual,	 community,	 or	 state	 ownership	 have	 not	 uniformly	resolved	 the	 issues	 of	 overuse	 and	 underprovision	 of	 non-excludable	environmental	goods	and	resources.	As	a	result,	there	is	a	demand	for	innovative	policy	solutions	that	more	effectively	address	social	dilemmas.		Part	 of	 the	 problem	 for	 policy	 makers	 is	 that	 there	 is	 no	 panacea	 for	 solving	environmental	 and	 natural	 resource	 problems.	 	 Policy	 makers	 must	 develop	frameworks	 that	 maximise	 net	 benefits,	 keeping	 in	 mind	 the	 challenge	 of	quantifying	 both	 market	 and	 non-market	 values	 and	 balancing	 competing	demands.	 Further,	 in	 the	 area	 of	 environmental	 policy,	 the	 consideration	 of	special	 interests	 and	an	acknowledgement	of	 context	 are	 sometimes	politically	more	 of	 a	 crucial	 issue	 than	 the	 allocation	 of	 benefits.	 	 Hence	 in	 assessing	
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alternative	 property	 rights	 options,	major	 challenges	 facing	 policy	makers	 and	the	 community	 are,	 not	 only	 assessing	 the	 probable	 outcomes	 of	 policy	alternatives,	 but	 also	 determining	 the	 likelihood	 of	 that	 the	 arrangement	 will	deliver	 “good”	 outcomes,	 whether	 defined	 in	 terms	 of	 resource	 conservation	over	time	or	economic	net	benefits.		In	 terms	 of	 economic	 approaches	 to	 managing	 water,	 the	 most	 widely	 used	method	to	constrain	and	enable	peoples’	behaviour	is	the	assignment	of	property	rights	 to	 use	 and	 management.	 	 Since	 Hobbes	 (1651)	 and	 Smith	 (1791)	 the	conventional	 approach	 to	 coordinating	peoples’	behaviour	has	been	 to	allocate	legal	 and	 economic	 property	 rights	 to	 the	 state	 or	 individual	 based	 on	 a	man:nature	dichotomy.	 	More	recently,	Olson	(1971)	and	Ostrom	(1990;	2005)	highlighted	that	in	situations	where	groups	are	small	and	homogenous,	collective	organisation	and	management	of	environmental	goods	and	resources	is	possible.		Stone	 (1972)	 proposed	 an	 alternative	 approach	 that	 collapsed	 the	 distinction	between	 real	 and	 artificial	 persons	 through	 granting	 legal	 rights	 to	environmental	 goods	 and	 resources.	 	 Although	 the	 proposal	 was	 deemed	 too	radical	 for	 implementation	at	 its	conception,	more	recently,	 the	 idea	has	begun	to	 gain	 traction	 at	 various	 scales	 of	 decision-making.	 	 In	 2012,	 a	 formal	agreement	 was	 signed	 that	 promised	 to	 grant	 the	 Whanganui	 River,	 New	Zealand,	 legal	 rights,	with	 legislation	passed	 in	March	2017.	 	Likewise,	 in	2008	and	 2011	 respectively,	 Ecuador	 and	 Bolivia	 granted	 Constitutional	 rights	 to	nature.	 In	2014	Te	Urewera	National	Park	in	New	Zealand	was	recognised	as	a	person	in	law,	whilst	various	municipalities	in	the	United	States	have	recognised	the	 rights	of	nature	 to	ecosystem	health	and	wellbeing.	 	 Similarly,	 in	Australia,	various	hybrid	forms	of	the	rights	for	nature	concept	have	been	integrated	into	environmental	policy.		Little	 is	 understood	 about	 the	 economic	 and	 environmental	 effects	 of	transferring	 property	 rights	 to	 environmental	 goods	 and	 resources,	 however.		We	know	that	transferring	property	rights	affects	 levels	of	rent	dissipation	and	wealth	distribution	in	a	group;	but	what	happens	when	those	property	rights	are	
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transferred	 to	 an	 environmental	 resource,	 like	 a	 river?	 	 For	 policy	 makers	interested	 in	 identifying	 new	 ways	 to	 solve	 environmental	 and	 resource	problems,	 an	 in-depth	 examination	 of	 the	 application	 of	 resource	 self-determination	 to	 a	 river	 system	 is	 timely.	 With	 more	 information	 about	 the	institutional	 economics	 of	 granting	 environmental	 goods	 and	 resources	 legal	standing	 policy	 makers	 can	 assess	 with	 more	 certainty	 the	 likelihood	 that	resource	self-determination	will	 resolve	the	collective	action	problems	faced	 in	their	region.		To	 summarise	 the	 research	 problem:	 the	 growing	 demand	 for	 environmental	goods	 and	 resources	 is	 increasing	 the	 demand	 for	 alternative	 institutional	arrangements,	which	improve	the	allocation	and	distribution	of	available	supply.		This	 is	especially	the	case	for	water.	 	The	questions	are,	how	can	resource	self-determination	be	applied	to	a	river	system	and	will	it	stand	as	a	better	approach	for	 delivering	 long-lasting	 and	 socially	 desirable	 outcomes	 than	 more	conventional	property	rights	approaches?			
1.2	 The	research	approach		The	 research	 reported	 in	 this	 thesis	 addresses	 the	 task	 of	 evaluating	 the	institutional	economic	effects	of	granting	a	river	 legal	standing.	 	 	 It	 is	proposed	that	an	ex	ante	analysis	of	the	application	of	resource	self-determination	to	the	Whanganui	 River	 be	 conducted	 to	 evaluate	 some	 of	 the	 potential	 effects	 of	resource	 self-determination	 on	 transaction	 costs,	 resource	 use	 outcomes,	 and	overall	 institutional	 robustness.	 All	 data	 collection	 and	 analysis	 was	 therefore	completed	 prior	 to	 the	 recent	 legislation	 granting	 the	 Whanganui	 River	 legal	standing	being	enacted	in	March	2017.		The	research	model	takes	inspiration	from	the	Bloomington	School’s	approach	to	institutional	 analysis,	 in	 partnership	 with	 transaction	 cost	 economics.	 	 The	Bloomington	 School’s	 combination	 of	 robust	 theory	 testing	 and	 hard-nosed	empiricism	provides	a	well-proven	foundation	for	examining	and	evaluating	the	
	 5	
new	property	rights	arrangement.	Transaction	cost	economics	complements	this	approach	 by	 using	 the	 comparative	 metric	 of	 ‘transaction	 costs’	 to	 assess	 the	relative	 merits	 of	 an	 institutional	 arrangement.	 	 As	 a	 result,	 transaction	 cost	economics	can	use	deductive	reasoning	and	hypothesis	testing	–	a	methodology	rarely	 used	 in	 the	 Bloomington	 approach	 –	 to	 help	 unpack	 the	 puzzles	 of	complex	institutional	organisation.				In	order	to	examine	resource	self-determination	in	the	context	of	a	river	system,	an	 embedded	 case	 study	 research	 design	 is	 adopted	 that	 divides	 the	 research	into	two	main	strands.		First,	a	comparative	institutional	analysis	examining	the	changes	in	property	rights	is	undertaken.	This	involves	a	qualitative	institutional	analysis	guided	by	the	Institutional	Analysis	and	Development	(IAD)	framework	and	a	quantitative	evaluation	of	the	possible	outcomes	using	game	theory	and	an	economic	 experiment.	 	 Second,	 a	 dynamic	 version	 of	 the	 IAD	 framework	 is	developed	by	synthesising	dynamic	game	theory	with	the	IAD.		This	framework	is	 then	 used	 to	 help	 explain	 how	 and	 why	 such	 a	 ‘radical’	 property	 rights	approach	 was	 identified	 for	 governance	 of	 the	Whanganui	 River.	 	 Finally,	 the	results	of	each	of	these	strands	of	research	are	brought	together	to	evaluate	the	relative	robustness	of	resource	self-determination	as	a	property	rights	approach	for	 the	 Whanganui	 River	 compared	 with	 the	 existing	 arrangement	 of	 state	ownership	(Cox	et	al.	2010;	Ostrom	1990).				In	 summary,	 the	 research	 approach	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 designed	 to	 address	 the	challenge	of	identifying	and	examining	alternative	institutional	arrangements	for	the	governance	of	river	systems.		It	uses	the	case	of	resource	self-determination	to	examine	several	of	the	core	questions	at	the	heart	of	 institutional	economics	and	 environmental	 policy.	 	 	 The	 study	 advances	 the	 Bloomington	 School	approach	 to	 institutional	 analysis	 and	 offers	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	contributions	to	the	literature.		These	are	likely	to	be	of	some	use	and	interest	to	policy	makers	and	scholars	alike.			
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1.3	 The	research	objectives		The	 main	 aim	 of	 this	 research	 is	 to	 predict	 the	 likely	 institutional	 economic	effects	 of	 using	 resource	 self-determination	 as	 an	 alternative	 property	 rights	system	for	a	river.		The	granting	of	legal	standing	to	the	Whanganui	River	offers	the	 first	 example	of	 this	 and	much	 can	be	gained	 from	undertaking	an	ex	 ante	analysis	of	its	proposed	application.			At	 a	 more	 general	 level,	 the	 objective	 of	 the	 research	 is	 to	 bring	 further	clarification	 to	 the	 ongoing	 debate	 of	 the	 role	 institutions	 play	 in	 influencing	peoples’	behaviour.	 	There	is	a	paucity	of	knowledge	regarding	institutions	and	institutional	 change,	 both	 theoretically	 and	 methodologically.	 	 This	 research	seeks	 to	 address	 this	 inadequacy	 by	 presenting	 a	 theoretical	 examination	 of	institutions	and	institutional	change	using	the	empirical	analysis	of	the	changing	property	rights	arrangement	governing	the	Whanganui	River	as	a	foundation.				
1.4	 The	structure	of	the	thesis		The	structure	of	 the	 thesis	 is	as	 follows.	 	Chapter	 two	 introduces	 the	 theory	of	institutions	 and	 institutional	 change,	 relating	 it	 to	 the	 property	 rights	 systems	most	commonly	used	to	allocate	and	distribute	water.			It	provides	a	background	to	the	concept	of	resource	self-determination	and	outlines	the	(limited)	history	of	the	system’s	use.		General	gaps	in	the	literature	are	identified,	which	provide	the	foundations	of	the	four	research	questions	developed	in	chapter	three.		Chapter	three	outlines	the	general	research	questions,	which	relate	to	the	study	of	 institutions	 and	 institutional	 change,	 and	 specifically	 question	 the	 effects	 of	applying	 resource	 self-determination	 to	 a	 river	 system.	 	 An	 overview	 of	 the	conceptual	 framework	 and	 research	 design	 used	 in	 this	 research	 is	 given.	 	 As	explained	in	section	1.2,	the	research	is	grounded	in	the	Bloomington	School	of	institutional	 analysis	 and	 transaction	 cost	 economics.	 	 The	 research	 adopts	 an	analytical	approach	that	splits	the	embedded	case	study	design	into	two	central	
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strands.	 	 The	 first	 strand	 is	 focused	 on	 comparing	 resource	 self-determination	with	 the	 property	 rights	 system	 of	 state	 ownership	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	Whanganui	 River	 using	 the	 IAD	 framework,	 game	 theory,	 and	 economic	experiments.	 	 The	 second	 section	 focuses	 on	 institutional	 change.	 	 A	 dynamic	version	of	the	IAD	framework	developed	in	chapter	three	is	applied	to	the	case	of	the	Whanganui	River	to	help	explain	how	and	why	resource	self-determination	was	 adopted	 as	 an	 alternative	 property	 rights	 arrangement.	 Finally,	 the	institutional	robustness	of	the	new	approach	is	evaluated	using	Ostrom’s	design	principles.				Precise	details	of	the	methodology	are	provided	in	chapter	four.		The	case	study	is	introduced	and	specifics	of	the	mixed-methods	used	to	gather	and	analyse	data	in	order	 to	answer	 the	 research	questions	provided.	The	 results	 to	each	of	 the	research	questions	are	given	in	chapters	five	to	eight.		Chapter	five	reports	the	results	of	the	comparative	institutional	analysis	as	well	as	giving	details	of	the	Te	Awa	Tupua	(Whanganui	River	Claims	Settlement)	Act,	which	 was	 passed	 into	 legislation	 in	 March	 2017.	 	 The	 analysis	 examines	 the	existing	institutional	arrangement	governing	the	Whanganui	River	and	compares	the	interaction	of	rules	and	actors	with	the	changes	expected	to	occur	following	the	implementation	of	resource	self-determination.	The	potential	significance	of	the	change	is	then	discussed	in	terms	of	the	distribution	of	property	rights.		This	discussion	 generates	 hypotheses	 for	 evaluating	 the	 possible	 economic	 and	environmental	 effects	 of	 the	 shift	 from	 state	 ownership	 to	 resource	 self-determination	in	the	case	of	the	Whanganui	River.		These	hypotheses	are	tested	in	chapter	six.		Chapter	 six	 provides	 details	 of	 the	 game	 designed	 to	 approximate	 the	institutional	setting	of	the	Whanganui	River	and	test	the	hypotheses	developed	from	 the	 analysis	 in	 chapter	 five.	 	 It	 also	outlines	 the	 experimental	design	and	analyses	 the	 results	 of	 the	 experiment	 played	 in	 the	 laboratory.	 	 The	 results	suggest	that	resource	self-determination	could	impact	environmental	outcomes	and	that	bargaining	under	 the	new	arrangement	could	be	more	costly	 than	the	
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existing	 property	 rights	 system	 of	 state	 ownership.	 	 The	 results	 also	 find	 that	players	 become	 more	 self-regarding	 in	 situations	 where	 they	 are	 suddenly	granted	property	rights,	having	previously	been	excluded	from	decision-making.			Following	 in	 the	 tradition	 of	 the	 wider	 institutional	 economics	 literature	 in	which	 a	 dynamic	 analysis	most	 commonly	 follows	 a	 static	 evaluation,	 chapter	seven	 takes	 an	 historical	 approach	 to	 examining	 how	 and	 why	 resource	 self-determination	was	proposed	for	the	Whanganui	River.	 	Declining	water	quality	and	water	scarcity	is	a	trend	across	New	Zealand	(Ministry	of	the	Environment	and	Statistics	New	Zealand	2017)	yet,	 legal	standing	has	been	proposed	for	the	Whanganui	River	alone.		Why	is	this	and	what	causal	variables	contributed	to	the	identification	 of	 resource	 self-determination?	 	 To	 answer	 these	 questions	 the	dynamic	 IAD	 framework	developed	 in	 chapter	 three	 is	used	 to	understand	 the	motivation	for	granting	a	river	legal	standing	in	the	case	of	the	Whanganui	River.		Chapter	 eight	 sums	 up	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 previous	 chapters	 by	 undertaking	 a	final	evaluation	of	the	proposed	institution	using	Ostrom’s	design	principles.	 	It	compares	the	robustness	and	resilience	of	the	existing	property	rights	setting	of	state	ownership	with	what	is	proposed	under	resource	self-determination.			Finally,	 chapter	 nine	 concludes,	 offering	 some	 closing	 thoughts	 and	recommendations	 to	 policy	 makers	 interested	 in	 applying	 resource	 self-determination	to	other	environmental	goods	and	resources.			
1.5	 Summary	
	This	research	aims	to	examine	what	happens	when,	in	law,	you	treat	a	river	as	a	person.		It	is	the	first	academic	treatment	of	this	subject.		It	is	important	because,	as	pressures	on	environmental	goods	and	resources	increase,	new	demands	are	being	placed	on	institutional	systems	designed	to	constrain	and	enable	peoples’	choices.		In	some	cases,	the	consideration	of	alternative	property	rights	systems	–	such	as	resource	self-determination	-	could	be	useful.		This	research	therefore	
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aims	to	examine	the	institutional	economic	effects	of	granting	legal	standing	to	a	river	system	to	determine	whether	it	could	be	a	robust	alternative	institutional	arrangement	for	natural	resource	management.		To	evaluate	the	new	property	rights	system,	this	study	aims	to	understand	how	the	 new	 arrangement	 will	 affect	 property	 rights,	 use,	 and	management	 of	 the	river	 system.	 	 Specific	 research	 questions	 are	 identified	 from	 gaps	 in	 the	literature	 and	 answered	 using	 a	 research	 design	 that	 advances	 the	 theoretical	and	 empirical	 research	 agenda	 of	 institutional	 economics.	 	 Ultimately,	 the	findings	show	that,	on	a	basic	level,	resource	self-determination	is	likely	to	affect	economic	 and	 socio-ecological	 outcomes.	 	 It	 concludes	 that	 resource	 self-determination	may	be	a	more	 robust	property	 rights	 system	 for	governing	 the	Whanganui	 River	 than	 the	 existing	 property	 rights	 arrangement,	 however,	 it	warns	 against	 replicating	 the	 approach	 for	 other	 river	 systems	 and	 common	property	resources	without	broader	institutional	integration.				 	
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2	 Understanding	common	property	institutions:	
	 nature,	performance,	and	change*	
	
	
		
2.0	 Introduction	
	As	 resources	 such	 as	 water	 come	 under	 increasing	 pressure,	 there	 has	 been	debate,	 particularly	 among	 policy-makers,	 about	 how	 best	 to	 alleviate	 social	dilemmas	 (McCann	 2013;	 Murphy	 et	 al.	 2000;	 Saleth	 &	 Dinar	 2004;	 Tisdell	2010).	One	of	 the	recent	advancements	has	been	the	granting	of	 legal	rights	 to	environmental	 goods	 and	 resources,	 however,	 nothing	 is	 known	 about	 the	institutional	economics	of	such	a	property	rights	change.		The	absence	of	critical	analysis	 is	 confirmed	by	 the	 thorough	 review	of	 the	 institutional	 and	property	rights	 literature	 undertaken	 in	 this	 chapter.	 	 The	 review	 also	 identifies	significant	 gaps	 in	 the	 theoretical	 and	methodological	 literature	 that	 motivate	several	of	the	general	research	questions	pursued	in	this	research.		Thus	the	chapter	is	composed	of	the	following	sections.		Section	one	outlines	the	theoretical	 definition	 of	 institutions	 used	 in	 this	 thesis.	 	 Section	 two	 discusses	how	 and	 why	 institutions	 change.	 Section	 three	 discusses	 the	 application	 of	institutions	to	common	property	resources,	highlighting	the	unique	challenges	of	water	 resources.	 	 Section	 four	provides	background	 to	 the	concept	of	 resource	self-determination.	Gaps	in	the	literature,	which	motivate	the	research	questions	outlined	in	chapter	three,	are	teased	out	in	section	five.			Section	six	draws	some	conclusions	from	the	chapter.	
	
	
	
*Elements	of	this	chapter	have	been	reproduced	in:	Talbot-Jones,	J.,	2017,	forthcoming.	Institutions	matter:	An	introduction	to	the	role	of	institutions	in	public	policy.	In	R.	Breunig	and	M.	Fabian,	eds.	Beyond	Ideology:	Governments	and	Markets	in	Modern	Public	Policy.	Abingdon,	UK:	Routledge.	
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2.1	 Institutions:	nature	and	definition	
	An	institution	is	a	self-sustaining	system	structuring	social	interaction.		The	most	commonly	 recognised	 parameters	 of	 the	 system	 are	 the	 societal	 “rules	 of	 the	game”	 (North	 1990,	 p.3)	 or	 the	 “prescriptions	 that	 humans	 use	 to	 organise	 all	forms	of	 repetitive	and	structured	 interactions”	 (Ostrom	2005,	p.3).	Such	rules	or	 prescriptions	 can	 be	 formal	 or	 informal,	 both	 functioning	 to	 coordinate	individual	beliefs	and	incentivise	and	constrain	the	behaviour	of	actors	operating	within	 the	 system.	 	 Formal	 rules	 include	 those	 that	 are	 humanly	 devised	 and	written	down,	such	as	statutory	and	judicial	law.	 	Informal	rules,	which	may	be	unwritten,	may	 at	 times	 be	 of	 equal	 or	 greater	 importance,	 and	 include	 social	norms,	conventions,	and	codes	of	behaviour.		Institutional	 rules	 are	 only	 effective	 when	 ‘in-use’1 	and	 enforced.	 Working	enforcement	 rules	 and	 mechanisms	 are	 thus	 an	 important	 component	 of	 any	institutional	system	(Alston	et	al.	2016;	North	1990).	When	rules	are	exogenous	to	the	players	of	the	game,	as	North	and	Ostrom	suggest,	an	external	third-party	enforcer,	such	as	the	state,	may	be	required,	extending	an	institutional	system	to	include	 the	polity	 (North	1991).	 	 For	 this	 reason,	 an	 institutional	 system	often	has	multiple	components	or	hierarchical	 levels.	 	Formal	and	 informal	rules	can	be	nested	and	embedded	so	that	the	choices	available	to	actors	at	a	higher	level	will	depend	on	the	capabilities	and	limits	of	the	rules	at	that	level	and	at	a	deeper	level	 (Ostrom	 2005).	 	 For	 instance,	 rules	 pertaining	 to	 monitoring	 and	enforcement	may	be	specified	at	one	level,	yet	affect	actors	operating	at	another.				Both	 Williamson	 (2000)	 and	 Ostrom	 (2005)	 consider	 a	 social	 institution	 to	consist	 of	 up	 to	 four	 levels. 2 		 Williamson	 considers	 the	 top	 level	 of	 an	institutional	 system	 to	 be	 a	 level	 of	 ‘social	 embeddedness’	 where	 the	 norms,	customs,	mores,	and	traditions	are	located.	The	second	level	in	this	system	is	the	‘institutional	 environment’,	where	 the	 formal	 rules	 such	 as	 constitutions,	 laws,	and	 property	 rights	 rest.	 	 At	 the	 third	 ‘institutions	 of	 governance’	 level,	 the																																																									1	Sometimes	rules	exist	in-form,	but	are	not	enforced	(Commons	1931;	Ostrom	2005).		This	research	will	focus	only	on	working	rules-in-use.	2	Others	have	also	made	important	contributions	to	the	analysis	of	institutional	structure.		For	a	sociological	approach	see	Hooghe	and	Marks	(2003)	and	a	political	science	approach	see	Hall	and	Taylor	(1996).	
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governance	of	contractual	relations	is	the	focus	of	analysis.		This	is	where	he	and	others	interested	in	the	economics	of	transaction	costs	focus	their	analysis,	their	argument	 being	 that	 the	 level	 of	 transaction	 costs	 determines	 the	 relative	effectiveness	of	an	 institutional	 system	(Coase	1937;	1960).	 	When	 transaction	costs	 are	 high	 at	 the	 governance	 level,	 the	 organisation	 of	 the	 institutional	system	 becomes	 relevant,	 as	 an	 alternative	 arrangement	 may	 deliver	 a	 more	efficient	outcome	(Williamson	1979).	 	The	 final	 level	considers	 these	outcomes	in	terms	of	resource	allocation	and	employment,	which	is	also	the	primary	focus	of	 most	 neoclassical	 analysis,	 nesting	 transaction	 cost	 economics	 within	 the	neoclassical	fold.		Williamson’s	 structure	 of	 an	 institutional	 system	 is	 similar	 to	 that	 detailed	 in	Ostrom	 (2005,	 p.59). 3 		 Ostrom	 also	 identifies	 four	 levels	 of	 rules,	 each	determining	the	activities	that	can	be	undertaken	and	the	rules	that	can	be	made	in	each	of	the	underlying	levels.		The	metaconstitutional	level	is	the	equivalent	of	Williamson’s	 idea	 of	 social	 embeddedness	 encompassing	 collective	 beliefs	 or	worldviews.	 	 These	 rules	 are	 likely	 to	 help	 shape	 the	 rules	 made	 at	 the	constitutional-choice	level,	which	in	turn,	shape	the	rules	at	the	policy-level,	and	operational-levels.	These	are	discussed	in	greater	depth	in	section	3.1.		Although	 some	 economists	 choose	 to	 define	 actors	 as	 institutions	 themselves	(Granovetter	1985;	Nelson	1994),	actors	are	generally	considered	the	players	of	the	 game	 (North	 1990;	 Ostrom	 1990).	 Actors	 can	 be	 either	 individuals	 or	organisations,	 the	 latter	 being	 “groups	 of	 individuals	 bound	 by	 some	 common	purpose	 to	 achieve	 objectives”	 (North,	 1990,	 p.	 5).4		 Boundedly	 rational,	 all	actors	 make	 choices,	 which	 let	 them	 optimise	 their	 utility	 subject	 to	 their	cognitive	constraints	(Ostrom	2005;	Simon	1955;	Williamson	2000).		Because	all	interactions	happen	in	a	social	setting,	actors	make	strategic	choices,	which	are	the	 best	 response	 given	 the	 expected	 behaviour	 of	 others.	 	 When	 actors’																																																									3	It	should	be	noted	that	although	similarities	can	be	drawn	between	Williamson	and	Ostrom’s	institutional	structure	frameworks	(indeed	this	is	done	by	Ostrom	(2005,	p.58)	herself),	there	are	distinct	differences	in	the	approaches	of	the	two.		These	differences	are	discussed	in	detail	by	Earl	and	Potts	(2011).	4	Hodgson	(2006)	discusses	how	North	was	sometimes	inconsistent	in	his	identification	of	organisations	as	actors.		As	he	states,	organisations	can	be	institutions,	although	institutions	cannot	be	organisations.		For	the	purpose	of	this	thesis	organisations	such	as	NGO’s	or	government	departments	are	going	to	be	treated	as	institutional	actors.	
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expectations	 of	 others’	 behaviour	 are	 stable	 due	 to	well-defined	 and	 enforced	institutions,	transaction	costs	are	reduced,	increasing	the	efficiency	of	the	system	as	a	whole	(North	1990;	North	&	Thomas	1973;	Williamson	2000).5		Transaction	 costs	have	 thus	become	a	useful	metric	 for	 comparing	 institutions	(Allen	2000;	Cole	2012;	McCann	2013):	those	institutions	with	lower	transaction	costs	 tend	 to	 be	 more	 effective	 than	 those	 with	 higher	 levels	 of	 transaction	costs.6		For	instance,	when	there	is	a	strong	correlation	between	the	formal	and	informal	 rules	 in-use	within	 an	 institution,	 actors’	 are	more	 inclined	 to	 follow	formal	 rules	 and	 transaction	 costs	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 lower	 (Greif	 2006,	 p.31).		Likewise,	 when	 linkages	 between	 and	 within	 levels	 of	 the	 institution	 are	strengthened,	transaction	costs	are	reduced,	making	an	institution	more	efficient	and	therefore	effective	(Heikkila	et	al.	2011).7			Because	 institutional	 systems	 tend	 to	 be	 durable	 rather	 than	 ephemeral	phenomena,	representing	them	as	stable	equilibria	 is	a	complementary	view	to	the	 rules	 of	 the	 game	 approach	 (Aoki	 2001;	 Bowles	 2004;	 Greif	 2006;	 Greif	 &	Kingston	2011;	Schotter	1981).		By	placing	a	theory	of	motivation	at	the	centre	of	analysis,	 the	 institutions-as-equilibria	 notion	 identifies	 the	 expected	 behaviour	of	 others,	 rather	 than	 the	 “rule”	 itself,	 as	 the	 critical	 coordination	 device	 and	motivator	 of	 actors’	 behaviour.	 	 Subsequently,	 the	 institutional	 system,	 which	
																																																								5	It	is	useful	to	note	that	Williamson	(1985)	asserts	that	institutions	are	formed	to	reduce	transactions	costs,	whilst	North	(1990)	considers	institutions	as	determinants	of	transaction	costs.		This	is	one	of	the	key	differences	between	transaction	cost	economics	and	the	institutions-as-rules-approach.	6	The	adoption	of	this	metric	and	the	nesting	of	the	notion	of	institutions	within	a	neo-classical	framework	allowed	for	the	advancement	of	the	“new	institutionalism”	(see.	Coase	1960;	North	1990;	Ostrom	2005;	Williamson	2000),	picking	up	where	the	“old	institutionalists”,	namely	John	R	Commons	(1931),	Thorstein	Veblen	(1898),	and	Westley	Mitchell	(1914),	faltered	(Arrow	1987).		The	old	institutionalists	viewed	actors	as	entwined	in	a	web	of	partially	durable	and	self-enforcing	institutions,	which	could	shape	actors’	underlying	beliefs	as	much	as	they	constrained	actors’	choices.		Some	of	the	work	of	evolutionary	economics	follows	in	this	tradition.	7	Important	to	note	here	is	that,	not	only	can	transaction	costs	have	multiple	definitions	and	refer	to	different	types	of	costs	(Arrow	1969;	Gordon	1994;	Stiglitz	2000),	but	that	transaction	costs	can	influence	the	effectiveness	of	an	institutional	arrangement	at	different	stages	of	the	policy	process	including	through	enactment,	implementation,	and	enforcement	(Thompson	1999).	McCann	and	Easter	(2004)	categorise	a	typology	of	transaction	costs	for	transitioning	to	a	water	market	which	includes	costs	associated	with:	(1)	research,	information	gathering,	and	analysis,	(2)	the	design	and	enactment	of	enabling	legislation,	(3)	the	implementation	of	the	new	arrangement,	(4)	support	and	administration	of	the	arrangement,	(5)	contracting	costs,	(6)	monitoring/detection,	and	(7)	prosecution/inducement/conflict	resolution.			Such	a	typology	of	costs	can	also	be	applied	to	the	transition	to	other	institutional	systems.		Some	of	these	costs	will	be	examined	in	this	research.	
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emerges	 and	 persists,	 is	 assumed	 to	 be	 self-enforcing	 with	 each	 actor’s	behaviour	being	a	mutual	best	response.		To	 clarify	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 two	 approaches:	 taking	 the	 case	 of	speeding,	 it	 is	 generally	 expected	 that	 if	 the	 government	 raises	 the	 fine	 for	speeding,	 the	 quantity	 of	 speeding	will	 decrease.	 Under	 the	 rules	 of	 the	 game	approach,	the	rule	is	the	institution	that	determines	peoples’	behaviour.		Should	people	not	behave	as	expected,	it	is	either	due	to	an	actors’	expectation	that	the	utility	from	breaking	the	rule	will	be	greater	than	the	product	of	the	probability	of	 being	 sanctioned	 times	 the	 utility	 loss	 of	 the	 sanction	 (the	 fine,	 the	 prison	term,	 etc.)	 (Voigt	 2013)	 or	 that	 a	 formal	 rule	 exists	 in-form	 but	 is	 not	 in-use	(Alston	 et	 al.	 2016).	 From	 the	 institutions-as-equilibrium	 perspective,	 it	 is	 not	the	 rule	 itself,	 but	 the	 expectations	 about	 the	 behaviour	 of	 other	 actors	(including	those	in	specialised	enforcement	roles	such	as	police,	judges	etc.)	that	creates	 institutional	 constraints	 and	moulds	 actors’	 behaviour.	 In	 other	words,	behaviour	 is	motivated	by	beliefs	about	others’	behaviour	(and	the	presence	of	sanctions)	rather	than	by	rules,	whether	or	not	they	are	in-use.		Under	 the	 institutions-as-equilibria	 frame,	 institutions	 are	 exogenous	 to	 the	individual	but	motivation	is	endogenously	provided	by	all.		As	explained	by	Greif	(2006,	p.16),	“[e]ach	individual,	responding	to	the	institutional	elements	implied	by	 others’	 behaviour	 and	 expected	 behaviour,	 behaves	 in	 a	 manner	 that	contributes	to	enabling,	guiding,	and	motivating	others	to	behave	in	the	manner	that	led	to	the	institutional	elements	that	generated	the	individual’s	behaviour	to	begin	 with.”	 	 Thus,	 as	 with	 the	 rule-of	 the-game	 approach	 the	 central	 unit	 of	analysis	is	the	transaction,	however,	it	is	defined	in	the	institutions-as-equilibria	approach	 as	 an	 action	 that	 transfers	 some	 social	 attitude,	 emotion,	 opinion,	 or	piece	of	 information	from	one	actor	to	another,	rather	than	transferring	a	good	or	service.		Two	pronounced	differences	between	the	 two	approaches	are	 the	 treatment	of	enforcement	and	the	interaction	of	formal	and	informal	rules.	 	Under	the	rules-of-the-game	 approach,	 enforcement	 rules	 are	 treated	 as	 exogenous	 to	 the	
	 15	
institution,	whereas	 in	 the	 institutions-as-equilibria	approach,	 the	 institution	 is	seen	as	self-enforcing.	This	means	that	under	the	former	view,	if	behaviour	does	not	 conform	 to	 formal	 rules,	 by	 default	 it	 is	 attributed	 to	 –	 and	 observed	 as	governed	 by	 –	 informal	 rules.	 	 How	 this	 interaction	 plays	 out	 can	 greatly	influence	the	arguments	of	 institutional	change	covered	in	detail	below.	 	Under	the	 institutions-as-equilibria	 view,	 a	 distinction	 between	 types	 of	 rules	 is	 not	needed	in	analysis;	both	are	understood	to	give	rise	to	the	shared	beliefs,	norms,	and	expectations	that	generate	regularities	of	behaviour	(Greif	2006).		Both	approaches	can	be	a	useful	part	of	the	analyst’s	toolkit.	 	 In	the	analysis	of	static	institutions	the	choice	of	the	approach	and	the	language	used	is	a	matter	of	convention	(Alston	et	al.	2016).		The	distinction	between	the	two	becomes	more	important	in	the	dynamic	analysis	of	institutions	to	answer	questions	pertaining	to	why	and	how	institutions	change.				As	demonstrated	in	the	following	section,	teasing	apart	the	competing	schools	of	thought	 provides	 an	 opportunity	 to	 advance	 the	 theoretical	 and	 analytical	literature	 pertaining	 to	 institutional	 change.	 	 Specifically	 it	 raises	 questions	 of	how	 and	why	 alternative	 property	 rights	 arrangements,	 such	 as	 resource	 self-determination,	 might	 be	 identified	 as	 an	 alternative	 approach	 for	 addressing	environmental	 and	 natural	 resource	 problems	 and	 how	 best	 to	 analyse	 the	diachronic	nature	of	such	change.	
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2.2	 Theories	of	institutional	change	
	History	 demonstrates	 that	 institutions	 do	 not	 stay	 constant	 over	 time	 (Greif	1989;	North	&	Thomas	1973).		Even	with	regards	to	water	systems,	institutional	frameworks	are	rarely	static.	 	For	instance,	in	Australia,	the	western	USA,	Chile,	China,	 and	 South	 Africa,	 the	 establishment	 of	 water	 markets	 resulted	 in	 the	establishment	of	new	 institutional	 rules	 and	a	 reassignment	of	 property	 rights	from	state	 to	private	 control	 (Grafton	et	 al.	 2011;	Tisdell	2014).	 	 Likewise,	 the	establishment	of	 alternative	 arrangements	 for	 the	 governance	of	 freshwater	 in	New	Zealand	have	seen	management	rights	transferred	from	centrally	managed	systems	to	shared	arrangements	between	the	state	and	local	indigenous	groups	(Memon	&	Kirk	2012).		Two	of	the	critical	questions	pertaining	to	these	are:	why	do	these	institutions	change	and	how	can	we	analyse	such	change?			By	 definition,	 institutional	 change	 is	 the	 modification	 of	 a	 system	 regulating	collective	behaviour.	 	 The	process	 of	 institutional	 change	 can	be	 split	 into	 two	broad	 categories,	 loosely	 extending	 the	 rules-of-the-game	 and	 institutions-as-equilibria	approaches	of	analysis	to	a	dynamic	form.	 	These	are	recognisable	as	the	 agency	 and	 structuralist	 perspectives	 of	 institutional	 change.	 	 The	 agency	perspective	 extends	 the	 rules-of-the-game	 approach	 placing	 the	 actor	 at	 the	centre	 of	 analysis	 and	 assuming	 that	 the	 individual	 can	 shape	 an	 institutional	system	to	his	or	her	own	benefit	(Alston	et	al.	2012;	Libecap	1989;	North	1990,	2005;	 Ostrom	 2005).	 In	 contrast,	 the	 structuralist	 perspective	 extends	 the	equilibrium	view	applying	an	evolutionary	approach	to	change.		Under	this	view,	an	institution	is	seen	to	transcend	individual	actors	to	evolve	as	a	cohesive	social	structure;	 the	whole	 being	 larger	 than	 the	 sum	 of	 its	 parts	 (Aoki	 2001;	 2007;	Greif	&	Laitin	2004;	Hodgson	1998b;	1998a).	The	 choice	of	perspective	affects	the	 interpretation	of	 institutional	change	by	requiring	the	adoption	of	different	units	of	analysis:	the	former,	the	individual,	and	the	latter,	the	group.		Applying	 the	 agency	 perspective	 to	 the	 study	 of	 institutions	 considers	 that	purposeful	 rule	 changes	 by	 actors	 drive	 institutional	 change.	 It	 assumes	 that	actors	 motivated	 by	 their	 own	 utility	 will	 try	 to	 design	 institutional	 rules	 to	
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improve	 their	 individual	 payoffs.	 	 All	 actors	 are	 able	 to	 be	 both	 inductive	 and	deductive	 in	 their	 strategic	 reasoning	 and	 make	 choices	 that	 optimise	 their	utility	in	light	of	past	experience	and	future	expectations.			Ostrom	 (2005;	 2013;	 Ostrom	 &	 Basurto	 2011)	 assumes	 institutional	 change	occurs	when	actors	at	one	level	perceive	the	rules	governing	their	interactions	to	be	unsatisfactory	motivating	them	to	“shift	 levels”	to	try	to	change	the	rules.	 	A	political	bargaining	process	ensues,	from	which	institutional	change	results	if	the	proposed	 rule	 change	 is	 agreed	 to	 by	 the	 necessary	 “minimum	 coalition”	 as	determined	 by	 the	 constitutional	 level	 rules	 (Greif	 &	 Kingston	 2011).	 	 In	 a	democratic	system,	this	minimum	coalition	may	be	a	majority;	in	a	dictatorship,	the	 dictator	 alone	 may	 be	 sufficient.	 	 The	 set	 of	 exogenous	 rules	 selected	 for	ultimately	depends	on	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 actors	 setting	 the	 rules,	 the	 relative	power	 of	 respective	 agents	 to	 seek	 out	 “rent”	 and	 influence	 the	 collective	decision-making	process	(Olson	1982)	and	on	existing	rules	that	may	continue	to	constrain	actors’	behaviour	(Mantzavinos	et	al.	2004).					Libecap	(1989)	uses	a	similar	argument	to	explore	the	development	of	property	right	 rules	 for	 common	 property	 resources.	 	 He	 argues	 that	 the	 distributional	consequences	arising	from	the	allocation	of	property	rights	incentivises	actors	to	engage	 in	 rent-seeking	 to	 try	 to	 alter	 rules	 to	 their	 own	 benefit.	 	 Lower	 level	property	 rights	 are	 determined	by	 actors	who	 are	motivated	 to	 optimise	 their	own	net	benefit	in	a	domain	structured	by	higher	level	political	rules,	which	are	equivalent	to	the	exogenous	rules	of	the	game.		Alston	et	al.	(2012),	also	suggests	that	 property	 rights	 emerge	 because	 of	 the	 interaction	 of	 norms	 and	 politics.	Using	examples	on	the	frontier	in	Australia,	the	United	States,	and	Brazil,	Alston	and	 his	 co-authors	 argue	 that	 the	 initial	 allocation	 of	 property	 rights	 are	determined	 by	 social	 norms,	 however,	 as	 competition	 grows,	 increasing	 rent	dissipation	or	conflict	incentivises	the	establishment	of	a	commons	arrangement	which	restricts	entry	and	monitors	use	by	claimants.	 	 It	 is	thus	the	incentive	of	reducing	transaction	costs	to	increase	individuals’	net	benefits	that	motivates	the	development	of	formal	property	rights	arrangements.		
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Alston’s	approach	to	property	rights	analysis	is	aligned	with	a	second	strand	of	the	 agency	 perspective	 that	 views	 the	 development	 of	 rules	 as	 an	 outcome	 of	evolutionary	competition	among	alternative	institutions	(Alchian	1950;	Demsetz	1967;	 Hayek	 1973;	Williamson	 1979).	 	 Complementary	 to	 the	 political	 design	perspective	 of	 Ostrom	 (2005)	 and	 Libecap	 (1989),	 the	 transaction	 cost	perspective	assumes	that	some	sets	of	rules	will	lead	to	more	efficient	outcomes	than	others.		Those	institutions	that	minimise	transaction	costs	will	emerge	and	persist	 until	 such	 a	 time	 that	 an	 exogenous	 parameter	 shock	 causes	 an	alternative	institutional	system	to	out-compete	the	existing	arrangement.	In	this	way,	 institutional	 change	 progresses	 steadily	 along	 an	 evolutionary	 path	 until	some	shock	causes	a	qualitative	shift	in	the	institutional	arrangement.		These	 two	 strands	 of	 the	 agency	 perspective	 both	 treat	 institutions	 as	 sets	 of	rules	 and	 focus	 on	 how	 new	 rules	 are	 selected,	 assuming	 enforcement	 occurs	exogenously	 (Aoki	 2001).	 In	 contrast,	 the	 structuralist	 perspective	 takes	 an	evolutionary	approach	 to	 institutional	change	assuming	such	change	 is	gradual	on	 an	 equilibrium	 path	 and	 that	 institutions	 are	 self-enforcing	 (Aoki	 2001;	Bowles	 2004;	 Greif	 2006;	 Greif	 &	 Laitin	 2004;	 Hodgson	 1998b).	 Rather	 than	rules	themselves,	it	is	the	behaviour	and	the	expected	behaviour	of	others,	which	induces	people	to	behave	(or	not	to	behave)	in	a	particular	way.		This	means	that	the	design	of	an	“institution”	is	beyond	any	one	individual’s	control;	instead	it	is	the	 behaviour	 of	 the	 group	 as	 a	 whole	 which	 determines	 its	 structure	 and	evolution	(Greif	2006).			Under	 the	 structuralist	 perspective	 new	 rules	 are	 adopted	 spontaneously	 and	without	 design	 so	 that	 institutions	 evolve	 by	 self-selecting	 for	 optimal	 formal	and	informal	rule	configurations.		Rather	than	institutional	change	being	driven	by	an	individual’s	pursuit	of	his	or	her	own	net	benefit	(as	is	assumed	to	occur	under	the	agency	perspective),	it	is	the	optimisation	of	the	aggregate	net	benefit	that	 determines	 why	 one	 institution	 is	 selected	 over	 another.	 Institutional	change	is	understood	to	come	from	exogenous	parameter	shocks,	which	cause	a	mass	shift	 in	actors’	beliefs	 triggering	a	state	of	 cognitive	disequlibrium	within	the	institution	and	catalysing	change	(Aoki	2011).	
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A	 conceptual	 synthesis	 of	 the	 agency	 and	 structuralist	 perspectives	 sees	institutional	change	as	an	evolutionary	process	driven	by	individuals	seeking	to	optimise	 their	 utility.8		 This	 is	 the	 approach	 to	 institutional	 change	 adopted	 in	this	 research.	 	 In	 this	 way,	 loose	 parallels	 with	 biological	 evolution	 can	 be	drawn.9		Species	evolve	by	selecting	for	individuals	who	have	the	highest	level	of	fitness,	 causing	some	 traits	 to	be	 favoured	over	others.	Similarly,	actors	within	the	institutional	system	select	for,	or	against,	rules	that	are	likely	to	convey	them	the	most	benefit.		Unlike	 biological	 evolution,	 however,	 institutional	 change	 is	 strategic	 and	 can	occur	 at	different	 time	and	 spatial	 scales	depending	on	 the	 type	of	 rules	being	affected.	 	 Such	 changes	 can	 pull	 and	 push	 the	 institutional	 system	 along	 its	evolutionary	path.		Informal	rules,	the	shared	beliefs	around	how	the	institution	(and	 society	 as	 a	 whole)	 operates,	 change	 slowly	 and	 spontaneously	(Mantzavinos	et	al.	2004;	North	1990;	Ostrom	2005;	Sugden	1989).		In	contrast,	formal	rules	can	be	(relatively)	quickly	changed	by	design,	selected	for	or	against	by	 actors	 using	 abductive	 reasoning	 (Greif	 &	 Kingston	 2011).	 	 In	 this	 way,	institutional	 change	 can	 be	 considered	 to	 follow	 an	 evolutionary	 path,	punctuated	by	spontaneous	events	and	the	choices	of	actors	motivated	by	their	own	utility	optimisation.10				Given	this	view	of	institutional	change,	how	can	such	change	be	analysed?		Proponents	 of	 both	 the	 agency	 and	 structuralist	 perspectives	 agree	 that	motivation	for	change	must	come	from	parameters	exogenous	to	the	institutions	under	 study.	When	 institutions	 are	 considered	 exogenous	 “rules	 of	 the	 game”,																																																									8	Hendriks	and	Guala	(2014;	2015)	also	argued	for	a	synthesis	of	the	two	perspectives	in	their	article,	“Institutions,	rules,	and	equilibria:	A	unified	theory”.		The	article	spurred	debate	amongst	institutional	theorists	including	Aoki	(2015),	Binmore	(2015),	Searle	(2015),	Smith	(2015),	and	Sugden	(2015).		The	commentators	all	upheld	elements	of	Hindriks	and	Guala’s	proposition	with	some	caveats,	except	for	Binmore	(2015),	Searle	(2015),	and	Sugden	(2015)	who	presented	dissenting	opinions.		9	Important	to	note	here	is	that	Ostrom	(2013)	also	drew	from	biological	evolution	in	her	explanation	of	institutional	change.		However,	Ostrom	draws	strong	parallels	between	the	two	processes	which	are	not	upheld	in	this	discussion	(Greif	2013;	Poteete	2013).	10	As	an	extra	point,	given	that	informal	rules	are	usually	long	standing,	it’s	likely	that	change	will	only	come	through	the	actions	of	many	over	a	long	period.	Formal	rules	also	take	time	to	pass	through	various	legislative	processes	but	can	be	changed	more	quickly	and	easily	by	the	actions	of	the	individual.,	depending	on	the	level	at	which	the	rules	are	established.		For	this	reason,	formal	rules	can	be	considered	as	more	likely	changed	by	the	individual	and	informal	rules	by	the	group.	
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change	 becomes	 exogenous	 by	 default.	 	 In	 situations	 where	 institutions	 are	endogenous,	the	drivers	of	change	have	often	been	considered	environmental	or	technological	 ‘shocks’	 (Greif	 &	 Laitin	 2004).	 Such	 shocks	 can	 be	 large	 and	induced	by	significant	events	such	as	war	or	through	smaller	disruptions	such	as	the	divergence	of	beliefs.	 	For	instance,	if	formal	rules	uphold	some	individuals’	beliefs	but	not	others,	actors	can	desist	from	following	rules.11		The	dissention	of	institutional	actors	whose	beliefs	do	not	correlate	with	enforced	formal	rules	can	impose	 costs	 on	 other	 institutional	 actors	 and	 cause	 a	 state	 of	 institutional	disequilibrium	over	time	(Aoki	2007;	Brousseau	et	al.	2011).			In	disequilibrium	actors	can	no	longer	discern	how	to	optimise	their	behaviour	in	light	of	their	expectations	about	others’	likely	choices.	Unexpected	behaviour	can	 impose	 costs	 on	 those	 actors	 unable	 to	 anticipate	 others’	 choices.	 If	dissenting	actors	impose	costs	on	actors	in	positions	of	agency	at	higher	levels	of	the	institutional	system,	the	actors	with	agency	may	have	an	incentive	to	change	formal	statutory	rules	to	improve	their	private	net	benefits,	potentially	changing	the	 available	 action	 sets	 (and	 actor	 interactions)	 within	 the	 institution.	 In	contrast,	if	the	increased	costs	affect	an	actor	at	a	lower	level	of	the	institutional	arrangement	there	is	little	he	or	she	can	do	except	exit	the	institutional	setting	or	‘withdraw	his	or	her	consent’	by	way	of	organised	collective	action	(Levi	1990)	or	through	the	decentralised	actions	of	many	individuals	(Kingston	&	Caballero	2009).	 	 Alternatively,	 actors	 may	 change	 their	 individual	 preferences	 to	 more	closely	align	with	the	rest	of	the	group’s	(Akerlof	&	Kranton	2005;	Bowles	1998,	2004),	 or,	 as	 Ostrom	 suggests	 try	 to	 move	 higher	 up	 the	 institutional	arrangement	so	as	to	be	granted	the	power	to	change	the	formal	rules	(Greif	&	Kingston	2011;	Ostrom	&	Basurto	2011).				Through	 repeated	 interaction,	 actors	 learn	 how	 to	 optimise	 their	 returns	 to	improve	their	individual	outcomes.		Actors	engage	in	a	process	of	trial	and	error	where	the	failure	to	solve	a	problem	leads	to	the	trial	of	a	new	solution	(Popper	1972).	 	 Because	 an	 institutional	 system	 consists	 of	 many	 rules	 providing																																																									11	Actors	are	only	motivated	to	follow	rules	that	correlate	with	their	individual	beliefs,	helping	explain	why	prohibition	failed	in	the	US	in	the	1920’s	but	is	generally	successful	in	the	Middle	East	(Greif	2006).		Likewise,	it	helps	explain	why	some	property	rights	arrangements	work	in	some	settings,	but	not	others.			
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different	 signals	 to	 actors,	 however,	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 any	 one	 of	 multiple	evolutionarily	stable	equilibria	could	emerge	from	the	process	of	trial	and	error	(Greif	 &	 Laitin	 2004;	 Mantzavinos	 et	 al.	 2004).	 	 These	 may	 or	 may	 not	 be	efficient,	 yet	 could	 persist	 due	 to	 the	 relative	 bargaining	 power	 of	 actors,	 as	determined	 by	 the	 relative	 opportunity	 costs	 of	 those	 participating	 (Knight	1992).	 	For	instance,	in	the	development	of	property	right	rules	on	the	frontier,	formal	rules	were	often	 imposed	on	a	group	of	actors,	despite	 them	conflicting	with	the	group’s	long-standing	informal	rules	(Alston	et	al.	2012).		The	resulting	inefficient	institutional	equilibrium	that	then	arose	persisted	because	the	greater	bargaining	power	of	one	group	of	actors	enabled	them	to	enforce	their	own	sets	of	beliefs	as	formal	rules.				Institutional	 change	 can	 thus	 be	 understood	 as	 an	 historical,	 path	 dependent	process,	 where	 the	 new	 roles	 established	 by	 actors	 are	 constrained	 by	 those	rules	already	in-use	(David	1994;	Greif	2013;	Mantzavinos	et	al.	2004).	 	Within	the	 Bloomington	 School	 no	 specific	 framework	 exists	 that	 accounts	 for	 such	 a	process	of	 change.	 	Although	Ostrom	proposed	a	model	 to	explain	 institutional	change,	 the	 approach	 is	 built	 on	 a	 multi-level	 process	 dependent	 on	 the	movement	of	actors	between	levels	of	the	 institutional	arrangement	(Ostrom	&	Basurto	2011).		Further,	by	treating	institutions	as	exogenous	rules-of-the-game,	the	underlying	assumption	 is	 that	actors	are	unable	 to	change	 the	rules,	which	constrain	them	at	the	same	level	of	the	institutional	arrangement	in	which	they	rest.	 	 As	 a	 result,	 to	 analyse	 institutional	 change	 within	 the	 Bloomington	tradition,	a	new	framework	is	required	which	allows	for	institutional	change	to	be	recognised	as	an	evolutionary,	path-dependent	process	driven	by	individuals	seeking	to	optimise	their	utility.				
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2.3	 Institutions	for	common	property	resources	
	In	a	positive	transaction	costs	world,	 the	design	of	 institutions	 is	 important	 for	encouraging	 the	 efficient	 use	 of	 public	 goods	 and	 common	 pool	 resources	(McCann	 2013;	 McCann	 et	 al.	 2005;	 Reeson	 &	 Tisdell	 2008).	 	 Jointly	 termed	common	 property	 resources	 (CPRs)	 in	 this	 thesis,	 these	 categories	 of	 goods	cover	 most	 environmental	 goods	 including	 freshwater,	 biodiversity,	 and	fisheries.	 	 Both	 non-excludable,	 public	 goods	 and	 common	 pool	 resources	 are	differentiated	 by	 the	 concept	 of	 rivalry	 or	 subtractability:	 public	 goods	 being	principally	 non-rival	 or	 non-subtractable	 and	 common	 pool	 resources	 being	principally	rival	and	subtractable.		Because	 of	 their	 respective	 rivalry	 characteristics,	 in	 open	 access	 situations	where	 rules	 constraining	 use	 and	 incentivising	 provision	 are	 absent,	 public	goods	are	frequently	underprovided	and	common	pool	resources	are	overused.		This	 is	 a	 particularly	 pertinent	 issue	 for	 freshwater,	 where,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	rules	 assigning	 rights	 to	 use	 and	 access,	 interdependency	 and	 competition	among	 users	 can	 be	 pervasive.	 	 In	 some	 cases,	 overextraction	 of	 water	 or	underprovision	 of	 water	 quality	 can	 impose	 externality	 or	 spillover	 effects	 on	third	 parties.	 	 Similarly,	 information	 asymmetries	 can	 affect	 decisions	 over	efficient	allocation,	which	is	only	achieved	when	the	present	value	marginal	net	benefits	 are	 equalised	 across	all	 users.	 	 To	 address	 such	 ‘social	 dilemmas’,	 the	most	common	collective	response	is	the	assignment	of	property	rights	to	create	some	 contract	 of	 excludability	 for	 the	 non-excludable	 goods	 and	 prevent	 rent	dissipation	 (Alchian	 &	 Demsetz	 1973;	 Furubotn	 &	 Pejovich	 1974).	 	 Property	rights	 are	 thus	 the	 socially	 accepted	 rights	 of	 actors	 to	 exploit	 assets	 for	 their	benefit,	with	at	least	a	partial	right	to	exclude	others	(Grafton	et	al.	2000).				Yet	 property	 rights	 are	 about	 neither	 ‘property’	 nor	 ‘rights’	 (Hodgson	 2014).		Instead	property	rights	are	a	collection	of	rules	granting	authority	to	particular	actors	 to	 undertake	 actions	 related	 to	 a	 specific	 domain,	 in	 turn,	 creating	 the	institutional	 system	structuring	social	 interaction	 (Commons	1968).	 	For	every	type	of	property	right	there	are	a	bundle	of	rules	pertaining	to	use,	excludability,	
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and	divestibility,	which	motivate	actors’	behaviour.			These	rules	can	be	formal	or	informal	and	detail	 the	right	 to	access	a	resource,	 to	use	 the	resource,	 to	make	decisions	about	the	management	of	the	resource,	to	exclude	others,	and	to	divest	your	 rights	 to	 others	 (Schlager	 &	 Ostrom	 1992).	 	 Actors	 endowed	 with	management,	 exclusion,	 and	 alienation	 rights	 grant	 rights	 to	 access	 and	withdrawal	 to	 the	 user.	 Together	 this	 bundle	 of	 rules	 helps	 determine	 the	structure	of	the	overarching	system,	which	ultimately	defines	how	a	CPR	is	used.		The	most	widely	used	CPR	property	rights	system	is	‘state	control’.		As	shown	in	table	2.1,	 a	 state-run	system	vests	CPR	property	 right	bundles	 in	 the	 state,	 the	state	being	defined	as	the	collection	of	elected	public	officials	designated	to	make	decisions	 at	 the	 level	 of	 constitutional-choice	 rules	 or	 the	 institutional	environment.	 	 As	 early	 as	 Hobbes	 (1651),	 this	 was	 the	 recommended	institutional	 response	 for	 addressing	 the	 overuse	 and	 underprovision	 of	common	 property	 resources;	 elected	 officials	 being	 considered	 most	 able	 to	represent	 the	views	of	 the	majority	 (Hardin	1968;	Olson	1971).	 	However,	 this	argument	 is	 based	 on	 rigid	 assumptions	 concerning	 the	 accuracy	 of	 available	information,	 the	monitoring	capabilities	and	sanctioning	reliability	of	 the	state,	and	low	(or	zero)	transaction	costs;	all	things	rarely	achieved	in	day-to-day	life	(Hayek	1945;	Ostrom	1990).		When	information,	monitoring,	and	sanctioning	are	 incomplete	and	transaction	costs	 are	 high,	 rent	 dissipation	 and	 inefficiencies	 can	 cause	 society	 to	 look	 for	alternative	ways	of	coordinating	CPR	use.		The	most	common	alternative	system	is	 a	 decentralised	 approach,	 where	 property	 rights	 are	 allocated	 to	 individual	actors	rather	than	held	by	the	state.		For	land	resources,	private	property	rights	contracts	can	be	complete	with	all	 five	rights	vested	in	a	single	actor;	however,	for	 other	 resources,	 such	 as	 water,	 complex	 systems	 of	 right	 allocation	 are	sometimes	 necessary.	 For	 instance,	 in	 a	 water	 market,	 rights	 to	 access,	 use,	exclusion,	and	divestibility	may	be	allocated	to	the	private	individual,	yet	rights	to	management	remain	with	the	state.	 	Even	 in	well	established	water	markets	such	as	those	in	the	western	USA	and	Murray-Darling	Basin,	individuals	may	be	granted	the	right	 to	access,	use,	exclude	others,	and	trade	water	rights,	but	 the	
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responsibility	 of	 setting	 the	 total	 limit	 on	 extraction	 remains	 with	 central	 or	Federal	government	(Bennett	2012;	McCann	&	Garrick	2014;	Tisdell	2009).	
	
	
Table	2.1:		 The	most	widely	used	property	rights	arrangements	for	governing		 CPRs,	 such	as	water	systems,	categorised	by	to	whom	property	rights	are	allocated.		
	 Entry	 Withdrawal	 Management	 Exclusion	 Alienation	
State	system	 User	 User	 State	 State	 State	
Private	
system	 Individual	 Individual	 Individual	(State)	 Individual	 Individual	
Collective	
system	 Community	 Community	 Community	 Community	 Community	
Co-
management	 User	 User	 Community	 State	or	individual	 State	or	individual			Building	 on	 the	 work	 of	 Olson	 (1971),	 Ostrom	 (1990)	 brought	 attention	 to	 a	third	 property	 rights	 approach	 for	 managing	 CPRs	 that	 challenged	 the	 notion	that	 markets	 or	 state	 control	 were	 the	 only	 two	 alternatives	 for	 overcoming	collective	 action	 problems.	 	 Ostrom	 found	 that	 in	 certain	 situations	 self-governance	is	possible	(Ostrom	1990;	Ostrom	et	al.	1992).		Subsequently,	it	was	found	that	actors	who	regularly	interact	were	able	to	more	efficiently	manage	a	resource	in	some	situations	than	a	large	central	actor	(Baland	&	Platteau	2003;	Basurto	&	Ostrom	2009;	 Janssen	et	al.	2010;	Libecap	1989;	Ostrom	2011b).	 	 In	addition,	face-to-face	communication	(Ostrom	2008a;	Ostrom	et	al.	1992),	trust	(Bohnet	et	al.	2006;	 Janssen	2015;	Ostrom	2011b),	reciprocity	(Fehr	&	Gachter	2000;	Giest	&	Howlett	2014;	Velez	et	al.	2009)	and	strong	leadership	(Folke	et	al.	2005)	 can	 further	 reduce	 transaction	 costs	 below	 the	 level	 sometimes	experienced	when	 property	 rights	 are	 held	 by	 a	 central	 actor	 (Ostrom	 2015).		Small	 groups	 act	 as	 a	 network	 for	 transmitting	 information	 between	 group	members	reinforcing	shared	beliefs	about	what	is	‘right’	or	‘wrong’	and	creating	an	institutional	arrangement	that	is	self-enforcing.			Further	 variations	 of	 the	 three	 traditional	 property	 rights	 contracts	 have	 also	been	developed.		In	co-management	systems	two	or	more	interest	groups	share	
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management	 rights.	 	 They	 are	 often	 used	 as	 a	 way	 of	 navigating	 cultural	grievance	or	as	an	alternate	pathway	for	uniting	diverse	interests.		For	instance,	co-management	 arrangements	 may	 bring	 together	 actors	 with	 different	worldviews	or	subscribing	to	contrasting	metaconstitutional	rules	(Berkes	2009;	Richmond	et	 al.	 2013).	 Such	 systems	 are	 effective	when	 the	 incentives	 of	 joint	managers	 and	 users	 align,	 motivating	 all	 actors	 to	 behave	 in	 a	 way	 that	encourages	efficient	resource	use	(Adger	et	al.	2005;	Baland	&	Platteau	2003).		More	broadly,	exogenous	parameters	and	worldviews	can	significantly	affect	the	relative	 efficacy	 of	 various	 property	 rights	 systems.	 	 As	 pointed	 out	 in	 the	previous	section,	actors	only	 follow	rules	when	they	are	motivated	to	do	so,	so	rules	 that	 assign	 rights	 to	water	 are	only	 efficient	when	 those	 actors	 to	whom	they’ve	been	assigned	believe	them	to	have	legitimacy.		Further,	all	actors	within	the	 institution	must	 acknowledge	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 those	 rights	 –	 not	 only	 the	rights	 holder	 (Schlager	 &	 Ostrom	 1992).	 	 As	 all	 rights	 have	 complementary	duties,	 a	 right	 implies	 that	 another	 actor	has	 a	 commensurate	duty	 to	observe	that	right.	 	Should	this	duty	not	be	observed,	the	property	rights	system	will	be	unstable	and	break	down	over	time.		Thus,	while	to	whom	property	rights	are	allocated	can	affect	the	distribution	of	wealth	and	the	level	of	rent	dissipation	associated	with	the	use	and	management	of	 CPRs,	 so	 can	 actors’	 beliefs	 and	 the	 exogenous	 contextual	 parameters.	 	 This	means	 that	 although	 property	 rights	 establish	 the	 parameters	 under	 which	decisions	over	CPR	use	are	made,	the	capacity	for	these	rules	to	achieve	efficient	outcomes	is	not	only	dependent	on	the	incentives	created	by	the	delineation	of	decision-making	 authority,	 but	 also	 by	 how	 closely	 the	 rules	 are	 matched	 to	actors’	 preferences	 and	 beliefs,	 the	 broader	 enforcement	 rules,	 and	 existing	social	norms	and	historical	context.				A	 robust	 property	 rights	 system	 is	 one	 that	 coordinates	 these	 elements	 and	 is	able	to	cope	with	external	and	internal	shocks	or	disruptions	to	the	system	over	time.	 	 For	 policy	 makers	 interested	 in	 crafting	 long-lasting	 solutions	 to	 the	problems	of	over-allocation	and	declining	water	quality	within	a	water	system,	
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the	review	of	the	institutional	and	property	rights	literature	so	far	suggests	that	it	is	the	coordination	of	these	elements	that	must	be	navigated	to	ensure	actors	are	encouraged	to	exercise	choices	over	common	property	resources	efficiently.	
	
	
2.4	 Resource	self-determination:	A	new	institutional	approach?	
	The	property	rights	systems	outlined	above	are	based	on	a	seminal	assumption	that	 environmental	 goods	 and	 resources	 are	 able	 to	 be	 owned	 in	 an	 absolute	sense	and	that	rules	allocating	rights	to	control	and	use	are	able	to	be	assigned	to	various	 actors	 interacting	 within	 an	 institutional	 arrangement.	 	 The	 property	rights	 system	 examined	 as	 part	 of	 this	 research	 relaxes	 these	 assumptions,	collapsing	 the	 dichotomy	 between	 man	 and	 nature	 and	 reassigning	 property	rights	 accordingly.	 	 The	 new	 approach	 grants	 the	 environmental	 good	 or	resource	 legal	 standing	 and	 then	 proceeds	 to	 confer	 ownership	 of	 the	environmental	 good	 or	 resource	 in	 the	 resource	 itself.	 Guardians	 or	 overseers	are	then	appointed	to	speak	on	the	resource’s	behalf.		In	 the	 literature,	 the	 assignment	 of	 legal	 rights	 to	 non-human	 entities	 can	 be	traced	back	to	Salmond’s	work	on	legal	fictions	(Salmond	1930)	as	well	as	early	judicial	 rulings,	 which	 granted	 rights	 to	 Hindu	 deities12.	 	More	 recently,	 Stone	(1972)	argued	that	natural	objects,	such	as	rivers,	mountains,	and	forests,	should	be	 given	 legal	 rights	 similar	 to	 those	 of	 other	 inanimate	 right-holders	 such	 as	trusts,	corporations,	joint	ventures,	and	municipalities	in	order	to	better	protect	them	under	law.		This	would	mean	that	nature	could	institute	legal	actions	at	its	
behest;	 that	 in	determining	 the	granting	of	 legal	 relief,	 the	court	would	have	 to	take	injury	to	it	into	account;	and,	finally,	that	relief	would	run	to	the	benefit	of	it	(Stone	1972).		In	other	words	a	third	party	would	no	longer	be	involved	in	legal	proceedings	because	injury	to	the	natural	object	itself	will	become	sufficient	for	the	delivery	of	due	compensation.13																																																											12	In	Vidya	Varuthi	Thirthia	Swamigal	v.	Baluswami	Ayyar,	[1922]	AIR.		Available	at:	https://indiankanoon.org/doc/242776/.	13	Building	on	Stone’s	work,	Morris	and	Ruru	(2010)	also	discussed	the	application	of	legal	standing	to	rivers	in	the	New	Zealand	context.	
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	By	his	own	take,	Stone	was	proposing	“the	unthinkable”	–	and,	although	the	US	Supreme	Court	initially	took	up	the	notion	of	nature	having	rights,	little	further	action	 followed.14		For	many,	Stone’s	proposal	was	 too	radical	and	perhaps	 too	challenging	 to	existing	property	rights	and	economic	 institutions	 (Stone	2010).		Traditional	 property	 rights	 arrangements,	 like	 those	 outlined	 above,	 rely	 on	 a	distinction	 between	 animate	 and	 inanimate	 objects	 that	 enables	 inanimate	objects	to	be	“owned”	in	an	absolute	sense.		In	a	court	this	means	that	injury	to	an	environmental	good	and	resource	is	measured	through	the	harm	inflicted	on	the	human	owner	or	property	rights	holder	rather	than	by	the	harm	inflicted	on	the	environmental	good	itself.	 	Under	resource	self-determination	this	dialogue	shifts.	 	 As	 the	 environmental	 good	 or	 resource	 is	 granted	 legal	 rights	 under	resource	self-determination,	no	 longer	can	the	environmental	good	or	resource	be	owned	by	anyone	or	used	without	regard	given	to	the	resource’s	health	and	wellbeing.	 	 Instead,	similar	to	a	 legal	minor,	 the	resource	 is	understood	to	own	itself,	with	guardians	appointed	to	speak	on	its	behalf	and	bargain	with	potential	‘users’	over	use.		Resource	 self-determination	 challenges	 the	 construct	of	ownership	assumed	 in	more	 traditional	 property	 rights	 systems,	 such	 as	 state,	 private,	 or	 collective	ownership.	 	 Given	 the	 expectation	 that	 environmental	 goods	 or	 resources	 are	economic	goods	over	which	bundles	of	property	rights	can	be	held,	how	users’	and	managers’	behaviour	might	change	in	light	of	this	development	in	property	rights	theory	is	unclear.		There	has	been	no	empirical	treatment	of	this	setting	or	theoretical	 evaluation	 of	 possible	 impacts	 to-date.	 	 This	 creates	 a	 space	 for	examination	and	justifies	the	study	undertaken	here.	
		
	 	
																																																								14	In	Sierra	Club	v.	Morton	[1972]	405	US	727.	Available	at:	https://scholar.google.com.au/scholar_case?case=15417249624067275504&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj4ycre4uzTAhWBuJQKHajCBpEQgAMIJSgAMAA.	
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2.4	 Grey	spots	in	the	literature	
	A	canvassing	of	the	literature	highlights	stubborn	weaknesses	in	the	theoretical	and	empirical	dimensions	of	institutional	economics.		These	include	the	study	of	alternative	property	rights	systems	that	sit	outside	the	boundaries	of	 the	state,	market,	 or	 collective,	 the	 development	 of	 dynamic	 frameworks	 of	 institutional	change,	 and	 the	 ex	 ante	 analysis	 of	 property	 systems	 before	 their	implementation.		These	grey	spots	in	institutional	economics	generally,	and	CPR	research	 in	 particular,	 contribute	 to	 the	 rationale,	 justification,	 and	motivation	for	 the	 specific	 research	questions	developed	 in	 this	 study.	 	Although,	 some	of	these	weak	spots	were	touched	on	in	this	literature	review,	they	are	now	drawn	out	 explicitly	 to	 provide	 motivation	 for	 the	 research	 questions	 outlined	 in	chapter	three.	
	
Alternative	property	rights	systems	for	governing	CPRs	In	 cases	where	 traditional	 property	 rights	 arrangement	 fail	 to	 deliver	 efficient	outcomes,	 the	 identification	 of	 alternative	 property	 rights	 systems,	 which	challenge	 the	 status	 quo	 could	 be	 useful.	 	 The	 most	 commonly	 used	 systems	outlined	in	section	2.3	rest	on	the	presumption	that	there	is	a	distinct	dichotomy	between	man	and	nature,	allowing	CPRs	to	be	‘owned’	in	an	absolute	sense.		An	interesting	 proposition	 is	 that	 relaxing	 this	 assumption	 could	 allow	 for	 the	emergence	 of	 alternative	 property	 rights	 setting	 which	 deliver	 different	environmental	 and	 economic	 outcomes.	 	 Depending	 on	 the	 goals	 of	 the	environmental	policy,	a	property	rights	system,	which	collapses	this	dichotomy	–	such	 as	 resource	 self-determination	 -	 could	 prove	 an	 effective	 mechanism	through	which	to	relieve	environmental	pressures	and	deliver	the	desired	policy	goals.		To	test	whether	this	is	indeed	the	case,	however,	we	need	empirical	data	examining	 how	 resource	 self-determination	 could	 work	 in	 practice	 and	identifying	 possible	 effects	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 empirics	 support	 any	 a	 priori	assumptions.		
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Research-based	examinations	of	institutional	change	The	 review	 of	 the	 literature	 showed	 that	 the	 definition	 of	 institutions	 and	 the	drivers	of	 institutional	change	are	still	contested.	 	Ongoing	disagreement	about	the	origins	of	change	makes	analysis	complex	due	to	a	lack	of	consensus	over	the	key	 variables	 and	 parameters	 at	 play.	 	 A	 synthesis	 of	 central	 elements	 of	 the	institutional	 economics	 literature	 in	 this	 chapter	 led	 to	 a	 conceptualisation	 of	institutional	 change	 as	 an	 evolutionary,	 path-dependent	 process	 driven	 by	individual	 decision-making.	 	 Within	 the	 Bloomington	 School	 there	 is	 no	framework	 that	 can	 be	 used	 to	 guide	 analysis	 of	 such	 institutional	 change	creating	a	demand	for	the	development	of	a	dynamic	framework.			From	 an	 empirical	 perspective,	 more	 research-based	 examinations	 of	institutional	 change	 will	 contribute	 to	 our	 empirical	 and	 theoretical	understanding	of	what	institutional	variables	and	parameters	motivate	a	change	in	property	rights	systems.	Therefore,	developing	a	framework,	which	addresses	the	 central	 characteristics	of	 institutional	 change	 from	within	 the	Bloomington	tradition,	and	then	applying	it	to	an	empirical	case,	will	be	a	useful	contribution	to	the	empirical	and	theoretical	literature.		
Ex	ante	approach	to	testing	alternative	property	rights	systems	Institutions	and	their	performance	are	mostly	evaluated	in	ex	post	rather	than	in	ex	 ante	 contexts	 (Alston	 et	 al.	 1997).	 Yet,	 ex	 ante	 analysis	 of	 alternative	arrangements	can	be	useful	for	policy	makers	interested	in	institutional	reform	(Lacey	et	al.	2015;	Rommel	2014;	Tisdell	2009;	Ward	et	al.	2008).		Shifting	from	the	 status	 quo	 can	 be	 costly	 (Colby	 1995)	 and	 informing	 the	 policy	 design	process	ex	ante	can	reduce	long-term	expenditure.		Within	the	literature	there	is	room	 for	 more	 research	 to	 focus	 on	 ex	 ante	 economic	 analysis	 to	 help	 guide	policy	makers	 and	 ensure	 that	 any	 proposed	 changes	 in	 property	 systems	 are	likely	 to	 deliver	 the	 desired	 incentives	 for	 alleviating	 environmental	 and	economic	pressures	(Ward	et	al.	2008).		
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2.4	 Conclusions	
	This	 chapter	 outlined	 the	 concept	 of	 institutions	 in	 an	 institutional	 economic	theoretical	setting.		Based	on	the	assumption	that	individuals	acting	in	pursuit	of	their	own	self-interest	 fail	 to	reach	socially	optimal	outcomes	in	the	absence	of	property	 rights,	 it	 showed	 how	 institutions	 coordinate	 actors’	 behaviour	 to	encourage	 the	 alignment	of	public	 and	private	 interests.	 	 It	 demonstrated	how	various	institutional	systems	can	be	used	to	address	social	dilemmas	pertaining	to	 the	 overuse	 of	 common	 pool	 resources	 and	 the	 underprovision	 of	 public	goods.		Yet	it	also	highlighted	the	ongoing	challenges	of	institutional	economics,	namely	defining	 institutions	and	explaining	 institutional	change,	while	bringing	attention	 to	 the	 public	 policy	 challenges	 associated	 with	 designing	 effective	institutions.		A	review	of	the	literature	indicates	two	complementary	strands	of	thought	shape	our	 economic	 understanding	 of	 institutions:	 the	 rules-of-the-game	 and	institutions-as-equilibria	 approach.	 	 These	 both	 have	 value	 for	 the	 analyst’s	toolkit	and	are	therefore	both	used	in	this	research.		In	chapter	five,	the	rules-of-the-game	 approach	 to	 institutions	 is	 used	 to	 compare	 existing	 property	 rights	arrangements	 with	 resource	 self-determination.	 	 While,	 because	 of	 the	usefulness	 of	 both	 the	 rules-of-the-game	 and	 equilibrium	 approaches	 for	understanding	 institutional	 change	 from	 an	 evolutionary	 perspective,	 both	approaches	are	utilized	for	the	dynamic	framework	developed	in	chapter	three	and	tested	in	chapter	seven.			The	 next	 chapter	 explains	 this	 further	 by	 outlining	 the	 conceptual	 framework	used	in	this	research	to	address	the	specific	research	questions	pertaining	to	the	adoption	of	resource	self-determination	as	an	alternative	property	rights	system	for	governing	CPRs	and	river	systems.		
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3		 Addressing	the	gaps	in	the	literature:		
	 Research	questions	and	research	design	
	
	
3.0		 Introduction	
	Motivated	by	 the	 research	problem	outlined	 in	 chapter	one	and	 the	grey	 spots	identified	 in	 the	 current	 theoretical	 and	 analytical	 literature,	 this	 chapter	introduces	the	central	research	questions	addressed	in	this	thesis.	 	The	chapter	also	outlines	 the	overarching	 research	 framework	and	 research	design	used	 to	evaluate	the	research	questions.				Given	 the	 subject	matter	 and	 objectives	 of	 this	 study,	 the	 Bloomington	 School	approach	 to	 institutional	 analysis	 is	 the	 principle	 lens	 through	 which	 the	research	 questions	 are	 addressed,	 with	 a	 secondary	 emphasis	 on	 the	institutional	 transaction	 cost	 approach.	An	 embedded	 case	 study	 is	 used	 as	 an	analytical	framework.		The	chapter	thus	proceeds	as	follows.		Section	one	outlines	the	general	research	questions.	 	 An	 extended	 section	 two	 specifies	 the	 research	 design	 and	 the	theoretical	 and	 analytical	 frameworks.	 A	 background	 to	 the	 methodological	approaches	used	 to	 address	 the	 research	questions	 are	 also	provided.	 	 Section	three	concludes.	
	
	
3.1	 Research	questions	
	As	a	reminder,	the	general	research	problem	outlined	in	chapter	one	stated	that	in	the	face	of	growing	resource	shortages,	alternative	institutional	arrangements	are	 needed	 to	 relieve	 pressure	 on	 resources.	 	 It	 also	 explained	 that	 although	resource	self-determination	has	been	proposed	and	used	for	the	management	of	environmental	 goods	 and	 resources,	 little	 is	 known	 about	 the	 potential	
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institutional	economic	effects	of	granting	legal	rights	to	natural	objects,	such	as	river	 systems.	 Subsequently,	 assessing	 the	 potential	 impacts	 of	 applying	resource	self-determination	to	a	river	system	is	a	core	objective	of	this	research.		In	the	discussion	of	alternative	property	rights	arrangements	in	chapter	two,	the	concept	 of	 resource	 self-determination	 was	 introduced.	 	 To	 examine	 resource	self-determination	in	detail	and	to	understand	how	it	can	be	used	for	governing	a	river	 system,	 this	 research	 analyses	 the	 changing	 governance	 arrangement	 for	the	Whanganui	River,	New	Zealand,	which	was	granted	legal	standing	in	March	2017.15		 It	aims	to	provide	an	ex	ante	analysis	of	 the	 institutional	economics	of	granting	a	river	legal	standing	and	to	provide	insight	to	policy	makers	interested	in	replicating	this	approach	more	widely.				The	research	questions	emerge	from	the	theoretical	and	methodological	gaps	in	the	literature	discussed	in	section	2.4.	The	first	general	research	question	asks:		
Research	 question	 1:	 How	 does	 resource	 self-determination	 affect	 the	
distribution	 of	 property	 rights	 amongst	 actors	 operating	 within	 an	
institutional	arrangement?	
	This	 research	 question	 stems	 from	 the	 need	 to	 identify	 alternative	 property	rights	 arrangements	 for	 water	 to	 address	 social	 dilemmas.	 	 As	 discussed	 in	chapter	two,	property	rights	are	a	bundle	of	rights	that	affect	levels	of	wealth	and	rent	dissipation	 in	a	group.	 	Under	resource	self-determination,	 legal	rights	are	granted	 to	 a	 CPR.	 	 Understanding	 how	 this	 will	 affect	 the	 bundle	 of	 property	rights	and	who	will	be	assigned	rights	 to	access	and	withdrawal,	management,	exclusion,	 and	 alienation	 will	 help	 determine	 how	 applying	 resource	 self-determination	 may	 affect	 economic	 and	 environmental	 outcomes.	 Research	question	 one	 is	 addressed	 in	 this	 study	 by	 undertaking	 a	 comparative	institutional	 analysis	 of	 a	 state	 property	 rights	 system	with	 the	 application	 of	resource	self-determination																																																									15	It	should	be	noted	that	this	research	in	its	entirety	was	carried	out	prior	to	the	Whanganui	River	being	granted	legal	standing.	At	the	time	of	submission	the	institutional	arrangement	is	still	to	be	implemented.	
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	The	second	research	question	aims	 to	evaluate	 the	 findings	of	 the	comparative	institutional	 analysis.	 	 It	 considers	 how	 the	 new	 property	 rights	 arrangement	may	 influence	 actors’	 behaviour	 and	 economic	 and	 environmental	 outcomes.		Specific	hypotheses,	which	support	the	second	research	question,	are	generated	by	 the	 institutional	 analysis	 and	 outlined	 in	 chapters	 five	 and	 six.	 	 Research	question	two	asks:		
Research	 question	 2:	 How	 will	 the	 identification	 of	 resource	 self-
determination	affect	economic	and	environmental	outcomes?		
	Answering	this	question	addresses	another	weak	spot	 in	the	literature	–	the	ex	ante	 analysis	 of	 proposed	 institutional	 arrangements.	 	 It	 aims	 to	 predict	 the	possible	 economic	 and	 environmental	 effects	 of	 implementing	 resource	 self-determination	by	comparing	the	strategic	behaviour	of	actors	interacting	under	a	 state	 property	 rights	 system	 with	 those	 interacting	 under	 resource	 self-determination.	The	possible	impacts	on	water	allocation	are	examined,	as	well	as	the	relative	levels	of	transaction	costs	compared.			The	third	research	question	is	split	into	two	parts.	 	The	first	part,	aims	to	shine	new	light	on	the	diachronic	elements	of	an	institution	over	time.	The	second	part	aims	 to	 examine	 how	 and	 why	 institutions	 change,	 specifically	 how	 and	 why	resource	 self-determination	 might	 be	 implemented	 as	 an	 alternative	 property	rights	arrangement	for	governing	a	river	system:		
Research	question	3:	(a)	How	can	we	analyse	institutional	change	when	it	is	
defined	as	an	evolutionary	process	driven	by	individuals	seeking	to	optimise	
their	 utility?;	 and	 (b)	 which	 institutional	 elements	 motivated	 a	 shift	 from	
state	ownership	to	resource	self-determination	in	the	case	of	the	Whanganui	
River?	
		Motivation	 for	 asking	 this	 question	 is	 two-fold.	 	 First,	 it	 is	 useful	 to	 know	 the	conditions	 under	which	 resource	 self-determination	would	 be	 proposed	 as	 an	
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alternative	 property	 rights	 approach	 for	 a	 river	 system.	 	 Why	 did	 decision	makers	 opt	 for	 resource	 self-determination	 over	 more	 commonly	 used	alternatives	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Whanganui	 River?	 The	 Whanganui	 River	 faces	many	of	 the	same	environmental	challenges	as	other	rivers	 in	New	Zealand,	so	why	 has	 resource	 self-determination	 been	 used	 in	 this	 case	 and	 not	 others?	Second,	 the	 question	 contributes	 to	 the	 broader	 discussion	 regarding	 the	theoretical	 and	 empirical	 weaknesses	 associated	 with	 understanding	institutional	 change	 outlined	 in	 chapter	 two.	 	 Ostrom	 (2013)	 stated	 that	understanding	 institutional	 change	 is	 one	 of	 the	 next	 frontiers	 of	 institutional	research	 and	 it	 was	 argued	 in	 section	 2.5	 that	 undertaking	 more	 detailed	knowledge-based	 analyses	 of	 institutional	 change	 are	 needed	 within	 the	institutional	literature.	By	posing	these	research	questions,	this	research	intends	to	make	theoretical	and	empirical	contributions	towards	advancing	this	frontier.		The	final	question	examines	the	likely	robustness	of	resource	self-determination	as	 a	 long-lasting	 property	 rights	 arrangement	 for	 the	 governance	 of	 a	 river	system.		A	robust	system	has	been	defined	as	one	able	to	cope	with	external	and	internal	shocks	or	disruptions,	and	thus,	this	final	question	asks:		
Research	 question	 4:	 How	 robust	 is	 resource	 self-determination	 as	 an	
alternative	property	rights	system	for	the	governance	of	river	systems?		The	results	of	this	analysis	aim	to	provide	an	ex	ante	assessment	of	resource	self-determination	as	a	long-lasting	property	rights	arrangement	and	determine	the	likelihood	 of	 it	 achieving	 the	 intended	 legislative	 objectives.	 	 It	 provides	 an	overarching	 assessment	 of	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 application	 of	 resource	 self-determination	 is	 likely	 to	be	a	 stable	property	 rights	 system	over	a	number	of	years.			
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3.2	 Research	design	
	To	 answer	 the	 research	 questions,	 a	 theoretical	 framework	 built	 on	 the	Bloomington	 School	 of	 institutional	 analysis	 and	 transaction	 cost	 economics	 is	supported	by	an	analytical	framework,	based	on	an	embedded	case	study	design.		The	 research	 orients	 towards	 a	 positivist	 ontological	 and	 epistemological	perspective	meaning	that	the	data	was	collected	and	interpreted	under	the	view	that	 the	 research	 findings	 were	 generally	 observable	 and	 quantifiable. 16		Elements	of	 the	theoretical	and	analytical	 frames	are	outlined	 in	 figure	3.1	and	each	component	explained	in	detail	below.		
	
	
Figure	3.1:		 A	visual	representation	of	 the	research	design	used	to	guide	and	structure	this	research.																																																									16	In	qualitative	case	study	research,	perspectives	such	as	the	relativist	or	interpretivist	perspectives	are	common	alternative	epistemological	orientations.		Such	orientations	consider	knowledge	to	be	created	through	interactions	between	the	researcher	and	subjects	so	that	findings	are	gathered	using	dialectical	methodologies	rather	than	through	the	verification	or	falsification	of	hypotheses.		Dialectical	methodologies	are	not	suitable	for	answering	the	general	research	questions	specified	in	chapter	three,	however,	given	that	quantitative	methods	are	also	used	in	this	thesis.		Subsequently,	a	single	reality	independent	of	the	researcher	is	assumed	in	this	thesis,	which	supposes	that	research	is	conducted	such	that	neither	the	researcher	nor	the	subjects	influence	the	other	(Guba	&	Lincoln	1994).				
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3.2.1	 Theoretical	framework:	Institutional	economics	After	 canvassing	 the	 literature	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 the	 overarching	theoretical	 framework	 used	 in	 this	 research	 emerges	 from	 blending	 the	Bloomington	School’s	abductive	approach	to	institutional	analysis	with	the	more	deductive	reasoning	of	transaction	cost	economics.			
i.	 The	Bloomington	School	of	institutional	analysis	The	overarching	methodological	framework	used	in	this	research	is	grounded	in	the	 Bloomington	 School	 of	 institutional	 analysis.	 The	 school	 embraces	 the	complexity	 of	 institutions	 and,	 as	 an	 underlying	 objective,	 attempts	 to	understand,	 chart,	 evaluate,	 and	 articulate	 the	 basic	 categories	 of	 social	interaction.	 Alongside	 the	 Rochester	 and	 Virginia	 Schools	 of	 thought,	 the	Bloomington	School	is	recognised	for	its	useful	contribution	to	the	development	of	 public	 choice	 and	new	 institutional	 theory	 (Boettke	&	Coyne	2005;	Mitchell	1988).	 	 In	 combination	 with	 this,	 the	 Bloomington	 School’s	 focus	 on	 common	pool	resources	makes	it	well	suited	as	a	guiding	frame	for	this	thesis.		The	Workshop	of	Political	Theory	and	Policy	Analysis,	Bloomington,	Indiana	has	an	 interdisciplinary,	 pluralist	 research	agenda	built	 around	 two	 central	pillars:	polycentralism	 and	 social	 order.	 Early	 work	 of	 Vincent	 and	 Elinor	 Ostrom	 on	public	service	 industries	and	local	public	economies	(McGinnis	1999;	Oakerson	1999;	 Ostrom	 &	 Ostrom	 1977;	 Ostrom	 et	 al.	 1961)	 contributed	 to	 the	development	of	polycentralism	as	it	relates	to	institutions	(Aligica	&	Tarko	2012;	Polanyi	 1951).	 	 Polycentralism	 refers	 to	 a	 social	 system	 made	 up	 of	 many	decision	 centres,	 which	 have	 limited	 and	 autonomous	 prerogatives,	 yet	 are	bounded	 by	 an	 overarching	 set	 of	 rules	 (Aligica	 &	 Tarko	 2012).	 	 It	 contrasts	markedly	with	the	traditional	monocentric	approach	to	analysis,	which	assumes	institutions	 always	 contain	 a	 unique	 centre	 of	 power	 and	 authority	 (Ostrom	1972;	Ostrom	et	al.	1988).				The	Ostrom’s	application	of	polycentralism	to	institutions	allows	for	complexity	and	diversity	within	institutional	arrangements	to	be	accounted	for.		Polycentric	arrangements	 are	 understood	 to	 be	 self-organising	 and	 to	 have	 built-in	
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mechanisms	 of	 self-correction	 (McGinnis	 2011b).	 	 There	 can	 be	 multiple	arrangements	 operating	 at	 once	 at	 different	 levels	 in	 an	 institutional	arrangement,	which,	when	analysed	through	a	polycentric	lens	have	been	able	to	create	new	lines	of	enquiry	and	to	shed	light	on	existing	debates	(Aligica	&	Tarko	2012).				The	 second	 central	 pillar	 in	 the	 architecture	 of	 the	 Bloomington	 School	 is	 the	Ostroms’	 view	 of	 social	 order.	 	 The	 theoretical	 tradition	 of	 institutions	consistently	 oscillated	between	 theories	 of	market	 and	 state,	 identifying	Adam	Smith’s	(1791)	theory	of	social	order	on	the	one	side	or	Thomas	Hobbes’	(1651)	theory	of	the	leviathan	on	the	other.		Ostrom	was	interested	in	stepping	beyond	the	 dichotomy	 and	 developing	 a	 theory	 and	 framework	 that	 offered	 “an	alternative	 that	 can	 be	 used	 to	 analyse	 and	 describe	 a	 variety	 of	 institutional	arrangements	 to	match	 the	 extensive	 variety	 of	 collective	 goods	 in	 the	world”	(Ostrom	1998,	p.14).		Through	a	combination	of	 theory	development	and	hard-nosed	empiricism,	the	Bloomington	School’s	approach	to	institutional	analysis	has	shown	that	creative	solutions	to	problems,	such	as	the	depletion	of	common	pool	resources,	can	exist	outside	of	the	sphere	of	national	governments	and	markets.	Results	have	shown	that	there	is	no	one	institutional	arrangement	that	is	“good”	in	all	circumstances,	instead,	 the	 goal	 of	 a	wise	policy	 is	 to	 search	 for	 an	 institutional	 arrangement,	which	 “minimises	 the	 cost	 associated	 with	 institutional	 weaknesses	 or	institutional	failure.”	(Aligica	&	Boettke	2009,	p.34).		To	help	evaluate	these	costs	in	 this	 research,	 the	 Ostrom’s	 approach	 to	 institutional	 economics	 is	complemented	by	elements	of	institutional	transaction	cost	economics.	
	
ii.	 Transaction	cost	economics	Institutional	 transaction	 cost	 economics	 is	 a	 complementary	 approach	 to	 the	Bloomington	 School	 of	 institutional	 analysis.	 	 One	 of	 the	 advantages	 of	 the	transaction	 cost	 approach	 is	 that	 it	 uses	 a	measure,	 which	 is	 quantifiable	 and	comparable	 for	 assessing	 institutional	 effectiveness.	 	 Such	 measures	 are	transaction	 costs	 which	 refer	 to	 the	 effort,	 time,	 and	 expense	 involved	 in	
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obtaining	the	information	necessary	to	negotiate,	make,	and	enforce	an	exchange	(Williamson	1985,	p.2).17		Transaction	costs	can	include	the	costs	involved	with	preparing	an	 institutional	arrangement	designed	 to	govern	CPRs	as	well	as	 the	costs	 associated	 with	 implementing	 and	 operationalising	 the	 property	 rights	framework	(McCann	2013;	McCann	&	Garrick	2014).				The	 transaction	 cost	 approach	 originated	 with	 Coase	 (1937)	 and	 was	 further	developed	by	Williamson	(1973;	1985;	2000)	to	explain	the	evolution	of	market	and	 nonmarket	 organisations	 within	 an	 institutional	 environment.	 	 To	 help	explain	 institutional	 change	 and	 to	 compare	 the	 relative	 efficiency	 of	 one	institutional	 arrangement	 over	 another	 North	 and	 Thomas	 (1973)	 and	 North	(1987;	1990)	integrated	transaction	costs	within	their	broader	rules	of	the	game	analysis	 of	 institutions	 to	 develop	 what	 has	 been	 termed	 ‘institutional	transaction	cost	economics’	(Allen	2000;	Saleth	&	Dinar	2004).		When	 comparing	 alternative	 property	 rights	 arrangements,	 low	 costs	 are	generally	 preferred	 over	 high	 levels	 of	 costs;	 however,	 transaction	 costs	 alone	cannot	measure	relative	institutional	performance.		In	some	situations,	not	all	of	the	 relevant	 transaction	 costs	 can	 be	 fully	 accounted	 for	 in	 narrow	 economic	terms.	 	 Some	 transactions	 within	 an	 institutional	 arrangement	 refer	 to	 non-market	exchanges	embedded	within	a	society’s	normative	and	cultural	systems	which	are	difficult	to	quantify,	for	instance	(Commons	1934;	Granovetter	1985).	Further,	when	developing	policy	goals,	maximising	net	benefits	rather	than	just	minimising	transaction	costs	is	usually	a	more	appropriate	metric	to	ensure	that	both	 abatement	 costs	 and	 environmental	 benefits	 are	 also	 accounted	 for	 in	decision-making	 and	 evaluation	 (Krutilla	 &	 Krause	 2011).	 	 Because	approximating	 net	 benefits	 was	 not	 a	 primary	 goal	 of	 this	 thesis,	 using	 the	transaction	 cost	 approach	 in	 partnership	with	 the	 broader	 contextual	 analysis	provided	for	by	the	Bloomington	School	created	a	more	robust	conceptual	basis	for	this	research	rather	than	using	one	independently	of	the	other.																																																									17	As	a	reminder,	under	both	the	rules-of-the-game	and	the	institutions-as-equilibria	approaches	the	transaction	remains	the	central	unit	of	analysis;	however,	in	the	rules-of-the-game	approach	transaction	costs	refer	to	the	costs	associated	with	gathering	information	to	facilitate	the	exchange	of	a	good	or	service	whereas	in	the	equilibrium	approach	the	costs	refer	to	those	associated	with	exchanging	a	social	attitude,	emotion,	opinion,	or	piece	of	information	between	actors.	
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3.2.2	 Analytical	framework:	The	case	study	To	 answer	 the	 research	 questions	 outlined	 in	 section	 3.1,	 an	 embedded	 case	study	approach	was	used	for	analysis	in	this	research.	Two	reasons	are	given	for	this.		Firstly,	prior	to	this	research	being	conducted,	no	study	had	examined	the	institutional	 economics	 of	 granting	 a	 river	 legal	 standing,	 and	 thus	 a	 detailed	investigation	 of	 the	 contextual	 conditions	 of	 its	 successful	 application	 was	deemed	 useful	 for	 drawing	 preliminary	 causal	 inferences	 (Yin	 &	 Davis	 2007).		Secondly,	using	a	case	study	to	examine	a	CPR	problem	within	the	Bloomington	tradition	 builds	 on	 40	 years	 of	 case-study	 research	 on	 the	 commons	 (Araral	2014).	 	 This	 provides	 a	 strong	 foundation	 for	 drawing	 inferences	 from	 theory	and	constructing	external	validity	for	the	research	(Poteete	et	al.	2010).		Generally	a	case	study	 is	used	to	examine	real-world	problems	for	which	there	are	many	more	variables	of	interest	than	available	data	points.	 	In	a	case	study,	rather	than	taking	established	socio-political	entities	as	cases,	as	often	occurs	in	large-N	studies,	the	researcher	“cases”	(Ragin	1992,	p.218)	so	that	the	object	and	the	 boundaries	 of	 the	 case	 studies	 are	 defined	 through	 the	 research	 project	(Vennesson	 2008).	 	 This	 aligns	 itself	 with	 the	 objectives	 of	 the	 Bloomington	School,	 which	 sometimes	 blurs	 the	 distinction	 between	 the	 phenomenon	 of	interest	and	the	context	in	which	it	exists.		A	 case	 study	 inquiry	 relies	 on	 multiple	 sources	 of	 evidence,	 which	 should	converge	 to	 demonstrate	 a	 finding’s	 consistency	 and	 provide	 validity	 to	 the	research	 (Yin	 2014).18		 In	 some	 cases,	 a	 case	 study	 inquiry	 can	 also	 rely	 on	several	units	of	analysis	to	understand	the	context	of	the	case	study	in	question.		This	is	known	as	an	embedded	case	study	design	and	is	the	analytical	approach	adopted	for	this	research	(Yin	2014).		The	advantage	of	an	embedded	case	study,	as	 opposed	 to	 its	 alternative,	 the	 holistic	 case	 study,	 is	 that	 it	 allows	 the	researcher	to	identify	relevant	subunits	for	analysis	and	conduct	a	more	detailed	analysis	of	the	case	of	interest.		In	turn,	this	can	also	contribute	to	a	reduction	in	possible	bias	and	more	robust	findings	(Shipman	1997).																																																									18	When	only	single	sources	of	observational	evidence	are	used,	unintentional	biases	can	emerge,	as	the	researcher	can	be	tempted	to	adopt	“subjective”	judgments,	which	confirm	a	researcher’s	preconceived	notions	rather	than	testing	for	construct	validity	within	the	case	study	(Flyvbjerg	2006;	Ruddin	2006).			
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In	 the	 embedded	 case	 study,	 five	 complementary	 methodological	 approaches	were	 adopted	 to	 examine	 the	 application	 of	 resource	 self-determination	 to	 a	river	 system.	 Mirroring	 Ostrom’s	 (2005)	 approach	 to	 institutional	 economic	analysis,	 initially	 a	 comparative	 analysis	was	 conducted	 in	 two	parts.	 Part	 one	focused	on	understanding	the	context	of	the	institutional	environment.	 	Guided	by	Ostrom’s	Insitutional	Analysis	and	Development	(IAD)	framework,	an	analysis	of	the	institutional	arrangement	governing	the	Whanganui	River	before	and	after	the	 adoption	 of	 resource	 self-determination	was	 carried	 out.	 	 The	 institutional	analysis	 generated	 hypotheses	 about	 levels	 of	 transaction	 costs	 and	 resource	allocation,	which	were	then	tested	in	part	two	of	the	comparative	analysis.		This	was	 done	 by	 approximating	 the	 institutional	 setting	 as	 a	 game	 and	 then	experimentally	testing	the	game	in	the	laboratory.		The	 second	 strand	 of	 the	 research	 aimed	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 theoretical	 and	methodological	literature	on	institutional	change	and	answer	the	third	research	question.	 By	 developing	 a	 dynamic	 version	 of	 the	 IAD	 framework	 and	 then	testing	 it	 using	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Whanganui	 River	 this	 part	 of	 the	 research	explained	 how	 and	 why	 resource	 self-determination	 was	 identified	 as	 an	alternative	arrangement	for	governing	the	Whanganui	River.			The	 final	 step	 before	 concluding	 involved	 a	 qualitative	 analysis	 of	 the	institutional	 arrangement	 using	 Ostrom’s	 (1990)	 design	 principles	 (Cox	 et	 al.	2010).	 	 These	 were	 used	 to	 predict	 the	 relative	 robustness	 of	 resource	 self-determination	 as	 an	 alternative	 governance	 arrangement	 for	 the	 Whanganui	River.				A	 comprehensive	 methodological	 review	 of	 each	 of	 the	 components	 of	 the	embedded	case	study	is	provided	in	the	following	sections.		
i.	 Exploring	 the	 institutional	 context:	 The	 Institutional	 Analysis	 and	
	 Development	framework	To	address	part	 one	of	 the	 institutional	 analysis	 and	 answer	 the	 first	 research	question	 from	 within	 the	 Bloomington	 tradition,	 a	 comparative	 analysis	 of	
	 41	
resource	 self-determination	and	 state	ownership	was	 conducted	guided	by	 the	Institutional	Analysis	and	Development	framework	(figure	3.2).19		Recognised	as	the	principal	analytical	instrument	in	the	toolbox	of	the	Bloomington	School,	the	IAD	framework	is	a	conceptual	map	that	lets	inquiry	be	organised	into	a	subject	and	set	of	variables	 to	examine	(Blomquist	&	DeLeon	2011;	Ostrom	2005).	 	As	explained	in	Cole	(2014)	the	framework	has	been	described	as	“one	of	the	most	developed	 and	 sophisticated	 attempts	 to	 use	 institutional	 and	 stakeholder	assessment	 in	 order	 to	 link	 theory	 and	 practice,	 analysis	 and	 policy”	 (Aligica	2006,	p.89).			
	
	
Figure	3.2:		 The	Institutional	Analysis	and	Development	framework	(Ostrom	2011a,	p.10).	This	framework	is	used	to	guide	the	comparative		 institutional	analysis	reported	in	chapter	five.			The	action	situation	is	the	core	component	of	the	framework	and	is	treated	as	an	informal	 representation	 of	 a	 repeated	 game	 (Polski	 &	 Ostrom	 1999).	 	 It	 is	 a	domain	in	which	boundedly	rational	actors	hold	a	position,	observe	information,	select	actions,	engage	in	patterns	of	interaction,	and	realise	outcomes	from	their	interaction	(McGinnis	2011a;	Simon	1955).	 	For	 instance,	 in	the	case	of	a	river,	actors	assigned	 the	positions	of	users	and	managers	may	engage	 in	bargaining	over	 water	 use	 in	 the	 action	 situation,	 constrained	 and	 incentivised	 by	 the																																																									19	The	alternative	analytical	framework	in	the	Bloomington	School	arsenal	is	the	Social-Ecological	Systems	framework	(McGinnis	&	Ostrom	2014;	Ostrom	2007;	Ostrom	&	Cox	2010).		This	framework	places	greater	emphasis	on	community	and	resource	interactions	than	the	IAD	–	something	that	was	not	the	focus	of	this	research.	
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structural	variables	and	the	expected	choices	of	their	 fellow	actors.	 	Within	the	action	 situation	 all	 of	 these	 actors	 are	 assumed	 to	 share	 some	 common	information	 about	 the	 situation	 but	 not	 necessarily	 the	 same	 set	 of	 benefits.		Often,	 the	 respective	 information	 endowments	 and	 the	 delineation	 of	 power	amongst	 the	 actors	 can	 greatly	 affect	 the	 benefits	 or	 payoffs	 each	 actor	 can	receive.		It	is	assumed	that	the	relative	potential	net	benefits	assigned	to	actions	and	outcomes	act	as	external	incentives	and	deterrents	for	actors	in	a	situation,	with	 the	 possible	 final	 outcomes	 being	 determined	 by	 each	 actor’s	 available	action	set.				This	action	set	is	determined	by	each	actor’s	expectations	of	the	likely	behaviour	of	others	operating	within	the	action	situation	as	well	as	three	sets	of	exogenous	parameters 20 :	 rules,	 community	 attributes,	 and	 biophysical	 and	 material	attributes.	Working	 rules-in-use	 designate	 relevant	 aspects	 of	 the	 institutional	context	and	can	 include	 formal	and	 informal	rules,	as	discussed	 in	chapter	 two	(Cole	 &	 Ostrom	 2010).	 	 Working	 rules-in-use	 are	 the	 rules	 of	 interest	 in	 this	research.		They	can	be	classified	as	position	rules,	which	specify	a	set	of	positions	for	 actors,	 as	 boundary	 rules	 which	 specify	 how	 actors	 enter	 or	 leave	 their	positions,	 authority	 rules	which	 determine	 the	 set	 of	 actions	 assigned	 to	 each	position,	 aggregation	 rules	 which	 specify	 the	 transformation	 function	 from	actions	 to	 outcomes,	 scope	 rules	which	 specify	 a	 set	 of	 outcomes,	 information	rules	which	specify	 the	 information	available	 to	each	position,	and	payoff	rules	which	 specify	 how	 benefits	 and	 costs	 are	 required,	 permitted,	 or	 forbidden	 to	players	 (McGinnis	 2011a).	 	 For	 CPRs,	 property	 right	 rules,	 which	 determine	which	actors	have	been	authorised	to	carry	out	which	actions	with	respect	to	the	use	and	management	of	the	good	or	resource	are	of	particular	importance.			Social	and	community	attributes	encompass	all	relevant	aspects	of	the	social	and	cultural	 context	 of	 the	 action	 situation	 of	 interest.	 	 Relevant	 attributes	 of	 the	community	include	trust	and	reciprocity,	a	shared	or	common	understanding	of																																																									20	Ostrom	(2005;	2011a)	calls	them	Exogenous	Variables	to	account	for	the	fact	that	these	states	can	change	over	time	as	a	result	of	feedback	loops	operating	within	an	institutional	arrangement.	As	discussed	in	section	2.2,	however,	the	details	of	this	feedback	loops	are	only	weakly	exploredin	the	literature,	instead	institutional	analyses	which	use	the	IAD	framework	assume	that	rules	are	exogenous	to	actors	within	the	action	situation..	
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members	of	a	community	and	social	capital	(McGinnis	2011a).			Shared	collective	beliefs	or	 ‘cultural	 repertoire’	 also	play	a	 role,	 at	 times	blurring	 the	distinction	between	 social	 and	 community	 attributes	 and	 informal	 rules.	 	What	 has	 been	found	is	that	when	capacity	for	these	aspects	is	provided	for,	less	confrontation	occurs	 within	 the	 action	 situation	 (Ostrom	 &	 Cox	 2010).	 	 The	 final	 element	considered	to	affect	the	action	situation	is	the	diversity	of	biophysical	variables,	which	the	institution	is	designed	to	manage.		Such	variables	refer	to	whether	the	goods	 and	 services	 can	 be	 defined	 by	 the	 characteristics	 of	 common	 pool	resources	 or	 public	 goods,	 thereby	 determining	 the	 type	 of	 interaction	 had	 by	actors	within	the	action	situation.		Within	 an	 institutional	 system	 there	 can	 be	 multiple	 action	 situations	 nested	within	and	across	several	layers	of	analysis	(McGinnis	2011c;	Ostrom	2005).		As	discussed	 in	 section	 2.1,	 a	 polycentric	 institutional	 arrangement	 can	 consist	 of	multiple	 levels,	 so	 that	 the	 actions	 available	 to	 an	 actor	 at	 a	 lower	 level	 are	determined	by	the	capabilities	and	limits	of	the	rules	at	that	level	and	those	at	a	higher	 level.	 	 Figure	 3.3	 shows	 that	 operational	 level	 rules	 directly	 affect	decisions	made	 by	 actors	 at	 the	 lowest	 level	 of	 the	 institutional	 arrangement.		Such	 rules	 and	 actions	 are	 affected	 and	 shaped	 by	 actors’	 actions	 taken	 at	 the	policy	 (formerly	 collective	 choice)	 level.	 	 They	 are	 then	 further	 constrained	by	the	 constitutional	 choice	 rules,	which	 shape	 the	 possible	 rules	 and	 action	 sets	available	to	actors	at	the	policy	choice	level	of	analysis.21				
																																																								21	Figure	3.3	outlines	a	top-down	approach	to	decision-making.		In	a	bottom-up	system	(Ostrom	2005;	Polski	&	Ostrom	1999)	operational	rules	are	understood	to	shape	policy	rules,	which,	in	turn	shape	constitutional	level	rules.	
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Figure	3.3:		 	 The	multiple	levels	of	analysis	in	the	IAD	when	used	to	explain	a	top-down	institutional	system.	Adapted	from	Ostrom	(2005,	p.59).				A	 critical,	 but	 rarely	 studied,	 final	 level	 is	 the	metaconstitutional	 level.	 	At	 this	level	the	rules	coordinating	actors’	collective	beliefs	about	how	the	world	works	are	 situated.	 	 Although	 unobservable,	metaconstitutional	 rules	 influence	 lower	levels	of	the	institutional	system,	shaping	informal	and	formal	rules.	When	actors	hold	 different	 metaconstitutional	 worldviews	 conflict	 can	 arise,	 creating	institutional	 inefficiencies	 and	 providing	 motivation	 for	 institutional	 change	(Greif	1989;	2006).				Linkages,	which	connect	the	multiple	decision	centres	within	and	across	levels	of	governance,	are	important	considerations	for	analysis	using	the	IAD	framework.		Defined	 as	 a	 point	 of	 interaction	 or	 cooperation	 between	 two	 or	more	 actors,	linkages	 enhance	 the	 capacity	 of	 actors	 to	 address	 problems	 or	 overcome	dilemmas	(Heikkila	et	al.	2011).		As	explained	by	Heikkila	and	colleagues	(2011),	in	transboundary	resource	management,	terms	such	as	“co-management”	(Adger	et	 al.	 2005;	 Berkes	 2002;	 Carlsson	 &	 Berkes	 2005;	 Pinkerton	 2003;	 Watson	
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2013),	“institutional	interplay”	(Spranz	et	al.	2012;	Young	2002)	and	“boundary	organisations”	(Cash	&	Moser	2000;	Lee	et	al.	2014)	are	often	alternative	terms	used	 to	 explore	 the	 connection	 between	 actors	 across	 multiple	 levels	 of	governance	 and	 decision	 centres.	 	Within	 the	 IAD	 framework,	 linkages	 can	 be	indicated	 by	 a	 formal	 rule,	 strategy,	 or	 regularised	 action	 that	 establishes	interdependencies	amongst	two	distinct	actors	around	a	specified	task	(Ostrom	2005).	 	 The	 strength	 of	 a	 linkage	 can	 affect	 the	 delivery	 of	 outcomes.	 	 When	linkages	are	weak	as	a	result	of	ill-defined	rules,	ineffective	enforcement,	or	poor	levels	 of	 trust	 and	 reciprocity,	 institutions	 can	 be	 inefficient	 and	 ineffective	 at	delivering	intended	outcomes.			
	
ii.	 Evaluating	the	“play	of	the	game”	While	the	differences	between	institutional	settings	can	be	investigated	using	the	IAD,	 the	role	particular	assumptions	or	rules	play	 in	achieving	outcomes	 is	not	always	 made	 explicit	 by	 the	 framework.	 	 Evaluating	 the	 play	 of	 the	 game	 is	subsequently	the	objective	of	part	two	of	the	comparative	institutional	analysis.				Within	the	Bloomington	and	transaction	cost	economics	schools,	several	metrics	have	 been	 developed	 to	 compare	 various	 institutional	 arrangements.	 To	compare	 environmental	 impacts,	 it	 is	 useful	 to	 evaluate	 how	 any	 institutional	changes	may	affect	peoples’	 choices	 around	 resource	use.	 	 From	an	 economics	perspective,	transaction	costs	represent	the	first	truly	useful	comparative	metric	for	 assessing	 economic	 effects	 (Coase	 1937;	 1960;	 Cole	 2012).	 	 By	 showing	which	 arrangement	minimises	 the	 costs	 of	 transacting,	 researchers	 and	 policy	makers	are	able	to	use	transaction	costs	to	help	determine	which	arrangement	is	most	 likely	 to	maximise	 social	welfare,	 keeping	 in	mind	 the	 importance	 of	 net	benefits	 for	 assessing	 the	 full	 economic	 impacts	 of	 an	 environmental	 policy	(Krutilla	&	Krause	2011).				Ostrom	 and	 colleagues	 working	 in	 the	 Bloomington	 tradition	 repeatedly	approximated	 the	 complexity	 of	 institutional	 settings	 in	 game	 form	 and	 tested	behavioural	 predictions	 in	 the	 laboratory	 (Ostrom	 et	 al.	 1994).	 	 Thus,	 these	previous	 studies	 provide	 a	 methodological	 foundation	 for	 answering	 research	
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question	 two,	 which	 asked	 about	 the	 economic	 and	 environmental	 effects	 of	resource	self-determination.		A	methodological	review	of	both	game	theory	and	experiments	is	given	below.	
	
Game	theory	Games	are	a	way	of	modeling	strategic	interactions,	that	is,	situations	in	which	an	actor’s	action	is	influenced	by	his	or	her	expectations	about	another’s	behaviour	and	 that	 this	 strategic	 element	 is	 recognised	 by	 all	 actors’	 party	 to	 the	interaction.	 	A	game	identifies	the	actors	or	players	and	specifies	a	 list	of	every	course	 of	 action	 available	 to	 each	 actor	 (including	 actions	 contingent	 on	 the	actions	taken	by	others,	or	on	chance	events).		This	is	known	as	the	strategy	set.		A	 game	 also	 identifies	 the	 payoffs	 associated	 with	 each	 strategy	 profile	(combination	 of	 strategies),	 the	 order	 of	 play,	 and	 the	 amount	 of	 information	held	by	each	actor	at	each	stage.22			A	 classical	game	presents	a	possible	outcome	of	 strategic	 interaction	assuming	all	players	are	completely	 rational.	 	The	 rationality	assumption	consists	of	 two	components:	 first,	 individuals	 are	 assumed	 to	 form,	 on	 average,	 correct	 beliefs	about	events	 in	their	environment	and	about	other	people’s	behaviour;	second,	given	their	beliefs,	individuals	choose	those	actions	that	satisfy	their	preferences.		Because	 these	 highly	 stylised	 assumptions	 fail	 to	 properly	 account	 for	 the	‘irrationalities’	often	observed	when	human	actors	interact,	they	are	sometimes	relaxed	to	more	accurately	represent	human	nature	(Schelling	2010).23		Models	 of	 classical	 game	 theory	 can	often	be	divided	 into	 two	 types	of	 games:	non-cooperative	 and	 cooperative	 games.	 	 Non-cooperative	 games	 deal	 with	situations	in	which	players	compete	and	make	decisions	independently	from	one	another	 whereas	 cooperative	 games	 consider	 situations	 in	 which	 groups	 or	coalitions	of	players	make	decisions	together.																																																											22	Such	working	parts	of	the	game	became	the	universal	working	parts	of	the	action	situation	in	the	IAD	framework	(Ostrom	1998).	23	For	example,	relaxing	the	rationality	assumption	has	enabled	concepts	such	as	bounded	rationality	and	learning	to	be	integrated	into	games	through	evolutionary	game	theory.		Such	concepts	have	not	yet	been	integrated	into	classical	games	(Osborne	1994).	
	 47	
The	 non-cooperative	 game	 of	 alternating	 offers	 (Rubinstein	 1982;	 Shaked	 &	Sutton	 1984;	 Stahl	 1971)	 has	 been	 the	 most	 widely	 used	 model	 for	understanding	 real-world	 processes	 relating	 to	 various	 property	 rights	settings.24		It	models	the	bargaining	process	as	a	sequence	of	offers	and	counter-offers	 and	 assumes	 that	 when	 actors	 are	 self-interested	 and	 have	 complete	information	 they	 should	 always	 arrive	 at	 an	 outcome	 that	 is	 Pareto	 efficient	(Osborne	&	Rubinstein	1990).		In	 such	 games,	 the	 interaction	 of	 players	 is	 often	 displayed	 in	 extensive	 form.		This	means	 that	 the	model	 of	 the	 game	 specifies	 the	 possible	 order	 of	 events,	allowing	 each	 player	 to	 consider	 his	 or	 her	 plan	 of	 action	 not	 only	 at	 the	beginning	of	the	game	but	also	whenever	he	or	she	has	to	make	a	decision.25		In	extensive	 form	 games	 and	 repeated	 games,	 it	 is	 assumed	 that	 actors	 will	 use	backward	 induction	 to	 analyse	 their	 situation,	 determine	 the	 consequences	 of	their	 actions	 and	 the	 likely	 choices	 of	 others,	 and	 choose	 accordingly	 (Smith	2010).			In	the	bargaining	game,	the	institutional	environment	governing	the	bargaining	process	 is	 specified	by	an	explicit	 set	of	 rules	which	provides	 for	 two	common	characteristics	of	real-world	bargaining:	the	increased	costs	and	risk	associated	with	waiting	to	complete	a	transaction,	and	relative	bargaining	power.		Because	the	process	of	bargaining	is	time	consuming,	costly	delays	provide	actors	with	an	incentive	to	complete	a	transaction	sooner	rather	than	later.	 	 In	the	alternating	bargaining	 model,	 this	 is	 captured	 by	 a	 discount	 factor	 that	 approaches	 one	(δ=1)	as	actors	become	infinitely	patient.	 	Similarly,	the	game	is	able	to	capture	relative	 bargaining	 power	 by	 specifying	 an	 institutional	 environment,	 which	allows	for	first-mover	advantage.26																																																											24	The	alternating	bargaining	model	was	an	extension	of	Nash’s	(1950)	normative	bargaining	model.	25	In	contrast,	normal	form	games	model	situations	in	which	each	player	chooses	his	or	her	strategy	once	and	for	all	simultaneously	with	all	other	players.		This	means	that	when	choosing	a	plan	of	action,	each	player	must	make	his	or	her	decision	without	being	informed	of	the	plan	of	action	chosen	by	any	other	player.			26	In	 any	 bargaining	 arrangement,	 the	 party	with	 the	 lower	 costs	 has	 greater	 bargaining	 power	 allowing	them	 to	 secure	 a	 larger	 share	of	 the	 good	or	 resource	 as	 a	 result	 (Knight	1992).	 	Bargaining	power	 thus	derives	 from	 the	 capacity	 of	 an	 actor	 to	benefit	 by	 inflicting	 costs	 on	 another,	 as	 can	occur	whenever	 an	actor	is	able	to	make	the	offer	in	a	negotiation.	
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Although	the	bargaining	game	is	often	used	to	examine	peoples’	behaviour	under	different	property	rights	settings,	it	is	important	to	note	that	the	type	of	question	being	asked	can	determine	the	best	modeling	approach	to	use	and	the	outcomes	ultimately	 reached	 (Madani	 2010;	 Ostrom	 2010a).	 For	 instance,	 although	 the	interaction	of	actors	operating	under	different	property	rights	settings	has	come	to	be	defined	by	non-cooperative	bargaining,	early	game	theorists	 interested	in	cooperation	modeled	 the	 interaction	 of	 users	 of	 CPRs	 as	 a	 prisoner’s	 dilemma	game	 (figure	 3.4(a))	 (Dawes	 1973;	 1975;	 Hardin	 1968;	 Hardin	 1982;	 Olson	1971;	 Schelling	 1978;	 Tucker	 1983).	 In	 the	 prisoner’s	 dilemma,	 there	 is	 a	possible	strategy	 for	each	actor	that,	 if	 taken,	yields	higher	payoffs	 to	 the	actor	than	any	other	possible	strategy.		However,	when	all	actors	try	to	maximise	their	payoffs	by	adopting	this	strategy,	each	arrives	at	an	outcome	that	is	worse	for	all;	in	 this	 case,	 the	Nash	equilibrium.	 	A	 coordination	 failure	 results	because	each	actor	fails	to	take	account	of	the	impact	their	decision	will	have	on	others.		
 
		 	 	 								(a)	 	 	 	 	 	 			(b)	
	
Figure	3.4:		 	 The	prisoner’s	dilemma	game	(a)	and	the	assurance	game	(b)	make		clear	how	much	of	an	impact	payoffs	have	on	actors’	choices.		In	the	prisoner’s	dilemma,	the	dominant	strategy	is	for	both	players	to	defect;	however,	in	the	assurance	game,	a	player’s	best	response	is	dependent	on	the	other	player’s	choices			In	any	case,	what	game	 theory	 is	able	 to	make	explicit	 is	 that	 it	 is	 the	possible	payoffs	available	 to	actors,	which	have	 the	greatest	effect	on	actors’	behaviour.		For	 instance,	 when	 interactions	 of	 users	 of	 common	 property	 resources	 are	modeled	 as	 a	 prisoner’s	 dilemma,	 the	 distribution	 of	 payoffs	 means	 that	 the	dominant	 strategy	 leads	 to	 the	 underprovision	 of	 public	 goods	 and	 overuse	 of	common	 pool	 resources.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 assurance	 game	 (figure	 3.4(b))	 (Sen	
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1967),	 which	 is	 also	 a	 strategic	 coordination	 game,	 shows	why	 some	 users	 of	CPRs	may	not	always	end	up	in	a	social	dilemma	(Camerer	2003).				Because	 of	 how	 the	 payoffs	 are	 structured,	 the	 assurance	 game	 has	 multiple	equilibria	of	which	at	least	one	is	considered	socially	optimal.		This	means	that	in	the	 assurance	 game	 actors	 have	 the	 same	 likelihood	 of	 achieving	 a	 socially	optimal	outcome	as	they	do	of	achieving	one	that	 is	not.	 	 It	suggests	that	when	actors	make	 their	 decisions	 in	 a	 group	 setting,	 they	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 gain	from	 mutual	 cooperation	 but	 will	 choose	 to	 defect	 when	 they	 anticipate	 that	others	will	defect.	 	Therefore,	 in	situations	where	groups	manage	to	cooperate,	the	assurance	game	suggests	that	one	of	the	reasons	they	succeed	is	that	there	is	no	risk	of	failed	cooperation	as	actors	trust	that	others	participating	in	the	game	will	make	a	choice	that	is	to	the	benefit	of	the	group.	In	situations	where	groups	do	 not	 successfully	 coordinate	 their	 behaviour	 (the	 risk-free	 strategy),	 it	 is	because	each	actor	does	not	trust	the	other	will	cooperate.			As	 these	 two	 examples	 demonstrate,	 in	 some	 instances	 the	 most	 effective	institutional	remedy	to	a	social	dilemma	or	an	allocation	problem	can	depend	on	how	the	problem	is	viewed	(Bowles	2004).		If	policy	makers	are	concerned	about	levels	 of	 cooperation,	 yet	 view	 actors	 as	 playing	 a	 version	 of	 the	 prisoner’s	dilemma,	 the	 only	 way	 to	 ensure	 actors	 arrive	 at	 an	 outcome	 that	 is	 socially	optimal	 is	by	a	permanent	 intervention	by	policy	makers	to	change	the	payoffs	or	the	rules	of	the	game.	 	However,	 if	actors	are	viewed	as	playing	a	version	of	the	 assurance	 game,	 a	 desirable	 outcome	 can	be	 reached	by	 a	 one-time	 rather	than	permanent	 intervention,	which	nudges	users	 towards	 the	socially	optimal	equilibrium.				Game	 theory	 can	 offer	 planning,	 policy,	 and	 design	 insights	 that	 not	 garnered	using	 other	 traditional	 quantitative	methods	 of	 environmental	 policy	 (Shogren	2005).	 	For	policy	makers	 interested	 in	specifying	an	 institutional	environment	characterised	by	different	property	rights	structures,	the	bargaining	game	can	be	useful.	 	 For	 those	 interested	 in	 cooperation,	 games	 such	 as	 the	 prisoner’s	dilemma	 or	 assurance	 game	may	 be	 a	more	 suitable	 focus.	 	 However,	 in	 both	
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cases,	a	common	problem	remains	-	that	the	strict	rationality	assumptions	rarely	hold	in	real	world	processes.		Subsequently,	testing	games	in	the	laboratory	can	provide	complementary	insights	into	peoples’	behaviour	in	a	group	setting.		
Experiments	In	the	mid-1980s,	a	group	of	interdisciplinary	scholars	performing	studies	in	the	field	began	to	discover	that	the	empirical	evidence	they	were	observing	was	not	consistent	 with	 the	 predictions	 made	 by	 conventional	 game	 theory	 (National	Research	 Council	 1986).	 	 These	 field	 insights	 were	 confirmed	 when	 tested	experimentally	under	controlled	conditions	(Ostrom	et	al.	1994).	 	Such	findings	catalysed	 the	 evolution	 of	 experimental	 economics	 and,	 since	 then,	 economic	experiments	conducted	 in	 the	 lab	and	 field	have	provided	 important	and	novel	insights	 into	 the	 workings	 of	 human	 decision-making	 and	 institutions	 (Bolton	2010).				Field	 experiments	 involve	 testing	 theories	 and	 studying	 institutions	 under	controlled	conditions	in	the	field	in	an	effort	to	understand	more	about	the	‘real	world’	 (List	2006).	 	By	creating	a	setting	with	a	mixture	of	control	and	realism	field	experiments	 create	a	useful	bridge	between	 the	 laboratory	and	naturally-occurring	 data	 (List	 &	 Price	 2013;	 2016).	 	 Unfortunately,	 however,	 field	experiments	 can	 be	 costly,	 making	 lab	 experiments	 a	 practical	 alternative	 in	some	 cases.	 Lab	 experiments	 can	 test	 theories	 and	 institutional	 effects	 at	relatively	low	cost	(Falk	&	Heckman	2009).	They	are	also	useful	for	asking	policy	questions	where	 the	 proposed	 programme	 intervention	 has	 no	 counterpart	 in	reality	 and	 where	 constructing	 counterfactuals	 are	 difficult	 to	 do	 in	 the	 field	(Camerer	 2011;	 Janssen	 et	 al.	 2010;	 Ward	 et	 al.	 2006).	 	 Subsequently,	 this	research	 uses	 a	 laboratory	 experiment	 to	 test	 the	 unique	 predictions	 of	 a	classical	 game	 and	 evaluate	 the	 effects	 of	 resource	 self-determination	 on	environmental	and	economic	outcomes	in	the	case	of	the	Whanganui	River,	New	Zealand.		When	the	non-cooperative	bargaining	game,	described	in	the	previous	section,	is	played	 in	 the	 lab	 to	 understand	 more	 about	 how	 actors	 make	 decisions	 over	
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CPRs	 under	 different	 property	 rights	 settings,	 players	 rarely	 behave	 as	 game	theory	would	predict	(Croson	&	Johnston	2000;	Dreber	et	al.	2012;	Hoffman	et	al.	 2008;	 Leliveld	 et	 al.	 2008;	 Oxoby	&	 Spraggon	 2008).	 	 In	 the	 version	 of	 the	bargaining	game	most	commonly	used,	a	positive	monetary	amount,	the	‘cake’	is	split	by	one	actor	(the	proposer)	and	distributed	(Güth	et	al.	1982).	 	The	other	party	(the	receiver)	can	either	accept	the	proposed	distribution	or,	if	there	is	no	agreement,	both	parties	get	zero.		The	game	theoretic	solution	assigns	nearly	all	the	cake	to	the	proposer,	the	receiver	being	expected	to	realise	that	getting	some	of	the	cake,	however	small,	is	better	than	nothing.		These	predictions	are	rarely	supported	 experimentally,	 however.	 	 Instead,	 players	 have	 been	 shown	 to	 be	significantly	more	cooperative	than	would	be	expected	using	game	theory.	In	the	standard	version	of	the	game,	rather	than	offering	receivers	the	smallest	positive	amount	 of	 the	 pie,	 proposers	 have	 been	 shown	 to	 offer	 receivers,	 on	 average,	around	40-60%	(Ostrom	2010b).		Such	offers	are	then	almost	always	accepted.				In	addition,	receivers’	acceptance	rates	tend	to	decrease	with	smaller	offers,	and	that	 they	 approach	 zero	 quite	 quickly	 for	 offers	 below	 20%	 (Güth	 &	 Kocher	2014).		This	suggests	that	receivers	are	not	only	guided	by	profit	maximisation,	but	 also	 by	 what	 might	 be	 considered	 ‘fair’.	 	 If	 a	 proposer	 is	 receiving	 a	substantially	greater	payoff	 than	the	receiver,	 the	receiver	might	be	 inclined	to	reject	the	offer,	even	at	a	cost	to	him	or	herself.		In	turn,	the	proposer	may	also	be	aware	of	 the	 receiver’s	willingness	 to	 reject	unfair	offers	or	be	guided	by	 their	own	fairness	concerns	when	making	offers	to	the	receiver.				When	the	bargaining	game	is	applied	to	property	rights	problems,	experimental	results	 again	 diverge	 from	 game	 theory	 predictions	 of	 players’	 choices.	 Early	property	 right	 experimental	 research	 showed	 that	 the	 allocation	 of	 property	rights	 to	 players	 in	 the	 bargaining	 game	 caused	 individual	 players	 to	 become	more	 self-regarding,	 with	 a	 heightened	 effect	 when	 the	 property	 right	 was	‘earned’	 (Hoffman	et	 al.	 1994).	 	More	 recent	 experiments	have	 shown	 that	 the	allocation	 of	 property	 rights	 can	 also	 impact	 social	 preferences	 (Dreber	 et	 al.	2012;	Huang	2000;	van	Dijk	&	Wilke	1997),	 loss-aversion	(Leliveld	et	al.	2008;	Sarlo	et	al.	2013),	feelings	of	entitlement	(Hoffman	et	al.	1994;	2008;	Lesorogol	
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2014),	 and	 have	 wealth	 effects	 (Oxoby	 &	 Spraggon	 2008).	 	 Separately,	experimental	 research	 has	 shown	 how	 property	 rights	 arrangements	 have	spillover	 effects	 on	 individuals	 or	 groups	 who	 are	 not	 directly	 party	 to	 an	exchange	(Bland	&	Nikiforakis	2015;	Murphy	&	Howitt	1998).		Further,	 contrary	 to	 game	 theoretic	 predictions,	 experiments	 have	 also	suggested	that	peoples’	decisions	are	not	independent	of	their	experience.		Third	parties	have	been	shown	to	retaliate	against	past	treatment,	impacting	resource	allocation	 outcomes	 (Herz	 &	 Taubinsky	 2014).	 	 Likewise,	 Bednar	 et	 al	 (2015)	recently	found	that	individuals’	future	behaviour	is	likely	to	depend	on	their	past	behaviour,	 showing	 that	 players	 take	 their	 experience	 with	 them	 into	 new	settings.		For	the	identification	of	resource	self-determination	for	the	Whanganui	River,	this	has	important	implications	as	it	suggests	that	policy	makers	who	treat	each	property	rights	setting	as	independent	could	tend	towards	underestimating	or	over	stating	predictions.			Experiments	 can	 be	 a	 useful	 tool	 for	 policy	makers	 to	 determine	 the	 possible	effects	of	property	rights	rule	changes	ex	ante	(Shogren	1993;	Ward	et	al.	2008).		They	 provide	 insights	 into	 actors’	 strategic	 behaviour	 in	 a	 setting	 where	 real	consequences	 exist	 for	 peoples’	 choices.	 	 This	 allows	 for	 a	 priori	 assumptions	about	 peoples’	 behaviour	 to	 be	 tested	 in	 a	 controlled	 environment.	 	 For	 this	reason,	 experiments	 and	 the	 bargaining	 game	 in	 particular	 are	 used	 in	 this	research	to	answer	the	second	research	question	and	determine	the	likely	effects	of	resource	self-determination	on	economic	and	environmental	outcomes.	
	
iii.	 Analysing	institutional	change:	The	dynamic	IAD	framework	The	 second	 major	 strand	 of	 this	 research	 examines	 the	 diachronic	 aspects	 of	institutions.		As	outlined	in	section	2.2,	the	subject	of	institutional	change	within	institutional	 economics	 remains	 divided	 by	 competing	 schools	 of	 thought.		Within	 the	 Bloomington	 School	 itself,	 no	 comprehensive	 theory	 or	 analytical	framework	 exists	 which	marries	 the	 two	 schools	 of	 thought	 and	 supports	 the	concept	of	institutional	change	as	an	evolutionary	process	driven	by	individuals	
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wishing	 to	 optimise	 their	 utility	 –	 the	 definition	 of	 institutional	 change	developed	in	section	2.2.27			This	definition	 is	not	supported	by	 the	 IAD	 framework	because	 the	 framework	treats	the	institutional	 ‘system’,	or	the	 ‘rules	of	the	game’,	as	exogenous.	 	When	rules	 are	 treated	 as	 exogenous,	 they	 are	 unable	 to	 be	 changed	 by	 actors	operating	within	the	action	situation.	 	This	precludes	the	analysis	of	purposeful	institutional	change.	 	Further,	the	game	underlying	the	framework	in	the	action	situation	 is	 conceptualised	 as	 a	 repeated	 game	 that	 does	 not	 provide	 for	 the	evolution	 of	 the	 institutional	 system	 as	 a	 whole	 or	 the	 adaptive	 learning	 of	individuals	(Greif	2013;	Poteete	2013).		An	 opening	 exists	 to	 extend	 the	 IAD	 to	 enable	 it	 to	 be	 used	 for	 explaining	institutional	 change.	 	 Inspiration	 can	 be	 taken	 from	 other	 dynamic	 analytical	frameworks	outside	of	the	Bloomington	School	and	by	integrating	the	important	elements	of	 institutional	change	outlined	 in	section	2.2	 into	 the	 framework.	 	 In	the	rules	of	 the	game	tradition	Mantazavinos	et	al.	 (2005),	Alston	et	al.	 (2012),	and	North	 (1990)	have	all	proposed	 frameworks	 in	which	actors	motivated	by	their	 own	 utility	 drive	 change.	 Similarly,	 frameworks	 supporting	 the	 notion	 of	evolutionary	 change	 have	 been	 developed	 which	 focus	 primarily	 on	 the	motivation	of	self-enforcing	expectations	(Aoki	2007;	Greif	&	Laitin	2004).28			Shared	 characteristics	 of	 these	 frameworks	 are	 that	 institutions	 are	 treated	 as	endogenous	 to	 the	 action	 situation	 and	 those	 that	 use	 game	 theory,	 model	players’	 interactions	as	dynamic	rather	 than	classical	games.	 	To	 transform	the	IAD	 into	 a	 dynamic	 framework	 suitable	 for	 the	 diachronic	 analysis	 of	institutions,	 it	 is	 proposed	 that	 these	 two	 elements	 are	 also	 accommodated																																																									27	Identified	as	a	frontier	of	future	work,	Ostrom	(2013)	made	a	preliminary	effort	at	positing	a	method	for	recording	 rule	 changes,	 suggesting	 a	 stepwise	 record	 of	 rule	 changes	 could	 be	 made	 to	 examine	 the	processes	 that	 lead	 to	 changes	 in	 rule	 configurations,	 analogising	 it	 with	 biological	 evolution	 in	circumstances	where	 the	 intentional	choice	of	 rules	 is	not	possible.	For	rule	configurations	 to	evolve,	 she	argued:	 “there	must	 be	 processes	 that	 (1)	 generate	 variety,	 (2)	 select	 rules	 based	 on	 relatively	 accurate	information	about	comparative	performance	in	a	particular	environment,	and	(3)	retain	rules	that	perform	better	in	regard	to	criteria	such	as	efficiency,	equity,	accountability,	and	sustainability”	(Ostrom	2013,	p.25).			28	Stretching	beyond	the	economic	approach	to	institutional	analysis,	Mahoney	and	Thelen	(2010)	also	propose	a	framework	for	gradual	institutional	change	that	builds	on	the	literature	of	path	dependence	as	it	relates	to	institutional	change	(eg.	David	1994;	Greif	2006;	North	1990).	
	 54	
within	the	IAD	framework,	first,	by	recognising	rules	as	endogenous	rather	than	exogenous	and,	second,	by	synthesising	dynamic	game	theory	with	the	IAD.					
Recognising	institutions	as	endogenous	From	a	theoretical	perspective,	institutional	change	must	be	considered	partially	endogenous,	purely	because	only	those	who	are	affected	by	the	institution	have	any	motivation	to	alter	it	(Brousseau	et	al.	2011;	Cole	&	Grossman	1999).		In	any	institutional	arrangement,	informal	rules	can	only	be	changed	en	masse	and	thus	informal	rules	can	be	considered	exogenous	to	the	individual	but	endogenous	to	the	 group	 (Greif	 2006).	 In	 contrast,	 depending	 on	 their	 position	 within	 the	institutional	arrangement,	a	single	actor	can	change	formal	rules.	 	Formal	rules	can	therefore	also	be	viewed	as	endogenous,	however,	their	relative	endogeneity	is	determined	by	 the	position	held	by	 the	actor	 in	 the	 institutional	 system.	For	actors	operating	at	the	lower	levels	of	an	institutional	system,	all	formal	rules	are	exogenous;	however,	for	those	at	higher	levels,	all	formal	rules	can	be	considered	endogenous.	 This	means	 that	 in	 any	multi-level	 system	 some	 actors	 operating	within	the	action	situation	will	have	the	power	to	change	the	working	rules	 in-use.		Such	 endogenous	 change	will	 be	predominantly	 “overwhelmingly	 incremental”	(North	 1990,	 p.89)	 as	 “[the]	 sequence	 of	 connecting	 events…allow	 the	 past	 to	exert	a	continuing	influence	upon	the	shape	of	the	present”	(David	1994,	p.206).		Over	successive	periods	actors	 learn	about	 the	consequences	of	 their	decisions	through	 a	 process	 of	 trial	 and	 error,	 and	 update	 their	 choices	 accordingly	(Mantzavinos	et	al.	2004;	Popper	1972).		However,	with	each	update	they	remain	constrained	by	the	existing	institutions,	biophysical	conditions,	and	the	broader	community	 attributes	 (McGinnis	 2011a).	 	 Together	 this	 interaction	produces	 a	gradually	evolving	equilibrium	path	 facilitated	by	the	systematic	reinforcement	of	beliefs	and	rules	over	time.			Exogenous	 disruptions	 or	 shocks	 can	 cause	 individual	 actors	 to	 update	 their	beliefs	 and	 rules	 rapidly,	 however,	 so	 that	 the	 gradually	 evolving	 equilibrium	
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path	becomes	a	punctuated	equilibrium	path.29		Small	exogenous	disruptions	can	be	 triggered	 by	 technological	 advancement	 (Arthur	 1989),	 the	 movement	 or	entry	of	an	actor	within	or	into	the	action	situation	(Basurto	&	Ostrom	2009),	or	changes	 in	 exogenous	 domains	 influencing	 decisions	 in	 the	 institutional	arrangement	 of	 interest.	 	 McGinnis	 (2011c),	 for	 instance,	 considered	 how	networks	 of	 adjacent	 action	 situations	 influence	 the	 institutional	 domain	 of	interest.	 	 Although	 the	 three	 case	 study	 examples	 were	 examined	 using	 the	original	 IAD	 framework,	 McGinnis	 showed	 how	 the	 action	 situation	 of	 one	institutional	arrangement	can	exogenously	influence	the	value	of	one	or	more	of	the	working	components	of	an	adjoining	action	situation.		In	an	effort	to	explain	institutional	 change,	 Ostrom	 and	 colleagues	 (Ostrom	 2013;	 Ostrom	 &	 Basurto	2011)	also	employed	the	idea	of	exogenous	disruptions,	but	considered	them	to	be	 captured	 by	 the	 choices	 of	 actors	 at	 one	 level	 affecting	 those	 at	 another	level.30		 These	 types	 of	 events	 are	 considered	 small	 disruptions	 and	 can	 be	viewed	as	interruptions	to	the	gradually	evolving	institution.		Over	 successive	 periods,	 however,	 repeated	 disruptions	may	 cause	 beliefs	 and	rules	 to	diverge	 so	 that	 “critical	 junctures”	 emerge	which	 increase	or	decrease	the	range	of	choices	available	to	actors	(Collier	&	Collier	2002).		Such	events	can	trigger	a	parametric	shift	in	equilibrium	through	the	rapid	adjustment	of	beliefs	and	 rules	 and	 impose	 significant	 shocks	 on	 the	 institutional	 system	 (Greif	 &	Laitin	 2004).	 	 Similarly,	 events	 such	 as	 war	 (Kingston	 2007)	 can	 also	 impose	significant	shocks	on	the	system	and	cause	qualitative	shifts	 in	the	institutional	equilibrium.	 	 In	 the	 process	 of	 institutional	 evolution,	 such	 shocks	 and	disruptions	provide	exogenous	impetus	for	progressive	change,	in	extreme	cases	driving	the	institutional	equilibirium	from	one	state	to	another	(Aoki	2001;	Greif	2006).		Adapting	 the	 IAD	 framework	 to	 account	 for	 endogenous	 evolutionary	 change	requires	 rules	 to	 be	 incorporated	directly	 into	 the	 action	 situation	 rather	 than	being	 categorised	 as	 exogenous	 to	 the	 action	 situation.	 The	 next	 section																																																									29	The	concept	of	“punctuated	equilibrium”	was	initiated	by	Eldredge	and	Gould	(1972)	and	came	out	of	evolutionary	biology.	30	It	is	in	this	way	that	Ostrom	is	able	to	keep	rules	exogenous	through	the	process	of	institutional	change.			
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demonstrates	that	this	adjustment	can	be	made	quite	easily	by	modeling	actors’	interactions	 in	 the	action	situation	as	a	dynamic	game	rather	 than	a	classically	repeated	game.				
Using	dynamic	game	theory	to	explain	diachronic	processes	When	 rules	 are	 viewed	 as	 exogenous	 as	 is	 the	 case	 in	 the	 IAD	 framework,	 the	most	 suitable	 game	 theory	 approach	 for	 modeling	 actors’	 interactions	 is	 a	classical	game.		In	a	classical	game,	rules	create	the	pre-existing	domain	in	which	players	interact	and	are	unable	to	be	changed	by	the	players.		When	institutional	change	is	viewed	as	an	evolutionary	process	driven	by	actors	seeking	to	optimise	their	utility,	however,	actors	must	be	given	the	authority	to	change	the	domain	of	the	 game	 in	 which	 they	 interact.	 This	 can	 be	 achieved	 by	 substituting	 the	classical	game	for	a	dynamic	game	in	the	action	situation.				A	canvassing	of	the	literature	shows	that	two	central	approaches	have	emerged	for	 analysing	 institutional	 change	 through	 a	 dynamic	 game	 theory	 lens:	 the	‘evolutionary’	and	‘equilibrium’	modeling	approaches.	 	In	both	approaches	each	repeated	strategic	 interaction	 is	expressed	as	a	static	game	either	 in	normal	or	extensive	 form	 (Friedman	 1998).	 	 The	 game	 form,	 including	 the	 payoffs	 and	possible	 strategies	 generally	 remains	 exogenously	 given	 and	 fixed	 and	 players	are	 given	 the	 opportunity	 to	 choose	 among	 different	 combinations	 of	alternatives	(Smith	1980).		It	is	generally	accepted	that	traits	or	alternatives	that	increase	net	benefits	are	preferred	over	those	that	do	not	(Hodgson	2007).		In	 the	 first	 ‘evolutionary’	 approach	 to	 analysis,	 a	 self-enforcing	 convention	 of	behaviour	 is	 established	 independent	 of	 third-party	 enforcement	 or	 conscious	design	 (Axelrod	 1984;	 Lewontin	 1961;	 Maynard	 Smith	 1972;	 1982;	 Smith	 &	Price	 1973;	 Sugden	 2005).31		 Players	 are	 assumed	 to	 lack	 common	 knowledge	about	 the	 rules	 and	 structure	 of	 the	 game,	 are	 understood	 to	 be	 boundedly	rational,	 and	 thought	 to	 inherit	 their	 strategies	 from	choices	made	 in	previous	rounds.	 Evolutionary	 games	 model	 the	 strategic	 interactions	 of	 actors	 by																																																									31	Additional	representative	works	in	evolutionary	game	theory	are	those	of	Sugden	(1989),	Aoki	(1995;	2001),	Young	(1998),	and	Bowles	(2004). 
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creating	 a	 situation	 in	which	 (a)	higher	payoff	 strategies	displace	 lower	payoff	strategies	 over	 time,	 (b)	 there	 is	 some	 inertia,	 and	 (c)	 players	 do	 not	systematically	 attempt	 to	 influence	 other	 players’	 future	 actions	 and	 are	therefore	 unconcerned	 about	 reputation	 effects	 (Friedman	 1998).	 This	distinguishes	 evolutionary	 games	 from	 classical	 games,	 such	 as	 the	 bargaining	game,	 in	 which	 players	 often	 share	 common	 knowledge,	 are	 assumed	 to	 be	purely	self-regarding,	and	are	understood	to	administer	calculated	threats	where	necessary	(Hodgson	&	Huang	2010).		The	alternative	game	theoretic	approach	is	that	developed	by	Greif	(1989;	2006),	Milgrom	et	al.	(1990),	Greif	et	al.	(1994),	and	Calvert	(1995)	among	others	and	is	known	as	the	‘equilibrium’	approach.	These	examples	use	sophisticated	concepts	of	 equilibrium,	 such	 as	 subgame	 perfect	 equilibrium,	 to	 explore	 the	 dynamic	nature	 of	 institutions	 (Greif	 &	 Laitin	 2004).	 	 A	 subgame	 perfect	 equilibrium	prescribes	 a	 strategy	 for	 each	 player	 constituted	 as	 a	 comprehensive	 plan	 of	action	choices	contingent	on	all	possible	future	states	of	the	game.		Each	element	of	the	evolving	institutional	arrangement	must	therefore	be	self-enforcing.		To	explain	endogenous	institutional	change	using	a	subgame	perfect	framework,	Greif	 and	 Laitin	 (2004)	 introduce	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘quasi-parameters’.	 	 Quasi-parameters	 refer	 to	 parameters,	 which	 are	 exogenous	 in	 the	 short-run,	 but	change	into	endogenous	variables	through	the	course	of	the	game.		At	each	stage	in	the	game,	Greif	and	Laitin	argue	that	changes	in	quasi-parameters	disrupt	the	equilibrium,	 providing	 an	 impetus	 for	 institutional	 change.	 	 As	 a	 result,	institutional	change	may	follow	a	punctuated	equilibrium	path,	in	which	gradual	changes	 in	 quasi-parameters	 occasionally	 lead	 to	 a	 ‘crisis’	 (and	 institutional	change)	 when	 it	 becomes	 clear	 that	 existing	 patterns	 of	 behaviour	 no	 longer	constitute	a	self-enforcing	equilibrium.			The	strength	of	this	model	is	its	ability	to	identify	stable	strategies	that	support	mutually	desirable	payoff	profiles,	however,	one	of	the	pronounced	weaknesses	is	that	its	use	of	the	subgame	perfect	means	that	the	approach	fails	to	reveal	why	a	 certain	 institution	 evolves	 in	 one	 place,	 yet	 does	 not	 evolve	 elsewhere.	 Aoki	
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(2001)	 overcomes	 this	 limitation	 by	 defining	 the	 ‘system’	 as	 a	 set	 of	 shared	beliefs	 about	 how	 the	 game	 is	 played	 and	 extending	 the	 equilibrium	 game	framework.		Rather	than	representing	institutions	using	equilibria	or	a	subgame	perfect	 solution	 concept,	 Aoki	 (2001,	 pp.197–202;	 2010,	 pp.124–128)	 uses	rigorous	set-theoretic	notions	 to	derive	 the	concept	of	 institutions	as	summary	representations	of	equilibria.				As	shown	in	figure	3.5,	in	Aoki’s	conception	of	an	institution,	the	institution	is	the	collective	 beliefs	 of	 all	 actors	 interacting	within	 the	 institutional	 arrangement.		This	is	represented	as	the	rules	of	the	game.		The	domain	of	a	game	is	the	set	of	actors	along	with	all	of	their	available	action	sets	in	each	successive	period.		The	action	 profile	 is	 thus	 the	 combination	 of	 actions	 chosen	 in	 one	 period	 by	 all	actors	 in	 a	 domain.	 	 Over	 successive	 periods,	 an	 action	 profile	 in	 one	 period	generates	a	consequence	 for	all	actors.	 	This	consequence	describes	all	possible	physical	states	affecting	the	payoffs	of	actors	within	the	domain	while	accounting	for	external	environments	and	historically	determined	states	of	 the	domains	at	the	 beginning	 of	 a	 period.	 	 The	 consequence	 of	 one	 period	 defines	 an	 initial	(exogenous)	 state	 of	 the	 next	 period,	 labeled	 the	 consequence	 function.	 	 Thus,	the	physical	consequences	in	the	state	space	for	each	action	profile,	as	well	as	an	historically	given	initial	state,	represent	the	exogenous	rules	of	the	game	and	can	act	as	an	exogenous	starting	unit	for	the	analysis	of	institutional	change.			
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Figure	3.5:		 Institutions	as	rules	cum	shared	beliefs.		Adapted	from	Aoki	2007,	p.9.		This	conceptualisation	of	dynamic	change	 is	useful	because	 it	views	a	changing	institution	 as	 a	 summary	 representation	 of	 an	 equilibrium	 outcome	 in	 a	 game	rather	 than	 a	 set	 of	 enforced	 rules	 or	 a	 complex	 state	 of	 subgame	 perfect	equilibrium.		This	allows	for:	(1)	the	evolving	institutional	system	to	be	analysed	as	a	whole,	(2)	the	identification	of	an	exogenous	starting	unit	necessary	for	the	study	of	endogenous	change,	and	(3)	 the	 incorporation	of	exogenous	shocks	or	disruptions	 into	 the	 frame	 –	 all	 elements	 identified	 in	 the	 previous	 section	 as	necessary	for	the	analysis	of	endogenous	institutional	change.		Yet,	 this	approach	remains	constrained	by	Aoki’s	own	definition	of	 institutions.		Aoki	 views	 institutions	 as	 a	 self-sustaining	 system	 of	 shared	 beliefs	 so	 that	change	 is	 thought	 to	only	occur	 if	 actors’	 beliefs	 change	on	 critical	mass.	 	This	means	that,	a	change	in	a	statutory	law	is	not	considered	an	institutional	change	unless	 it	 simultaneously	 and	 systematically	 alters	 the	 perception	 of	 many	individual	actors	 to	 induce	a	qualitative	change	 in	 their	strategic	choices.	 	New	institutions	 only	 develop	 in	 response	 to	 an	 environmental	 shock,	 or	 internal	crisis	in	the	domain,	or	some	combinations	of	both.			
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Thus,	although	Aoki’s	summary	equilibrium	analysis	 is	assessing	the	choices	of	each	individual,	institutional	change	occurs	at	the	collective	or	social	level	of	an	institutional	arrangement.		By	defining	institutions	as	a	system	of	shared	beliefs,	it	fails	to	make	allowance	for	the	fact	that	the	selection	of	institutional	equilibria	is	 not	 only	 driven	 by	 the	 beliefs	 of	 the	 critical	 mass	 as	 expected	 under	 the	structuralist	perspective,	but	also	the	relative	payoffs	and	power	of	independent	agents	 anticipated	 under	 the	 agency	 perspective.	 	 In	 addition,	 although,	 Aoki	does	emphasise	that	‘symbolic	markers’,	such	as	rules,	summarise	the	properties	of	equilibria	(Aoki	2001;	2007),	he	does	not	acknowledge	that	rules	themselves	are	a	necessary	condition	for	coordinating	peoples’	behaviour	(Binmore	2010).32		In	 situations	where	 actors	 have	 heterogeneous	 individual	 beliefs,	 formal	 rules	and	 their	 enforcement	 become	 a	 critical	 component	 of	 the	 institution	 for	coordinating	peoples’	choices.		These	 missing	 elements	 can	 be	 effectively	 addressed	 by	 synthesising	 Aoki’s	approach	 to	 institutional	 change	 with	 the	 multi-level	 elements	 of	 Ostrom’s	original	 IAD	 framework,	 however.	 In	 the	 following	 section	 Aoki’s	 approach	 to	institutional	change	is	embedded	into	the	IAD	framework.		What	results	is	a	new	dynamic	 IAD	 framework	 that	 is	 theoretically	 and	 conceptually	 robust	 for	 the	analysis	of	institutional	change.	
	
Extending	the	IAD	for	dynamic	analysis	The	current	shortfall	of	the	IAD	framework	is	that	it	does	not	explicitly	address	the	process	of	institutional	change.		By	basing	the	framework	on	a	repeated	game	and	 including	 feedback	 loops	 in	 the	 framework,	 Ostrom	 acknowledges	 that	institutions	 involve	 repeated	 interactions,	 but	 by	 treating	 rules	 as	 exogenous	does	 not	 provide	 for	 the	 endogenous	 evolution	 of	 rules	 or	 the	 purposeful	adjustment	 of	 rules	 by	 actors	 within	 the	 action	 situation.	 	 To	 enable	 the	 IAD	framework	to	explicitly	provide	for	the	evolution	of	an	institutional	arrangement	driven	 by	 individuals	 seeking	 to	 optimise	 their	 utility,	 institutions	 need	 to	 be	
																																																								32	Aoki	does	emphasise	that	‘symbolic	markers’,	such	as	rules,	summarise	the	properties	of	equilibria	(Aoki	2001;	2007),	however,	he	does	not	formally	create	a	link	between	the	equilibrium	and	rules	based	accounts	of	institutions,	nor	the	agency	and	structuralist	perspectives.	
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treated	as	endogenous	and	 the	 interaction	of	actors	within	 the	action	situation	modeled	as	a	dynamic	game.	
	Building	 on	 the	 discussion	 of	 institutional	 change	 in	 chapter	 two	 and	 the	discussion	 above,	 the	 previous	 section	 identified	 three	 important	 analytical	components	 of	 institutional	 change	 to	 help	 explain	 why	 one	 institution	 is	selected	 over	 another.	 	 These	 components	 were	 the	 identification	 of	 an	exogenous	 starting	 unit,	 the	 synthesis	 of	 evolutionary	 and	 purposeful	 change,	and	 exogenous	 shocks	 or	 disruptions.	 	 Aoki’s	 dynamic	 model	 of	 institutional	change	identifies	an	exogenous	starting	unit,	provides	an	explanation	of	why	one	institution	 is	 selected	over	another,	and	allows	 for	evolutionary	analysis	of	 the	institutional	 system	 as	 a	 whole.	 	 He	 also	 considers	 the	 shift	 in	 institutional	equilibirum	 that	 can	 come	 from	 exogenous	 shocks.	 	 Purposeful	 institutional	change	 can	 be	 considered	 in	 the	 analysis	 by	 synthesising	 Ostrom’s	multi-level	institutional	map	with	Aoki’s	model	as	is	described	below.		Ostrom’s	 starting	 unit	 of	 analysis	 for	 the	 IAD	 is	 the	 action	 situation,	 or	 the	working	 parts	 of	 the	 game	 (McGinnis	 2011a).	 	 In	 the	 dynamic	 form	 of	 the	framework,	 the	 starting	 unit	 of	 analysis	 is	 the	 summary	 representation	 of	 the	equilibrium	outcome	of	the	game	labeled	the	consequence	function,	in	figure	3.6.	Identifying	the	exogenous	starting	unit	requires	pinpointing	the	self-sustaining,	salient	patterns	of	social	interactions	at	play	at	the	time	the	researcher	wishes	to	commence	 their	 analysis	 as	 well	 as	 the	 outcomes,	 which	 arise	 from	 such	interactions.	 As	with	 Ostrom’s	 action	 situation	 the	 researcher	 can	 record	 how	actors	interact	in	the	domain	and	the	action	sets	available	for	each	of	them.		The	consequence	 function,	 which	 specifies	 particular	 (physical)	 consequences	 of	concern	 to	 some	 or	 all	 of	 the	 actors	 equates	 to	 the	 outcomes	 observed	 in	 the	action	situation	in	the	IAD.				 	
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The	initial	consequence	function	is	considered	to	be	the	outcome	of	a	gradually	evolving	 state	 of	 equilibrium	 bounded	 by	 the	 exogenous	 variables	 outlined	 by	Ostrom	 in	 the	 IAD	 framework,	 namely	 the	 biophysical	 characteristics,	 the	community	attributes	and	the	rules-in-use	(Aoki	2001,	p.186).		Actors	operating	within	 the	 institutional	 arrangement	are	understood	 to	hold	beliefs	 about	how	the	world	works	 and	how	others	 are	 likely	 to	behave.	 	 These	beliefs	 constrain	and	 influence	 individuals	 and	 organisations	 enabling	 such	 actors	 to	 form	strategies	to	optimise	their	mutually-consistent	choices.	As	each	actor’s	strategy	is	 based	 on	 their	 expectations	 of	 how	 they	 expect	 others	 to	 behave,	 the	 group	jointly	constructs	an	equilibrium	state,	which	is	represented	by	the	rules-in-use.			This	 state	 of	 institutional	 equilibrium	 coordinates	 behaviour	 until	 such	 a	 time	that	some	sort	of	exogenous	shock	disrupts	the	equilibrium.		As	discussed,	these	shocks	can	shift	the	institution	qualitatively	so	that	it	jumps	from	one	equilibria	to	 another,	 or	 simply	 interrupt	 it	 so	 that	 individuals	 iteratively	 update	 their	beliefs	in	the	existing	action	situation	causing	the	pattern	of	institutional	change	to	follow	a	punctuated-equilibrium	path.		Significant	shocks	are	categorised	by	a	shift	 in	 worldview	 and	 a	 measurable	 shift	 in	 decision-making	 power,	 while	smaller	 disruptions	 are	 recognisable	 through	 progressive	 rule	 changes	 and	gradual	social	change.		Although	Aoki	assumes	 that	 institutional	 change	occurs	as	a	 result	of	a	 shift	 in	beliefs	by	the	majority,	should	the	shock	or	disruption	affect	a	decision-making	actor	at	 an	upper	 level	of	 the	 institutional	arrangement,	he	or	 she	may	change	the	rules	to	better	reflect	his	or	her	new	set	of	beliefs,	whether	or	not	the	new	beliefs	 are	 shared	 with	 others.	 In	 situations	 where	 the	 shock	 is	 not	 large,	individuals	 may	 update	 their	 beliefs	 about	 the	 social	 landscape	 iteratively	creating	 a	 punctuated	 equilibrium	 path.	 	 This	 pathway	 will	 also	 display	 path-dependence,	 as	 the	 development	 of	 both	 informal	 and	 formal	 rules	 will	 be	explicitly	moulded	by,	and	adapted	from,	the	consequent	function	of	the	previous	period.				
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Purposeful	rule	changes	by	actors	optimising	their	utility	are	 incorporated	 into	the	 dynamic	 framework	 by	 assuming	 that	 each	 actor	 operating	 within	 the	institutional	 arrangement	 has	 his	 or	 her	 own	 set	 of	 beliefs,	 which	 guide	 their	decisions	 and	 motivate	 their	 choices.	 	 At	 each	 level	 of	 the	 institutional	arrangement	 actors	with	 the	 authority	 to	 change	 rules	will	 do	 so	 if	 deemed	of	benefit	to	themselves.		However,	as	actors	are	only	able	to	change	formal	rules	at	the	level	of	the	institutional	arrangement	at	which	they	rest,	those	at	lower	levels	of	 the	 institutional	 arrangement	 will	 be	 limited	 in	 what	 change	 they	 can	engender.			Actors	at	higher	levels	of	the	institutional	arrangement,	however,	will	be	able	to	actively	change	formal	rules	and	impact	the	choices	available	to	actors	at	lower	levels	of	the	institutional	arrangement.		The	assumption	is	that	formal	rules	are	more	likely	to	be	endogenous	to	actors	who	have	greater	authority	to	design	and	change	formal	rules	at	the	upper	policy	or	constitutional	levels	of	the	institutional	arrangement.		Those	at	lower	levels	of	the	 institutional	 arrangement	will	 find	 the	design	of	 formal	 rules	 outside	 their	control	 and	 will	 have	 to	 drive	 change	 through	 processes	 outside	 of	 the	institutional	arrangement	 in	which	they	operate.	 	 	 	Similarly,	 it	 is	assumed	that	informal	rules	will	evolve	gradually	without	design	unless	all	actors	exposed	to	an	 exogenous	 shock	 update	 their	 beliefs	 simultaneously	 causing	 a	 qualitative	shift	in	equilibrium.			This	 new	 dynamic	 IAD	 framework	 allows	 institutional	 change	 to	 be	 analysed	when	 defined	 as	 an	 evolutionary	 process	 driven	 by	 individuals	 looking	 to	optimise	their	utility.		In	chapter	seven	this	dynamic	IAD	framework	is	applied	to	the	 case	 of	 the	Whanganui	 River	 to	 help	 explain	 how	 and	 why	 resource	 self-determination	 was	 selected	 as	 an	 alternative	 approach	 for	 governing	 a	 river	system.		
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iv.	 Measuring	institutional	robustness:	Ostrom’s	design	principles	As	 a	 final	 mode	 of	 evaluation,	 the	 overarching	 robustness	 of	 resource	 self-determination	is	assessed	and	compared	with	state	ownership	in	chapter	eight.		This	evaluation	aims	to	answer	the	 fourth	research	question	to	determine	how	long	lasting	and	stable	the	new	arrangement	is	likely	to	be.		This	is	a	significant	challenge	 for	 reasons	 that	 are	both	methodological	 and	 substantive.	 	The	most	significant	issues	of	method	stem	from	the	sheer	number	of	conditions	that	may	be	relevant	to	the	relative	stability	of	an	institutional	arrangement.		For	instance,	in	a	comparative	analysis	of	three	key	works	on	resource	governance	(Baland	&	Platteau	 1996;	 Ostrom	 1990;	Wade	 1988),	 Agrawal	 (2001)	 found	 36	 separate	characteristics	identified	by	the	authors	as	central	to	the	successful	governance	of	common	property	resources.		Likewise,	there	are	issues	with	inter-scalar	comparisons.		Do	inferences	that	are	valid	at	the	local	level	also	apply	to	more	macro-level	phenomena?		What	about	cross-scale	 analyses?	 	 Young	 (2002)	 concluded	 that	 cross-scale	 interactions	create	an	 inescapable	 tension	where	 the	benefits	of	higher-level	arrangements,	measured	 in	 terms	 of	 opportunities	 to	 consider	 biophysical	 interdependencies	and	 to	 engage	 in	 ecosystem	 management,	 is	 contrasted	 with	 the	 costs	 of	operating	 at	 higher	 levels.	 	 These	 costs	 include	 the	 difficulty	 of	 tailoring	 the	arrangement	 to	 local	 conditions	 and	 local	 actors.	 	 Together,	 these	 tradeoffs	create	 challenges	 for	 identifying	 characteristics	 that	 translate	 into	 robust	governance	frameworks.		From	 a	 substantive	 perspective,	 within	 most	 lists	 characterising	 robust	institutional	 arrangements	 deficiencies	 remain	 in	 the	 set	 and	 type	 of	characteristics	 identified.	 	 Often	 the	 resource	 characteristics	 themselves	 are	lacking,	 with	 little	 attention	 given	 to	 how	 various	 aspects	 of	 a	 resource	 may	affect	how,	and	whether,	users	are	able	 to	 sustain	 institutions	 (Agrawal	2003).		Likewise,	 many	 lists	 pay	 only	 limited	 attention	 to	 the	 exogenous	 social,	institution,	 and	 physical	 environment	 (Araral	 2014).	 As	 discussed,	 variables	exogenous	 to	 the	 domain	 can	 affect	 choices	 made	 within	 the	 institutional	
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arrangement.	 	 Likewise,	 the	 interaction	 of	 states	 and	 markets	 outside	 of	 the	domain	can	explicitly	shape	the	variables	under	study.		Ostrom’s	(1990)	design	principles	are	not	immune	to	these	methodological	and	substantive	 challenges,	 but	 they	 provide	 a	 convincing	 set	 of	 variables	 for	understanding	why	the	results	of	 institutional	design	are	robust	 in	some	cases,	yet	fail	in	others	(Cole	2012).33		Empirical	testing	of	studies	designed	to	evaluate	the	principles	have	supported	the	general	hypothesis	that	when	a	group	designs	a	 property	 rights	 system	 that	 meets	 most	 of	 the	 design	 principles,	 there	 is	 a	greater	probability	 that	 it	will	 survive	disturbances	over	 time	(Cox	et	al.	2010;	Ostrom	2008a).	 	 	Because	the	principles	are	built	on	the	presumption	that	local	solutions,	 which	 are	 less	 costly,	 are	 preferred	 to	 more	 distant	 social	 choice	forums,	 which	 are	 more	 costly,	 the	 conclusions	 of	 the	 principles	 can	 be	considered	consistent	with	a	comparative	transaction-cost	analysis	(Cole	2012).		For	 this	 reason,	 analysis	 of	 the	 proposed	 application	 of	 resource	 self-determination	 to	 the	Whanganui	 River	 is	 a	 useful	 complementary	 predictor	 of	the	 likely	 success	 of	 the	 new	 arrangement.	 	 While	 testing	 peoples’	 behaviour	experimentally	 can	 evaluate	 the	 possible	 impacts	 a	 change	 in	 property	 rights	may	have	on	environmental	and	economic	outcomes,	it	 is	unlikely	to	be	able	to	capture	the	nuances	of	the	institutional	arrangement,	which	could	influence	the	long-term	success	of	resource	self-determination.		Therefore,	the	final	evaluation	takes	Ostrom’s	design	principles	and	uses	 them	as	a	broader	predictive	 tool	of	resource	 self-determination’s	 robustness	 in	 the	 context	 of	 Whanganui	 River.	Using	 the	 design	 principles	 as	 a	 comparative	 measure,	 resource	 self-determination	 is	 also	 compared	 with	 state	 ownership	 to	 identify	 whether	 the	new	 arrangement	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 more	 stable	 and	 robust	 than	 the	 existing	property	 rights	 system	 governing	 the	 Whanganui	 River.	 	 The	 results	 of	 this	analysis	are	given	in	chapter	eight.																																																											33	The	list	of	Ostrom’s	design	principles	used	in	this	research	follow	Michael	Cox	and	colleague’s	(2010)	extension	of	Ostrom’s	eight	design	principles.		That	this	was	a	necessary	extension	appears	to	have	been	first	discussed	in	Agrawal	(2001).	
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3.3	 Conclusions	
	This	 chapter	 outlined	 a	methodological	 framework	 for	 this	 research	 nested	 in	the	 Bloomington	 approach	 and	 complemented	 by	 transaction	 cost	 economics.		Over	 40	 years	 of	 research	 on	 common	 pool	 resources	 in	 this	 tradition	 has	demonstrated	 the	diversity	 and	 complexity	 of	 institutions	 and	 the	 impact	 they	can	 have	 on	 peoples’	 behaviour.	 	 Frontiers	 remain,	 however,	 not	 least	 in	 the	analysis	of	dynamic	institutions	and	the	identification	of	property	rights	regimes	that	sit	outside	those	more	commonly	examined.		The	 review	 of	 the	 methodology	 literature	 discussed	 the	 various	 analytical	approaches	 used	 in	 this	 research,	 highlighting	 the	 value	 of	 adopting	 an	embedded	case	study	approach	to	analyse	the	complex	case	of	applying	resource	self-determination	to	a	river	system	grounded	in	theory.34		The	following	chapter	introduces	the	case	study	in	careful	detail	and	outlines	the	methods	used	for	data	collection	and	analysis.			
	 	
																																																								34	Important	to	note	here	is	that	it	is	necessary	to	show,	not	only	that	results	are	in	line	with	theory,	but	that	alternative	explanations	are	not	supported.	
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4	 Case	study,	data	collection,	and	
	 analytical	summary	
	
	
4.0	 Introduction	
	The	 previous	 chapter	 introduced	 the	 research	 questions	 and	 outlined	 the	research	 design	 used	 in	 this	 thesis.	 	 It	 explained	 how,	 in	 the	 spirit	 of	 the	Bloomington	School	and	transaction	cost	economics,	the	research	questions	are	addressed	 using	 a	 research	 framework	 designed	 to	 advance	 a	 theoretical	 and	empirical	 research	 agenda.	 	 As	 discussed,	 this	 research	 examines	 the	institutional	 economics	 of	 granting	 a	 river	 legal	 standing	 using	 an	 embedded	case	study.	 	The	case	study	can	be	separated	 into	 two	key	analytical	strands:	a	comparative	 analysis	 comparing	 resource	 self-determination	 with	 the	centralised	 property	 rights	 system	 and	 an	 historical	 analysis	 exploring	institutional	 change.	 A	 qualitative	 analysis	 is	 then	 conducted	 examining	 the	relative	 robustness	 of	 the	 resource	 self-determination	 compared	 with	 the	existing	property	rights	system	of	state	ownership.		This	 chapter	 introduces	 the	 case	 study	 of	 the	 Whanganui	 River	 and	 provides	insight	 into	 the	 specific	mixed-methods	used	 to	answer	 the	 research	questions	and	advance	 the	 research	agenda.	 	 In	 section	one,	 the	case	study	 is	 introduced	and	 community	 attributes	 and	 biophysical	 characteristics	 of	 the	 catchment	outlined.	 	 These	 are	 considered	 some	 of	 the	 exogenous	 parameters	 of	 the	institutional	arrangement.	 	 In	section	two,	the	process	undertaken	for	selecting	the	case	study	site	is	explained.		The	qualitative	and	quantitative	data	collection	process	 is	 explained	 in	 section	 three.	 Section	 four	 summarises	 the	 analytical	approach	as	further	details	of	each	process	are	provided	in	chapters	five,	six,	and	seven.		The	chapter	is	concluded	in	section	five.			
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4.1	 	 Introducing	the	case	study:	The	Whanganui	River,	New	Zealand35	
	From	 the	 base	 of	 Mt	 Tongariro,	 the	 Whanganui	 River	 weaves	 through	 New	Zealand’s	central	North	Island	for	290km	flowing	into	the	Tasman	Sea	beside	the	town	of	Whanganui.	 	As	New	Zealand’s	 longest	navigable	river,	 the	Whanganui	has	 always	been	a	major	 ‘highway’	 linking	 the	 coast	 and	 the	 interior.	 	 Prior	 to	European	settlement	in	the	1830’s,	the	river	supported	a	population	of	(at	times)	over	2000	Maori	and	many	more	would	 travel	up	and	down	 its	 length,	 trading	goods	 and	 travelling	 across	 country	 (Young	 2006). 36 		 More	 than	 140	 pā	(settlements)	 were	 located	 along	 the	 river,	 many	 of	 which	 were	 large	 and	permanent	 kāinga	 (villages)	 (Waitangi	 Tribunal	 1999).	 	 For	 the	 people	 of	Whanganui,	Te-Atihaunui-a-Paparangi,	the	river	has	always	been	of	high	cultural	and	spiritual	value.	
	
Map	4.1:		 Whanganui	River	catchment	area	(Waitangi	Tribunal	1999,	p.14).																																																									35	See	glossary	of	Māori	terms	in	Appendix	i.	36 Prior to European settlement, the total Māori population in Aotearoa-New Zealand was estimated to be around 
100,000.  By 1843 it had already fallen to between 50,000 and 80,000 (King 2003).  Today around 15% of New 
Zealand’s population (around 600,000) identify as Māori (Statistics New Zealand 2013). 
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Following	European	 settlement	 stock	 and	 tradable	 goods	were	 transported	 up	and	down	river	and	to	early	visitors	the	Whanganui	became	known	as	“the	Rhine	of	the	Pacific”	(Downes	1921).		The	New	Zealand	government	(the	Crown)	began	to	 formalise	 its	 institutional	 control	 over	 the	 river	 from	 the	 1870’s,	 using	 the	river	for	gravel	extraction	and	hydropower	(Waitangi	Tribunal	1999).		Today	the	Tongariro	 Power	 Development	 Scheme	 (TPDS)	 operated	 by	 Genesis	 Energy	Limited	 (Genesis)	 diverts	 82%	 of	 the	 headwaters	 of	 the	 Whanganui	 to	 help	supply	around	5%	of	New	Zealand’s	electricity	 (Waitangi	Tribunal	2015).	 	The	diverted	water	can	be	considered	consumptive	flow	as	 it	 is	not	returned	to	the	river,	 instead	 being	 channeled	 north	 to	 Lake	 Taupo	 and	 released	 into	 the	Waikato	 River.	 	 Genesis	 is	 the	 largest	 user	 of	 water	 on	 the	Whanganui	 River,	although	as	of	November	2016	172	other	operators	also	had	consent	to	extract	and	use	water.	
	
Map	4.2:		 	 The	Tongariro	Power	Development	Scheme	catchment	area	(Waitangi	Tribunal	2013,	p.1066).		82%	of	flow	is	diverted	from	the	headwaters	of	the	Whanganui	River	for	operation	of	the	western	diversion.	
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The	river	catchment	covers	approximately	7100	square	kilometres	of	steep	hill	country,	 alpine	 areas,	 indigenous	 forest,	 scrub,	 farmland,	 and	 exotic	 forestry	(Horizons	Regional	Council	2003).	The	majority	of	the	catchment	is	managed	as	private	property,	although	parts	of	 two	National	Parks,	managed	by	 the	Crown	sit	 within	 the	 catchment’s	 boundaries.	 The	 catchment	 covers	 four	 local	government	jurisdictions	and	encompasses	several	small	towns	and	settlements	of	which	most	are	located	beside	the	Whanganui	River	or	its	tributaries.	 	These	include	 Taumarunui	 and	 the	 town	 of	 Whanganui,	 which	 has	 a	 population	 of	almost	43	000	(Statistics	New	Zealand	2013)37.	 	Communities	 in	the	catchment	are	largely	bi-cultural	and	on	average	have	a	higher	unemployment	rate	than	the	rest	 of	 New	 Zealand	 (Statistics	 New	 Zealand	 2013).	 	 Industry	 and	 agriculture	remain	the	drivers	of	growth	in	the	region.		In	terms	of	non-market	economic	values,	since	time	immemorial	the	Whanganui	River	has	been	central	to	the	life	of	local	Māori.		For	Te	Atihaunui	the	river	is	an	ancestor	 from	 whom	 the	 Iwi	 descend	 and	 towards	 whom	 they	 have	 a	responsibility.	 	 There	 have	 been	 long-standing	 contests	 over	 ownership	 and	control	of	the	river,	with	the	rights	held	by	the	state	being	repeatedly	challenged	by	the	Iwi	in	court.		The	river	also	has	high	recreation	and	tourist	values.		More	than	5500	people	canoe	or	kayak	the	river	annually,	usually	spending	between	three	to	five	days	on	the	water	(Department	of	Conservation	2012a)38.		Some	of	the	river’s	tributaries,	 like	the	Whangaehu	River,	offer	some	of	the	world’s	best	trout	 fisheries,	 contributing	 further	 to	 the	 river’s	 recreational	value.	 	The	 river	also	 has	 high	 natural	 and	 environmental	 values	 providing	 habitat	 for	 the	endangered	whio	 (blue	 duck)	 and	 several	 other	 endangered	 species,	 including	native	fish.		The	 risk	 of	 soil	 erosion	 is	 an	 inherent	 feature	 of	 the	 landscape	 due	 to	 the	relatively	 young	 soft-rock	 geology	 and	 the	magnitude	 and	 frequency	of	 storms																																																									37	Whanganui	and	the	other	small	centres	along	the	river	are	largely	bicultural.		Unemployment	levels	are	over	2%	higher	in	Whanganui	than	the	rest	of	New	Zealand,	sitting	at	9.6%	rather	than	7.1%	(Statistics	New	Zealand	2013).		The	town	is	reliant	on	industry	for	economic	prosperity.	The	river	is	an	important	component	of	the	town’s	identity	for	both	Māori	and	non-Māori	(Pākehā).	38	This	report	states	that	between	2005/06	and	2011/12	visitor	numbers	on	the	‘Whanganui	River	Journey’	increased	by	43.5%,	so	the	quoted	figure	of	5500	annual	canoeists	is	now	likely	to	be	higher.	
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(Manderson	 et	 al.	 2013).	 	 This	 risk	 has	 been	 exacerbated	 by	 extensive	 land	clearance	 resulting	 in	 degraded	 water	 quality	 and	 reducing	 the	 productive	capacity	 of	 surrounding	 farmland	 (Horizons	 Regional	 Council	 2003).	 	 Water	quality	 in	 the	 catchment	 has	 also	 deteriorated	 due	 to	 effluent	 from	 sewage	discharges	and	run-off	of	animal	manures	and	nutrients	 from	up-stream	farms.		This	 has	 led	 to	 some	 lakes	 and	 rivers	 in	 the	Whanganui	 Region	 declining	 to	 a	point	 where	 it	 is	 too	 risky	 to	 swim	 or	 gather	 food,	 and	 aquatic	 life	 is	 being	affected	(Horizons	Regional	Council	2016b).		Water	quality	in	the	Whanganui	River	itself	is	rated	as	‘fair’,	which	means	that	it	is	 generally	 suitable	 for	 swimming	 (Horizons	 Regional	 Council	 2016,	 s.5);	however,	a	report	by	NIWA	on	water	quality	in	the	Whanganui	River	published	in	 1995	 concluded	 "[its]	 degraded	 condition	 is	 unsatisfactory	 in	 a	 river	 with	major	 tourist	 and	 conservation	 values…"	 (NIWA	 1995,	 p.9).	 	 From	 a	 cultural	perspective,	 local	 Iwi	 also	 consider	 the	 health	 of	 the	 river	 unsatisfactory.	 	 The	mixing	 of	 the	 waters	 of	 the	 Whanganui	 River	 by	 the	 Tongariro	 Power	Development	Scheme	is	an	affront	to	the	river	and	Iwi’s	mana	(honour,	prestige)	and	the	river,	which	once	tasted	of	kowhai	flowers,	now	runs	slow	and	sluggish	(Young	1998).		In	2012,	a	preliminary	agreement	was	signed	by	representatives	of	Whanganui	Iwi	and	the	Crown,	formally	acknowledging	the	special	status	of	the	Whanganui	River	as	an	ancestor	of	the	Whanganui	Iwi	and	promising	the	development	of	a	framework	that	would	recognise	the	legal	rights	of	the	Whanganui	River	and	its	catchment.		At	the	time	of	writing,	the	proposal	had	been	formalised	as	the	Te	Pā	Auroa	 framework	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Te	 Awa	 Tupua	 (Whanganui	 River	 Claims	Settlement)	Bill	2016,	which	was	passed	into	legislation	in	March	2017.		This	Act	offers	the	first	example	of	river	being	given	legal	rights	“from	the	mountains	to	the	sea”	and	 it	 is	 thus	 this	case	and	property	rights	change	that	 is	examined	 in	this	research.		
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4.2	 	 Selecting	the	case	study	site		
	To	 answer	 the	 research	 questions	 pertaining	 to	 the	 institutional	 economics	 of	granting	 a	 river	 legal	 standing,	 it	 was	 necessary	 to	 study	 a	 substantively	important	 case	 where	 resource	 self-determination	 had	 been	 proposed	 for	governing	a	river	system.	At	 the	commencement	of	 this	research	 in	2013	there	was	only	one	example	of	this:	the	Whanganui	River,	New	Zealand.				Within	the	case	study	literature,	some	scholars	have	argued	that	the	selection	of	extreme	cases,	like	the	adoption	of	resource	self-determination,	adds	little	value	to	the	literature	(Achen	&	Snidal	1989;	Geddes	1991;	2003).		Their	concerns	lie	in	the	potential	for	selection	biases	and	the	risk	of	“inferential	fallacies”	that	have	“devastating	consequences”	for	findings’	validity	(Achen	&	Snidal	1989,	pp.160–161).	 	However,	good	theories	must	be	able	 to	explain	substantively	 important	cases	 as	 well	 as	 those	 randomly	 selected.	 The	 application	 of	 resource	 self-determination	 and	 the	 selection	 of	 the	Whanganui	 River	 case	 present	 a	 useful	opportunity	 to	 test	 long-standing	 institutional	 theories	within	 a	 new	 property	rights	setting.		Others	 have	 also	 suggested	 that	 the	 analysis	 of	 single	 cases	 provides	 little	opportunity	 for	 a	 generalisation	 of	 results	 (Donmoyer	 2000).	 	 Agrawal	 (2001)	for	 instance,	 argues	 that	 the	 wide	 range	 of	 different	 variables	 to	 which	 the	success	 (or	 failure)	 of	 certain	 institutional	 arrangements	 is	 often	 attributed	reduces	 the	 generalisability	 of	 results	 and	 that	 the	 conclusions	 drawn	 from	single	 cases	 are	 often	 only	 relevant	 to	 the	 case	 under	 consideration.	However,	examples	 of	 influential	 case	 study	 research	 show	 that	 this	 is	 not	 always	 true.		Single	case	studies	can	influence	the	scientific	discourse	and,	in	some	cases,	have	motivated	the	establishment	of	broad-based	research	programmes.39		Successful	case	 studies	 address	 the	 potential	 weaknesses	 of	 single	 case	 analysis	 by	grounding	the	research	questions	and	hypotheses	in	theory,	thereby	maintaining	external	 validity	 in	 analysis	 and	 providing	 for	 transferability	 (Lincoln	 &	 Guba	1985)	if	not	generalisability,	of	findings	(Donmoyer	2000).																																																									39	See	(Allison	1971;	Dahl	1961;	Skocpol	1979)	for	examples	of	influential	single	case	studies.	
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The	 case	 of	 the	 Whanganui	 River	 offers	 a	 definitive	 example	 of	 how	 a	 river	system	can	be	granted	legal	rights.		The	case	provides	an	opportunity	to	compare	a	 state	 property	 rights	 arrangement	 with	 the	 system	 of	 resource	 self-determination	by	comparing	the	existing	property	rights	arrangement	with	the	future	 system.	 	 It	 also	 allows	 for	 the	 ex	 ante	 analysis	 of	 economic	 and	environmental	effects	of	the	property	rights	change	–	one	of	the	grey	spots	in	the	literature	 identified	 in	 chapter	 two.	 	 In	 addition,	 the	 case	 provides	 an	opportunity	to	undertake	a	research-based	analysis	of	institutional	change	using	the	new	dynamic	IAD	framework	developed	in	chapter	three.	Finally,	the	case	is	able	to	be	analysed	using	Ostrom’s	design	principles	to	draw	conclusions	about	the	 likely	 robustness	 of	 resource	 self-determination	 as	 an	 alternative	property	rights	arrangement	for	governing	a	river	system.					4.3		 Data	collection	
	Both	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 data	 were	 collected	 as	 part	 of	 this	 research.		Qualitative	data	were	gathered	from	interviews	with	actors	operating	within	the	institutional	arrangement	governing	the	Whanganui	River	and	triangulated	with	data	gathered	from	archival	records	and	various	document	sources.		Quantitative	data,	 used	 for	 evaluating	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 institutional	 environment,	 came	from	a	laboratory	experiment.		The	process	of	data	collection	for	each	data	type	is	described	in	turn.	
	
4.3.1	 Qualitative	data:	Interviews	and	fieldwork	The	primary	qualitative	data	used	to	answer	research	questions	one,	three,	and	four	 were	 gathered	 from	 in-depth	 interviews	 with	 33	 actors	 involved	 with	governance	and	use	of	 the	Whanganui	River.	 	The	 interview	periods	were	split	into	 two	blocks,	with	 interviews	with	15	 subjects	 taking	place	 between	 June	 –	August	 2014	 and	 interviews	 with	 a	 further	 18	 actors	 undertaken	 between	October-November	2015.		The	majority	of	interviews	were	individual	interviews	conducted	face-to-face	in	Wellington	and	in	Whanganui,	New	Zealand;	however,	by	necessity	two	interviews	were	conducted	over	the	phone	and	Skype	due	to	it	
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not	 being	 possible	 to	meet	with	 the	 subjects.	 Two	 interviews	were	 conducted	with	two	subjects	each	(one	of	 these	subjects	also	participated	 in	an	 individual	interview	before	contributing	to	a	second)	and	one	interview	was	conducted	in	a	group	setting.		Interview	 subjects	 were	 actors	 at	 each	 level	 of	 the	 institutional	 arrangement	governing	 the	 Whanganui	 River.	 	 An	 initial	 scoping	 study,	 plus	 pre-existing	knowledge	of	 the	water	governance	structure	 in	New	Zealand,	contributed	to	a	preliminary	 identification	 of	 key	 stakeholders	 and	 organisations.	 	 Individual	interview	subjects	were	selected	using	purposive	sampling	and	then	through	the	snowball	 technique,	 whereby	 suitable	 interview	 subjects	 were	 identified	 from	recommendations	 of	 other	 interviewees	 (Atkinson	 &	 Flint	 2001).	 	 In	 several	cases,	 interview	 subjects	 introduced	me	 to	 future	 interviewees,	which	 enabled	access	to	subjects	that	would	have	been	otherwise	difficult	to	contact.		Potential	network	biases	were	mitigated	by	ensuring	 that	 the	 interview	subjects	 initially	selected	 came	 from	 a	 range	 of	 backgrounds	 and	 by	 remaining	 attentive	 to	 the	perils	 of	 relying	 too	 heavily	 on	 information	 obtained	 from	 one	 interviewee’s	referrals	(Biernacki	&	Waldorf	1981;	Mosley	2013).		The	 interview	 subjects	 were	 contacted	 initially	 via	 email,	 prompted	 with	reminders	and	called	by	telephone	when	necessary.	Interviews	were	open-ended	but	 followed	 a	 basic	 structure	 that	 was	 offered	 to	 subjects	 before	 meeting,	enabling	 them	 to	 prepare	 for	 the	 discussion	 should	 they	 wish.	 	 Thus	 each	interview	can	be	classified	as	a	semi-structured	interview	(Starr	2014).		Subjects	were	 asked	 about	 how	 governance	 of	 the	Whanganui	 River	 was	 administered	under	 the	 state	 property	 rights	 system	 as	well	 as	 their	 expectations	 of	 how	 it	would	 operate	 following	 the	 river	 being	 granted	 legal	 standing.	 	 Interviews	usually	lasted	around	40	minutes,	with	the	longest	extending	to	90	minutes	and	the	shortest	being	only	20	minutes.		Approval	 to	 collect	 interview	 data	 was	 given	 by	 the	 Australian	 National	University	Ethics	Committee	as	an	Expedited	Ethical	Review	E2.		This	meant	that	the	data	collection	process	was	considered	to	“engage	participants	who	are	fully	
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competent	and	not	vulnerable	in	research	settings	that	are	relatively	benign,	[but	that	 the	 circumstances	 are]	 not	 what	 the	 participants	 would	 encounter	 in	everyday	life”.		Consent	was	sought	from	each	participant	who	offered	to	partake	in	 the	 interview	 process	 prior	 to	 the	 interview	 commencing	 and	 it	 was	made	clear	to	interviewees	that	they	could	withdraw	from	the	interview	at	any	stage.40		A	copy	of	 the	 information	sheet	and	consent	 form	shared	with	participants	are	available	in	appendices	(ii)	and	(iii).		Once	 collected,	 data	 were	 stored	 on	 a	 password-secured	 computer	 and	 the	consent	forms	locked	in	a	secure	cabinet	separately	to	any	hard-copy	interview	data.	 	 Audio-recordings	 were	 transcribed	 using	 headphones	 as	 soon	 as	practicable	following	the	interview	and	the	dictaphone	stored	on	the	researchers	person	 (travelling	 from	 interviews)	 or	 in	 a	 locked	 storage	 device.	 The	 audio	recording	was	removed	from	the	dictaphone	as	soon	as	it	was	viable	and	stored	on	a	password-protected	computer.		It	was	agreed	that	all	data	would	be	stored	for	at	least	five	years	following	publication.		The	time	period	of	data	collection	covered	the	period	directly	after	resource	self-determination	 was	 proposed	 as	 a	 new	 property	 rights	 arrangement	 for	governing	the	river	and	the	18	months	following.		Throughout	this	period	there	was	much	uncertainty	about	the	 legislation	(passed	in	March	2017)	and	how	it	would	be	operationalised.		This	made	persuading	some	actors	to	take	part	in	the	research	quite	difficult.		Over	the	period	of	data	collection,	there	was	a	significant	level	of	 anxiety	about	 the	potential	 for	 the	public	 to	 react	negatively	 to	a	 river	being	granted	legal	rights	and	the	impact	this	could	have	on	the	legislation	being	successfully	 passed.	 	 Significant	 investment	 had	 been	 made	 through	 the	negotiation	process	and	neither	negotiating	party	(the	Crown	and	Iwi)	wished	to	treat	 their	respective	 investments	as	sunk	costs.	 	As	a	result,	 in	addition	to	 the	formal	interview	subjects,	several	people	were	interviewed	about	the	subject	but	their	comments	were	made	officially	off-the-record.		
																																																								40	One	interview	subject	did	pull	out	of	the	research	citing	a	conflict	of	interest.	
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As	is	important	for	ensuring	the	validity	of	interview	data,	the	comments	made	by	 interview	 subjects	 were	 triangulated	 with	 documents	 and	 archival	 records	where	 appropriate.	 	 Documents	 such	 as	 policy,	 legislation,	 and	 news	 sources	were	 of	 particular	 value	 for	 understanding	 the	 linkages	 prevalent	 in	 the	governance	 arrangement	 of	 the	 Whanganui	 River.	 	 These	 were	 principally	sourced	online.		Archival	records,	such	as	early	reports	of	life	on	the	Whanganui	River	 were	 gathered	 from	 the	 Whanganui	 Historic	 Museum’s	 archive.	 	 The	Museum	has	a	significant	collection	of	documents	of	early	life	on	the	Whanganui	River	and	the	social	attitudes	that	dominated	interactions	between	actors.		Other	archival	material	was	 gathered	 from	 the	University	of	Canterbury	 and	Victoria	University	 of	 Wellington,	 and	 several	 books	 from	 the	 National	 Library	 of	Australia.			The	 triangulation	process	 involved	 cross-checking	 the	accuracy,	 relevance,	 and	completeness	of	 the	 information	given	by	 the	 interviewees	against	 information	from	 other	 sources	 (Starr	 2014).	 	 The	 process	was	 also	 inverted	 to	 check	 the	validity	 of	 my	 interpretation	 of	 documents	 and	 reports	 with	 interviewees	 to	elaborate	 my	 understanding	 of	 the	 data	 (Jick	 1979)	 and	 confirm	 its	 accuracy	(Denzin	2009).	 	Ultimately,	the	collection	of	qualitative	data	and	its	subsequent	analysis	 provided	 a	 strong	 contextual	 basis	 for	 the	 quantitative	 analysis	 and	contributed	to	 the	elucidation	of	 the	 institutional	economics	effects	of	applying	resource	self-determination	to	a	river	system	(Danermark	2002).	
	
4.3.2	 Quantitative	data:	Laboratory	experiments	To	 evaluate	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 institutional	 change	 governing	 the	 Whanganui	River,	data	on	peoples’	behaviour	under	the	two	settings	were	gathered	from	the	laboratory.	All	experimental	sessions	were	carried	out	at	the	Monash	Laboratory	for	Experimental	Economics,	Monash	University,	Australia,	between	October	and	November	2015.	A	total	of	108	undergraduate	students	from	various	disciplines	were	 recruited	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 experiment	 using	 the	 Online	 Recruitment	System	for	Economic	Experiments	(ORSEE)	(Greiner	2004).		
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The	specific	hypotheses	for	the	experiment	were	generated	from	the	analysis	of	the	 institutional	environment	carried	out	using	 the	 IAD	so	 that	 the	hypotheses	identified	 for	 evaluating	 the	 findings	 from	 the	 qualitative	 data	 were	 not	generated	until	the	qualitative	analysis	was	complete.		Significant	time	was	spent	translating	the	findings	of	the	IAD	into	game	form	and	designing	an	experiment,	a	process,	which	is	outlined	in	detail	in	chapter	six.41				Again	ethics	approval	was	sought	from	the	Australian	National	University	Ethics	Committee	in	2015	and	granted	prior	to	conducting	the	experiment.	 	This	time,	approval	was	given	as	a	Low-Risk	Expedited	1	Protocol	as	it	was	considered	that	the	participants	would	only	be	engaging	in	activities	similar	to	what	they	would	encounter	 in	 everyday	 life.	 	 The	 experiment	 was	 carried	 out	 in	 line	 with	 the	ethics	approval	and	the	procedure	outlined	in	detail	in	chapter	six.				
4.4	 	 Analysis	of	data		The	 qualitative	 data	 collected	 as	 part	 of	 this	 research	 were	 preliminarily	organised	 and	 examined	 using	 data	 displays.	 	 This	 process	 began	 during	 the	fieldwork	and	continued	through	analysis.	 	These	data	displays	took	two	forms	and	 spurred	 two	 different	 analytical	 strategies;	 each	 of	which	was	 selected	 to	best	address	the	research	questions.		Each	will	be	now	described	in	turn.		For	 the	 comparative	 analysis	 of	 the	 existing	 and	 proposed	 institutional	arrangements	 governing	 the	 Whanganui	 River,	 the	 exogenous	 variables	 and	actors	 interacting	 in	 the	 institutional	 arrangement	 governing	 the	 Whanganui	River	were	 identified	 from	 the	qualitative	data.	 	 Interview	data	were	manually	coded	 to	 identify	 key	 actors	 and	 rules	 and	 triangulated	 with	 documentary	evidence	where	 possible.	 	 Key	 statements	 of	 interviewees	were	 cross-checked	with	 data	 from	 other	 sources	 and	 entered	 into	 the	 data	 display	 accordingly.																																																										41	Initially	the	objective	had	been	to	design	an	experiment	addressing	actors’	levels	of	cooperation	under	the	two	property	rights	settings,	centralised	control	and	resource	self-determination.		However,	a	canvassing	of	the	literature	showed	that	property	rights	arrangements	were	more	commonly	tested	using	non-cooperative	bargaining	games.		Subsequently,	it	is	in	this	tradition	that	the	evaluation	proceeded.	
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Attention	 then	 turned	 to	 understanding	 the	 changes	 proposed	 under	 resource	self-determination	 and	 the	 analytical	 process	 was	 repeated	 to	 determine	 the	effect	resource	self-determination	will	have	on	property	rights.			To	 evaluate	 these	 changes	 and	 quantify	 the	 possible	 effects	 on	 environmental	and	economic	outcomes,	data	collected	in	the	lab	was	statistically	analysed	using	STATA.	 	 Both	 a	 within	 and	 between	 analysis	 of	 the	 existing	 and	 future	institutional	 arrangements	 was	 conducted	 at	 the	 individual	 level	 to	 test	 three	general	hypotheses	generated	from	the	qualitative	institutional	analysis.		Further	details	of	the	analysis	are	given	in	chapter	six.		A	second	analytical	strategy	was	employed	to	understand	how	and	why	resource	self-determination	was	selected	as	an	alternate	property	rights	arrangement	for	the	Whanganui	 River	 (Carus	&	Ogilvie	 2009).	 The	 dynamic	 version	 of	 the	 IAD	framework	outlined	 in	 chapter	 three	was	 tested	empirically.	 	Transcriptions	of	the	interview	data	were	printed	and	coded	thematically,	separating	data	points	into	 causal	 variables	 acknowledged	 by	 theory	 to	 contribute	 to	 institutional	change.	 	 These	 variables	 included	 rules	 that	 were	 treated	 as	 endogenous	 and	exogenous	 shock	 parameters.	 	 Data	 gathered	 from	 document	 sources	 and	archival	records	were	similarly	organised	and	coded.	What	emerged	was	a	map	of	 path-dependent	 institutional	 change	 for	 the	Whanganui	River,	which	 clearly	outlined	the	role	various	factors	played	in	the	eventual	identification	of	resource	self-determination.		The	 overarching	 objective	 of	 this	 process	 was	 two-fold.	 	 Firstly,	 the	 research	aimed	to	contribute	to	theory	by	examining	whether	 institutional	change	could	be	 considered	 endogenous	 and	 to	 determine	 whether	 diachronic	 change	 was	indeed	 a	 combination	 of	 evolutionary	 progression	 and	 individual	 utility	maximisation	as	had	been	proposed	in	chapter	two.	Secondly,	this	section	of	the	research	 aimed	 to	 examine	 empirically	 how	 and	 why	 resource	 self-determination	 was	 adopted	 as	 a	 property	 rights	 approach	 for	 a	 river	 in	 New	Zealand.				
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4.5	 Conclusions	
	The	 research	 design	 adopted	 for	 exploring	 the	 institutional	 economics	 of	granting	a	water	system	legal	standing	uses	an	embedded	case	study	design.		The	use	of	mixed-methods	 for	data	 collection	and	analysis	 allows	a	 comprehensive	picture	 of	 resource	 self-determination	 to	 be	 painted	 by	 accounting	 for	 both	qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 elements	 of	 the	 case.	 It	 allows	 the	 research	questions	to	be	addressed	as	well	as	the	grey	spots	in	the	literature	outlined	in	chapter	two.		Together	this	allows	for	a	contribution	to	be	made,	which	advances	both	the	empirical	and	theoretical	literature.		The	selection	of	 the	case	was	dictated	by	 it	being	the	only	example	of	resource	self-determination	 proposed	 for	 a	 river	 system	 at	 the	 commencement	 of	 this	research.	 	Although	some	researchers	express	concerns	about	single	case	study	designs,	 the	 combination	 of	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 approaches	 to	 data	collection	 and	 analysis	 in	 this	 study	 allows	 for	 comparisons	 over	 time	 and	provides	a	useful	collection	of	evidence	for	interpretation.	For	policy	makers	the	findings	 of	 this	 study	 will	 provide	 a	 useful	 resource	 for	 understanding	 the	motivations	 for	 adopting	 resource	 self-determination	 and	 the	 circumstances	under	which	it	may	be	a	robust	property	rights	system.		Aligning	 with	 other	 studies	 of	 institutions	 which	 look	 at	 institutional	 change	following	 static	 analysis	 (Aoki	 2001;	 Greif	 2006;	 Ostrom	 1990),	 the	 next	 two	chapters	 provide	 a	 comparative	 analysis	 of	 the	 existing	 institutional	arrangement	governing	the	Whanganui	River	and	evaluate	how	the	adoption	of	resource	 self-determination	 is	 expected	 to	 affect	 peoples’	 behaviour	 and	 CPR	use.	 	 This	 is	 followed	 in	 chapter	 seven	 by	 a	 dynamic	 analysis	 of	 institutional	change,	examining	the	institutional	components	contributing	to	the	adoption	of	resource	 self-determination.	 	 Chapter	 eight	 gathers	 all	 of	 these	 results	 and	discusses	them	in	light	of	Ostrom’s	design	principles	and	chapter	nine	concludes.	
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5	 Exploring	the	institutional	context	
	
	
5.0	 Introduction		From	 the	 outset,	 the	 adoption	 of	 resource	 self-determination	 presents	 a	significant	shift	in	the	institutional	arrangement	governing	the	Whanganui	River.		From	what	 is	 understood	 about	 how	 institutional	 arrangements	 can	 affect	 the	distribution	of	wealth	and	decision-making	power,	the	assignment	of	legal	rights	to	the	river	could	lead	to	marked	changes	in	transaction	costs	and	resource	use	outcomes.	 	 Subsequently,	 this	 chapter	 undertakes	 an	 exploratory	 comparative	analysis	of	 the	existing	and	proposed	 institutional	arrangements	governing	 the	Whanganui	 River	 guided	 by	 the	 IAD	 framework	 introduced	 in	 chapter	 three.	Ultimately	it	aims	to	answer	research	question	one,	which	asked	about	how	the	allocation	of	property	rights	will	be	affected	by	the	application	of	resource	self-determination	to	the	river	system.		In	 this	 chapter,	 section	 one	 identifies	 the	 key	 components	 of	 the	 existing	institutional	 arrangement,	highlighting	 the	 important	 linkages	 that	 connect	 the	polycentric	 decision-making	 centres.	 	 Section	 two	 discusses	 details	 of	 the	settlement	in	which	the	new	framework	was	first	outlined,	as	well	as	the	Te	Awa	Tupua	 Act	 2017,	 which	 formalises	 the	 new	 arrangement..	 	 Section	 three	examines	how	the	new	Act	is	likely	to	affect	the	existing	rules	and	actors.		Section	four	analyses	the	effect	this	change	will	have	on	the	bundle	of	property	rights	for	the	 river	 and	 discusses	 the	 implications	 of	 these	 changes.	 	 This	 analysis	 and	discussion	 generates	 the	 hypotheses	 for	 testing	 in	 chapter	 six.	 	 Section	 five	concludes.			
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5.1	 Whanganui	River	institutional	arrangement	under	state	ownership		Until	 the	 recent	 passing	 of	 the	 Te	 Awa	 Tupua	 (Whangnaui	 River	 Claims	Settlement)	Act	2017,	the	Whanganui	River	was	managed	through	a	fragmented	freshwater	governance	system	built	on	a	model	most	similar	to	state	ownership.		The	Crown	(the	state)	owned	a	significant	part	of	the	riverbed	in	the	main	stem	of	 river,	which	was	administered	by	 the	Commissioner	of	Crown	Lands.	 	Other	parts	 of	 the	 bed	were	 administered	 by	 the	Department	 of	 Conservation	 under	conservation	 legislation.	 Parts	 of	 the	 banks	 were	 in	 private	 ownership,	 while	other	parts	were	owned	by	the	Crown.		Under	common	law	water	was	owned	by	no-one,	 and	 was	 treated	 as	 a	 public	 good,	 however,	 the	 property	 rights	 to	management,	exclusion,	and	alienation	were	vested	in	the	Crown.42					There	were	 several	 centres	 of	 decision-making	 power	within	 each	 level	 of	 the	institutional	arrangement,	creating	a	system	of	polycentric	governance.		This	was	particularly	evident	at	 the	policy	 level	of	 the	 institutional	arrangement	as	rules	made	at	the	national	and	local	policy	levels	are	of	added	importance	in	the	New	Zealand	 context	 due	 to	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 codified	 constitution43.	 	 Therefore,	 to	analyse	 the	 governance	 system	 of	 the	 Whanganui	 River	 using	 the	 IAD	framework,	Ostrom’s	multi-tier	 system	was	amended	 to	divide	 the	policy	 level	into	an	upper	and	lower	level	(figure	5.1).	In	the	amended	framework,	national	level	rules	and	actors	are	placed	in	the	upper	policy	level,	whilst	local	authorities	and	rules	are	identified	at	the	lower	policy	level.		At	the	operational	level,	remain	those	users	of	 the	river	who	are	constrained	and	enabled	by	 the	rules	made	at	the	higher	levels	of	the	institutional	arrangement.																																																									42	This	position,	which	is	held	by	the	Crown,	is	highly	contentious	due	to	unresolved	issues	regarding	Māori	rights	to	freshwater.		A	2003	ruling	in	the	Court	of	Appeal	(in	Ngati	Apa	v	Attorney	General	[2003]	NZLR	643.	Available	at:	http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZCA/2003/117.html)	found	that	the	introduction	of	common	law	to	New	Zealand	from	England	did	not	extinguish	Māori	customary	title.	This	means	that	whatever	customary	title	Māori	held	to	freshwater,	prior	to	the	assertion	of	British	Sovereignty	in	1840,	continues	to	exist	unless	it	has	been	lawfully	extinguished.			The	matter	was	further	examined	by	the	Waitangi	Tribunal	in	2012,	which	agreed	with	the	2003	ruling	and	went	on	to	say:		“It	does	not	matter	that	Māori	did	not	think	in	terms	of	ownership	in	the	same	way	as	Europeans.	What	they	possessed	[in	terms	of	water]	is	equated	with	ownership	for	the	purposes	of	English	or	New	Zealand	law”	(Waitangi	Tribunal	2012,	p.	89).		Following	each	decision	and	ruling,	very	few	recommendation	have	been	put	forward	for	navigating	the	issue	and	thus	it	remains	an	ongoing	matter	of	contention	for	both	Māori	and	the	Crown	(Duncan	2017).	43	Important	to	emphasise	here	is	that	in	saying	New	Zealand	does	not	have	a	codified	constitution	is	not	equivalent	to	not	having	a	constitution.		It	just	means	that	the	constitution	is	a	collection	of	formal	and	informal	rules	that	are	able	to	be	changed	and	adapted	over	time	by	actors	at	the	constitutional	level.	
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Figure	5.1:	 Ostrom’s	 multi-tier	 conceptual	 map	 identifying	 levels	 of	 an	 institutional	arrangement	 adapted	 for	 the	 New	 Zealand	 context.	 	 Adapted	 from	 Ostrom	(2005,	p.59).			The	 following	 analysis	 of	 the	 current	 institutional	 arrangement	 governing	 the	Whanganui	River	is	organised	by	examining	the	actors	and	rules	at	each	level	of	the	institutional	arrangement.		Later	this	is	compared	with	the	expected	changes	to	rules	and	actors	under	resource	self-determination.	A	summary	visualisation	of	the	institutional	arrangement	under	state	ownership	is	given	in	figure	5.2	and	explained	in	detail	below.		
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Figure	5.2:		 This	 diagram	 offers	 a	 simplified	 depiction	 of	 the	 institutional	 arrangement	governing	 the	 Whanganui	 River	 under	 state	 ownership,	 paying	 particular	attention	to	the	interaction	of	actors	and	rules.		Guided	by	the	IAD	framework,	it	shows	 a	 top-down	 system	of	 governance	 shaped	 by	 the	 European	worldview..		Under	 this	 arrangement	 the	 Māori	 worldview	 is	 largely	 relegated	 to	 the	operational	 level,	as	shown	by	 the	dashed	 lines.	Although	not	displayed	 in	 this	diagram,	 the	 outcome	 of	 this	 interaction	 has	 been	 sustained	 conflict	 and	contestation	 between	 Iwi	 and	 the	 Crown	 for	 over	 140	 years	 regarding	ownership	 and	 control	 of	 the	 river.	 	 The	 outcomes	 of	 actors’	 interactions	 are	discussed	further	in	section	5.4.	
	
	
5.1.1	 Metaconstitutional	level	As	shown	in	figure	5.2,	under	state	ownership	two	competing	worldviews	shape	the	metaconstitutional	 level	 of	 decision-making	 in	 the	Whanganui	 region.	 	 The	European	worldview	predominates.		It	identifies	a	dichotomy	between	man	and	nature,	which	allows	for	the	 ‘ownership’	of	goods	and	resources	such	as	water.		The	 set	 of	 beliefs	 translates	 to	 a	 system	 of	 rules	 that	 shapes	 the	 majority	 of	formal	institutions	and	actor	interactions	through	each	of	the	lower	levels	of	the	institutional	arrangement	governing	the	Whanganui	River.				
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In	 contrast,	 the	 Māori	 worldview	 (te	 ao	 Māori,	 values),	 which	 sees	 nature	 as	indistinct	from	man,	has	little	influence	on	the	formal	and	informal	rules	at	any	of	the	higher	levels	of	the	institutional	arrangement.		Driven	by	a	belief	that	the	Whanganui	River	is	an	ancestor,	under	the	Māori	worldview,	nature	is	unable	to	be	owned	 in	 an	 absolute	 sense.	 	 Instead	a	person’s	 relationship	with	 a	natural	object,	 such	as	 the	 river,	 is	 one	of	kaitiakitanga	 (guardianship	or	 stewardship)	(Roberts	et	al.	1995;	Salmond	2014),	allowing	a	person	to	hold	usufruct	rights,	but	not	ownership	as	is	accepted	under	the	western	worldview.	44				Although,	 the	basic	 tenets	of	 Iwi’s	beliefs	and	worldview	have	remained	strong	among	Māori,	 influencing	 the	way	 Iwi	 constructed	 tribal	 status	 and	 authority,	endeavour	 to	 influence	management	 of	 the	 river,	 and	 relate	 to	 other	 agencies	and	 government,	 the	Māori	worldview	 is	 largely	 relegated	 to	 informal	 rules	 at	the	 operational	 level	 of	 decision-making	 (Harmsworth	 et	 al.	 2013;	 Waitangi	Tribunal	2015).	 	 	This	experience	 is	 consistent	with	 that	of	other	Māori	across	New	Zealand	(Memon	&	Kirk	2012;	Ruru	2009).	
	
5.1.2	 Constitutional	level	Shaped	 principally	 by	 the	 western	 worldview,	 New	 Zealand’s	 uncodified	constitution	consists	of	a	sophisticated	system	of	laws	and	legislation	identified	in	 formal	 legal	 documents,	 in	 decisions	 of	 the	 courts,	 and	 in	 practices.	 	 These	include	but	are	not	 limited	 to,	 the	Treaty	of	Waitangi	 (New	Zealand’s	 founding	document),	 the	 Constitution	 Act	 1986,	 a	 collection	 of	 statutes	 (Acts	 of	Parliament),	 Orders	 in	 Council,	 letters	 patent,	 decisions	 of	 the	 courts,	constitutional	 conventions,	 and,	 more	 recently,	 international	 law	 (Shaw	 &	Eichbaum	2011).	 	These	rules	specify	the	values	of	 the	working	components	of	the	action	situation	at	 the	constitutional	 level	of	 the	arrangement	and	at	every	level	below.																																																										44	The	concept	of	kaitiakitanga	is	not	easily	translated	as	it	invokes	much	more	than	the	notion	of	guardianship	in	the	western	sense.		Literal	interpretations	of	kaitiakitanga	stem	from	the	core	word	tiaki	meaning	‘to	care	for,	guard,	protect,	to	keep	watch	over	and	shelter’	(Marsden	&	Henare	1992).		In	the	spiritual	world,	kaitiaki	are	seen	as	the	spiritual	beings	that	protect	and	guard	particular	tribal	taonga	(treasures,	which	can	include	natural	resources,	like	the	Whanganui	River).		In	the	social	world,	kaumatua	(elders)	and	rangatira	(leaders)	are	the	principal	kaitiaki	of	the	kin	group.		
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The	 Treaty	 of	 Waitangi,	 for	 example,	 provides	 the	 foundational	 rules	 for	 the	relationship	between	Māori	and	Pakeha	(non-Māori)	 in	New	Zealand.	Signed	in	1840,	the	Treaty	consists	of	three	articles	–	the	first	two	being	in	English	and	the	third	in	Māori.		Inconsistent	translations	of	the	articles	have	caused	the	nature	of	the	relationship	between	Māori	and	Pakeha	 to	be	 fraught	and	dynamic	 (Stokes	1992).	 	 Today,	 Māori	 and	 the	 Crown	 are	 formally	 acknowledged	 to	 be	 Treaty	partners,	but	how	this	transpires	into	working	rules-in-use	is	less	clearly	defined	(Lennox	et	al.	2011;	Ruru	2009).		The	 Constitution	 Act	 1986	 establishes	 the	 authority,	 boundary,	 and	 position	rules	of	the	institutional	system.		As	with	all	Commonwealth	states,	the	Queen	is	identified	 as	 Head	 of	 State	 and	 Governor-General	 as	 her	 representative.		Following	the	Westminster	System	model,	 the	executive	and	the	 legislature	are	the	 central	 groups	 of	 actors	 operating	 within	 the	 institutional	 arrangement.		Each	 of	 these	 groups	 is	 guided	 by	 a	 set	 of	 position	 and	 authority	 rules	 that	specify	 each	 actor’s	 role	 in	 developing	 the	 statutory	 law	 that	 guides	 decision-making	 at	 each	 of	 the	 lower	 levels	 of	 the	 institutional	 arrangement.	 	 Several	Ministers	 in	 the	 executive	 have	 indirect	 effects	 on	 water	 governance	 in	 the	Whanganui	through	their	respective	portfolios	(Eppel	2014).		These	include	the	Ministers	 for	 Conservation,	 Environment,	 Primary	 Industries,	 Health,	 and	 the	Minister	 of	 Treaty	 Settlements.	 	 The	 legislature	 is	 charged	with	 passing	 rules,	which	guide	decision-making	at	each	 level	of	 the	 institutional	arrangement.	 	As	all	actors	within	the	executive	and	legislature	can	be	thought	to	be	motivated	by	their	reelection	at	the	start	of	the	next	policy	cycle,	these	actors	can	be	viewed	as	reflections	of	particular	interest	groups	(Alston	1996).		Although	 sitting	 outside	 the	 institutional	 arrangement	 itself,	 within	 the	Westminster	 system	a	well-functioning	 and	 independent	 judiciary	 restricts	 the	power	 of	 the	 legislature	 and	 executive	 to	 interfere	 with	 the	 administration	 of	justice,	whilst	upholding	the	rights	of	individual	citizens	(Aghion	et	al.	2004).		In	New	Zealand	 the	 judiciary	has	played	an	 important	 role	 in	 the	development	of	law	 relating	 to	 freshwater.	However,	 the	 court’s	 role	 as	 the	 ‘enforcer’	 places	 it	
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outside	 the	 institutional	 arrangement	 of	 the	 polity	when	 considering	 the	 roles	and	responsibilities	of	actors	involved	with	governing	the	Whanganui	River.45				
5.1.3	 Upper	policy	level	At	 the	 upper	 policy	 level	 a	 number	 of	 national	 government	 agencies	 are	responsible	for	some	aspect	of	water	governance	affecting	the	Whanganui	River.		The	Ministry	 for	 the	Environment,	Ministry	 for	Primary	 Industries,	Ministry	of	Health,	 and	 the	 Department	 for	 Internal	 Affairs	 each	 have	 some	 specific	 or	general	 legal	mandate	 that	 determines	 their	 role	 and	 responsibility	within	 the	regulatory	 regime	 governing	 use	 and	management	 of	 the	 river	 system	 (Eppel	2014).				Two	independent	bodies	-	the	Parliamentary	Commissioner	for	the	Environment	and	 the	Waitangi	 Tribunal	 -	 act	 as	 constraining	 mechanisms	 on	ministries	 by	providing	independent	reviews	of	matters	of	the	environment	and	the	Treaty	of	Waitangi	respectively.	 	New	Zealand	Fish	and	Game	(Fish	and	Game),	the	Royal	Forest	and	Bird	Protection	Society	(Forest	and	Bird),	and	Federated	Farmers	all	maintain	strong	advocacy	positions	at	the	upper	policy	level.46		The	 Department	 of	 Conservation	 (DOC)	 promotes	 water	 health	 through	 the	preservation	 and	 protection	 of	 natural	 resources	 under	 the	 Conservation	 Act	1987.	 	The	Conservation	Act	specifies	that	DOC’s	role	is	to	preserve	indigenous	biodiversity	 including	 freshwater	 fisheries	 and	 the	 habitats	 of	 freshwater	 fish	species.	 	 To	 do	 so,	 DOC	 manages	 a	 substantial	 portion	 of	 land	 within	 the	Whanganui	catchment	including	the	Tongariro	National	Park	and	the	Whanganui	National	 Park	 under	 the	 National	 Parks	 Act	 1980,	 and	 land	 adjoining	 the	Whanganui	 under	 the	 Reserves	 Act	 1977.	 For	 this	 reason,	 under	 conservation																																																									45	As	discussed	in	section	2.1,	following	the	rules-of-the-game	view,	the	enforcement	of	rules	is	treated	as	exogenous.		In	New	Zealand,	the	judiciary	system	is	made	up	of	the	Supreme	Court	which	sits	at	the	top	of	the	judiciary	system;	the	Court	of	Appeal	which	hears	appeals	from	the	High	Court	on	points	of	law;	the	High	Court	which	deals	with	serious	criminal	offences	and	civil	matters,	hearing	appeals	from	the	lower	courts	and	sixty-three	District	Courts.	There	is	also	a	separate	Māori	Land	Court	and	Māori	Appellate	Court,	which	have	jurisdiction	over	Māori	land	cases	under	the	Te	Ture	Whenua	Māori	Act	1993.				46	Fish	and	Game	is	a	‘user	pays,	user	says’	non-profit	organisation	with	legislative	authority	focused	on	managing,	maintaining,	and	enhancing	sports	fish	and	game	birds	and	their	habitats.		The	Royal	Forest	and	Bird	Protection	Society	and	Federated	Farmers	are	lobbying	organisations	working	on	behalf	of	land	and	wildlife,	and	agriculturalists	respectively.	
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legislation,	the	Department	of	Conservation	owns	parts	of	the	riverbed	as	well	as	land	on	the	banks,	although	the	river	itself	is	not	part	of	the	park	(Department	of	Conservation	2015).	47		A	final	actor	influencing	water	governance	decisions	at	the	upper	policy	level	is	the	Land	and	Water	Forum.	 	 In	2009,	 the	government	brought	together	central	‘stakeholders’	 in	 freshwater	 management,	 including	 hydropower	 generators,	Federated	 Farmers,	 Fonterra	 (New	 Zealand’s	 largest	 dairy	 company),	environmental	NGOs	and	five	major	river	iwi	to	negotiate	agreed	approaches	to	the	management	of	 freshwater	 through	 the	 ‘Land	 and	Water	Forum’	 (Fisher	&	Russell	2011).		As	of	early	2016,	they	had	released	four	reports,	which	contained	some	 156	 recommendations,	 some	 of	 which	 have	 been	 picked	 up	 by	 the	respective	ministries	(Brower	2016).48		There	 are	 over	 26	 pieces	 of	 upper	 policy	 legislation	 guiding	 use	 of	 the	Whanganui	River	(Office	of	Treaty	Settlements	2016).	 	This	creates	a	myriad	of	goals	 and	 objectives	 for	 policy	 makers	 and	 requires	 the	 river	 system	 to	 be	broken	up	into	components	of	beds,	banks,	and	water	for	management	purposes.	As	 explained	 in	 the	 introduction	 of	 this	 section,	 the	 riverbed	 is	 owned	 by	 the	Crown,	except	in	sections	which	are	held	in	private	ownership.		The	Crown	and	private	property	owners	hold	the	banks,	while	the	current	position	held	by	the	Crown	is	that	water	is	owned	by	no-one.		Decisions	 over	 management	 of	 each	 section	 of	 the	 river	 are	 guided	 by	 an	overarching	 management	 framework	 developed	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Resource	Management	Act	(RMA)	1991.		This	is	an	effects-based	piece	of	legislation	that,	at																																																									47	In	most	national	parks	the	declaration	of	land	as	national	park	includes	the	beds	of	all	waterways	within	the	 park	 boundaries,	 however,	 as	 ownership	 of	 the	 river	 was	 under	 digresses	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 park’s	creation,	the	bed	of	the	main	stem	of	the	Whanganui	River	and	its	tributaries	are	not	included	in	the	Park.	Instead,	where	the	Park	adjoins	the	river,	the	Whanganui	National	Park	boundary	is	the	riverbank.	48	The	perceived	‘effectiveness’	of	the	Land	and	Water	Forum	as	an	alternative	approach	to	freshwater	governance	has	been	mixed.		As	noted	by	chairperson,	Alastair	Bisley,	the	Land	and	Water	Forum	was	‘an	exercise	in	collaborative	governance	–	addressing	complex	and	intractable	issues	by	bringing	together	the	principal	stakeholders,	including	from	the	private	sector	and	civil	society,	to	seek	agreement/consensus	on	a	way	forward.’	(Eppel	2013).	Although	this	approach	adopts	several	concepts	heralded	by	proponents	of	collaborative	governance,	vocal	criticisms	of	the	Forum	have	included	pronounced	power	asymmetries,	low	levels	of	transparency,	and	a	cherry	picking	of	recommendations	by	Ministers	(Brower	2016;	Stewart	2015).		These	issues	led	to	questions	about	the	Forum’s	legitimacy	and	Fish	and	Game	ultimately	pulling	out	of	the	process	in	2015	and	Forest	and	Bird	in	2017.
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its	 conception,	 replaced	 69	 other	 pieces	 of	 legislation	 and	 19	 regulations	(Memon	 &	 Gleeson	 1995).	 	 In	 1991	 it	 was	 recognised	 as	 an	 internationally	unique	 and	 forward-thinking	 piece	 of	 legislation	 with	 a	 single	 purpose	 “…to	promote	 the	 sustainable	 management	 of	 natural	 and	 physical	 resources”	[s.5.1]. 49 		 The	 Act	 requires	 decision	 makers	 to	 balance	 inter-generational	environmental	 and	 development	 outcomes,	 specifying	 that	 the	 cultural,	 social,	and	economic	well	being	of	communities	must	be	balanced	against	the	needs	of	future	generations.50				The	 RMA	 requires	 that	 for	 every	 development	 project	 proposed,	 ‘matters	 of	national	 importance’	must	 be	 recognised	 and	 provided	 for	 [s.6].	 	 The	National	Policy	Statement	for	Freshwater	Management	(NPS-FM)	2014	provides	direction	to	 local	 government	 at	 the	 lower	 policy	 level	 on	 how	 this	 is	 to	 be	 achieved.		Thirteen	national	values	and	uses	for	 freshwater	are	 identified	 in	the	NPS	with	two	 of	 them	 deemed	 as	 compulsory:	 ecosystem	 health	 and	 human	 health	 for	recreation.	 National	 bottom	 lines	 are	 set	 for	 the	 compulsory	 values	 and	minimum	acceptable	states	for	the	other	national	values.		In	 the	 NPS-FM	 2014,	 the	 Treaty	 of	 Waitangi	 is	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 underlying	foundation	 of	 Crown	 and	 iwi	 relationships	 for	 the	 management	 of	 freshwater	resources.	 	 This	 builds	 on	 section	 eight	 of	 the	 RMA,	 which	 requires	 that	principles	 of	 the	 Treaty	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 in	 decision-making.	 Similarly,	sections	6(e)	and	6(g)	greatly	influence	key	provisions	of	the	lower	policy	level	rules	 for	 governance	 of	 the	 Whanganui	 River.	 	 These	 sections	 require	 the	acknowledgement	 of	 and	 provision	 for	 “[t]he	 relationship	 of	 Māori	 and	 their	culture	and	traditions	with	their	ancestral	lands,	water,	sites,	waahi	tapu	(sacred	place),	and	other	taonga”	[s.6(e)];	and:	“[t]he	protection	of	protected	customary	rights”	[s.6(g)].																																																										49	“Sustainable	management”	means	the	use,	development,	and	protection	of	natural	and	physical	resources	in	a	way,	or	at	a	rate,	which	enables	people	and	communities	to	provide	for	their	social,	economic,	and	cultural	well-being	and	for	their	health	and	safety.		This	is	to	be	balanced	by	the	needs	of	future	generations;	the	safeguarding	of	the	life-supporting	capacities	of	air,	water,	soil,	and	ecosystems;	and	the	avoidance,	remediation	or	mitigation	of	adverse	effects	of	activites	on	the	environment.		[Appendix	C:	‘Part	II,	Purpose	and	Principles’	[ss.5-8].]	50	The	Local	Government	Act	2002	empowers	local	authorities	to	develop	the	policy	necessary	to	achieve	these	goals.	
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In	addition,	the	Act	specifies	other	aggregation	and	scope	rules.	 ‘Other	matters’	that	 those	 exercising	 functions	 under	 the	 Act	 shall	 have	 particular	 regard	 to	include	kaitiakitanga,	the	efficient	use	and	development	of	natural	and	physical	resources,	 the	 efficiency	 of	 the	 end	 use	 of	 energy,	 the	 maintenance	 and	enhancement	of	amenity	values;	intrinsic	values	of	ecosystems,	the	maintenance	and	enhancement	of	the	quality	of	the	environment,	any	finite	characteristics	of	natural	and	physical	resources,	the	protection	of	the	habitat	of	trout	and	salmon,	the	 effects	 of	 climate	 change,	 and	 the	 benefits	 to	 be	 derived	 from	 the	 use	 and	development	 of	 renewable	 energy.	 	 As	 pointed	 out	 by	 the	 Parliamentary	Commissioner	 for	 the	Environment	 in	2012,	 these	mandates	can	create	 further	competition	 between	 environmental	 interests	 within	 the	 institutional	arrangement	 for	 those	managing	 freshwater	 (Parliamentary	 Commissioner	 for	the	Environment	2012).		For	 the	Whanganui	 River,	 the	 Act	 specifies	 position,	 boundary,	 authority,	 and	aggregation	 rules,	 providing	 links	 between	 national,	 regional,	 district	 and	 city	authorities.	 	 Actors	 at	 the	 lower	 policy	 level	 have	 the	 responsibility	 of	implementing	the	RMA	and	monitoring	and	enforcing	the	behaviour	of	actors	at	the	 operational	 level	 of	 the	 institutional	 arrangement.	 	 Although	 the	 RMA	 is	designed	to	act	as	an	overarching	piece	of	management	legislation	that	balances	competing	 interests,	 its	success	 in	practice	has	been	mixed	(Brown	et	al.	2016;	Harmsworth	 et	 al.	 2016;	 Makgill	 2010;	 Palmer	 2015;	 Wright	 2015).	 	 For	 the	Whanganui	specifically,	it	fails	to	provide	an	integrated	approach	to	management	of	 the	Whanganui	River.	The	way	that	upper	 level	policy	has	 transpired	means	that	the	Marine	and	Coastal	Area	(Takutai	Moana)	Act	2011	and	the	RMA	apply	to	 the	 Whanganui	 River	 up	 to	 the	 limits	 of	 the	 coastal	 marine	 area51;	 while,	effectively	 the	 Land	 Act	 1948	 applies	 to	 the	 parts	 of	 the	 river	 owned	 by	 the	Crown	beyond	the	coastal	zone.	The	Land	Act	1948	itself	provides	no	guidance	on	management	 objectives	 for	 Crown	 riverbeds,	 nor	 any	 restrictions	 on	 uses;	instead	 vesting	 this	 responsibility	 in	 the	 RMA	 and	 its	 accompanying	 pieces	 of	legislation.	It	states	that	riverbeds	of	navigable	rivers,	like	the	Whanganui	River,																																																									51	The	Minister	of	Conservation,	regional	councils	and	territorial	authorities	all	have	responsibilities	under	the	RMA	for	managing	coastal	development.		Each	is	guided	by	the	New	Zealand	Coastal	Policy	Statement	2010.	
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are	 to	 be	 administered	 by	 Crown	 Lands	 and	 Land	 Information	 New	 Zealand,	while	 local	 government,	 private	 property	 holders,	 and	 DOC	manage	 the	water	and	 riverbanks	 at	 the	 lower	 policy	 and	 operational	 levels.	 	 This	 creates	 a	multiplicity	of	regimes	operating	along	the	length	of	the	river,	which	cut	across	one	another	and	challenge	the	notion	of	integrated	water	management.		
	
5.1.4	 Lower	Policy	Level	Under	 the	 RMA	 and	 the	 Local	 Government	 Act	 2002,	 local	 authorities	 are	empowered	 to	 achieve	 the	 objectives	 outlined	 in	 the	 NPS-FW	 2014	 and	 to	develop	 rules	 that	 constrain	 actors	 at	 the	 operational	 level.	 These	 local	authorities	are	divided	into	Regional	and	District	Councils,	each	of	which	has	its	own	jurisdictional	responsibilities.	 In	the	Whanganui	region,	Horizons	Regional	Council	 (Horizons)	 is	 responsible	 for	 managing	 the	 Whanganui-Mānawatu	region's	natural	resources,	leading	regional	land	transport	planning,	contracting	passenger	 transport	 services	and	 coordinating	 the	 region's	 response	 to	natural	disasters.	 Its	 jurisdiction	 covers	 22,212	 sq	 km	 of	 land,	 8.1%	 of	 New	 Zealand’s	land	area,	and	extends	12	nautical	miles	out	to	sea.		The	Council	is	made	up	of	12	elected	Councilors	who	collectively	decide	on	suitable	plans	and	policies	for	the	region.	 The	Executive	 Management	 Team	 then	 decides	 how	 these	 plans	 and	policies	are	to	be	implemented.		The	regional	plan,	the	One	Plan,	manages	freshwater	use	through	the	allocation	of	‘consents’	to	use	on	a	first-come,	first-served	basis.		Horizons	issues	consents	to	actors	at	the	operational	level	that	authorise	resource	use	(e.g.	water	takes	or	discharges	to	water)	under	specified	conditions	consent-by-consent.		This	means	that	the	duration	of	the	consent	and	activities	permitted	under	each	consent	can	vary	 (Horizons	 2016a,	 s.6).52		 This	 is	 the	 same	 approach	 used	 across	 New	Zealand	and	has	led	many	to	argue	that	the	consent	system	under	the	RMA	has	(a)	 been	 unable	 to	 address	 cumulative	 effects;	 (b)	 foreclosed	 integrated	
																																																								52	In	2017,	Fish	and	Game	and	the	Environmental	Defence	Society	took	Horizons	to	the	Environment	Court	for	failing	to	monitor	and	enforce	issued	resource	consents,	negatively	impacting	water	quality.		The	Court	ruled	in	favour	of	the	plaintiffs,	agreeing	that	the	Council	was	not	working	within	freshwater	limits	and	that	a	change	in	practice	was	required	to	ensure	that	Horizons	began	working	in	conformity	with	the	law	(NZEnvC		[2017]	37	Available	here:	http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZEnvC/2017/37.html)	.			
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catchment-based	 water	 planning;	 and	 (c)	 fostered	 too	 much	 time-consuming	litigation	in	the	Environment	Court	(Duncan	2017).				For	the	Whanganui	River,	173	consents	to	use	are	currently	allocated	to	actors	at	the	operational	level.	 	The	single	largest	user	is	the	energy	sector,	however,	the	most	rapidly	 increasing	users	are	 in	the	agriculture	sector	for	which	consented	surface	 water	 takes	 more	 than	 doubled	 between	 1997	 and	 2009	 (Horizons	Regional	Council	2016a,	pp.5–2).	 	Mitigation	of	soil	erosion	and	flood	control	 is	also	 provided	 for	 by	 the	 Plan	 and	 supplemented	 by	 the	 Whanganui	 River	Catchment	 Strategy	 (WRCS).	 	 Unlike	 the	 One	 Plan,	 which	 specifies	 graduated	sanctions	in	the	way	of	fines	for	breaches	and	infringements,	the	WRCS	aims	to	incentivise	landowners	to	adopt	erosion-minimising	practices	through	subsidies	and	supporting	partnerships.53			The	 Whanganui,	 Stratford,	 and	 Ruapehu	 District	 Councils	 have	 operational	responsibilities	 associated	 with	 the	 urban	 areas	 within	 the	 Whanganui	catchment.	 They	 are	 responsible	 for	 the	 provision	 of	 local	 infrastructure,	 for	environmental	health	and	safety,	and	for	controlling	the	effects	of	 land	use	and	the	surface	of	river	systems.		Each	District	Council	must	produce	a	District	Plan	and	update	it	every	ten	years.		The	Resource	Management	Act	1991	requires	that	a	 District	 Plan	 must	 state:	 the	 objectives	 for	 the	 district;	 the	 policies	 to	implement	the	objectives;	and	the	rules	(if	any)	to	implement	the	policies.	 	The	District	 Plan	 must	 also	 give	 effect	 to	 any	 national	 policy	 statement	 or	 New	Zealand	coastal	policy	 statement	and	 is	 required	 to	not	be	 inconsistent	with:	a	water	conservation	order;	a	regional	policy	statement;	or	a	regional	plan	for	any	matter	specified	in	s.30(1)	of	the	Resource	Management	Act	(functions,	powers,	and	duties	of	local	authorities).		The	 RMA	 also	 specifies	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	 local	 authorities	 must	conduct	 relationships	 with	 iwi	 and	 other	 groups	 with	 interests	 in	 the	 river	creating	 linkages	across	and	within	 the	 institutional	arrangement.	 	Historically,	iwi	have	been	classified	as	stakeholders	in	legislation	and	practice	(Ruru	2009),																																																									53	No	evaluation	of	the	relative	effectiveness	of	these	approaches	was	found	by	the	author.	
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however,	more	recently	they	are	referred	to	as	Treaty	partners,	as	explained	in	section	5.1.2.	54		Across	New	Zealand	and	in	the	Whanganui,	the	Treaty	principles	are	being	used	 to	guide	and	structure	relationships,	with	an	emphasis	given	 to	incorporating	 iwi	 in	 decision-making	 from	 the	 outset	 of	 any	 process	(Harmsworth	et	al.	2016).		This	is	evident	in	the	Whanganui	region,	where	local	authorities,	 such	as	Horizons,	are	steadily	 increasing	 the	proportion	of	 funding	dedicated	 to	 building	 enduring	 relationships	 with	 hapū	 (sub-tribe)	 and	 iwi	(Horizons	Regional	Council	2015,	p.109).		Initiatives,	 like	 the	Whanganui	 River	 Enhancement	 Trust	 (WRET),	 initiated	 to	provide	resources	to	mitigate	effects	of	the	ongoing	operation	of	the	TPDS,	create	linkages	 between	 the	 Whanganui	 and	 Ruapehu	 District	 Councils	 and	 Genesis	Energy	 Limited,	 operators	 of	 the	 TPDS.	 	 To	 improve	 water	 quality	 in	 priority	catchments	 of	 the	 Whanganui	 River,	 WRET	 partners	 with	 Horizons	 to	 help	farmers	 manage	 erosion.	 	 In	 this	 way,	 relationships	 between	 different	 groups	across	 various	 decision	 centres	 within	 the	 institutional	 arrangement	 are	developed.		The	 local	 area	 office	 of	 the	 Department	 of	 Conservation	 is	 also	 involved	 with	managing	recreational	use	of	the	river.	Over	5500	people	canoe	the	‘Whanganui	River	Journey’	each	year,	paying	concessions	to	the	Department	of	Conservation	for	access	(Department	of	Conservation	2012a).		Despite	the	river	sitting	outside	the	 boundaries	 of	 the	 Whanganui	 National	 Park,	 the	 guiding	 management	document	for	managing	recreational	users	of	the	river	is	the	Whanganui	National	Park	 Management	 Plan	 2012-2022	 (Department	 of	 Conservation	 2012b).	 The	Plan	was	prepared	in	accordance	with	sections	46	and	47	of	the	National	Parks	Act	 1980.	 	 Led	 by	 the	 Tongariro	 Whanganui	 Taranaki	 Conservancy	 of	 the	Department	 of	 Conservation,	 the	 Plan	 was	 developed	 in	 consultation	 with	representatives	 from	 Whanganui	 Iwi,	 the	 public,	 the	 Taranaki/Whanganui	Conservation	 Board	 and	 other	 interested	 groups	 and	 individuals.	 	 It																																																									54	A	good	example	of	this	change	in	the	Whanganui	region	is	shown	in	the	evolving	language	of	the	Whanganui	River	Catchment	Management	Strategy.		In	1997,	iwi	are	identified	as	relevant	stakeholders	(Horizons	Regional	Council	2003,	p.3),	however,	such	language	has	been	explicitly	removed	in	the	2014-15	Strategy	(Horizons	Regional	Council	2014).	
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acknowledges	 the	 special	 relationship	 Whanganui	 Iwi	 has	 with	 the	 Park,	 the	river,	 and	 its	 catchment.55 		 It	 also	 makes	 concessions	 to	 Whanganui	 Iwi’s	aspirations	for	a	Māori	National	Park	and	aims	to	seek	common	values	to	inform	and	strengthen	‘collaborative	management’.		These	objectives	have	been	further	formalised	in	three	separate	Memorandums	of	Understanding	between	DOC	and	different	tribal	groups	associated	with	the	river.		In	addition	to	Iwi,	the	local	DOC	office	 is	 also	 in	 consultation	 with	 statutory	 agencies,	 community	 groups,	charitable	organisations,	individual	actors,	and	the	general	public	as	required	by	the	Conservation	Act	1987.	For	these	reasons,	DOC	has	strong	linkages	with	Iwi	within	the	Whanganui	region.	
	
5.1.5	 Operational	level	Moving	 down	 to	 the	 operational	 level,	 several	 groups	 of	 actors	 have	 daily	interactions	with	the	river.	These	include	local	Māori,	49%	of	which	are	affiliated	with	 Whanganui	 Iwi	 (Statistics	 New	 Zealand	 2013),	 Genesis	 Energy	 Limited,	residents	 of	 the	 small	 towns	 and	 communities,	 which	 grace	 the	 riverbank,	farmers	 and	 agriculturalists,	 business	 owners	 which	 depend	 on	 and	 require	access	to	the	river,	and	recreationists.	The	choices	available	to	these	groups	are	determined	 by	 the	 rules	 constructed	 at	 the	 higher	 levels	 of	 the	 institutional	arrangement	–	 for	 the	most	part	modeled	on	a	property	 rights	 system	of	 state	ownership.	 	For	those	wanting	to	use	water	from	the	river,	a	‘resource	consent’	for	 take	 must	 be	 granted	 by	 Horizons	 Regional	 Council	 through	 the	 consent	process	described	above.		Māori	make	up	a	quarter	of	the	population	of	the	Whanganui	district	(Waitangi	Tribunal	2015).	 	Based	on	the	2013	census	most	have	lower	incomes,	are	more	likely	 to	work	 in	 low-skilled	 jobs,	 and	 are	more	 likely	 to	 be	 unemployed	 than	non-Māori.	 	 Like	 Māori	 throughout	 New	 Zealand,	 Māori	 in	 Whanganui	 are	significantly	 less	healthy	than	non-Māori,	mortality	rates	are	twice	as	high,	and	lifespans	 significantly	 shorter.	 	 Education	 levels	 and	 housing	 standards	 of	Whanganui	 Māori	 are	 significantly	 lower	 than	 their	 non-Māori	 counterparts.																																																										55	The	National	Parks	Act	1980	specifically	acknowledges	Whanganui	Iwi’s	special	relationship	with	the	river	and	requires	that	in	developing	a	management	plan,	particular	regard	must	be	given	to	“…the	spiritual,	historical,	and	cultural	significance	of	the	Wanganui	River	to	the	Whanganui	Iwi”	(s.30.2).	
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Although	 Whanganui	 Māori	 have	 made	 considerable	 efforts	 to	 preserve	 and	nurture	 their	 language,	 the	majority	 cannot	 speak	 or	 understand	 te	 reo	Māori	(Māori	 language).	 	 	 Efforts	 to	 preserve	 their	 culture	 are	 more	 universal	 and	
tikanga	(behaviour,	practices)	and	te	ao	Māori	values	continue	to	shape	Māori’s	interaction	with	 the	 river.	 	Within	 legislation,	 special	 dispensation	 is	 given	 for	customary	food	gathering	along	the	river	and	its	tributaries	and	the	continuation	of	cultural	practices,	although	this	dispensation	does	not	give	them	a	direct	role	in	decision-making.		The	 Whanganui	 River	 Māori	 Trust	 Board	 (Trust	 Board)	 represents	 Iwi	 with	interests	in	the	river	and	administers	its	assets	to	the	general	benefit	of	Iwi.		The	Trust	Board	has	 the	 general	 functions	 set	 out	 in	 section	24	of	 the	Māori	Trust	Boards	Act	1955	as	well	as	the	specific	statutory	function,	set	out	in	section	six	of	the	Whanganui	River	Trust	Board	Act	1988,	of	negotiating:			
“...with	 the	Government,	or	any	other	body	or	authority	concerned,	 for	 the	
settlement	 of	 all	 outstanding	 claims	 relating	 to	 the	 customary	 rights	 and	
usages	of	te	iwi	o	Whanganui,	or	any	particular	hapu,	whanau,	or	group,	in	
respect	of	the	Whanganui	River,	including	the	bed	of	the	river,	its	minerals,	
its	water,	and	its	fish.”			The	 Whanganui	 River	 Māori	 Trust	 Board	 is	 responsible	 for	 negotiating	 with	actors	 at	 the	 upper	 and	 lower	 policy	 levels	 of	 the	 institutional	 arrangement	regarding	all	matters,	which	concern	Iwi	interests.			Members	of	 the	Whanganui	River	Māori	Trust	Board	are	also	part	of	 the	Land	and	Water	 Forum	 and	 the	 Freshwater	 Iwi	 Leaders	 Group.	 The	 Freshwater	 Iwi	Leaders	 Group	 is	 a	 broader	 consolidation	 of	 iwi	 across	 New	 Zealand	representing	those	iwi	with	ancestral	lakes	and	rivers	that	would	be	affected	by	any	partial	privatisation	of	power	companies.		It	was	established	by	iwi	in	2007	and	 contributes	 to	 discussions	 around	 alternative	 approaches	 to	 freshwater	
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governance	 in	New	Zealand	 through	 the	Land	 and	Water	 Forum	and	by	direct	engagement	with	Ministers.56		Genesis	Energy	Limited	is	the	largest	consumer	of	water	on	the	river,	diverting	82%	of	the	flow	from	the	headwaters	through	the	Tongariro	Power	Development	Scheme.	 	 This	 diversion	 consent,	 granted	 by	 Horizons	 and	 upheld	 in	 the	Environment	Court	until	203957,	has	been	the	cause	of	ongoing	controversy	over	conflicting	interests	regarding	water	use.		In	an	effort	to	reduce	conflict	with	Iwi	and	conservation	groups,	such	as	Forest	and	Bird,	measures	have	been	taken	by	Genesis	to	identify	areas	of	interest	shared	with	other	actors	across	all	levels	of	the	institutional	arrangement.	 	Over	the	past	decade	Genesis	has	invested	in	14	partnerships	 with	 Horizons,	 iwi,	 DOC,	 the	 New	 Zealand	 Defence	 Force,	 and	various	 environmental	 and	 recreational	 groups	 to	 improve	 environmental,	social,	 cultural	 and	 recreational	 outcomes.	 	 Two	 key	 partnerships	 are	 the	Whanganui	 River	 Enhancement	 Trust	 and	 the	 Central	 North	 Island	 Blue	 Duck	Trust,	both	focused	on	improving	river	health.		In	addition,	Genesis	signed	a	memorandum	of	understanding,	Hei	Whakaaro	Tahi	
ki	Te	Mana	o	Te	Awa,	with	Whanganui	 Iwi	 in	 2010	 agreeing	 to	withhold	 from	litigation.	 	 Although	 this	 improved	 relationships	 between	 Iwi	 and	 Genesis,	Whanganui	 Iwi	 maintain	 that	 the	 development	 of	 the	 Tongariro	 Power	Development	Scheme	damaged	the	mauri	 (life	 force)	of	 the	river	and	therefore	the	 mana	 of	 the	 Iwi	 and	 the	 River	 (Office	 of	 Treaty	 Settlements	 2016).	 	 As	explained	 by	Hikaia	Amohia	 (Ngati	Haua)	 in	 his	 submission	 to	 the	Whanganui	River	 Report	 hearing	 in	 1994:	 “For	 our	 people	 ihi	 (power),	 tapu	 (restricted,	sacred),	 and	mana	 go	 together.	 	 Each	 one	 is	 dependent	 upon	 the	 others.	 	 Any	interference	with	nature,	including	the	River,	breaks	the	law	of	tapu,	breaks	the	
ihi	or	sacred	affinity	of	our	Māori	people	with	the	River;	and	reduces	the	mana	and	soul	of	the	Whanganui	River…When	you	interfere	with	the	flow	of	the	River,	you	are	interfering	with	nature”	(Waitangi	Tribunal	1999,	p.56).	 	Subsequently,																																																									56	In	one	interview,	the	dominance	of	the	Freshwater	Iwi	Leaders	Group	in	the	Land	and	Water	Forum	was	cited	by	Fish	and	Game	chairperson,	Bryce	Johnson,	as	a	principle	reason	for	Fish	and	Game	leaving	the	Forum	in	2014.	57	In	Ngati	Rangi	Trust	and	others	v	Manawatu-Wanganui	Regional	Council	[2007]	NZCA	378.	Available	at:	http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZCA/2007/378.html.	
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although	Whanganui	Iwi	have	agreed	to	abstain	from	further	challenges	against	Genesis,	Whanganui	Iwi	maintains	firmly	its	objection	to	the	continued	operation	of	 the	Tongariro	Power	Development	Scheme.	 	As	explained	by	 the	Minister	of	Treaty	 Settlements,	 Christopher	 Finlayson,	 in	 an	 interview:	 “…in	 my	 personal	view	 -	 in	100	years	 time	 that	 [the	TPDS]	will	 all	be	undone,	or	 it	may	even	be	earlier	than	that…they’re	fiddling	with	nature	in	a	really	big	way	up	there”.		For	 those	 living	 in	 towns	 adjoining	 the	 river,	 the	 Whanganui	 River	 plays	 a	significant	 role	 in	 daily	 life.	 	 It	 is	 a	 source	 of	 pride	 for	 both	Māori	 and	Pākehā	(non-Māori)	in	Whanganui.	Several	community	groups	have	been	established	to	celebrate	 the	 River	 and	 keep	 its	 history	 alive,	 such	 as	 the	 Whanganui	 River	History	Association.		There	are	12	small	businesses	that	support	recreation	and	tourism	 on	 the	 river,	 with	 jet	 boat	 operations	 and	 canoe	 trips.	 The	 river’s	tributaries	 are	 also	 important	 recreational	 fishing	 grounds,	 for	 which	 people	must	buy	concessions	from	Fish	and	Game.		Many	private	property	holders	own	land	 along	 the	 banks	 of	 the	Whanganui	 and	 its	 tributaries,	 both	 in	 urban	 and	rural	settings	and	farming	remains	one	of	the	region’s	most	important	economic	growth	areas.		Under	law,	private	property	holders	who	hold	riparian	title,	have	ownership	of	the	riverbed	up	to	the	centre	line.				
5.2	 Granting	legal	standing	to	the	Whanganui	River		The	 shift	 towards	 resource	 self-determination	was	 an	 extended	 process	 in	 the	case	 of	 the	 Whanganui	 River	 that	 was	 a	 response	 to	 longstanding	 grievances	over	 ownership	 and	 control	 of	 the	Whanganui	 River.58		 In	 2012,	 a	 High-Level	Agreement	-	Tūtohu	Whakatupua	-	proposed	a	new	framework	for	governing	the	Whanganui	River	based	on	 the	 recognition	of	 the	Whanganui	River	 as	Te	Awa	Tupua,	a	whole	and	 indivisible	 legal	entity	 reaching	 from	the	mountains	 to	 the	sea	(Office	of	Treaty	Settlements	2012).		A	more	detailed	governance	framework	was	then	outlined	in	a	‘Deed	of	Settlement’	agreement	signed	by	Whanganui	Iwi	and	 the	 Crown,	 on	 5	 August	 2014,	 which	 revealed	 how	 resource	 self-																																																								58	Please	refer	to	chapter	seven	for	a	detailed	discussion	of	how	and	why	the	framework	was	proposed.	
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determination	was	proposed	to	be	 implemented	 for	 the	case	of	 the	Whanganui	River	(Office	of	Treaty	Settlements	2014a).		
5.2.1	 Ruruku	Whakatupua	Ruruku	Whakatupua,	the	Deed	of	Settlement,	had	two	parts	and	comprised	two	documents:	 Ruruku	 Whakatupua	 –	 Te	 Mana	 o	 Te	 Iwi	 o	 Whanganui	 (Office	 of	Treaty	 Settlements	 2014b),	 which	was	 primarily	 directed	 towards	Whanganui	Iwi	 and	 Ruruku	 Whakatupua	 –	 Te	 Mana	 o	 Te	 Awa	 Tupua	 (Office	 of	 Treaty	Settlements	 2014a),	 which	 outlined	 the	 formal	 framework	 proposed	 for	 the	introduction	of	 resource	self-determination	 for	 the	Whanganui	River.	 	As	 these	documents	were	used	as	the	primary	source	through	the	course	of	this	research	for	understanding	the	institutional	change,	details	of	the	agreement	are	provided	in	the	following	two	sections	and	a	visual	representation	of	the	agreement	given	in	figure	5.3.	
	
Figure	5.3:	 Visual	representation	of	the	Te	Pā	Auroa	nā	Te	Awa	Tupua		framework	 designed	to	 support	 the	 application	 of	 resource	 self-determination	 to	 the	 Whanganui	River.	 A	 summary	 of	 all	 actors	 and	 rules	 associated	 with	 the	 Te	 Pā	 Auroa	framework	is	also	given	on	page	xvi.	
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i.			Ruruku	Whakatupua	Te	Mana	o	Te	Awa	Tupua59	
Ruruku	Whakatupua	Te	Mana	o	 te	Awa	Tupua	 was	 primarily	 directed	 towards	establishing	the	new	legal	framework	for	governing	the	Whanganui	River,	Te	Pā	
Auroa	nā	Te	Awa	Tupua	 (Te	 Pā	 Auroa	 –	 lit.	 the	 broad	 eel	weir).	 	 Te	 Pā	 Auroa	recognised	 Te	 Awa	 Tupua	 (lit.	 River	 with	 Ancestral	 Power)60	as	 an	 indivisible	and	 living	 whole,	 comprising	 the	 river	 from	 the	 mountains	 to	 the	 sea,	 its	tributaries,	 and	 all	 its	 physical	 and	 metaphysical	 elements.61		 The	 settlement	proposed	to	accord	Te	Awa	Tupua	full	legal	personality,	enabling	Te	Awa	Tupua	to	be	a	“legal	person”	[s.2.2]	with	the	same	“rights,	powers,	duties	and	liabilities”	[s.2.3].				In	the	same	way	that	a	child	requires	representation	in	a	court	of	law,	the	rights,	powers,	 and	 duties	 of	 Te	 Awa	 Tupua	 were	 proposed	 to	 be	 exercised	 and	performed	 by	 a	 guardian,	Te	Pou	Tupua	 (Te	 Pou	 –	 lit.	 the	 sacred	 and	 revered	station).	 	Ruruku	Whakatupua	proposed	 that	Te	Pou	be	 the	human	 face	of	 the	river	and	comprise	a	singular	role	exercised	jointly	be	two	persons	(symbolic	of	the	Treaty	of	Waitangi	partnership)	–	one	appointed	by	the	Crown	and	the	other	by	Whanganui	Iwi.		Te	Pou	Tupua	was	expected	to	act	in	the	interests	of	Te	Awa	Tupua	 and	 consistently	 with	 four	 intrinsic	 values	 -	 Tupua	 te	 Kawa	 (lit.	 the	principles	 of	 natural	 law)	 -	 representing	 the	 essence	 of	 Te	 Awa	 Tupua	 and	intending	to	capture	the	te	ao	values	and	beliefs	of	Whanganui	Iwi:		 1. Ko	te	Awa	te	mātāpuna	o	te	ora	-	the	River	 is	 the	source	of	 spiritual	and	physical	sustenance;	2. E	rere	kau	mai	 te	Awa	nui	mai	 te	Kahui	Maunga	ki	Tangaroa	–	 the	 great	River	flows	from	the	mountains	to	the	sea;	3. Ko	au	te	Awa	ko	te	Awa	ko	au	–	I	am	the	River	and	the	River	is	me	
																																																								59	All	sections	of	legislation	cited	in	this	section	come	from	Ruruku	Whakatupua	Te	Mana	o	Te	Awa	Tupua	(Office	of	Treaty	Settlements	2014a)	unless	cited	otherwise.	60	Tupua	is	something	extraordinary,	from	the	ancestral	realm	(for	a	discussion	of	tupua	see	(Tcherkezoff	2008,	pp.141–44)).	61	In	an	institutional	economics	frame	Te	Awa	Tupua	represents	the	catchment	including	its	biophysical	and	material	characteristics	and	community	attributes.	
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4. Ngā	 manga	 iti,	 ngā	 manga	 nui	 e	 honohono	 kau	 ana,	 ka	 tupu	 hei	 Awa	
Tupua	–	 the	 small	 and	 the	 large	 streams	 that	 flow	 into	one	another	and	form	one	River.		As	the	human	face	of	the	river,	the	framework	stated	that	Te	Pou	will	be	required	to	build	relationships	and	form	individual	agreements	with	government	agencies	at	each	level	of	the	institutional	arrangement.62		Initially	Te	Pou’s	role	will	be	to	act	 in	 an	 advisory	 capacity;	 however,	 over	 time,	 space	 is	 created	 in	 the	framework	 for	Te	Pou	to	 take	on	more	decision-making	responsibility	 [s.9.6].63		Te	Pou	will	also	exercise	landowner	functions	and	administer	a	NZD$30	million	contestable	 fund	 -	Te	Koretete	au	Te	Awa	Tupua	 (lit.	 a	 storage	 basket	 for	 food	from	the	river)	-	that	will	be	made	available	by	the	Crown	for	initiatives	affecting	the	health	and	wellbeing	of	Te	Awa	Tupua	and	for	judicial	purposes,	if	needed.		Te	Pou	is	to	be	supported	by	an	advisory	group,	Te	Karewao	(lit.	the	supplejack	vine),	 which	 will	 advise	 the	 guardian	 in	 the	 exercise	 of	 its	 functions	 when	necessary.		When	required	by	Te	Pou,	this	group	will	convene	and	is	to	consist	of	one	person	appointed	by	Ngā	Tāngata	Tiaki	o	Whanganui	 (a	 trust	arising	 from	the	 consolidation	 of	 three	 existing	 entities64	that	 manage	 various	 assets	 and	liability	 issues	 of	 Whanganui	 Iwi),	 one	 by	 other	 iwi	 with	 interests	 in	 the	Whanganui	 River,	 and	 one	 person	 appointed	 by	 the	 relevant	 local	 authorities.		Other	people	 can	 also	be	 invited	 to	 advise	when	necessary.	 	 In	 addition	 to	 the	contestable	fund,	NZD$200,000	is	to	be	paid	annually	by	the	Crown	to	Te	Pou	for	20	 years	 as	 a	 contribution	 to	 the	 costs	 associated	with	 the	 exercise	 of	 Te	 Pou	Tupua’s	functions.																																																												62	At	the	upper	policy	level,	Te	Pou	Tupua	will	enter	into	a	relationship	document	with	the	Commission	of	Crown	Lands,	the	Director-General	of	Conservation,	and	the	Chief	Executive	of	the	Ministry	of	Business	Innovation	and	Employment.		They	are	also	required	to	engage	with	relevant	local	authorities	–	these	include	Horizons	Regional	Council,	Whanganui	District	Council,	Stratford	District	Council,	and	Ruapehu	District	Council.	63	Section	9.6	of	Ruruku	Whakatupua	–	Te	Mana	o	Te	Awa	Tupua	states:	“The	parties	acknowledge	that	the	position	referred	to	in	clause	9.5.2	may	change	in	the	future	(including	in	the	context	of	the	freshwater	policy	review	process	referred	to	in	clause	9.2)	and	this	settlement	does	not	preclude	any	such	change.”	When	questioned	about	the	meaning	of	this,	the	Minister	of	Treaty	Settlements,	Christopher	Finlayson,	agreed	that	the	purpose	was	to	create	space	for	the	guardians	to	be	granted	more	decision-making	power	over	use	of	the	river	in	the	future.	64	The	existing	entities	are	the	Whanganui	River	Māori	Trust	Board,	the	Pakaitore	Trust,	and	Te	Whiringa	Muka	Trust.	
		 101	
The	Deed	 of	 Settlement	 suggests	 that	 the	 development	 of	 the	 framework	 is	 to	proceed	in	two	stages.		Initially	decision-making	responsibility	will	remain	with	local	 authorities,	 however,	 over	 time,	 greater	 decision-making	 power	 and	responsibility	 will	 be	 transferred	 to	 Te	 Pou.	 	 The	 framework	 stated	 that	 the	appointers	of	Te	Pou	(the	Crown	and	 Iwi)	will	have	oversight	of	 the	guardians	and	 are	 able	 to	 ultimately	 revoke	 Te	 Pou’s	 privileges	 should	 either	 appointed	actor	be	seen	as	acting	counter	to	the	mandate.				To	bring	together	actors	with	interests	in	the	Whanganui	River,	a	strategy	group,	
Te	Kōpuka	nā	Te	Awa	Tupua	 (Te	 Kōpuka	 -	 lit.	 white	mānuka,	 the	 timber	 from	which	eel	weirs	across	the	river	were	built),	will	also	be	established.		Its	role	is	to	identify	 issues	 relating	 to	 the	 environmental,	 social,	 cultural,	 and	 economic	health	and	wellbeing	of	Te	Awa	Tupua,	to	establish	a	Te	Awa	Tupua	strategy	to	address	 those	 issues,	 and	 to	 provide	 recommended	 actions	 to	 address	 those	issues.		The	strategy	document,	Te	Heke	Ngahuru	ki	Te	Awa	Tupua	(Te	Heke	-	lit.	the	 autumn	 migration	 of	 eels),	 will	 be	 reviewed	 every	 ten	 years.	 	 It	 must	 be	considered	 by	 all	 government	 agencies	 making	 decisions	 that	 impact	 Te	 Awa	Tupua	and	is	thus	to	be	the	principle	document	guiding	decision-making	for	the	Whanganui	River	catchment.		Te	 Kōpuka	 is	 to	 have	 up	 to	 17	 members	 that	 represent	 persons	 and	organisations	 with	 interests	 in	 the	 Whanganui	 River,	 including	 iwi,	 local	 and	central	 government,	 commercial	 and	 recreational	 users	 and	 environmental	groups.		The	membership	is	to	be	as	follows:		 - one	member	appointed	by	Ngā	Tāngata	Tiaki	o	Whanganui;	- up	 to	 five	 members	 appointed	 by	 iwi	 with	 interests	 in	 the	Whanganui	River;	- up	to	four	members	appointed	by	the	relevant	local	authorities;	- one	member	appointed	by	Fish	and	Game	New	Zealand;	- one	member	appointed	by	the	Director-General	of	Conservation;	- one	member	appointed	by	Genesis	Energy	Limited;	
		 102	
- one	 member	 appointed	 to	 represent	 environmental	 and	 conservation	interests;	- one	member	appointed	to	represent	tourism	interests;	- one	member	appointed	to	represent	recreational	interests;	and	- one	member	appointed	to	represent	the	primary	sector.65		Capacity	 in	 terms	 of	 administrative	 and	 technical	 support	 for	 establishing	 Te	Kōpuka	and	developing	the	strategy	document	is	to	be	provided	for	by	Horizons	Regional	 Council.	 	 The	 Crown	will	 provide	 Horizons	with	 NZD$430,000	 to	 aid	this	process.		In	the	long-term,	Te	Kōpuka	will	be	responsible	for	the	monitoring	the	implementation	of	the	strategy	and	reviewing	its	progress	and	success.		It	is	to	provide	a	forum	for	discussion	of	issues	relating	to	the	health	and	wellbeing	of	Te	Awa	Tupua	and	to	exercise	any	function	that	may	be	delegated	to	it	by	a	local	authority.				By	affording	Te	Awa	Tupua	“legal	standing”	and	an	“independent	voice”	the	river	and	its	tributaries	will	be	considered	“a	living	entity	in	its	own	right…incapable	of	 being	 ‘owned’	 in	 an	 absolute	 sense”	 [s.2.6-7]	 (Office	 of	 Treaty	 Settlements	2012).		Ownership	of	parts	of	the	riverbed	is	to	be	vested	away	from	the	Crown	and	 placed	 in	 the	 name	 of	 the	 river	 itself,	 providing	 for	 the	 “protection	 and	promotion	of	the	health	and	wellbeing	of	Te	Awa	Tupua”	[s.1.3].		In	undertaking	this	 action,	 private	 property	 is	 to	 remain	 unaffected	 as	 are	 existing	 rights,	structures,	and	consents.		The	vesting	of	the	riverbed	does	not	create	or	transfer	proprietary	interests	in	water.		
ii.			Ruruku	Whakatupua	Te	Mana	o	Te	Iwi	o	Whanganui66	
Ruruku	Whakatupua	te	Mana	o	te	Iwi	o	Whanganui	is	the	overarching	settlement	document	within	which	Te	Ruruku	Whakatupua	te	Mana	o	te	Awa	Tupua	rests.	It	recognises	 the	special	relationship	of	Whanganui	 Iwi	and	the	Whanganui	River	and	gives	“an	apology	in	respect	of	the	Whanganui	River	to	the	iwi	and	hapū	of	Whanganui,	their	tupuna	(ancestors)	and	their	uri	(future	descendants)”	[s.3.20]																																																									65	Each	appointing	entity	is	an	“appointer”.	66	All	sections	of	legislation	cited	in	this	section	come	from	Ruruku	Whakatupua	Te	Mana	o	Te	Iwi	o	Whanganui	(Office	of	Treaty	Settlements	2014b)	unless	cited	otherwise.	
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for	 past	 grievances	 caused	 by	 the	 Crown.	 In	 essence,	 Ruruku	Whakatupua	 Te	
Mana	o	te	Iwi	o	Whanganui	seeks	to	atone	for	Crown	actions	in	which	it	failed	to	respect	 Whanganui	 Iwi’s	 relationship	 with	 Te	 Awa	 Tupua	 and	 to	 begin	 the	process	of	healing.		As	acknowledged	in	sections	3.25	and	4.1:		 		“…this	 settlement	 marks	 the	 beginning	 of	 a	 renewed	 and	 enduring	
relationship	between	Whanganui	Iwi	and	the	Crown	that	has	Te	Awa	Tupua	
at	 its	centre	and	is	based	on	mutual	trust	and	cooperation,	good	faith	and	
respect…”	[s.3.25	and	s.4.1]		The	settlement	provides	for	authorised	customary	activities	[s.7],	such	as	fishery	activities	and	customary	practices,	and	gives	cultural	[s.8]	and	financial	redress	[s.9].		Cultural	redress	includes	the	recognition	of	the	importance	of	ripo	(rapids)	to	 Whanganui	 Iwi,	 the	 alteration	 of	 existing	 geographic	 names	 that	 are	considered	by	Whanganui	 Iwi	to	be	 incorrect,	and	the	development	of	a	“social	services	project”	which	aims	to	improve	social	services	in	the	Whanganui	region	through	enhancing	delivery	by	government	agencies.				Financial	redress	amounts	to	NZD$80	million	with	an	additional	NZD$1	million	allocated	 for	 transitional	 and	 implementation	 purposes	 related	 to	 the	establishment	 of	 the	 River	 framework	 to	 be	managed	 by	 Ngā	 Tāngata	 Tiaki	 o	Whanganui	 [s.10].	 	 Finally,	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 that	 a	 relationship	 between	 the	Crown	 and	 Whanganui	 Iwi	 remains	 strong,	 an	 express	 commitment	 to	 work	together	to	implement	the	settlement	is	also	given	[s.11].	
	
5.2.2	 Te	Awa	Tupua	(Whanganui	River	Claims	Settlement)	Act	2017	The	Te	Awa	Tupua	 (Whanganui	River	Claims	Settlement)	Act	2017,	which	was	passed	 into	 law	 in	 March	 2017,	 formalises	 the	 Deed	 of	 Settlement	 without	adding	any	additional	 elements	 to	 the	 framework.	 	The	Act	 is	divided	 into	 five	parts.	 	 The	 first	 part	 provides	 preliminary	 provisions,	 including	 guidelines	 for	interpretation.	 	Part	two	is	the	main	body	of	the	framework	and	is	divided	into	seven	 subparts.	 	 Subpart	 one	 outlines	 the	 Act’s	 scope	 and	 effect	 –	 detailing	 in	section	11.3	that:	
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“This	part	must	be	interpreted	in	a	manner	that	best	furthers-	
(a)	the	intent	of	Te	Pā	Auroa	set	out	in	clause	1.4	of	Ruruku	Whakatupua	–
	 	Te	Mana	o	Te	Awa	Tupua;	and	
(b)	the	agreements	expressed	in	the	deed	of	settlement	in	relation	to	Te	Pā	
	 Auroa.”		The	purpose	of	the	Act	outlined	in	section	1.3	states	that	the	Act	is:		
“(a)	 to	 record	 the	 acknowledgements	 and	 apology	 given	 by	 the	 Crown	 to	
Whanganui	 Iwi	 in	Ruruku	Whakatupua—Te	Mana	o	Te	Iwi	o	Whanganui;	
and	
(b)	to	give	effect	to	the	provisions	of	the	deed	of	settlement	that	establish	Te	
Pā	Auroa	nā	Te	Awa	Tupua;	and	
(c)	to	give	effect	to	the	provisions	of	the	deed	of	settlement	that	settle	the	
historical	claims	of	Whanganui	Iwi	as	those	claims	relate	to	the	Whanganui	
River.”			Subpart	 two	 sets	 out	 how	 Te	 Awa	 Tupua	will	 be	 declared	 and	 accorded	 legal	recognition	 and	 identifies	 the	 intrinsic	 values,	 Tupua	 te	 Kawa.	 	 It	 also	 details	limits	to	the	effect	of	the	Act	and	defines	how	it	will	be	integrated	with	existing	legislation.	The	purpose,	functions,	and	powers	of	Te	Pou	Tupua	and	its	advisory	group,	Te	Karewao,	are	outlined	in	subpart	three.		Subpart	four	provides	for	the	establishment	 of	 the	 strategy	 group,	 Te	 Kōpuka,	 its	 functions,	 and	 its	 powers.		This	group	must	develop	and	approve,	review	and	monitor	the	implementation	of	the	strategy	document,	Te	Heke	Ngahuru,	for	Te	Awa	Tupua.		The	purpose	and	contents	 of	 Te	 Heke	 Ngahuru,	 which	 are	 to	 give	 practical	 guidance	 for	 the	integrated	management	 of	 Te	 Awa	 Tupua,	 are	 also	 outlined	 in	 this	 section.	 In	subpart	 five,	parts	of	 the	bed	of	Whanganui	River	are	vested	 in	Te	Awa	Tupua.		Land	which	is	not	to	be	alienated	is	identified,	the	integration	of	these	new	rules	with	 existing	 legislation	 and	 rules	 of	 law,	 the	 status	 of	 certain	 rights	 and	interests,	 future	 acquisitions	 and	 interests,	 and	 liabilities	 and	 responsibilities.		
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Subpart	six	establishes	Te	Korotete	o	Te	Awa	Tupua,	the	NZD$30	million	Te	Awa	Tupua	Fund.				Finally,	 subpart	 seven	 details	 ‘other	 arrangements’	 relating	 to	 Te	 Awa	 Tupua	namely	the	protection	of	the	name	Te	Awa	Tupua	and	the	establishment	of	the	Te	Awa	Tupua	register.		It	also	outlines	the	consequence	of	Te	Pou	Tupua	being	deemed	an	affected	person	under	 the	RMA,	establishes	a	process	 for	managing	activities	on	 the	surface	of	 the	Whanganui	River,	and	outlines	a	 framework	 for	the	 collaboration	 of	 Whanganui	 Iwi,	 Horizons	 Regional	 Council,	 certain	departments	of	State,	and	the	New	Zealand	Fish	and	Game	Council	to	co-ordinate	the	 planning	 and	 management	 of	 fisheries	 and	 fish	 habitat	 in	 the	Whanganui	River	 catchment.	 It	 makes	 provisions	 for	 customary	 food	 gathering	 and	 the	identification	of	taonga	tuturu	(physical	treasures)	found	on	the	river.		Part	three	addresses	the	redress	of	Whanganui	Iwi	that	was	outlined	in	Ruruku	
Whakatupua	Te	Mana	o	te	Iwi	o	Whanganui.	 	 It	has	 four	subparts.	 	Subpart	one	sets	 out	 the	 acknowledgements	 and	 apology	 of	 the	 Crown	 to	Whanganui	 Iwi.		Subpart	two	acknowledges	the	relationship	of	Whanganui	Iwi	and	Te	Awa	Tupua	as	well	as	the	status	of	the	trustees	of	Ngā	Tāngata	Tiaki	o	Whanganui.	Subpart	three	 sets	 out	 the	 authorised	 customary	 activities	 and	 subpart	 four	 makes	provisions	for	other	cultural	redress.		Part	four	settles	historical	claims	and	other	miscellaneous	matters	and	part	five	is	primarily	concerned	with	the	maters	relevant	to	the	reorganisation	of	various	governance	arrangements	of	Whanganui	Iwi	including	the	dissolution	of	various	trusts	and	 the	creation	of	Ngā	Tāngata	Tiaki	o	Whanganui.	 	 It	also	sets	out	 the	transitional	 taxation	 provisions	 for	 governance	 reorganisation	 and	 the	consequential	repeal,	revocations,	and	amendments	to	various	bodies	of	existing	legislation.			
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5.3	 Whanganui	River	institutional	arrangement	under	resource	self-
	 determination		The	 introduction	 of	 resource	 self-determination	 for	 governing	 the	Whanganui	River	 sees	 ownership	 of	 the	 riverbed	 vested	 in	 Te	 Awa	 Tupua	 and	 decision-making	 responsibility	 eventually	 transferred	 to	 Te	 Pou	 Tupua.	 	 Although	 the	legislation	 is	 introduced	 by	 constitutional	 level	 actors,	 the	 legislation	 devolves	the	majority	of	decision-making	responsibility	to	actors	at	the	operational	level,	transforming	the	institutional	arrangement	from	a	top-down	system	to	one	that	is	driven	by	operational	level	decision-making.					As	 shown	 in	 figure	 5.4,	 the	 new	 arrangement	 bridges	 the	 western	 and	 Māori	worldviews	 at	 the	 metaconstitutional	 level	 and,	 as	 a	 result,	 identifies	 a	 new	property	 rights	 system	 likely	 to	 influence	 decision-making	 at	 each	 level	 of	 the	institutional	 arrangement.	 	 By	 approximating	 the	Māori	worldview	 in	western	law,	the	decision-making	framework	is	shifted	from	a	rules-based	to	value-based	system	(Morris	&	Ruru	2010).	 	The	principle	changes	to	the	rules	and	actors	at	each	 level	 are	 explained	 in	 detail	 below.	 Because	 the	 process	 transforms	 the	institutional	 arrangement	 into	 a	 community-based	 system,	 analysis	 of	 this	section	begins	at	the	operational	level.		
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Figure	5.4:	 Guided	by	the	IAD	framework,	 this	diagram	offers	a	simplified	depiction	of	 the	new	 institutional	 arrangement	proposed	 to	be	 implemented	 for	 governance	of	the	Whanganui	River.		By	approximating	the	Māori	worldview	in	a	western	legal	framework,	 a	 new	 system	 of	 property	 rights	 is	 developed	 –	 resource	 self-determination.	 	The	broader	 framework	transforms	governance	 into	a	bottom-up	system,	with	operational	level	actors	making	decisions	likely	to	affect	policy	at	higher	levels.	The	full	arrows	represent	the	dominant	transfer	of	rules,	whilst	the	dashed	arrows	show	a	weaker	transfer	of	rules.		Under	the	new	framework	all	 decisions	 regarding	Te	Awa	Tupua	 are	 to	 be	 guided	by	 the	Tupua	 te	Kawa	values	 at	 each	 level	 of	 decision-making.	 	 These	 are	 considered	 to	 capture	 the	essence	of	Te	Awa	Tupua.	
	
	
5.3.1	 Operational	level	As	discussed	in	the	preceding	sections,	the	Te	Awa	Tupua	Act	introduces	several	new	 actors	 to	 the	 operational	 level	 of	 the	 institutional	 arrangement	 governing	the	Whanganui	River.		These	include	the	new	legal	entity,	Te	Awa	Tupua,	and	its	guardian,	 Te	 Pou	Tupua.	 	Helping	 guide	Te	 Pou,	will	 be	 an	 advisory	 group,	 Te	Karewao,	 which	 crosses	 the	 operational	 and	 lower	 policy	 levels.	 	 Te	 Kopuka,	made	up	of	representative	users	and	policy	level	actors,	will	develop	the	strategy	document,	Te	Heke,	and	ensure	that	it	is	implemented	accordingly.			
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By	according	Te	Awa	Tupua	legal	standing	and	vesting	ownership	of	the	riverbed	in	 its	name,	the	river	 is	shifted	from	a	resource	unit	to	an	actor	(Ostrom	&	Cox	2010).	At	 the	policy	 level,	no	 longer	can	 the	 river	be	considered	a	good	 that	 is	consumable	 and	 is	 talked	 ‘about’,	 instead	 it	must	 be	 talked	 ‘to’	 and	 interacted	‘with’.	 	 As	 the	 human	 face	 of	 Te	 Awa	 Tupua,	 Te	 Pou	 Tupua	 is	 situated	 at	 the	operational	 level,	 yet	 has	 the	 legitimacy	 to	 move	 between	 levels	 of	 the	institutional	arrangement.		Te	Pou	Tupua	is	mandated	with	the	responsibility	to	inform	 and	 guide	 decision-making	 at	 the	 lower	 and	 upper	 policy	 levels	supported	by	Te	Karewao.	 	 As	 discussed	 in	 section	5.2.1,	 space	 is	made	 in	 the	Deed	of	Settlement	for	Te	Pou’s	role	to	change	over	time	–	a	commitment	upheld	in	the	Act,	by	deeming	that	the	Act	upholds	the	Deed.		The	 Act	 nests	 ideas	 of	 community	 governance	 within	 the	 institutional	arrangement	 (Bowles	 &	 Gintis	 2002;	 Robinson	 et	 al.	 2015).	 	 Under	 the	 new	framework,	 responsibility	 for	 developing	 a	management	 strategy	 for	 the	 river	and	its	catchment	will	be	transferred	from	the	lower	policy	level	to	the	strategy	group,	Te	Kōpuka,	located	predominantly	at	the	operational	level.	The	intention	of	legislating	for	Te	Kōpuka,	the	strategy	group,	is	to	bring	together	operational	level	 actors	 including	 Genesis	 and	 Iwi	 to	 discuss	 and	 outline	 their	 various	interests	and	priorities.		The	objective	of	this	is	to	develop	‘whole	river	strategy’	based	on	a	management	approach	that	is	inclusive	rather	than	exclusive.		It	will	also	 potentially	minimise	 conflicts	 between	 competing	 actors.	 	 The	 goal	 of	 the	resulting	management	strategy,	Te	Heke,	is	to	outline	a	catchment-level	strategy,	which	 considers	 Te	 Awa	 Tupua	 as	 a	 whole	 with	 a	 view	 to	 addressing	 the	institutional	 fragmentation	 currently	 affecting	 governance	 of	 the	 river	 and	 its	broader	 catchment.	 	 Overall,	 these	 changes	 at	 the	 operational	 level	will	 shape	each	higher	level	of	decision-making	within	the	institutional	arrangement.	
	
5.3.2	 Lower	policy	level	At	 the	 lower	 policy	 level,	 existing	 frameworks	 and	 decision-making	 structures	will	 remain	 in	 place.	 	 Through	 the	 first	 stage	 of	 implementation,	 the	 local	authorities	 will	 retain	 decision-making	 responsibility,	 however,	 the	 Act	 states	that	the	intrinsic	values	of	Tupua	te	Kawa	must	be	considered	and	accounted	for	
		 109	
whenever	a	decision	 is	made	which	affects	Te	Awa	Tupua.	 	Depending	on	how	these	values	 are	 interpreted,	 this	 could	affect	how	 local	 authorities	make	 their	decisions	 and	 the	 priorities	 placed	 on	 use.	 	 For	 instance,	 as	 pointed	 out	 by	 a	Crown	official	 at	Ministry	 for	 the	Environment,	 “I	 don’t	 really	 think	of	Te	Awa	Tupua	 as	 an	 environmental	 concept,	 as	 such…I	 think	 it	 will	 help	 make	 better	decisions	 for	 the	 river	 and	 the	 community,	 but	 I	 don’t	 think	 it	 will	 be	 driven	through	 an	 environmental	 perspective”.	 	 She	 went	 on	 to	 say	 that	 the	 most	important	element	of	the	concept	is	the	integration	of	community	into	decision-making	and	recognition	of	the	interrelatedness	of	the	river	and	the	Iwi.67				Although	Te	Pou	will	 not	 initially	have	direct	decision-making	 authority	under	the	new	arrangement,	the	interviews	revealed	that	Te	Pou	may	be	considered	an	affected	party	under	the	RMA	when	Horizons	Regional	Council	is	assessing	new	consents	 concerning	 use	 of	 the	 river.	 	 This	 status	will	 indirectly	 grant	 Te	 Pou	authority	to	object	to	proposals	concerning	use	of	the	Whanganui	River	and	its	catchment.		Over	time,	Te	Pou’s	authority	may	be	extended	if	it	is	granted	greater	decision-making	 responsibility.	 	 Such	 a	 development	 will	 transfer	 day-to-day	decision-making	 responsibility	 from	 the	 lower	 policy	 level	 to	 the	 operational	level.		
5.3.3	 Upper	policy	level	The	 interviews	 revealed	 that	 introducing	 the	 Te	 Awa	 Tupua	 legislation	 at	 the	upper	 policy	 level	 by	 constitutional	 level	 actors	 was	 necessary	 for	 creating	institutional	 legitimacy	 and	 for	 ensuring	 that	 the	 newly	 imposed	 rules	 have	impetus	across	all	levels	of	the	institutional	arrangement.	The	advent	of	the	new	Act	will	 affect	 26	 pieces	 of	 legislation,	which	 have	working	 rules-in-use	 at	 the	upper	 policy	 level	 [s.2.10].	 	 The	 Act	 requires	 that	 any	 person	 exercising	functions,	duties	or	powers	under	any	one	of	 these	statues	must	recognise	and	provide	 for	 the	 status	 of	 Te	 Awa	 Tupua	 and	 Tupua	 te	 Kawa	 as	 well	 as	 give	particular	regard	to	the	strategy	document.		The	Te	Awa	Tupua	Act	is	to	be	given																																																									67	In	the	case	of	Te	Urewera,	which	was	granted	legal	standing	in	2014,	recognising	this	interconnectedness	between	local	Iwi	and	the	land	meant	that	some	actions	prohibited	under	legislation,	like	the	Conservation	Act	1987,	had	to	be	re-examined.		Similar	steps	may	need	to	be	taken	in	the	case	of	the	Whanganui	River,	changing	the	management	focus	of	the	river	in	some	ways.	
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different	 ‘weightings’	 under	 each	 piece	 of	 affected	 legislation.	 	 The	majority	 of	actors	 exercising	 duties,	 functions,	 or	 powers	 affecting	 Te	 Awa	 Tupua	 will	 be	required	 to	 ‘recognise	 and	 provide	 for’	 the	 status	 of	 Te	 Awa	 Tupua	 and	 the	values	of	Tupua	te	Kawa.		Under	 New	 Zealand	 legislation,	 the	 requirement	 for	 a	 decision-maker	 to	‘recognise	and	provide	for’	a	matter	is	a	strong	directive	for	an	agency	or	a	local	authority	to	consider	and	provide	for	the	relevant	factor	when	reaching	its	final	decision.	Often	(as	in	s.6	of	the	RMA),	‘recognise	and	provide	for’	leaves	it	to	the	discretion	 of	 the	 decision-maker	 as	 to	 how	 to	 'provide	 for'	 particular	matters,	although	the	rules	stipulate	that	the	matter	must	be	addressed	and	not	ignored.		As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 Te	 Awa	 Tupua	 Act,	 other	 actors	 operating	 under	 affected	legislation	will	be	required	‘to	have	particular	regard’	for	the	status	and	values	of	Te	Awa	Tupua	and	Tupua	te	Kawa.	 	This	means	that	the	decision-making	actor	will	have	to	be	satisfied	that	the	decision	he	or	she	is	making	meets	the	purposes	that	 are	 relevant,	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 can	be	 achieved	 in	partnership	with	 other	considerations	relevant	to	the	decision.	In	such	cases,	the	decision-making	actor	can	retain	flexibility	as	to	whether	other	relevant	factors	predominate	only	after	the	 matters	 for	 which	 they	 must	 have	 particular	 regard	 for	 have	 been	 fully	considered.			These	 various	 legal	 weightings	 will	 redefine	 how	 statutory	 authorities	 at	 the	upper	 and	 lower	policy	 levels,	 including	 the	Ministry	 for	 the	Environment,	 the	Ministry	 of	 Primary	 Industries,	 the	 Department	 of	 Conservation,	 and	 various	local	 authorities,	 interact	 and	 arrive	 at	 particular	 decisions.	 	 Te	 Pou	 Tupua	 is	required	 to	 enter	 into	 formal	 relationships	 with	 the	 Commissioner	 of	 Crown	Lands,	 the	 Director	 General	 of	 Conservation,	 and	 the	 Chief	 Executive	 of	 the	Ministry	of	Business	 Innovation	and	Employment	as	well	as	with	actors	within	local	and	central	government	thereby	creating	 linkages	across	each	 level	of	 the	institutional	arrangement	[s.19(f)].		
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5.3.4	 Constitutional	level	Initially,	Te	Pou	Tupua	is	to	have	no	direct	role	in	making	decisions	over	use	of	the	 river,	 however,	 as	 mentioned,	 the	 original	 Deed	 of	 Settlement	 and	subsequent	Act	creates	space	for	the	responsibilities	of	Te	Pou	Tupua	to	change	over	time.		The	Minister	of	Treaty	Settlements	agreed	that	the	motivation	for	this	is	 to	potentially	 vest	 greater	decision-making	power	 in	Te	Pou	Tupua.	 	 Should	this	 happen,	 the	 responsibility	 of	 decision-making	 and	 enforcement	 will	 be	transferred	 from	 the	 legislature	 to	 the	 judiciary	 under	 resource	 self-determination.				Elsewhere	the	transfer	of	power	from	the	legislature	to	the	judiciary	has	resulted	in	an	increase	in	costs	for	resolving	social-cost	problems	in	some	cases	(Komesar	2001).		Litigation	costs	can	be	high	(Johnson	1992)	and	the	discretion	of	judges	to	rule	on	issues	set	by	precedent	 limits	the	scope	of	decision-making	(Binks	&	Forbath	2011).		For	example,	the	concept	of	“value”	is	not	explicitly	employed	in	law	in	a	sense	equivalent	to	the	economics	usage.		This	can	cause	some	decisions	to	be	made	in	the	courts	which	are	“fair”	in	a	legal	sense,	but	may	not	be	efficient	from	 an	 economic	 perspective,	 and	 may	 impose	 costs	 on	 different	 sectors	 of	society	(Pemberton	&	Kerr	2013).			As	the	principle	of	the	rule	of	law	is	one	of	New	Zealand’s	central	constitutional	principles,	 the	 likely	 transfer	 in	 decision-making	 power	 from	 the	 Crown	 to	 Te	Pou	 Tupua	 has	 direct	 relevance	 to	 constitutional	 level	 actors	 and	 the	 level’s	associated	 rules.	 	 Yet,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Whanganui	 River,	 the	 interviews	suggested	 that	 actors	 developing	 the	 framework	 have	 not	 explored	 the	implications	of	this	transfer	of	power	and	change	in	decision-making	process	in	detail.		Some	of	the	implications	of	this	are	therefore	discussed	in	section	5.4	and	in	the	final	conclusions	in	chapter	nine.		
5.3.5	 Metaconstitutional	level	The	 Te	 Awa	 Tupua	 Act	 integrates	 Māori	 te	 ao	 values	 into	 a	 western	 legal	framework.	 	As	shown	 in	 figure	5.4,	 to	do	so,	 requires	bridging	 the	 two	sets	of	worldviews,	so	that	the	Māori	worldview	can	be	approximated	and	formalised	in	
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law.	 	 Although	many	 have	 highlighted	 the	 complexity	 of	 changing	 or	 affecting	peoples’	views	about	how	the	world	works68,	others	have	drawn	attention	to	the	fact	 that,	 when	 worldviews	 are	 conceptualised	 as	 ‘mental	 models’	 (Denzau	 &	North	1994),	the	worldview	can	be	unpacked	as	a	framework	and	set	of	beliefs	and	 values,	 and	 incentives	 developed	 to	 facilitate	 a	 change	 (Biggs	 et	 al.	 2011;	North	2005).		As	North	(2005)	explains,	actors	have	mental	models,	which	reflect	their	 understanding	 of	 the	world.	 	 As	 they	 learn	more	 about	 the	world,	 actors	revise	their	mental	models,	changing	their	views	about	how	the	world	works.		As	these	 experiences	 are	 often	 shared	 (Aoki	 2007),	 truncated,	 individual	 mental	models	move	closer	together	over	time	until	they	eventually	arrive	at	a	state	of	equilibrium.	 	This	process	can	be	reinforced	 through	 the	 formalisation	of	 rules	(Aoki	2015).		For	these	reasons,	in	the	case	of	the	Whanganui	River,	reinforcing	the	integration	of	worldviews	through	formal	rules	should	theoretically	facilitate	the	 integration	of	worldviews	as	actors,	 guided	by	 the	new	set	of	 formal	 rules,	collectively	grope	towards	a	new	institutional	equilibrium.			
	
5.4	 Discussion	of	outcomes	and	the	development	of	general	hypotheses	
	 for	evaluation		Currently	 the	 Whanganui	 River	 is	 governed	 using	 a	 top-down	 multi-level	decision-making	 process	 (Hooghe	 &	 Marks	 2003).	 	 As	 shown	 in	 table	 5.1	 the	bundle	 of	 property	 rights	 are	 held	 by	 the	 Crown	 with	 decision-making	responsibility	 for	management,	 exclusion,	 and	 alienation	 devolved	 to	 actors	 at	the	lower	policy	level.		The	rules	specifying	who	is	able	to	extract	and	use	water	and	under	what	conditions	are	outlined	in	the	various	regional	and	district	plans	and	 granted	 to	 actors	 at	 the	 operational	 level	 through	 a	 ‘consent’	 or	 permit	process	on	a	case-by-case	basis	(Eppel	2014).			The	interaction	of	actors	in	this	institutional	arrangement	affects	environmental,	social,	 and	 economic	 outcomes.	 	 As	 discussed	 in	 section	 4.1,	 although	 there	 is																																																									68	For	a	discussion	of	competing	theories	of	worldviews	see	(Hiebert	2008,	pp.13–30).	Within	economics,	worldviews	and	the	metaconstitutional	level	of	decision-making	has	rarely	been	analysed	outside	of	the	concept	of	mental	models.	
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variation	 along	 the	 length	of	 the	 river,	 overall	water	 quality	 in	 the	Whanganui	River	 is	 rated	 as	 ‘fair’	 from	 an	 environmental	 perspective,	 (Horizons	 Regional	Council	2016,	s.5),	however,	the	river	suffers	from	high	levels	of	silt,	a	problem	exacerbated	 by	 the	 reduced	 flow	 (Department	 of	 Conservation	 2012b;	McLachlan	2017).	 	From	a	cultural	perspective,	 local	 Iwi	consider	 the	health	of	the	river	unsatisfactory	(Office	of	Treaty	Settlements	2011).	 	The	mixing	of	 the	waters	of	the	Whanganui	River	by	the	TPDS	is	an	affront	to	the	river’s	and	Iwi’s	
mana	(Young	1998).	This	causes	conflict	within	the	institutional	arrangement	at	each	level	of	decision-making.		Further,	governing	the	Whanganui	River	under	a	state	 ownership	 model	 does	 not	 sufficiently	 capture	 Whanganui	 Iwi’s	relationship	 with	 the	 river,	 creating	 additional	 tension	 between	 actors	 at	 all	levels	 of	 the	 institutional	 arrangement.	 	 Ensuing	 disagreements	 (outlined	 in	detail	 in	 chapter	 seven)	 raise	 the	 costs	 of	 the	 institutional	 arrangement	significantly.		
Table	5.1:		 How	legal	and	economic	property	rights	are	allocated	to	actors	at	each	level	of	the	 institutional	 arrangement	 under	 state	 ownership	 and	 resource	 self-determination	in	the	case	of	the	Whanganui	River/Te	Awa	Tupua.		
 Entry	 Withdrawal	 Management	 Exclusion	 Alienation	
State	
ownership	 Users	 Users	 Crown (admin.	by	local	govt)	 Crown (admin.	by	local	govt)	 Crown (admin.	by	local	govt)	
Resource	self-
determination	
(Stage	I)	
Users	 Users	 Te	Awa	Tupua	(admin.	by	local	govt)	 Te	Awa	Tupua	(admin.	by	local	govt)	 Te	Awa	Tupua	(admin.	by	local	govt)	
Resource	self-
determination	
(Stage	II)	
Users	 Users	 Te	Awa	Tupua	(admin.	by	Te	Pou	Tupua)	 Te	Awa	Tupua	(admin.	by	Te	Pou	Tupua)	 Te	Awa	Tupua	(admin.	by	Te	Pou	Tupua)			Under	 resource	 self-determination,	 legal	 rights	 have	 been	 vested	 in	 Te	 Awa	Tupua	by	recognising	Te	Awa	Tupua	as	a	legal	entity.		Legal	property	rights	have	also	been	vested	in	Te	Awa	Tupua,	through	vesting	ownership	of	the	riverbed	in	the	 new	 legal	 entity.	 	 The	 interviews	 made	 clear	 that	 under	 the	 Te	 Pā	 Auroa	framework,	 the	 assignment	 of	 economic	 property	 rights	 is	 to	 advance	 in	 two	
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stages.69		First,	rights	to	management,	exclusion,	and	alienation	will	remain	with	local	 government.	 	 	 Then,	 over	 time	 they	will	 shift	 to	Te	Pou	Tupua.	 	This	will	cause	 a	 transfer	 of	 daily	 decision-making	 responsibility	 from	 the	 lower	 policy	level	 to	 the	 operational	 level,	 and	 the	 responsibility	 for	 settling	 disputes	 to	 be	transferred	from	the	legislature	to	the	judiciary.		In	 both	 stages	 of	 development,	 the	 management	 strategy	 developed	 by	 Te	Kōpuka	 is	 likely	 to	 influence	 how	 decisions	 are	 made.	 	 Because	 the	 new	 Act	states	 that	 any	 action	 undertaken	 by	 a	 decision-maker	must	 be	 undertaken	 in	consultation	with	Te	Pou	Tupua	and	follow	the	management	strategy	prepared	by	Te	Kōpuka,	the	power	held	by	the	economic	rights	holders	(Horizons	and	then	Te	Pou	Tupua)	may	be	constrained	by	the	legal	rights	granted	to	Te	Awa	Tupua	and	the	rules	developed	as	part	of	the	strategy.	 	 It	 is	reasonable	to	hypothesise	that	 this	 may	 place	 constraints	 on	 the	 management,	 exclusion,	 and	 alienation	rights	held	by	the	economic	property	rights	holder	and	affect	to	whom	entry	and	withdrawal	rights	can	be	granted.			In	 turn	 such	 a	 change	 may	 affect	 the	 distribution	 and	 allocation	 of	 consents,	during	 both	 stage	 one	 and	 two	 of	 implementation	 of	 the	 new	 framework.		Although,	 the	Act	 specifically	 precludes	 the	 creation	 or	 transfer	 of	 proprietary	rights	to	water,	under	common	law	title	to	the	surface	of	land	entails	proprietary	authority	to	the	space	occupied	by	the	water	column	(Gray	and	Gray	2011).		This	suggests	 that	 the	 holder	 of	 the	 riverbed	will	 also	 be	 granted	 implicit	 decision-making	 rights	 over	 the	 water	 column	 above	 the	 bed,	 potentially	 affecting	 the	bargaining	process	between	users	and	managers	over	time.		When	guided	by	the	Tupua	te	Kawa	values	and	the	strategy	document	developed	by	Te	Kōpuka,	the	new	 decision-makers	 may	 be	 legally	 bound	 to	 make	 decisions	 with	 different	priorities	to	those	held	by	decision-makers	operating	under	state	ownership.		
																																																								69	‘Legal	property	rights’	are	one’s	rights	under	the	law	to	freely	exercise	a	choice,	whereas	‘economic	property	rights’	are	the	‘ability	to	freely	exercise	a	choice’	(Allen	2015).		There	is	some	discussion	about	whether	a	distinction	between	legal	and	economic	property	exists	(Hodgson	2015).		This	research	makes	the	assumption	that	a	distinction	does	exist.	
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For	instance,	should	Te	Pou	be	granted	economic	property	rights	in	stage	two	of	implementation,	 users	 interested	 in	 procuring	water	 rights	may	 have	 to	 enter	into	a	bargaining	process	with	Te	Pou	directly.	 	 In	such	a	case,	Te	Pou	Tupua’s	decision-making	 mandate	 will	 be	 to	 enhance	 Te	 Awa	 Tupua’s	 health	 and	wellbeing.		This	will	shift	the	priorities	of	the	primary	decision-maker	within	the	institutional	 arrangement	 from	 one	 focused	 on	 balancing	 environmental	 and	development	 outcomes,	 as	 required	 under	 the	 RMA,	 to	 one	 concerned	 with	delivering	outcomes	to	the	benefit	of	Te	Awa	Tupua.	It	can	be	hypothesised	that	such	a	 change	will	 affect	 environmental	outcomes	 for	 the	 river	and	potentially	economic	outcomes	at	both	local	and	national	levels.			Such	a	scenario	will	also	cause	enforcement	responsibility	to	be	transferred	from	the	 legislature	 to	 the	 judiciary	 as	 the	 responsibility	 for	determining	whether	 a	user	has	violated	terms	of	contract	between	two	‘citizens’	at	the	operational	level	of	 decision-making	 is	 the	 duty	 of	 the	 judiciary.	 If	 agreement	 over	 entry	 and	withdrawal	 cannot	 be	 reached	 between	 Te	 Pou	 and	 the	 user,	 determining	whether	Te	Pou	or	 the	user	 requires	 compensation	will	be	at	 the	discretion	of	the	 courts.	 	 This	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 raise	 the	 costs	 of	 the	 new	 institutional	arrangement	 as	 litigation	 becomes	 counter	 to	 transaction	 efficiency	 (Johnson	1992).				Further,	as	touched	on	in	section	5.3.4,	the	outcomes	reached	by	the	courts	may	not	consider	the	wider	implications	their	judgments	have	on	the	net	benefits	of	society	 as	 a	 whole.	 	 Take,	 for	 example,	 the	 extraction	 of	 water	 from	 the	Whanganui	River.	Although	 it	may	be	 agreed	 that	 the	most	 efficient	use	of	 the	river	is	to	use	a	certain	portion	of	the	water	that	flows	through	it	for	extractive	purposes,	under	resource	self-determination,	this	outcome	may	not	be	achieved	because	extraction	 is	deemed	 to	damage	 the	health	and	wellbeing	of	 the	 river.		Instead,	 in	correctly	applying	the	law,	the	court	may	rule	that	no	water	is	to	be	taken.		From	a	legal	point	of	view,	this	may	be	the	correct	application	of	the	law,	but	it	fails	to	consider	potentially	detrimental	impacts	on	society.70																																																										70	Important	to	note	here	is	that	the	law	will	not,	of	course,	always	shape	inefficient	outcomes	–	there	is	no	necessary	tension	between	the	rule	of	law	and	principles	of	economic	efficiency.	However,	this	example	
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Another	 factor	 important	 to	 consider	 from	 an	 economic	 perspective	 is	 the	potential	 opportunities	 that	 may	 arise	 for	 rent-seeking	 from	 implementing	resource	 self-determination.	 	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Whanganui	 River,	 significant	decision-making	 responsibility	 may	 end	 up	 concentrated	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	guardians.		To	mitigate	this,	the	new	Te	Awa	Tupua	Act	states	that	at	any	point,	should	the	appointers	consider	Te	Pou	Tupua	to	be	acting	in	a	manner	counter	to	the	 contract,	 the	 appointers	 are	 granted	 authority	 to	 revoke	 Te	 Pou	 Tupua’s	privilege.		This	creates	guards	for	the	guardians,	namely	Whanganui	Iwi	and	the	Crown,	or	more	specifically	Ngā	Tāngata	Tiaki	o	Whanganui	and	the	Minister	of	Conservation.71		 In	 the	 spirit	 of	 the	 Roman	 poet,	 Juvenal,	 the	 appointment	 of	these	 two	 overseers	 could	 be	 considered	 superfluous	 to	 the	 delivery	 of	 a	desirable	 outcome,	 as	 neither	 the	 guardians	 nor	 the	 guards	 can	 be	 trusted.	 	 A	more	 optimistic	 outlook,	 however,	 is	 to	 question	 the	 extent	 oversight	will,	 or	even	 can	 be,	 necessary	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Whanganui	 following	 the	implementation	of	resource	self-determination.		In	 any	 situation,	 oversight	 and	 enforcement	 is	 only	 necessary	 if	 an	 ‘illegal’	strategy	available	 to	a	guardian,	such	as	rent-seeking,	 is	more	attractive	 than	a		‘legal’	strategy	(Hurwicz	2008).72		In	the	case	of	the	Whanganui	River,	if	the	new	framework	and	strategy	document		is	able	to	create	an	institutional	environment	in	which	 every	 illegal	 strategy	 is	 dominated	by	 (that	 is,	 is	 less	 attractive	 than)	some	 legal	 strategy,	 oversight	 by	 Iwi	 and	 the	 Crown	 will	 be	 unnecessary.	However,	should	an	illegal	strategy	be	more	attractive	to	Te	Pou	than	a	legal	one,	or	if	an	illegal	strategy	is	only	weakly	dominated	by	a	legal	strategy,	oversight	by	the	Crown	and	Ngā	Tāngata	Tiaki	o	Whanganui	will	be	necessary	to	achieve	the																																																																																																																																																															demonstrates	potential	complexities	that	could	arise	under	some	circumstances	when	overarching	decision-making	responsibility	is	placed	with	the	courts	as	a	result	of	the	bargaining	process	being	transferred	to	actors	at	the	operational	level	under	resource	self-determination.	71	The	consequences	of	this	are	interesting	to	consider	in	light	of	recent	DOC	strategies,	for	which	the	Minister	of	Conservation	is	the	respective	minister.	In	2015,	DOC	released	a	strategy	for	the	management	of	all	environmental	goods	and	resources,	including	freshwater.		As	part	of	this	DOC	outlined	seven	strategic	stretch	goals,	of	which	the	second	goal	stated	that	by	2025	“50	freshwater	ecosystems	are	restored	from	‘mountains	to	the	sea’”	(Department	of	Conservation	2015,	p.6).	When	the	Deputy	Director-General	of	Partnerships	at	DOC,	Dr	Kay	Booth,	was	asked	about	this,	she	said:	“if	the	Whanganui	River	wasn’t	right	at	the	top	of	the	list	of	rivers	that	we	would	want	New	Zealand	to	have	restored	from	the	mountains	to	the	sea,	I	don’t	know	what	would	be”.		This	suggests	that	both	of	the	overseers	could	have	a	preference	for	restoring	the	river	and	potentially	reducing	the	current	levels	of	diversion.		72	Illegal	strategies	could	be	considered	those	in	which	the	guardian	engages	in	rent-seeking	or	acts	in	a	manner	counter	to	the	legislative	mandate.	
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legislative	objectives	set	out	in	the	Act.		In	light	of	this,	this	analysis	suggests	that	significant	 emphasis	 must	 be	 put	 on	 the	 strategy	 document,	 Te	 Heke,	 to	articulate	 the	 strategies	 available	 to	 Te	 Pou	 and	 to	 design	 a	 system	 of	 payoffs	that	 ensure	 that	 the	 guardians	 are	 incentivised	 to	make	 decisions	which	 align	with	the	purposes	of	the	Te	Awa	Tupua	Act	and	discourage	any	rent-seeking	or	‘illegal’	activities.		Whether	one	 strategy	dominates	another	 could	also	be	affected	by	 the	 level	of	associated	transaction	costs:	 in	most	cases	less	costly	strategies	are	going	to	be	preferred	 to	 more	 costly	 strategies	 (Williamson	 2000).	 	 For	 the	 institutional	arrangement	 as	 a	whole,	 it	will	 be	more	 robust	 if	 the	 costs	 of	 implementation	and	running	the	new	framework	are	minimised.	A	proxy	of	the	expected	costs	of	changing,	establishing,	and	enforcing	these	new	sets	of	property	rights	 is	given	by	 the	 financial	 support	 promised	 by	 the	 Crown	 to	 support	 the	 establishment	and	 implementation	of	 the	new	framework.	 	 It	 can	be	assumed	that	 the	Crown	views	 these	 costs	 as	 long-term	 investments	 with	 the	 purpose	 of	 minimising	future	litigation	costs,	although	no	cost	benefit	analyses	have	been	carried	out	ex	ante.			Transaction	costs	could	also	be	affected	by	the	introduction	of	new	actors	to	the	governance	structure	(Rasmussen	&	Toshkov	2013),	the	uncertainty	associated	with	making	decisions	based	on	a	values-based	system	rather	than	a	rules-based	system	 (Kerr	 2007;	 Pemberton	 &	 Kerr	 2013),	 long-lasting	 effects	 of	 previous	decisions	that	may	be	transferred	across	the	institutional	settings	(Bednar	et	al.	2015;	 Mantzavinos	 et	 al.	 2004),	 and	 incomplete	 and	 asymmetric	 information	(Gagliardi	2008;	Hodgson	2006;	Libecap	2014).	 	However,	 as	 Saleth	 and	Dinar	(2004)	suggest,	water	reform	only	occurs	when	the	aggregated	transaction	costs	are	less	than	the	opportunity	costs	(ie	foregone	net	benefits)	of	maintaining	the	status	 quo.	 	 This	 implies	 that	 the	 new	 arrangement	must	 also	 be	 expected	 to	create	significant	benefits	for	users	and	managers.				Given	 that	 the	 new	 institutional	 arrangement	 develops	more	 of	 a	 community-based	 system,	 many	 of	 the	 well-documented	 benefits	 of	 collective	 property	
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rights	systems	could	be	captured	by	the	implementation	of	the	new	framework.	These	 could	 include	 increased	 levels	 of	 social	 capital	 within	 the	 community	(Bowles	&	Gintis	2002),	increased	opportunities	for	face-to-face	communication	and	trust	building	which	could	lead	to	socially	optimal	outcomes	(Bowles	2004;	Cole	 &	 Grossman	 2010),	 and	 a	 more	 robust	 property	 rights	 system	 overall	(Ostrom	2008a).	These	 characteristics	are	evaluated	 in	 closer	detail	 in	 chapter	eight.		This	 discussion	 generates	 several	 testable	 hypotheses	 that	 can	 be	 tested	 to	evaluate	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 new	 institutional	 arrangement	 and	 to	 answer	 the	second	 general	 research	 question	 outlined	 in	 chapter	 three.	 	 The	 discussion	shows	that	as	a	result	of	implementing	resource	self-determination	there	will	be	a	change	in	property	rights	with	legal	property	rights	to	the	riverbed	transferred	from	the	Crown	to	Te	Awa	Tupua.		Over	time	economic	property	rights	may	also	be	 transferred	 to	 Te	 Awa	 Tupua	 through	 Te	 Pou	 Tupua,	 potentially	 impacting	how	rights	 to	water	may	be	allocated.	 	As	 the	allocation	of	property	 rights	can	impact	 rents	 and	 wealth	 distribution,	 there	 can	 also	 be	 long-term	 effects	 on	environmental	and	economic	outcomes.			Therefore,	it	is	hypothesised	that:		
Hypothesis	 One:	 The	 level	 of	 transaction	 costs	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 different	 under	 the	 two	
property	rights	settings.		
Hypothesis	 Two:	The	assignment	of	property	rights	will	affect	the	distribution	of	water	
allocation	in	the	Whanganui	River.	
	
Hypothesis	Three:	Past	experiences	under	one	property	rights	setting	are	likely	to	affect	
actors’	behaviour	in	a	new	setting.	
	The	 first	 two	hypotheses	are	generated	directly	 from	 the	 comparative	analysis	undertaken	 using	 the	 IAD	 for	 which	 assessing	 economic	 and	 environmental	outcomes	from	the	two	property	rights	settings	are	a	useful	form	of	evaluation.		The	third	general	hypotheses	is	influenced	by	a	recognition	that	context	matters	to	 any	 analysis.	 	 It	 also	 provides	 a	 preliminary	 examination	 of	 institutional	change	that	 is	examined	in	greater	detail	 in	chapter	seven.	 	 In	this	study,	 these	
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hypotheses	 are	 tested	 in	 the	 laboratory	 by	 approximating	 the	 institutional	setting	in	game	form	and	quantifying	actors’	strategic	behaviour.	
	
	
5.5	 Conclusions		This	chapter	has	detailed	the	rule	changes	legislated	to	occur	under	the	Te	Awa	Tupua	 (Whanganui	 River	 Settlement	 Claims)	 Act	 2017.	 	 The	 results	 of	 this	comparative	 analysis	 show	 that	 decision-making	 for	 the	 Whanganui	 River	currently	 uses	 a	 top-down	 approach	 to	 decision-making	 modeled	 on	 a	 state	ownership	property	rights	system.		Although	rights	to	exclusion,	alienation,	and	management	are	devolved	 to	 lower	policy	actors,	 ownership	of	 the	 riverbed	 is	vested	in	the	Crown	and	all	of	the	operational	level	actors	remain	stakeholders	in	decision-making.	 	 Under	 the	 new	 arrangement	 of	 resource	 self-determination,	ownership	of	the	riverbed	is	vested	in	an	operational	level	actor,	Te	Awa	Tupua,	and	 the	 rights	 to	 decision-making	proposed	 to	 be	 eventually	 transferred	 to	Te	Awa	Tupua’s	guardian,	Te	Pou	Tupua.		The	effects	of	progressing	to	stage	two	of	the	institutional	arrangement	are	the	most	useful	 to	examine	to	evaluate	 the	 long-term	environmental	and	economic	impacts	 of	 the	 change	 in	 property	 rights.	 	 Under	 such	 a	 scenario,	 it	 can	 be	hypothesised	that	both	resource	use	outcomes	and	transaction	costs	are	likely	to	change	 as	 the	 new	 property	 rights	 holder	 (Te	 Pou	 Tupua)	 takes	 over	 the	responsibility	of	negotiating	with	users	over	use	of	 the	river.	Further,	 it	can	be	hypothesised	 that	 the	 change	 in	property	 rights	 is	 likely	 to	be	affected	by	past	events	that	may	influence	actors’	choices	in	the	new	setting.	 	These	hypotheses	can	be	tested	by	modeling	the	 institutional	structure	governing	the	Whanganui	River	as	a	game	and	then	testing	the	game	theory	predictions	in	the	lab.	 	In	the	game,	the	institutional	setting	can	be	approximated	by	specifying	the	sequence	of	moves	available	to	actors,	and,	the	actors’	preferences,	by	the	payoff	each	player	receives	 from	 making	 a	 choice.	 	 The	 number	 of	 rounds	 it	 takes	 to	 reach	agreement	 in	a	 repeated	game	can	 represent	 transaction	 costs.	 	 In	 chapter	 six,	such	a	game	is	modeled	and	tested	under	experimental	conditions	to	determine	
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the	 possible	 impacts	 on	 environmental	 and	 economic	 outcomes	 of	 granting	 a	river	legal	standing.		
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6		 Evaluating	the	play	of	the	game*			
6.0	 Introduction		To	establish	internal	validity	for	chapter	five,	chapter	six	evaluates	some	of	the	observations	 made	 in	 the	 institutional	 analysis	 and	 tests	 the	 hypotheses	developed.		In	doing	so,	chapter	six	also	addresses	the	second	research	question,	which	asked	about	the	economic	and	environmental	effects	of	granting	resource	self-determination	 to	 a	 river	 system.	 	 The	 methodological	 approach	 used	 to	answer	the	research	question	and	test	the	hypotheses	is	a	combination	of	game	theory	 and	 a	 laboratory	 experiment.	 	 First,	 the	 complex	 institutional	 settings	governing	 the	Whanganui	 River	 are	 approximated	 as	 a	 simple	 game,	 and	 then	the	 game	 theoretical	 predictions	 tested	 under	 controlled	 conditions	 in	 the	laboratory.	 As	 a	 reminder,	 the	 three	 general	 hypotheses	 generated	 by	 the	institutional	 analysis	 stated:	 (1)	 transaction	 costs	 for	 actors	 negotiating	 under	the	 two	 arrangements	 will	 change	 as	 a	 result	 of	 implementing	 resource	 self-determination;	(2)	resource	self-determination	will	impact	the	use	and	provision	of	 water	 in	 the	 river;	 and	 (3)	 actors’	 experiences	 under	 one	 property	 rights	system	will	affect	how	they	behave	under	a	new	system.		The	chapter	thus	proceeds	as	follows.	In	section	one	the	institutional	governance	system	of	the	Whanganui	River	is	modelled	using	non-cooperative	game	theory.	This	 game	 is	 then	 translated	 into	 a	 testable	 experiment	 for	 which	 the	experimental	design	 is	outlined	 in	section	 two.	 	Section	 two	 is	 then	subdivided	into	subsections,	which	outline	the	procedure,	experimental	design,	treatments,	testable	 hypotheses,	 and	 results.	 	 Section	 three	 discusses	 implications	 of	 the	findings,	and	section	four	draws	conclusions	from	the	chapter.	
	
	 	
*	The	experiment	reported	in	this	chapter	was	conducted	in	partnership	with	Dr.	Joe	Vecci.	 	The	results	 of	 the	 chapter	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	 working	 paper:	 	 Talbot-Jones,	 J.	 &	 Vecci,	 J.,	 2016.	Normalising	 property	 rights:	 A	 new	 approach	 to	 resource	management?	 	 Available	 on	 request.		Both	authors	contributed	equally	to	the	paper.	
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6.1	 A	normative	approach	to	evaluation:	Game	theory		Based	on	the	analysis	undertaken	in	chapter	five,	the	most	pertinent	scenario	to	evaluate	 in	 the	case	of	 the	Whanganui	River	 is	 the	bargaining	process	between	the	 property	 rights	 holder	 and	 a	 water	 user	 under	 different	 property	 rights	settings.	 	Although	 the	Act	 states	 that	 the	new	arrangement	does	not	create	or	transfer	proprietary	 rights	 in	water,	 under	 common	 law,	 title	 to	 the	 surface	of	land	entails	proprietary	authority	to	the	space	occupied	by	the	water	column,	the	superjacent	air	space	to	a	reasonable	height,	and	the	space	comprising	the	soils	beneath	the	bed	of	the	river	(Gray	&	Gray	2011).	 	For	this	reason,	effects	of	the	change	 in	 ownership	 of	 the	 riverbed	will	 result	 in	 changes	 in	 decision-making	over	water	use.			As	 operators	 of	 the	 Tongariro	 Power	 Development	 Scheme	 (TPDS),	 Genesis	Energy	Limited,	a	public-private	partnership,	has	the	largest	impact	on	the	river,	diverting	 82%	 of	 flow	 from	 the	 river’s	 headwaters.73		 Under	 the	 existing	 state	ownership	 arrangement	 for	 the	 Whanganui	 River,	 when	 Genesis’	 consent	 for	water	 take	 comes	 up	 for	 renewal,	 Genesis	 negotiates	 with	 the	 Crown	 to	determine	 how	much	 flow	 it	 is	 to	 be	 allocated.	 	 As	 explained	 in	 section	 5.2,	 a	first-come,	 first-served	 consent	 based	 system	 determines	 how	 water	 is	distributed	 among	 users	 of	 water.	 	 Under	 the	 consent	 system,	 Horizons,	representing	the	Crown,	can	offer	Genesis	a	proportion	of	available	flow	and,	 if	needed,	can	readjust	its	offer	repeatedly	until	agreement	is	reached.		Each	time	a	new	offer	is	made,	the	transaction	costs	are	assumed	to	increase.		Each	decision	made	by	Horizons	 is	understood	 to	affect	 the	 ‘river’,	 in	ways	 that	may,	or	may	not,	be	accounted	for.			Based	 on	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 institutional	 analysis,	 it	 is	 anticipated	 that	 under	resource	 self-determination	 decision-making	 authority	 will	 eventually	 be	transferred	 from	 the	 Crown,	 represented	 by	 Horizons,	 to	 Te	 Awa	 Tupua,	 as	represented	 by	 Te	 Pou	 Tupua.	 As	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 this	may																																																									73	Ibid.	Footnote	52.		Until	2013,	Genesis	Energy	Limited	was	a	state-owned	enterprise.		At	the	time	of	writing,	the	government	retained	the	majority	share	(51%)	in	company	ownership.	
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result	 in	 users	 such	 as	 Genesis	 engaging	 directly	 with	 the	 river	 to	 negotiate	water	use,	relegating	the	Crown	to	a	position	of	observer.	In	such	situations,	the	bargaining	process	is	assumed	to	play	out	in	the	same	manner	as	under	the	state	ownership	system	where	the	property	rights	holder	makes	an	offer	to	the	user,	who	 can	 accept	 or	 reject	 such	 an	 offer.	 	 If	 offers	 by	 the	 river	 are	 rejected,	 the	bargaining	 process	 will	 be	 repeated	 at	 a	 cost,	 continuing	 until	 agreement	 is	reached	 or	 costs	 of	 continued	 negotiation	 are	 considered	 to	 outweigh	 the	benefits.			One	 way	 to	 illustrate	 the	 bargaining	 process	 occurring	 over	 use	 of	 the	Whanganui	River	 is	 to	modify	 the	basic	repeated	bargaining	game	discussed	 in	chapter	 three.	 	 In	 the	 repeated	 bargaining	 game	 with	 alternating	 offers	 one	player	 (the	proposer)	 is	 able	 to	make	an	offer	 to	another	player	 (the	 receiver)	who	can	then	choose	to	accept	or	reject	 the	proposer’s	offer	(Rubinstein	1982;	Stahl	1971).		If	the	receiver	accepts,	the	game	ends	with	each	player	receiving	a	payoff	 determined	 by	 the	 number	 of	 tokens	 he	 or	 she	 received.	 	 If	 he	 or	 she	rejects,	 the	 game	 continues	 to	 another	 round,	with	 a	 reduced	 pie	 and	 the	 two	players	swapping	roles,	so	that	the	receiver	now	becomes	the	proposer	and	vice	versa	ad	infinitum.		It	 is	assumed	 that	 there	 is	no	communication	between	 the	players	although	all	players	have	complete	information,	implying	that	all	players	know	the	structure	of	 the	game	and	 the	payoffs	attached	 to	outcomes.	 	 	Players	either	know	or	do	not	know	the	current	moves	of	other	players	depending	on	whether	or	not	they	are	observable.		It	is	assumed	that	both	players	want	a	larger	slice	of	the	pie	and	that	they	both	dislike	delay,	due	to	their	positive	time	preference	and	the	cost	of	repeated	transactions.74				Figure	 6.1	 depicts	 this	 setting	 showing	 two	 periods	 of	 a	 bargaining	 game	 of	alternating	offers	with	a	finite	horizon	(Stahl	1971).		In	period	1	of	the	game,	P1	is	the	proposer	and	makes	an	offer	to	P2,	the	receiver,	dividing	a	pie	of	size	one.																																																										74	Both	the	finite	(Stahl	1971)	and	infinite	(Rubinstein	1982)	version	of	the	bargaining	game	with	alternating	offers	can	be	solved	for	the	subgame	perfect	equilibrium.	
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If	P2	accepts	(A)	P1’s	offer	of	o1	the	players	receive	their	respective	payoffs	of	π2	and	π1	and	the	game	ends.		However,	if	P2	rejects	(R)	P1’s	offer,	the	game	moves	onto	period	2	and	 repeats	with	P2			acting	as	 the	proposer	and	P1,	 the	 receiver.		With	 each	 subsequent	 round,	 the	overall	 pie	decreases	 in	 size	by	 a	designated	discount	factor	δ	∈	(0,	1).		In	the	finite	bargaining	game	depicted	here,	this	means	that	 in	period	3,	 P1	will	 be	 able	 to	make	 a	 final	 take-it-or-leave-it	 offer.	 	 Given	that	the	game	is	about	to	end,	P2	will	accept	any	offer	made	by	P1,	so	P2	can	offer	o3=0.	 	 Using	 backward	 induction,	 this	 means	 that	 in	 the	 sequential	 finite	bargaining	game	depicted	in	figure	6.1,	the	unique	subgame	perfect	equilibrium	is	that	P1	offers	an	immediate	split	of	(δ2(1	–	o3),	δ2o3)	in	period	1	and	that	P2	will	accept.			
	
Figure	6.1:		 A	 finite	 horizon	 bargaining	 game	with	 alternating	 offers	 (Stahl	 1971).	 	 In	 this	three	period	game,	backward	induction	shows	that	in	period	1	P1	will	offer	P2		o1	≥	o3δ2	and	keep	the	remaining	surplus	for	him	or	herself.			To	 represent	 the	 institutional	 structure	 governing	 the	 Whanganui	 River	 the	repeated	 bargaining	 game	 with	 alternating	 offers	 is	 adjusted	 to	 more	 closely	resemble	 the	 simple	 one-sided	 models	 of	 Cramton	 (1984)	 and	 Sobel	 and	
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Takahashi	(1983)	(figure	6.2).		In	these	one-sided	models	one	player	makes	all	of	the	 offers	 and	 another	 remains	 the	 receiver	 throughout	 the	 game	 rather	 than	alternating	sequentially.	The	number	of	tokens	to	be	split	between	P1	and	P2	 is	non-negative	and	adds	up	to	the	positive	total	of	z	(ie	x	+	y	=	z).					
	
Figure	6.2:	 A	 version	 of	 the	 single-offer,	 repeated	 bargaining	 game	 approximating	 the	institutional	arrangement	governing	the	Whanganui	River,	New	Zealand.			To	approximate	 the	 institutional	 arrangement	governing	 the	Whanganui	River,	this	single	offer	game	is	adjusted	to	introduce	a	third	player	(P3).		P3	can	observe	the	exchange	of	the	proposer	and	receiver	but	has	no	say	in	the	decision-making	and	 therefore	 has	 his	 or	 her	 payoff	 determined	 by	 the	 two	bargaining	 parties.		This	represents	the	institutional	arrangement	governing	the	Whanganui	River	in	which	three	key	actors	interact:	the	Crown,	the	user	(Genesis),	and	the	river/Te	Awa	Tupua.75		 In	 this	 game,	 if	 player	 P2	 accepts	 P1’s	 offer,	 the	 game	 ends,	 and	
																																																								75	This	game	can	be	adjusted	to	represent	the	governance	arrangement	of	the	Whanganui	River	under	state	ownership	and	resource	self-determination.	Under	state	ownership,	the	Crown	is	treated	as	P1,	P2	is	Genesis	or	the	dam,	and	the	third	party	i.e.	P3	–	the	river/Te	Awa	Tupua.		Under	resource	self-determination,	the	river/Te	Awa	Tupua	becomes	P1,	Genesis	Energy	remains	P2,	and	the	Crown	becomes	the	third	party.		It	can	
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each	player	will	receive	their	payoffs	of	π1,	π2,	and	π3	(payoffs	for	P1,	P2,	and	P3	respectively).		If	player	P2	rejects	the	offer,	play	moves	into	period	2	and	play	is	repeated	 with	 all	 players’	 payoffs	 discounted	 by	 δ.	 	 If	 players	 reach	 the	 final	period	without	reaching	agreement,	all	players	receive	zero.		For	this	reason,	the	proposer’s	dominant	strategy	in	period	1	is	to	choose	a	choice	set	that	optimises	his	 or	 her	 own	 payoffs,	 even	 if	 player	 P2	 is	 to	 receive	 zero.	 	 Because	 the	 final	answer	 is	 weakly	 dominated	 by	 zero,	 backward	 induction	 shows	 that	 the	receiver	 (P2)	 is	 better	 off	 to	 accept	 than	 reject	 the	proposer’s	 first	 offer	 as	 the	proposer	 has	 no	 incentive	 to	 change	 his	 or	 her	 offer	 in	 each	 repeated	 round.		Further,	the	rejection	of	P1’s	initial	offer	will	cause	P2’s	payoffs	to	decrease	by	δ,	making	 them	 worse	 off	 in	 each	 subsequent	 round.	 When	 players	 are	 self-regarding	 it	 is	 assumed	 they	will	make	 decisions	which	 are	 profit	maximising	and	 that	 they	will	 not	 take	 the	 effects	 of	 their	 choices	 on	 the	 third	player	 into	account	in	their	decision-making.			
	
6.2	 A	descriptive	approach	to	evaluation:	Laboratory	experiment	
	As	explained	in	section	3.4,	the	predictions	made	by	game	theory	do	not	always	hold	 up	 when	 tested	 empirically.	 Subsequently,	 this	 section	 outlines	 an	experiment,	 which	 was	 designed	 to	 test	 the	 predictions	 of	 the	 game	 in	 the	laboratory.		
6.2.1	 Procedure	All	 sessions	of	 the	experiment	were	computerised	and	carried	out	using	Z-tree	(Fischbacher	 2007)	 at	 the	 Monash	 Laboratory	 for	 Experimental	 Economics,	Monash	University,	Australia,	between	October	and	November	2015.	All	players	were	recruited	using	the	Online	Recruitment	System	for	Economic	Experiments	(ORSEE)	 (Greiner	 2004).	 	 A	 total	 of	 144	 undergraduate	 students	 from	 various	disciplines	participated	in	at	most	one	session.	 	Before	the	experiment	officially	began,	 players’	 consent	was	 sought	 (see	 appendix	 iv.)	 and	 all	 players	 received																																																																																																																																																															be	assumed	that	both	the	Crown	and	Te	Awa	Tupua	will	offer	Genesis	a	proportion	of	the	total,	which	ensures	that	each	property	rights	holder	will	receive	the	greatest	payoff	at	the	smallest	cost.		
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written	instructions	(see	appendix	v.).	 	These	instructions	were	also	read	aloud	by	 the	 experimenter	 to	 establish	 common	 knowledge.	 	 To	 ensure	 players	understood	 how	 the	 allocation	 of	 tokens	 would	 affect	 each	 player’s	 payoffs,	detailed	 examples	 were	 given	 in	 the	 instructions.	 	 The	 opportunity	 to	 ask	clarifying	 questions	 privately	 was	 given.	 	 To	 minimise	 any	 potential	 demand	effect	 resulting	 from	 the	 choice	 of	 examples	 given	 by	 the	 experimenter,	 the	experimenter	 gave	a	 range	of	 examples	highlighting	 the	payoffs	 resulting	 from	each	corner	solution	as	well	as	an	interior	solution	(Zizzo	2009).		Although	 players	 only	 required	 a	 few	 minutes	 to	 make	 their	 decisions,	 the	extensive	 instructions	 caused	 each	 session	 to	 last	 almost	 an	 hour.	 	 Players	earned	 on	 average	 14	 AUD	 including	 a	 show-up	 fee	 of	 5	 AUD.76		 In	 total	 six	sessions	were	undertaken	which	each	consisted	of	eight	three-person	groups.	All	players	participated	 in	 two	phases	but	were	paid	 for	one	phase	decided	at	 the	end	 of	 the	 experiment	 by	 a	 coin	 toss.	 A	 randomly	 chosen	 participant	administered	the	coin	toss	in	full	view	of	all	other	participants.		All	earnings	were	collected	from	the	experimenter	privately	at	the	end	of	the	experiment.		
6.2.2	 Experimental	design	To	compare	the	choices	made	by	players	under	the	two	property	rights	settings	and	 test	 the	general	hypotheses	outlined	 in	chapter	 five,	a	within	and	between	subject	variation	of	the	one-sided	finitely	repeated	bargaining	game	described	in	section	6.1	was	played	in	the	laboratory.		Players	were	initially	put	into	groups	of	three.	Each	group	consisted	of	Players	P1,	P2,	and	P3	who	represented	the	Crown,	Genesis,	 and	 the	 river/Te	 Awa	 Tupua	 respectively	 but	 remained	 blind	 to	 the	institutional	context,	as	is	standard	experimental	procedure.77		These	blind	titles	(P1,	P2,	and	P3)	and	groups	were	randomly	assigned	to	players	at	the	start	of	the	experiment	 and	 were	 retained	 by	 the	 players	 through	 the	 course	 of	 the	experiment.					
																																																								76	All	subjects	had	participated	in	other	economics	experiments,	but	none	had	previously	participated	in	a	bargaining	game.	77	In	the	experiment	Players	P1,	P2,	and	P3	were	called	Players	A,	B,	and	C	respectively.	
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Players	P1,	P2,	and	P3	each	had	a	different	set	of	payoffs	of	which	all	players	were	informed	 (table	 6.1).	 	 In	 the	 game,	 each	 player’s	 payoff	 aimed	 to	 capture	 the	preferences	of	the	Crown,	Genesis,	and	the	river/Te	Awa	Tupua,	as	revealed	by	their	respective	 legislative	mandate	and	observable	choices.78		As	shown	 in	 the	table	below,	Player	P1’s	payoff	was	optimised	when	it	allocated	83	tokens	to	P2,	namely	 Genesis.	 	 This	 optimisation	 was	 derived	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 under	 the	existing	 institutional	arrangement	82%	of	 the	 flow	 from	the	headwaters	of	 the	Whanganui	River	has	been	 allocated	 to	Genesis	 by	 the	Crown	 leaving	18%	 for	the	river.	 	Player	P2,	representing	Genesis,	was	assumed	to	optimise	its	returns	when	it	received	all	the	tokens.		This	is	equivalent	to	all	water	being	allocated	to	the	dam.	 	 Similarly,	 P3,	 the	 river/Te	Awa	Tupua	was	 assumed	best	 off	when	 it	received	all	tokens	or	all	water	is	left	instream,	as	this	was	assumed	to	optimise	Te	Awa	Tupua’s	health	and	wellbeing.	 	This	means	P2’s	payoff	 is	greatest	when	he/she	was	offered	all	100	tokens	and	P3’s	payoff	was	greatest	when	zero	tokens	were	given	to	P2.			The	 initial	 payoffs	 can	 be	 interpreted	 in	 the	 following	way:	 For	 those	 subjects	who	 selected	 choice	 set	 F,	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	 assume	 they	 were	 seeking	 to	optimise	 aggregate	 social	 utility.	 Self-regarding	 P3’s	 were	 aiming	 to	 maximise	their	 own	 earnings	 by	 selecting	 choice	 set	 A.	 P3’s	 who	 cared	 both	 about	 their	monetary	 earnings	 as	 well	 as	 what	 constitutes	 socially	 appropriate	 behaviour	were	 those	 that	 selected	 a	 choice	 set	 other	 than	 A.	 Lastly,	 subjects	 that	 value	equal	payoffs	for	all	players	were	expected	to	have	selected	choice	set	D.			
	 	
																																																								78	The	payoffs	are	only	approximations	of	the	payoffs	available	to	the	Crown,	Genesis,	and	the	river/Te	Awa	Tupua.	
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Table	6.1:		 Payoff	table	detailing	the	payoffs	received	by	Players	P1,	P2,	and	P3	according	to	how	many	tokens	allocated	to	the	receiver	and	proposer.		
Choice	Set	
Quantity	of	
tokens	for	
proposer	(x)	
Quantity	of	
tokens	for	
receiver	(y)	
Payoff	of	P1	 Payoff	of	P2	 Payoff	of	P3	
A	 100	 0	 $3	 $0	 $15	B	 83	 17	 $4.50	 $4.50	 $13.50	C	 67	 33	 $6	 $6.80	 $12	D	 50	 50	 $9	 $9	 $9	E	 33	 67	 $13.50	 $11.30	 $6	F	 17	 83	 $15	 $13.50	 $3	G	 0	 100	 $3	 $15	 $0			In	line	with	standard	bargaining	game	procedure,	each	game	involved	a	proposer	making	an	offer	of	between	0	and	100	tokens	to	a	receiver	who	could	then	accept	or	reject	this	offer.	If	the	receiver	accepted	the	proposer’s	offer,	the	game	ended	and	 the	 respective	monetary	 payoffs	made	 in	 accordance	with	 the	 conversion	rates	detailed	in	table	6.1.		If	the	receiver	rejected	the	offer,	the	game	continued	to	the	next	round	of	bargaining	with	payoffs	for	all	players	discounted	by	10%.79		In	each	treatment,	 the	 inactive	 third	player	was	present	 for	each	exchange	and	could	observe	all	decisions	made	by	the	proposer	and	receiver,	but	not	engage	in	any	decision-making.				Each	game	consisted	of	two	phases:	phase	1	and	phase	2.		Players	were	informed	of	this	at	the	start	of	the	experiment,	but	were	not	told	the	details	of	the	second	phase	until	the	completion	of	the	first.	Subject	group	and	player	titles	remained	
																																																								79	This	discount	rate	of	δ	=	0.9	was	chosen	to	encourage	players	to	be	more	(rather	than	less)	patient	in	their	decision-making	and	to	ensure	that	after	ten	repeated	rounds,	the	payoffs	of	all	players	would	fall	to	zero.	
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unchanged	between	phase	1	and	phase	2.		Players	could	engage	in	a	maximum	of	ten	repeated	rounds	in	each	phase.80			The	 use	 of	 the	 bargaining	 game	 to	 test	 the	 effects	 of	 property	 right	 rules	 on	peoples’	choices	builds	on	an	established	body	of	literature	reviewed	in	section	3.4	(Croson	&	Johnston	2000;	Dreber	et	al.	2012;	Hoffman	et	al.	2008;	Leliveld	et	al.	2008;	Oxoby	&	Spraggon	2008).		In	each	of	these	papers	the	experimenter	in	the	lab	constructed	property	rights	differently,	although	all	found	similar	results,	showing	 that	 players	 display	 more	 self-regarding	 behaviour	 when	 granted	rights.81		 In	 this	 game,	 the	 assignment	 of	 property	 rights	was	 emphasised	 in	 a	style	 similar	 to	 Leliveld	 et	 al	 (2008).	 Thus,	 in	 the	 instructions	 a	 graphical	depiction	of	the	game	was	provided	which	showed	a	pile	of	tokens	heaped	on	the	proposer’s	side	of	the	table,	and	nothing	on	the	receiver’s	side	(figure	6.3).82				
		
	
Figure	6.3:		 Graphic	representation	of	the	property	rights	setting	and	each	player’s	role	that	was	given	to	players	in	the	instructions	at	the	start	of	the	experiment.	
	
	
	 																																																									80	The	reason	for	including	two	phases	is	that	to	understand	what	happens	to	peoples’	choices	when	property	rights	arrangements	change,	a	within	subject	analysis	had	to	be	undertaken,	which	required	looking	at	the	changes	in	players’	choices	over	time.	81	It	should	be	noted	that	studies,	which	required	players	to	‘earn’	their	property	right	tended	to	produce	stronger	results	than	those	who	simply	used	randomly	allocated	rights.			82	It	was	made	clear	to	players	that	this	was	a	hypothetical	depiction	and	that	in	reality	players	would	be	in	booths	with	identities	anonymised.	
Proposer         Responder       Third-party 
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6.2.3	 Treatments	Subjects	participated	 in	one	of	 three	 treatments:	 (i)	 the	 ‘State	Ownership’	 (SO)	treatment;	 (ii)	 the	 ‘Resource	 Self-Determination’	 (RSD)	 treatment;	 or	 (iii)	 the	‘Changing’	 (C)	 treatment.	 	 The	 ‘State	 Ownership’	 and	 ‘Resource	 Self-Determination’	 treatments	 simulated	 the	 property	 rights	 systems	 of	 state	ownership	 and	 resource	 self-determination	 respectively,	 while	 the	 ‘Changing’	treatment	simulated	a	property	rights	shift	from	one	arrangement	to	another.		A	single	treatment	was	tested	at	each	experimental	session.		
	
The	State	Ownership	treatment	The	 ‘State	Ownership’	 treatment	acted	as	a	baseline	control	 for	the	experiment	representing	the	current	property	rights	arrangement	governing	the	Whanganui	River.	As	discussed,	 under	 the	RMA,	 the	decision-maker	 is	 required	 to	balance	consumptive	and	 instream	water	use,	preferring	some	water	 to	be	allocated	 to	each	use	(interior	solution)	rather	than	to	either	extreme	(corner	solution).	 	To	represent	 this,	 P1	 (the	 Crown)	 was	 assigned	 the	 role	 of	 proposer	 and	 was	endowed	with	100	tokens.	 	P1’s	task	was	to	decide	how	many	tokens	he	or	she	wished	 to	give	P2	 (Genesis).	P2	was	assigned	 the	role	of	 the	receiver	and	could	either	 accept	 P1’s	 offer,	 at	 which	 point	 the	 phase	 ended	 and	 the	 respective	payoffs	made.	Alternatively,	P2	 could	 reject	P1’s	offer	 in	which	 case	all	players’	payoffs	 were	 reduced	 by	 10%	 (δ	 =	 0.9)	 and	 the	 game	 proceeded	 to	 the	 next	round.	 For	 each	 subsequent	 round,	 the	process	was	 repeated,	 so	 that	 P1	 could	make	an	offer	to	P2,	which	could	be	accepted	or	rejected.				Throughout	 this	 process	 P3	 (the	Whanganui	 River)	 remained	 an	 inactive	 third	player	 who	 was	 able	 to	 observe	 proceedings	 but	 not	 make	 any	 decisions.	 All	players	knew	of	P3’s	role	and	that	each	rejection	by	P2	would	decrease	their	total	payoffs	by	a	 fixed	discount	 factor.	 	All	players	also	knew	that	P1’s	payoffs	were	optimised	when	he	or	she	kept	only	some	of	 the	 tokens	 for	him	or	herself	and	offered	 the	 rest	 to	 P2;	 that	 P2	 optimised	 his	 or	 her	 payoffs	 when	 he	 or	 she	received	 all	 of	 the	 tokens;	 and	 that	 the	 inactive	 P3	would	 optimise	 his	 or	 her	payoffs	 if	zero	tokens	were	given	to	P2.	 	 If	an	agreement	was	not	reached	after	
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ten	repeated	rounds,	all	subjects	earned	zero	for	phase	1.83		In	the	SO	treatment,	phase	 2	 was	 a	 repeat	 of	 phase	 1.	 	 Instructions	 were	 repeated	 in	 full	 and	 all	subjects	retained	the	same	groups,	roles,	and	optimal	payoffs.		
The	Resource	Self-Determination	treatment	The	‘Resource	Self-Determination’	treatment	represents	the	new	property	rights	setting	proposed	for	the	Whanganui	River.		In	stage	two	of	the	new	institutional	arrangement	the	power	to	make	decisions	over	use	are	to	be	vested	in	the	river	itself,	 with	 a	 mandate	 instructing	 the	 guardian,	 Te	 Pou	 Tupua,	 to	 have	 a	 self-regarding	 preference	 for	 environmental	 health	 and	 wellbeing.	 	 It	 is	 assumed	therefore	 that	 the	 river’s	 total	 benefits	 will	 be	 optimised	 when	 there	 is	 zero	consumptive	use	of	the	river.		In	line	with	demand	theory	it	is	also	assumed	that	marginal	 benefits	will	 decrease	with	 each	 additional	 unit	 of	water	 allocated	 to	instream	use.		Resource	Self-Determination	also	means	that	any	bargaining	over	use	will	 occur	 between	Te	Awa	Tupua,	 represented	by	Te	Pou	Tupua,	 and	 the	user.	 	 In	 this	 setting,	 the	 central	 planner	 will	 only	 be	 able	 to	 observe	 any	exchange,	having	been	devolved	of	decision-making	power.				Subsequently,	 in	 this	 treatment,	 P3	was	 identified	 as	 the	 proposer	 whose	 task	was	to	decide	how	many	tokens	he/she	wished	to	give	P2.	The	receiver,	P2	could	then	 accept	 or	 reject,	with	 any	 acceptance	 ending	 the	 phase	 and	 any	 rejection	taking	 all	 players	 onto	 the	 next	 round	 with	 reduced	 payoffs	 (δ	 =	 0.9).	 In	 this	treatment	P1	was	the	 inactive	third	player	who	observed	all	exchanges	without	any	power	to	partake	in	decision-making.		Phase	1	and	2	in	this	treatment	were	kept	 constant	 and	 once	 again	 instructions	were	 repeated	 in	 full	 at	 the	 start	 of	phase	2.	 	Subjects	retained	the	same	groups,	roles,	and	optimal	payoffs	through	each	phase.		
The	Changing	treatment	The	 ‘Changing’	 treatment	 is	 akin	 to	 the	 change	 in	 property	 right	 control	occurring	 for	 the	 Whanganui	 River,	 where	 the	 property	 rights	 are	 being	transferred	 from	 the	 Crown	whose	 payoffs	 are	 optimised	when	 some	water	 is																																																									83	After	ten	repeated	rounds	all	players’	payoffs	have	fallen	to	zero.	
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left	in	the	river	and	some	extracted	for	hydropower	use,	to	a	third	party,	namely	Te	Awa	Tupua,	whose	payoffs	are	greatest	when	all	water	is	left	in	the	system.		In	both	settings	the	property	rights	holder	must	decide	how	much	water	he	or	she	wishes	 to	 allocate	 to	 Genesis,	 whose	 payoffs	will	 be	 optimised	 if	 the	 property	rights	holder	decides	to	allocate	all	water	to	consumptive	uses.				As	such,	phase	1	of	this	treatment	was	identical	to	phase	1	of	the	SO	treatment.		This	meant	 that	 in	 this	 treatment	 P1	was	 given	 the	 role	 of	 proposer,	 endowed	with	100	tokens,	and	asked	to	decide	how	many	he/she	wished	to	allocate	to	P2,	the	 receiver.	P2	could	either	accept	or	 reject	P1’s	offer.	 	 If	he/she	accepted,	 the	phase	ended,	whereas	if	he/she	rejected,	play	continued	to	the	next	round	with	reduced	payoffs	for	all	players.		Again,	all	players	knew	that	for	each	subsequent	round	their	total	payoffs	would	decrease	by	a	fixed	discount	factor	of	10%	(δ	=	0.9).	 	 If	 agreement	 was	 not	 reached	 after	 ten	 repeated	 rounds	 all	 players	received	zero.		In	this	treatment	P3	was	identified	as	the	inactive	third	player.			After	completion	of	phase	1,	players	moved	onto	phase	2.	In	phase	2,	a	new	set	of	instructions	 was	 distributed	 and	 all	 players	 informed	 that	 P3’s	 role	 was	 to	change	and	he/she	became	the	proposer.		P3	was	then	tasked	with	deciding	how	many	tokens	to	give	P2,	who	remained	the	receiver.		If	P2	accepted	P3’s	offer,	the	phase	ended,	however,	if	the	offer	was	rejected,	play	continued	to	the	next	round	with	reduced	payoffs	for	all	players	(δ	=	0.9).		In	this	phase,	P1	(who	had	been	the	proposer	in	phase	1)	became	the	inactive	third	player.	Phase	2	of	the	C	treatment	was	thus	identical	to	phase	1	of	the	RSD	treatment.		
6.2.4	 Testable	hypotheses	The	experiment	was	designed	to	address	three	general	hypotheses	developed	in	chapter	 five.	 	 The	 first	 two	 hypotheses	 directly	 address	 the	 second	 research	question	 developed	 in	 chapter	 three	 which	 asked	 about	 the	 economic	 and	environmental	 effects	 of	 implementing	 resource	 self-determination.	 	 The	 third	hypothesis	 sets	 up	 a	 preliminary	 analysis	 of	 research	 question	 three	 and	 the	analysis	of	institutional	change,	which	is	explored	further	in	chapter	seven.		As	a	reminder,	the	first	hypothesis	stated	that	there	will	be	a	difference	in	transaction	
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costs	between	the	two	settings,	essentially	asking	whether	the	new	arrangement	will	 be	 more,	 or	 less,	 costly	 as	 a	 property	 rights	 mechanism	 than	 the	 more	traditional	 state	 ownership	 arrangement.	 	 The	 second	 hypothesis	 stated	 that	resource	 self-determination	will	 impact	 the	 use	 and	 provision	 of	 water	 in	 the	case	 of	 the	 Whanganui	 River.	 	 From	 the	 experimental	 design,	 two	 testable	hypotheses	 were	 developed	 which	 aimed	 to	 test	 these	 general	 hypotheses	 by	comparing	players’	behaviour	in	the	RSD	and	SO	treatments.				The	first	null	hypothesis	tested	in	the	experiment	compares	the	possible	costs	of	bargaining	under	resource	self-determination	with	the	costs	of	bargaining	under	state	 ownership.	 To	 test	 this,	 the	 number	 of	 bargaining	 rounds	 to	 reach	agreement	 in	 each	 treatment	 is	 compared.	 	 The	 first	 testable	 hypothesis	therefore	states:		
Null	Hypothesis	 1:	 If	 the	 transaction	costs	 for	RSD	are	 the	same	as	SO,	 then	 the	
number	of	bargaining	rounds	to	reach	agreement	should	be	the	same	under	each	
treatment.		The	alternative	hypothesis	therefore	states	that	the	number	of	repeated	rounds	of	negotiation	entered	into	before	reaching	agreement	will	be	different	under	the	two	settings.		The	 second	 testable	 hypothesis	 aimed	 to	 examine	 whether	 resource	 self-determination	is	likely	to	deliver	different	resource	outcomes	to	state	ownership	in	 the	 case	of	 the	Whanganui	River.	 	This	hypothesis	was	 tested	by	 comparing	the	 number	 of	 tokens	 offered	 by	 the	 proposer	 to	 the	 receiver	 under	 each	treatment.	 	 The	 null	 hypothesis	 states	 that	 there	 will	 be	 no	 difference	 in	 the	number	 of	 tokens	 offered	 to	 the	 receiver	 under	 SO	 and	 under	 RSD,	 while	 the	alternative	hypothesis	is	that	there	will	be	a	difference	in	the	number	of	tokens	offered	to	the	receiver	in	the	two	treatments.	It	states:			
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Null	Hypothesis	2:	If	RSD	has	no	impact	on	resource	allocation,	then	P3	will	offer	
the	same	number	of	tokens	in	the	first	period	of	phase	1	of	the	RSD	treatment	as	P1	
in	the	first	period	of	phase	1	of	the	SO	treatment.84					The	 third	 general	 hypothesis	 stated	 in	 chapter	 five	 asked	 whether	 previous	property	 rights	 arrangements	 affect	 behaviour	 when	 stakeholders	 are	 forced	into	a	new	property	rights	setting.	 	Self-regarding	players	who	prioritise	profit	maximisation	 are	 expected	 to	 make	 choices,	 which	 optimise	 their	 individual	payoffs.		In	light	of	this,	players	who	are	motivated	by	pecuniary	interests	would	be	expected	to	select	their	payoff-maximising	choice,	even	following	a	property	rights	 change.	 	 	 Players’	 choices	would	 also	 be	 expected	 to	 remain	 constant	 if	they	optimised	 their	utility	by	 incorporating	non-pecuniary	concerns	 into	 their	calculations.	 For	 instance,	 if	 players	 were	 to	 display	 a	 ‘social	 preference’	 for	equality,	they	would	be	inclined	to	choose	a	choice	set	which	allowed	for	equal	payoffs	 for	 all	 players,	 irrespective	 of	 the	 institutional	 setting	 (Güth	 &	 Kocher	2014;	 Huang	 2000).	 	 However,	 if	 players	 displayed	 a	 social	 preference	 for	‘fairness’,	players’	choices	could	be	expected	to	change	under	different	property	rights	 settings	based	on	 their	 experience	 in	 the	previous	arrangement	 (Herz	&	Taubinsky	 2014;	 Hoffman	 &	 Spitzer	 1982).	 	 Some	 experimental	 findings	 do	suggest	 that	players	carry	 their	experiences	with	 them	 into	a	new	 institutional	setting,	 suggesting	 that	 some	players’	 choices	 can	 be	 influenced	 by	 experience	and	learning,	as	well	as	personal	incentives	(Bednar	et	al.	2015).		In	these	cases,	existing	 institutional	 settings	 could	 be	 expected	 to	 impact	 peoples’	 future	choices.			To	 understand	 how	 the	 behaviour	 of	 subjects	 in	 one	 institutional	 setting	may	affect	 their	 choices	 in	 another,	 players’	 behaviour	 in	 phase	 1	 of	 the	 RSD	treatment	was	compared	with	players’	behavoiur	in	phase	2	of	the	C	treatment.	This	 means	 that	 the	 behaviour	 of	 P3	 before	 (phase	 1	 of	 RSD)	 and	 after	 an	institutional	change	(phase	2	of	C)	was	compared.			
																																																								84	Period	1	of	phase	one	is	focused	on	here	to	ensure	a	clean	estimate	is	made.	
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To	address	the	third	general	hypothesis,	testable	null	hypotheses	three	and	four	therefore	state:		
Null	Hypothesis	3:	If	past	property	rights	arrangements	have	no	effect	on	current	
property	rights	arrangements,	players’	choices	in	phase	1	of	the	RSD	treatment	will	
have	no	effect	on	players’	choices	in	phase	2	of	the	C	treatment.				
Null	Hypothesis	4:	Similarly,	 if	past	property	rights	arrangements	have	no	effect	
on	current	behaviour,	the	number	of	bargaining	rounds	will	be	unchanged	in	phase	
1	of	the	RSD	treatment	and	in	phase	2	of	the	C	treatment.		
	The	alternative	hypotheses	state	the	opposite	to	the	null	in	each	case.	
	
6.2.5	 Results	
Hypothesis	One	To	measure	the	transaction	cost	impacts	of	each	property	rights	arrangement	in	terms	of	bargaining;	the	number	of	bargaining	rounds	entered	into	by	players	in	the	SO	and	RSD	treatments	was	examined.		It	was	assumed	that	each	additional	round	of	bargaining	reflected	an	increase	in	transaction	costs	due	to	the	inherent	costs	 of	 repeated	 negotiations,	 and	 the	 subsequent	 decrease	 in	 payoffs.		Comparing	figures	6.4(a)	and	(b)	shows	that	players	bargain	for	a	longer	period	of	time	before	reaching	agreement	in	the	first	phase	of	the	RSD	treatment	than	they	do	in	the	first	phase	of	the	C	treatment.85			
																																																								85	Again	there	was	no	significant	difference	between	the	number	of	rounds	of	bargaining	in	phase	1	of	the	C	and	SO	treatments.		There	was	also	no	significant	difference	in	the	number	of	bargaining	rounds	in	phase	1	and	2	in	each	of	the	RSD	and	SO	treatments.	
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Figure	6.4:		 (a)	Proportion	of	each	choice	set	offered	by	P1	to	P2	in	each	round	of	phase	1	of	the	State	Ownership	treatment	and	the	number	of	rounds	of	bargaining	taken	to	reach	agreement;	(b)	Proportion	of	each	choice	set	offered	by	P3	to	P2	in	each	round	of	phase	1	of	the	Resource	Self-Determination	treatment	and	the	number	of	rounds	of	bargaining	taken	to	reach	agreement;	(c)	Proportion	of	each	choice	set	offered	by	P3	to	P2	in	each	round	of	phase	2	of	the	Changing	treatment	and	the	number	of	rounds	of	bargaining	taken	to	reach	agreement.	
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Table	 6.2	 analyses	 this	 in	 detail,	 comparing	 phase	 1	 of	 the	 C	 treatment	 with	phase	1	of	 the	RSD	 treatment.	A	Wilcoxon	Rank	Sum	test	 is	used	 to	determine	whether	 there	 is	 a	 significant	 difference	 between	 the	 number	 of	 bargaining	rounds	 in	 the	 two	 treatments.		The	 z-stat	 value	of	2.54	 is	 significant	 at	p<0.01.	That	 this	 result	 is	 highly	 significant	 suggests	 that	 resource	 self-determination	may	 be	 a	 more	 costly	 arrangement	 than	 state	 ownership	 for	 governing	 the	Whanganui	River	when	 considering	 the	 costs	 of	 ongoing	negotiations	between	users	and	managers.86			
Table	6.2:		 Between	treatment	comparison	of	the	number	of	periods	of	bargaining	taken	to	reach	agreement	in	the	C	and	RSD	treatments.	
	
Number	of	bargaining	
periods	 Phase	1	
C	Treatment	 1.21	
RSD	Treatment	 1.61	
Z-stat	 2.54***	Note:	Tests	which	examined	different	offers	between	treatments	used	a	Wilcoxon	rank	sum	test.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
	
	
Hypothesis	Two	To	 test	 null	 Hypothesis	 Two	 proposers’	 offers	 in	 the	 first	 phase	 of	 the	 C	treatment	were	 compared	with	 proposers’	 offers	 in	 the	 first	 phase	 of	 the	 RSD	treatment.87		The	results	are	graphically	displayed	in	figures	6.4(a)	and	(b)	and	show	the	proportion	of	each	choice	set	selected	in	each	repeated	period	by	the	proposers	in	phase	1	of	the	C	treatment	and	phase	1	of	the	RSD	treatment.		To	 get	 the	 cleanest	measure	 of	 players’	 true	 preferences	 and	 to	 be	 consistent	with	 the	 literature,	 players’	 choices	 in	 the	 first	 period	 were	 the	 focus	 of	 the	analysis.	 	 Table	 6.3	 breaks	 down	 the	 proportion	 of	 tokens	 offered	 by	 the	proposer	to	the	receiver	in	the	first	period	of	phase	1	under	each	treatment.	On	
																																																								86	Due	to	the	nature	of	the	incentive	structure	this	result	is	not	unexpected,	making	the	findings	of	Hypotheses	Three	and	Four	especially	useful.	87	Phase	1	of	the	C	treatment	was	used	for	comparison	with	phase	1	of	the	RSD	treatment	because	there	was	no	difference	found	between	the	choices	made	by	players	in	phase	1	of	the	SO	treatment	and	phase	1	of	the	C	treatment.                    
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average	72.7%	of	subjects	selected	the	socially	optimal	choice-set	F	in	phase	1	of	the	C	treatment,	allocating	17	tokens	to	P1	and	83	tokens	to	P2.		This	is	a	choice	that	zero	players	made	in	phase	1	of	the	RSD	treatment.	 	A	two	sided	Wilcoxon	rank	 sum	 test	 was	 used	 to	 determine	 whether	 the	 difference	 in	 offers	 by	 the	proposers	in	the	two	treatments	is	significant	and	finds	the	z-stat	value	of	4.21	is	significant	at	p<0.01.88		Hence,	it	is	concluded	that	there	is	a	significant	difference	in	the	choices	made	by	proposers	in	the	two	treatments.				This	is	further	supported	by	the	observation	that	64%	of	P1's	in	period	1	of	RSD	selected	 the	 'fairer'	 choice-set	 C	 instead	 of	 choice-set	 F,	 thereby	 choosing	 to	divide	the	allocation	of	tokens	more	evenly	between	themselves	(67	tokens)	and	P2	(33	tokens)	than	players	did	under	SO.		The	two-sided	Wilcoxon	rank	sum	test	found	that	the	z-stat	value	of	4.28	is	significant	at	p<0.01.		Hence	it	can	again	be	concluded	that	there	is	a	significant	difference	in	the	choices	made	by	players	in	the	 RSD	 treatment	 and	 the	 SO	 treatment	 and	 that	 players	 divide	 tokens	more	evenly	between	themselves	and	the	proposer	under	RSD	than	they	do	under	SO.			From	a	welfare	perspective,	 the	selection	of	choice	set	C	by	players	 in	 the	RSD	treatment	is	a	comparatively	worse	outcome	in	terms	of	aggregate	social	utility,	having	an	especially	marked	 impact	on	 the	payoffs	of	P1	 and	P2.	However,	 this	result	 does	 lend	 itself	 to	 a	more	 equitable	 distribution	 of	 resources	 –	whether	this	 result	 holds	 in	 the	 face	 of	 institutional	 change	 is	 addressed	 by	 the	 next	hypothesis.		
	 	
																																																								88	The	Wilcoxon	rank	sum	test	was	used	to	measure	between	subject	variation.	as	is	the	case	when	RSD	is	being	compared	with	SO.		It	provides	a	nonparametric	test	of	the	null	hypothesis	that	states	that	it	is	equally	likely	that	a	randomly	selected	value	from	one	sample	will	be	less	than	or	greater	than	a	randomly	selected	value	from	a	second	sample.		The	Wilcoxian	signed	rank	test	was	used	to	measure	within	subject	variation	as	occurs	when	phase	1	of	RSD	is	being	compared	with	phase	2	of	C.		It	is	useful	for	understanding	the	change	occurring	within	a	particular	setting	because	it	compares	two	related	groups	over	time	to	assess	whether	their	population	mean	ranks	differ.			
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Table	6.3:		 The	proportion	of	each	choice-set	offered	by	the	proposers	in	phase	1	of	the	Changing	treatment	and	phase	1	of	the	Resource	Self-Determination	treatment	during	period	1	and	2	of	each	treatment.		
Proposers’	offers	by	choice-set	 C	 RSD	 Z-stat	
Period	1	 Choice	set	A	 0	 0	 0	 		 Choice	set	B	 0	 0	 0		 Choice	set	C	 0	 0.642	 4.28***		 Choice	set	D	 0.136	 0.357	 1.53		 Choice	set	E	 0.136	 0	 1.42		 Choice	set	F	 0.727	 0	 4.21***		 Choice	set	G	 0	 0	 0	
Period	2	 Choice	set	A	 0	 0.071	 1.25		 Choice	set	B	 0	 0	 0		 Choice	set	C	 0	 0.214	 2.24**		 Choice	set	D	 0	 0.286	 2.62***		 Choice	set	E	 0	 0	 0		 Choice	set	F	 0.091	 0	 1.14		 Choice	set	G	 0	 0	 0	Note:	All	tests	are	two	sided	Wilcoxon	rank	sum	tests.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1		
	
Hypothesis	Three	To	test	whether	actors	take	their	experiences	under	one	property	rights	setting	with	them	into	a	new	setting,	Phase	1	of	the	RSD	treatment	was	compared	with	Phase	2	of	the	C	treatment.		This	compared	the	behaviour	of	P3	before	(phase	1	of	RSD)	 and	 after	 (phase	2	 of	 C)	 an	 institutional	 change.	 	 The	proportion	of	 each	choice	set	selected	by	the	proposer	(P3)	in	each	repeated	round	of	phase	1	of	the	RSD	treatment	was	shown	in	figure	6.4(b).		When	compared	with	phase	2	of	the	C	 treatment,	 shown	 in	 figure	 6.4(c)	 it	 appears	 that	 there	 is	 a	 change	 in	 the	behaviour	of	players	before	and	after	the	property	rights	change.				Figure	 6.4(b)	 shows	 that	 in	 the	 first	 round	 of	 the	 RSD	 treatment,	 P3	 selected	either	 choice	 set	 C	 or	 choice	 set	 D	 only,	 offering	 P2	 either	 33	 or	 50	 tokens	respectively.	 However,	 figure	 6.4(c)	 shows	 that	 when	 P3	 is	 suddenly	 granted	decision-making	power,	having	previously	been	the	inactive	third	player,	 fewer	
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players	 offer	 the	more	 ‘equitable’	 choice-set	C	 in	period	1.	 Instead,	 the	 choice-sets	selected	by	P3	in	phase	2	of	 the	C	 treatments	are	more	self-regarding	than	those	selected	by	P3	in	phase	1	of	the	RSD	treatment.	 	As	well,	the	figures	show	that	after	having	been	an	inactive	third	player	in	phase	1	of	the	C	treatment,	P3’s	offer	a	greater	range	of	choice-sets	to	P2’s	than	when	they	had	not	been	exposed	to	an	alternative	property	rights	arrangement.		The	statistical	significance	of	 these	observations	 is	confirmed	 in	 table	6.4.	 	The	first	period	is	again	the	primary	focus	of	this	analysis,	however,	periods	2	and	3	are	also	discussed	as	97%	of	offers	are	accepted	prior	to	the	commencement	of	period	4	in	each	treatment.	Two	key	findings	emerge	from	the	analysis	of	period	1.	 	Firstly,	on	average	P3	is	 less	likely	to	select	choice	set	B	in	the	first	round	of	phase	1	of	the	RSD	treatment	than	he	or	she	is	in	the	first	round	of	phase	2	of	the	C	 treatment.	 	 Using	 the	Wilcoxon	 signed	 rank	 test,	 the	 z-stat	 value	 of	 2.52	 is	significant	 at	 the	 p<0.05.	 	 Hence	 it	 is	 concluded	 that	when	 power	 is	 suddenly	vested	in	players	who	previously	had	no	decision-making	authority,	such	players	act	in	a	manner	that	is	more	self-regarding	than	if	they	had	not	been	exposed	to	an	 alternative	 arrangement.	 	 Secondly,	 on	 average	 P3	 is	 more	 likely	 to	 select	choice	 set	 C	 in	 phase	 1	 of	 the	RSD	 treatment	 compared	with	 phase	 2	 of	 the	 C	treatment.	 	Again,	using	 the	Wilcoxon	rank	sum	test,	 the	z-stat	value	of	1.84	 is	significant	at	p<0.01,	 suggesting	 that	players	are	more	willing	 to	distribute	 the	number	 of	 tokens	 more	 evenly	 when	 they	 hadn’t	 previously	 been	 operating	under	an	alternative	property	rights	arrangement.		In	periods	2	and	3,	P3	is	shown	to	continue	to	be	more	self-regarding	in	phase	2	of	 the	C	 treatment	 than	he	or	 she	 is	 in	phase	1	of	RSD.	 In	period	2	of	 the	RSD	treatment	 P3	selects	 the	 ‘fairer’	 choice	 sets	 C	 and	D	21%	and	29%	of	 the	 time	respectively,	as	opposed	 to	19%	and	13%	in	phase	2	of	 the	C	 treatment.	Using	the	Wilcoxon	Rank	Sum	test,	the	z-stat	value	is	0.090	with	a	significance	level	of	
p>0.70.		This	difference	was	not	shown	to	be	statistically	significant,	however,	it	indicates	that	the	behavioural	patterns	continue	beyond	the	first	round.		Similar	results	were	found	in	period	3	in	which	there	is	a	difference	between	phase	1	of	the	RSD	 treatment	 and	phase	 2	 of	 the	 C	 treatment,	 however,	 again	 the	 results	
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were	not	 shown	 to	be	significant.	 	Together,	 these	 results	 suggest	 that	 there	 is	some	 reason	 to	 suggest	 that	 peoples’	 behaviour	 is	 not	 independent	 of	 their	experience,	 instead	 suggesting	 that	 players	 become	more	 self-regarding	 when	given	 the	 power	 to	make	 decisions	 having	 previously	 been	 excluded	 from	 the	decision-making	process.		
Table	6.4:		 The	proportion	of	each	choice-set	offered	by	P3	in	phase	1	of	the	Resource	Self-Determination	treatment	and	phase	2	of	the	Changing	treatment	during	periods	1-3	of	each	treatment.		
Proposers’	offers	by	choice	set	 RSD	(Phase	1)	 C	(Phase	2)	 Z-stat	
Period	1	 Choice	set	A	 0	 0.136	 1.42		 Choice	set	B	 0	 0.364	 2.52**		 Choice	set	C	 0.642	 0.318	 1.84*		 Choice	set	D	 0.357	 0.136	 1.53		 Choice	set	E	 0	 0	 0		 Choice	set	F	 0	 0.045	 0.79		 Choice	set	G	 0	 0	 0	
Period	2	 Choice	set	A	 0.071	 0.181	 0.921	
	 Choice	set	B	 0	 0.091	 1.145		 Choice	set	C	 0.214	 0.227	 0.090		 Choice	set	D	 0.286	 0.136	 1.088		 Choice	set	E	 0	 0	 0		 Choice	set	F	 0	 0	 0		 Choice	set	G	 0	 0	 0	
Period	3	 Choice	set	A	 0	 0.136	 1.42	
	 Choice	set	B	 0	 0.091	 1.14	
	 Choice	set	C	 0.071	 0.045	 0.33		 Choice	set	D	 0.071	 0.091	 0.203		 Choice	set	E	 0	 0	 0		 Choice	set	F	 0	 0	 0		 Choice	set	G	 0	 0	 0	Note:	All	tests	are	two	sided	Wilcoxon	signed	rank	tests.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1			To	 further	 examine	how	 changing	property	 rights	 affect	 behaviour,	 the	 rate	 at	which	offers	are	accepted	over	time	was	investigated.	As	P2’s	role	as	a	proposer	stays	 constant	 over	 phase	 1	 and	 phase	 2	 of	 each	 treatment,	 P2’s	 behaviour	 is	examined	in	phase	1	and	2	of	the	C	treatment	to	see	if	exposure	to	P1	in	phase	1	of	the	C	treatment	affects	his	or	her	responses	to	P3	in	phase	2.		
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Figure	6.5	presents	the	cumulative	acceptance	rates	by	round.			The	figure	shows	that	P2’s	accept	the	offers	of	the	proposer	more	quickly	in	phase	1	than	in	phase	2	of	 the	C	 treatment.	 	 It	 also	 shows	 that	P2’s	 reach	agreement	more	quickly	 in	phase	2	of	 the	RSD	treatment	 than	 they	do	 in	phase	2	of	 the	C	 treatment.	 	The	significance	of	these	results	is	shown	in	table	6.5.		The	null	hypothesis	of	equality	of	distributions	between	the	probability	of	acceptance	in	phase	1	and	phase	2	of	the	 RSD	 and	 C	 treatments	 is	 tested	 using	 a	 two-sided	 Kolmogorov-Smirnov	test.89	Because	the	mass	of	the	distribution	of	acceptance	for	P2	in	phase	2	of	the	C	 treatment	 lies	 to	 the	 right	 of	 the	 acceptance	 rates	 of	 phase	 1	 of	 the	 RSD	treatment	and	the	probability	of	acceptance	is	 found	to	be	higher	 in	phase	1	of	the	C	treatment	than	in	phase	2,	the	null	hypothesis	can	be	rejected.90		This	result	is	 significant	 at	p<0.05.	 	 Hence,	we	 can	 conclude	 that	 P2’s	 are	 also	 affected	 by	their	experiences	under	one	property	 rights	arrangement	and	 this	affects	 their	choices	in	another.	A	similar	rate	of	acceptance	is	found	between	the	two	phases	of	the	RSD	treatment,	although	this	result	is	not	significant.91	
	
Figure	6.5:		 Comparing	 cumulative	 acceptance	 rates	 of	 P2’s	 in	 each	 phase	 of	 the	 Resource	Self-Determination	and	Changing	treatments.																																																									89	The	Kolmogorov-Smirnov	test	(Chakravarti	et	al.	1967)	was	used	to	decide	if	the	sample	comes	from	a	population	with	a	specific	distribution.		90	This	was	expected	due	to	the	lower	payoff	earned	by	P3	in	the	second	phase	of	the	changing	treatment.	91	Similar	rates	of	acceptance	were	also	found	in	phase	1	and	2	of	the	SO	treatment.	
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Table	6.5:		 Rate	of	acceptance	by	P2	 in	phases	1	and	2	of	 the	Changing	and	Resource	Self-Determination	treatments.		
Period	and	treatment	 Acceptance	rates	 Z-stat	
Period	1:	Changing	 Phase	1	 Phase	2	 	
	 0.909	 0.363	 3.46***	
Period	1:	RSD	 Phase	1	 Phase	2	 	
	 0.428	 0.571	 0.707	
Period	1:	RSD	+	C	 Phase	1RSD	 Phase	2	C	 	
	 0.428	 0.363	 0.384**	
Panel	D:	RSD	+	C	 Phase	2	RSD	 Phase	2C	 	
	 0.571	 0.363	 1.206		Note:	Tests	which	examined	different	acceptance	 rates	within	each	 treatment	used	 a	Wilcoxon	 signed	 rank	 test	 while	 those	 examining	 rates	 of	 acceptance	between	 treatments	 used	 a	Wilcoxon	 rank	 sum	 test.	 ***	 p<0.01,	 **	 p<0.05,	 *	p<0.1	
	
	
Hypothesis	Four	To	measure	whether	 the	 level	of	 transaction	costs	are	also	affected	by	players'	previous	 experience,	 the	number	of	 bargaining	 rounds	 entered	 into	by	players	before	and	after	exposure	to	a	new	property	rights	arrangements	was	examined.		Again,	 it	 was	 assumed	 that	 each	 additional	 round	 of	 bargaining	 reflects	 an	increase	in	transaction	costs	due	to	the	inherent	costs	of	repeated	negotiations,	and	 the	 subsequent	 decrease	 in	 available	 payoffs.	 When	 phase	 1	 of	 the	 RSD	treatment	 was	 compared	 with	 phase	 2	 of	 the	 C	 treatment	 a	 Wilcoxon	 signed	Rank	test	produced	a	z-stat	value	of	1.89,	which	was	not	found	to	be	significant.		Hence,	 it	 cannot	 be	 concluded	 that	 the	 bargaining	 process	 took	 significantly	longer	to	reach	agreement	when	P3’s	had	been	exposed	to	the	previous	property	rights	arrangement	than	in	situations	when	they	had	not.		
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6.3	 Discussion		This	 experiment	 provides	 an	 exploratory	 quantification	 of	 how	 resource	 self-determination	 may	 affect	 resource	 management	 outcomes	 for	 the	 Whanganui	River.		By	comparing	players’	choices	under	state	ownership	with	those	making	choices	 under	 resource	 self-determination,	 levels	 of	 resource	 allocation	 and	relative	transaction	costs	were	estimated.		This	experiment	also	investigated	the	effects	 of	 transferring	 property	 rights	 to	 a	 third	 party	 and	 explored	 how	 past	property	rights	arrangements	affect	peoples’	future	choices.				The	results	suggest	that	resource	self-determination	may	change	the	proportion	of	 flow	 allocated	 to	 consumptive	 use	 for	 the	 Whanganui	 River.	 	 This	reassignment	of	flow	could	help	address	concerns	over	levels	of	take	persisting	under	 the	 current	 institutional	 arrangement.	 	 Yet,	 the	 results	 also	 suggest	 that	resource	self-determination	 is	 likely	to	 increase	transaction	costs	 for	users	and	managers	when	they	are	negotiating	over	use,	reducing	the	potential	net	benefit	of	the	new	arrangement.92		These	results	also	suggest	that	players’	choices	in	a	new	property	rights	setting	are	not	 independent	of	their	experience;	rather	the	transfer	of	decision-making	power	 to	 someone	 who	 has	 previously	 been	 powerless,	 causes	 that	 player	 to	become	more	self-regarding	affecting	the	levels	of	transaction	costs	and	the	final	resource	 allocation.	 	Drawing	 links	 from	 existing	 studies,	 two	 possible	explanations	 are	 offered	 to	 explain	 this	 result:	 retaliation	 and/or	learning.	 	Players	 who	 have	 a	 social	 preference	 for	 fairness	 could	 retaliate	 in	phase	2	of	the	changing	treatment	after	being	treated	‘unfairly’	in	phase	1	(Herz	&	Taubinsky	2014).		Alternatively,	akin	to	a	learning	or	experience	effect,	players	could	 be	 gathering	 information	 about	 appropriate	 behaviour	 from	 the	 old	institutional	 environment,	 causing	 them	 to	 readjust	 their	 choices	 in	 the	 new	setting	(Bednar	et	al.	2015).		These	propositions	are	left	open	to	future	research	but	 could	 have	 important	 implications	 for	 how	 smoothly	 a	 new	 group	 or																																																									92	It	should	be	noted	again	that	it	is	acknowledged	that	the	transaction	costs	associated	with	designing,	implementing,	and	operating	resource	self-determination	for	the	Whanganui	River	are	significantly	more	extensive	than	the	bargaining	costs	explored	in	this	experiment.		
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community	 is	 able	 to	 transition	 into	 a	 new	property	 rights	 setting	 following	 a	transfer	of	decision-making	power.			Important	 to	note	 is	 that	 in	 this	 experiment,	 that	 the	 first	 two	null	hypotheses	are	 able	 to	 be	 rejected	 is	 unsurprising	 due	 to	 the	 divergence	 of	 the	 optimal	private	interests	of	P3	and	P2	being	greater	than	that	of	P1	and	P2.		This	is	because	in	real	life,	the	allocation	of	water	for	consumptive	use	benefits	the	Crown	more	so	 than	 it	 will	 Te	 Awa	 Tupua	 (assuming	 health	 and	 wellbeing	 equates	 with	ecosystem	 health	 as	 defined	 by	 ecological	 process).	 	 In	 contrast,	 for	 Te	 Awa	Tupua	and	 the	TPDS,	use	of	 the	water	 is	 a	 zero	 sum	game.	 	This	means	 that	 if	economic	property	rights	are	transferred	to	Te	Pou	in	stage	two	of	implementing	the	new	Te	Pā	Auroa	framework	it	is	likely	that	extended	periods	of	bargaining	may	 lead	 to	 a	more	 equal	 split	 of	water	between	 instream	and	extractive	uses	than	occurs	under	state	ownership.		The	experiment	also	showed	that	the	extreme	predictions	by	the	game	outlined	in	section	6.1	that	the	property	rights	holder	would	offer	nothing	to	the	receiver	in	period	one	are	not	supported.		Instead	property	rights	holders	are	much	more	generous	than	theory	would	predict,	while	receivers	appear	unwilling	to	accept	offers	made	by	the	proposer,	which	disadvantage	them	too	greatly.		Although	not	explicitly	 teased	out	 in	 this	analysis,	 it	does	appear	 that	 the	game’s	predictions	that	 the	 third	 player’s	 payoffs	 will	 be	 ignored	 by	 the	 bargaining	 parties	 does	hold.	 	 Determining	whether	 this	 actually	 is	 the	 case	 is	 also	 an	 opportunity	 for	future	research.	
	
	
6.4	 Conclusions	
	This	experiment	evaluated	 the	central	 findings	of	 the	comparative	 institutional	analysis.	 	 The	 results	 suggested	 that	 resource	 self-determination	 could	 reduce	levels	of	water	extraction	in	the	Whanganui	River,	which	could,	in	turn	improve	water	quality.		The	results	also	suggested	that	arriving	at	agreement	over	use	of	the	river	under	resource	self-determination	will	be	more	costly	than	under	state	
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ownership.	 		This	could	mean	that	resource	self-determination	is	a	less	efficient	arrangement	than	the	existing	state	ownership	arrangement.		Further,	given	the	underrepresentation	 of	 the	 river’s	 interests	 in	 previous	 decision-making	arrangements	 the	 transfer	 of	 power	 to	 Te	 Awa	 Tupua	 through	 resource	 self-determination	may	cause	actors	speaking	on	the	river’s	behalf	 to	act	 in	a	more	self-regarding	manner	than	policy	makers	would	expect.	 	These	results	suggest	that	this	could	not	only	reduce	extractive	uses	still	further,	but	also	result	in	even	greater	transaction	costs.		A	key	limitation	of	game	theory	and	experiments	is	their	inability	to	capture	the	complexity	 in	a	real	 institutional	setting.	 	 In	 this	case	 the	experiment,	does	not	address	many	of	the	nuances	of	the	current	institutional	arrangement	governing	the	Whanganui	River,	or	the	future	arrangement.		Subsequently,	in	chapter	eight,	these	 experimental	 results	 are	 complemented	 by	 an	 assessment	 of	 the	 likely	robustness	of	the	new	institutional	arrangement	to	get	a	deeper	understanding	of	the	possible	institutional	economic	effects	of	granting	a	river	legal	standing.			
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7	 Analysing	institutional	change	using
	 the	dynamic	IAD	framework		
	
7.0	 Introduction		Chapter	 seven	 moves	 into	 the	 second	 strand	 of	 this	 research	 focusing	 on	institutional	 change.	 	 In	 this	 chapter,	 a	 dynamic	 analysis	 of	 the	 changing	institutional	 arrangement	 governing	 the	Whanganui	 River	 is	 undertaken	 using	the	 dynamic	 IAD	 framework	 outlined	 in	 chapter	 three.	 	 The	 results	 of	 this	chapter	 aim	 to	 answer	 research	 question	 three,	 which	 asked	 how	 and	 why	resource	 self-determination	 was	 identified	 as	 an	 alternative	 property	 rights	arrangement	for	the	Whanganui	River.				The	chapter	proceeds	as	follows.		Taking	the	consequence	function	as	a	starting	unit	 for	 analysis,	 section	 one	 identifies	 the	 outcomes	 of	 the	 first	 institutional	equilibrium	governing	 the	Whanganui	River	pre-European	 settlement.	 	 Section	two	 considers	 stage	 two	 of	 institutional	 evolution	 starting	 with	 the	 arrival	 of	Europeans	to	New	Zealand	in	the	1830’s.		Included	in	this	section	is	an	analysis	of	 the	 first	 significant	 exogenous	 shock	 that	 triggered	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	institutional	change,	the	transition	period,	and	the	new	institutional	equilibrium.		Two	sets	of	ongoing	disruptions	are	identified	over	stage	two	that	puncture	the	equilibrium	 path	 and	 help	 explain	 why	 the	 institutional	 equilibrium	 of	 state	ownership	failed	to	be	stable.		Section	three	outlines	the	second	major	shock	that	triggered	the	transition	to	RSD	and	the	next	stage	of	 institutional	development.	Section	four	discusses	these	findings	and	section	five	concludes.	
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7.1.	 Stage	one:	The	Whanganui	River	under	collective	ownership		
	The	starting	unit	of	analysis	for	understanding	the	evolution	of	Whanganui	River	governance	 is	 the	 outcomes	 of	 the	 institutional	 arrangement	 coordinating	behaviour	 prior	 to	 European	 settlement	 of	 New	 Zealand	 and	 the	 Whanganui	region.93		Preceding	European	settlement	the	Iwi	of	Whanganui,	Te	Atihaunui	a	Paparangi	or	Te	Atihau,	had	control	of	the	Whanganui	River	(Waitangi	Tribunal	1999).94		For	Te	Atihau,	the	Whanganui	River	was	a	powerful	source	of	mana.95		Te	Atihau	believed	that	before	the	arrival	of	the	ancestral	canoes	from	Hawaiiki,	the	ancient	ones	resided	in	Aotearoa	(New	Zealand).		One	day,	at	the	request	of	one	of	the	brothers	of	Maui-tikitiki,	Ranginui	 (the	Sky	Father)	created	Matua	te	
Mana	(Mt	Ruapehu),	which	stands	in	the	middle	of	the	North	Island.	According	to	Te	Atihau,	Matua	 te	Mana’s	 obvious	 loneliness	made	Ranginui	 cry.	 	 Two	of	 his	tears	 fell	at	 the	feet	of	Matua	te	Mana	and	one	of	these	became	the	Whanganui	River.	 Paerangi	 and	 Ruatipua,	 Te-Atihaunui-a-Paparangi’s	 primary	 ancestors,	then	lived	at	one	with	the	Whanganui	River	for	many	years.96		Ruatipua,	 is	 believed	 to	 draw	 mauri	 (life	 force)	 from	 the	 headwaters	 of	 the	Whanganui	River	on	Mount	Tongariro,	and	from	its	tributaries.		The	connection	of	 the	 tributaries	which	 form	 the	Whanganui	River	mirror	 the	 interconnection	through	whakapapa	 (genealogy)	 of	 the	 descendents	 of	 Ruatipua	 and	 Paerangi,	the	 Whanganui	 Iwi.	 	 Because	 the	 river	 is	 a	 tupuna	 awa	 (a	 river	 that	 is	 an	ancestor)	Whanganui	Iwi	had	a	responsibility	towards	it:	Ko	te	awa;	ko	te	awa	ko	
au	(I	am	the	river,	and	the	river	is	me).		The	 te	 ao	 value-based	 system	 of	 tikanga	 coordinated	 individual	 beliefs	 and	guided	 the	 social	 interactions	 of	 Whanganui	 Iwi.	 Iwi’s	 beliefs	 about	 their	relationship	with	the	river	were	shaped	around	the	notion	of	kaitiakitanga.		This	meant	 that	 although	 the	 identification	 of	 usufruct	 rights	 was	 possible,	 the																																																									93	This	is	selected	as	the	starting	unit	as	this	is	the	earliest	record	of	a	stable	equilibrium	of	collective	action	determining	use	of	the	Whanganui	River.		This	can	be	considered	the	initial	consequence	function	for	the	starting	unit	of	analysis	(Aoki	2001).	94	Te-Atihaunui-a-Paparangi	or	Te	Atihau	were	a	loose	and	sometimes	fractious	confederation	of	hapu	who	would	later	be	recognised	as	Whanganui	Iwi.			They	are	sometimes	also	referred	to	also	as	Ngati	Hau.			95	This	is	still	the	case	today.	96	This	represents	just	one	of	the	creation	stories	of	the	Whanganui	River.	
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alienation	of	land	or	other	environmental	resources	was	a	foreign	concept.	Tribal	lands	and	resources	were	held	in	common,	and	‘ownership’	existed	only	as	far	as	the	ethic	of	kaitiakitanga	permitted.97			
Tikanga	and	kaitiakitanga	were	upheld	and	maintained	by	a	system	of	sanctions	and	rewards,	which	regulated	relationships	between	hapū,	the	environment,	and	within	 the	 kin	 group	 itself	 (Roberts	 et	 al.	 1995).	 The	 institutional	 equilibrium	coordinated	the	behaviour	of	more	than	2000	Māori	who	lived	along	the	length	of	 the	 river	 (Waitangi	 Tribunal	 1999).	 Rangatira	 and	 kaitiaki	 with	mana	 and	upholding	rangatiratanga	(chieftainship)	were	accountable	to,	and	tempered	by,	the	wider	kin	group	who,	 together,	upheld	the	values	pertaining	to	tapu,	mana,	and	 reciprocity.98	These	 three	 values	 were	 central	 tenets	 of	 Māori	 custom,	guiding	 activities	 such	 as	 trade	 (where	 goods	were	 ‘gifted’	 rather	 than	 traded	with	no	expectation	of	an	immediate	rejoinder),	and	solidifying	whanaungatanga	(relationships)	 between	 iwi	 members.	 	 Reciprocity	 and	 an	 emphasis	 on	relationships,	 which	 were	 ongoing,	 enhanced	 the	 political	 strength	 of	 the	 kin	group	by	maintaining	relations	between	people,	their	ancestors,	the	spirit	world,	and	the	natural	environment.99		Māori	in	the	Whanganui	region	operated	in	collectivist	societies	built	around	the	iwi,	 hapū,	 and	whanau	 (family	 group)	 (Salmond	 2014)100	Although	 Te	 Atihau	predominantly	 interacted	with	 those	of	 their	 familial	 group,	 each	member	was	also	closely	involved	in	the	lives	of	other	members	of	their	hapū	and	iwi.	 	Non-cooperation	 principally	 characterised	 relations	 with	 other	 iwi,	 although	 gift																																																									97	Ibid.	Footnote	40.	98	The	responsibility	of	being	kaitiaki	and	maintaining	rights	to	land	and	resources	were	not	automatic	(Davies	2015)	.	Rights	had	to	be	continually	proven,	reinforced,	and	maintained,	meaning	that	no	group	could	assert	or	claim	kaitiaki	rights	unless	they	had	demonstrated	title	to,	and	continued	mana	over,	lands	and	resources.		Iwi	could	gain	the	right	to	exercise	kaitiakitanga	over	land	or	resources	by	acquiring	title	by	discovery,	conquest,	marriage,	or	gift	(Kawharu	2000).		Alternatively,	kaitiaki	rights	could	be	gained	through	inheritance,	although	in	this	case,	the	resources	willed	were	not	the	possession	of	the	successor,	but	of	a	group.	Rights	of	administration	and	management	were	transferred	from	the	leader	to	the	individual	but	not	exclusive	rights	in,	and	use	of,	lands	and	resources.		99	Ostrom	(1998)	identified	trust,	reputation,	and	reciprocity	–	rewarding	co-operators	and	punishing	non-cooperators	-	as	the	three	most	important	variables	for	determining	cooperation.		Several	other	scientists	interested	in	collective	action	problems	have	upheld	this	hypothesis,	notably	Gintis	(2000)	and	Bowles	and	Gintis	(2004).		Also	relevant	is	work	outside	the	institutional	economics	discipline,	such	as	that	of	Zhong	et	al.	(2006)	and	Chen	et	al.	(2007)	who	have	examined	how	network	structure	influences	collective	action	outcomes.	100	This	was	the	same	for	all	Māori	across	Aotearoa,	New	Zealand.	
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exchange	of	localised	goods	did	occur	between	tribes	and	iwi	as	they	travelled	up	and	down	the	river	(Cumberland	1949).			Passage	 up	 and	 down	 the	 river	 was	 controlled	 by	 hapū	 that	 were	 descended	from	 three	 related	ancestors:	Hinengakau,	who	was	associated	with	 the	 river’s	upper	 reaches,	 Tama	Upoko,	who	 settled	 in	 the	middle,	 and	Tupoho,	who	was	known	 for	 the	 lower	 half.	 	 Although	 the	 individuals	 of	 the	 hapū	 or	 individual	families	 had	 the	 primary	 right	 of	 river	 user	 through	 their	 particular	 sections,	hapū	or	 individuals	used	parts	of	 the	river	at	widely	different	places	and	were	highly	 mobile	 (Waitangi	 Tribunal	 1999).	 When	 travelling	 along	 the	 river,	 the	mana	of	each	hapū	would	need	to	be	respected	and	social	norms	upheld,	which	was	 possible	 due	 to	 the	 interconnectedness	 of	 all	 river	 hapū	 and	 the	 ancient	sentiment	of	unity	that	bound	all	members	of	the	Iwi.			
7.2		 Stage	two:	A	new	institutional	equilibrium	of	state	ownership	
	Stage	 two	 of	 the	 institutional	 development	 of	 the	 governance	 system	 for	 the	Whanganui	 River	 encompasses	 the	 period	 when	 the	 Whanganui	 River	governance	arrangement	was	structured	around	a	state	ownership	system.		This	is	 most	 similar	 to	 the	 institutional	 system	 governing	 the	 Whanganui	 River	examined	in	detail	in	chapter	five.		This	section	covers	the	period	from	European	arrival	in	the	1830’s	until	the	1980’s	when	a	second	exogenous	shock	reshaped	the	institutional	arrangement	and	created	a	path	to	resource	self-determination.	
	
7.2.1	 The	first	exogenous	shock:	The	European	arrival	The	first	exogenous	shock	affecting	the	institutional	arrangement	governing	the	Whanganui	 River	was	 the	 arrival	 of	 Europeans	 from	 the	 1830’s	 and	 the	 “legal	transplant”	 of	 European	 systems,	 rules,	 and	 beliefs	 into	 the	Whanganui	 region	(Berkowitz	 et	 al.	 2003b;	 Chapple	&	Barton	1930).	 	 The	European	 individualist	society	 and	 its	 attitude	 to	 property	 were	 profoundly	 different	 to	 Māori’s	
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collectivist	approach	to	resource	management	and	property	rights.101		As	White	(1967)	 comments	 “Christianity	 is	 the	most	 anthropocentric	 religion	 the	world	has	 seen.	 [It]	 not	 only	 established	 a	 dualism	 of	 man	 and	 nature	 but…by	destroying	 pagan	 animism,	 Christianity	made	 it	 possible	 to	 exploit	 nature	 in	 a	mood	of	indifference	to	the	feelings	of	natural	objects”	(Roberts	et	al.	1995).		Early	 Europeans	 viewed	 the	Whanganui	 River	 as	 a	 resource	 to	 be	 used	 and	 a	good	that	could	be	owned,	albeit	initially	in	the	public	domain.		Although	Māori	were	 argued	 to	 be	 “…the	most	 interesting	 savages	 on	 the	 globe”	 (Anonymous	1833,	 p.333;	 cited	 in	 (Hickford	 2006),	 many	 of	 their	 ideas	 of	 property	 and	resources	 were	 considered	 in	 need	 of	 being	 ‘civilised’	 into	 ‘improved’	 British	conceptions	 of	 property	 (Hickford	 2011).	 	 English	 common	 law	 rested	 on	 the	notion	that	property	could	be	owned	and	made	excludable,	that	property	could	be	divested,	 and	 relationships	 could	be	 contractual	 and	 terminated.	 	 European	thinking	 was	 future	 oriented	 with	 a	 bias	 towards	 new	 discoveries	 and	approaches	 (Sunde	 2003),	 rewarding	 the	 individual	 rather	 than	 the	 group	 for	optimising	utility	through	trade	and	exchange	of	property.				As	 summarised	 in	 table	 7.1,	 this	 contrasted	 strongly	 with	 Māori	 lore,	 which	accepted	the	interrelatedness	and	interconnectedness	of	all	phenomena	by	way	of	whakapapa	 (genealogy).	 	 Relationships	 to	 place	 and	 people	 were	 ongoing,	revealed	by	the	value	placed	on	the	act	of	reciprocity.	 	People	were	encouraged	to	 ‘walk	backwards	 into	the	future’;	always	conscious	of	what	had	gone	before.		Contracts	 and	 trades	 were	 not	 finite,	 instead	 accepting	 that	 an	 action	 by	 one	group	would	 require	 a	 reciprocal	 act	 at	 some	 stage	 in	 the	 future	by	 the	 other,	whether	 in	thanks	or	retribution.	 	Further,	 it	was	the	collective	rather	than	the	individual	that	was	important	(Durie	1993).		
	 	
																																																								101	See	Greif	(1994)	for	a	comparative	analysis	of	individualist	and	collectivist	societies	
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Table	7.1:		 Comparison	of	Māori	and	European	societal	structures.		
Institutional	constraints	 Māori	 European	
Worldview	 Tikanga	(values	based)	 Anthropocentric	(rules	based)	
Social	structure	 Collectivist	 Individualist	
Resource	management	
philosophy	 Kaitiakitanga		 Ownership	
Contracts	and	relationships	 Unbounded	transactions	 Bounded	transactions			Although	these	contrasting	worldviews	caused	some	initial	 frictions,	 the	region	was	 initially	 able	 to	 accommodate	 the	 beliefs	 and	 informal	 rules	 guiding	behaviour	in	the	two	groups.	A	system	of	de	facto	property	rights	emerged	along	the	 length	 of	 the	 river,	with	 new	 settlers	 and	Māori	 adapting	 their	 beliefs	 and	rules	to	accommodate	the	other	group	when	required	(Waitangi	Tribunal	2015).		This	period	 can	be	 viewed	as	 an	 extended	period	of	 transition	before	 the	new	institutional	equilibrium	for	the	Whanganui	River	was	formalised	in	the	mirror	image	of	European’s	collective	beliefs.102	
	
7.2.2	 A	period	of	transition	After	the	initial	shock	of	European	arrival,	patterns	of	interaction	emerged	along	the	 length	of	 the	 river	 that	enabled	Māori	and	 the	British	 to	establish	adjacent	action	 situations.	 	 These	 reflected	 each	 group’s	 respective	 sets	 of	 collective	beliefs.		There	was	no	certainty	over	ownership	of	the	river,	and	little	pressure	to	formalise	it.		This	relaxed	attitude	was	for	a	number	of	reasons	–	both	economic	and	political.	First,	until	the	mid-late	19th	century	resources	such	as	land	were	in	sufficient	supply	and	the	number	of	settlers	in	the	small	township	of	Whanganui	remained	low,	creating	little	competition	for	resources	(Downes	1915).	Second,	representatives	of	the	British	Crown	and	539	Māori	Chiefs	had	signed	the	Treaty	
																																																								102	It	is	for	this	reason	that	Berkowitz	et	al.	(2003a)	argues	that	when	European	law	was	imposed	on	New	Zealand	Māori	they	were	not	totally	unaccustomed	to	the	colonial	legal	order	and	were	largely	‘receptive’.		Although	this	might	be	true	for	some	Māori,	it	certainly	wasn’t	the	case	in	Whanganui,	as	this	analysis	demonstrates.	
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of	Waitangi	in	1840.103		To	Māori,	this	had	been	presented	in	such	a	way	that	it	appeared	 as	 if	 the	 relationship	 of	 the	 British	 Crown	 to	 Māori	 was	 one	 of	 a	‘protectorate’	between	 two	sovereign	nations.	 	Article	 I	of	 the	Māori	version	of	the	 Treaty	 states	 that	Māori	 ceded	 ‘kawanatanga’	 (governance)	 of	 their	 lands,	rather	than	annexation	and	sovereignty	in	the	western	sense.104				In	a	similar	vein,	Article	II	of	the	Māori	version	translates	literally	as:	the	Queen	of	England	consents	to	Māori	“..the	full	chieftainship	of	their	lands,	their	villages,	and	 all	 their	 possessions…”.	 	 For	 this	 reason,	 even	 several	 decades	 after	 the	signing	of	the	Treaty,	it	was	clear	that	Whanganui	Iwi	still	believed	they	held	title	and	authority	over	the	river.105		In	1864,	for	instance,	two	Whanganui	Iwi	hapū	fought	 over	 the	 river	 being	 used	 as	 a	 highway	 for	 upriver	 Māori	 to	 attack	Europeans	at	Wanganui.	The	fight	was	less	about	the	subject	of	aggression,	but	more	about	whether	the	river	could	be	used	to	transport	guns	through	the	lower	reaches	for	which	Ngati	Hau	still	felt	they	held	usufruct	rights	(Young	1998).		Through	the	1840’s-50’s	Europeans	who	continued	to	respect	Māori	custom	and	settle	on	land	that	Māori	knew	they	had	sold,	had	relations	with	Whanganui	Iwi	that	 were	 generally	 positive;	 only	 souring	 when	 those	 relationships	 were	 not	maintained	as	custom	dictated	(Downes	1921).	 	Thus,	until	 the	1870’s	de	 facto	rights	 informally	 upheld	 property	 rights	 to	 use	 and	 management	 of	 various	sections	 of	 the	 river.	 The	 institutional	 equilibrium	 of	 the	 upper	 section	 of	 the	river	remained	shaped	by	the	individual	beliefs	of	the	Whanganui	Iwi,	while	the	
																																																								103	The	Treaty	was	brought	to	the	Whanganui	on	May	23	1840	by	Rev.	O	Hadfield	and	Rev.	H	Williams.		The	terms	of	the	Treaty	were	“carefully	explained	to	the	Natives”	and	it	was	subsequently	signed	by	14	of	the	Whanganui	Chiefs,	five	of	whom	were	principal	chiefs	(Chapple	&	Barton	1930).	104	Kawanatanga	was	a	term	coined	by	missionaries	and	first	used	in	early	biblical	translations	to	represent	the	concept	of	governance	(Sunde	2003).		Why	this	term	was	chosen	remains	a	source	of	debate,	however,	the	most	likely	reason	is	that	had	any	other	term	such	as	mana	been	used,	Māori	Chiefs	would	have	been	unlikely	to	sign	the	Treaty	as	they	would	have	been	unwilling	to	cede	their	mana	to	the	Crown.			
Mana	had	been	used	five	years	earlier	in	the	Declaration	of	Independence	(1835),	which	had	proposed	a	Māori	independent	state	of	“United	Tribes	of	New	Zealand”	with	powers	to	frame	laws	and	dispense	justice.		This	recognition	of	Māori	sovereignty	and	independence	ended	up	being	of	concern	to	the	British	and	dispelling	this	was	a	key	motivator	of	the	British	to	draft	an	alternate	agreement	in	1840	(Durie	1993).	105	There	appear	several	possible	reasons	for	this.		Firstly,	although	14	Whanganui	chiefs	had	signed	the	Treaty,	all	had	signed	the	Māori	version,	rather	than	the	English	version,	suggesting	that	their	interpretation	of	the	promises	of	the	Treaty	differed	from	the	expectations	of	the	British.			Likewise,	several	land	deals	between	the	New	Zealand	Company	had	failed	to	be	honoured,	creating	uncertainty	around	ownership	and	rights	through	this	period	(Waitangi	Tribunal	1999).	
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lower	 sections	 were	 governed	 according	 to	 coordinated	 European	 beliefs	(Downes	1915).			This	changed	as	the	number	of	European	settlers	increased	(Downes	1915).		By	the	1860’s	over	2000	people	were	living	in	Whanganui.	In	the	view	of	the	newly	arriving	settlers,	the	English	version	of	the	Treaty	said	that	Māori	had	few	formal	rights	to	control	of	the	river	or	surrounding	land	in	situations	where	ownership	rights	 were	 uncertain	 (Waitangi	 Tribunal	 2015).	 	 The	 English	 version	 of	 the	Treaty	 had	 stated	 that	 upon	 signing	 Māori	 were	 to	 cede	 sovereignty	 or	‘ownership’	 to	 the	Crown	 in	 return	 for	protection	over	 those	 “properties”	 they	did	not	wish	to	sell.			It	became	clear	that	as	new	actors	arrived	in	the	Whanganui	region,	the	de	facto	rules	 that	 had	 initially	 guided	 cordial	 Māori	 and	 European	 relations	 could	 no	longer	 be	 effectively	 enforced	 by	 the	 informal	 arrangements	 upon	 which	 the	early	 relationships	 had	 been	 founded	 (Alston	 et	 al.	 2012;	 Waitangi	 Tribunal	2015).	 	As	the	number	of	settlers	increased,	external	enforcement	mechanisms,	such	 as	 the	 military,	 became	 a	 more	 efficient	 mechanism	 of	 constraining	 and	enabling	actors’	behaviour	than	the	complex	system	of	established	informal	rules	and	 customs	 (Downes	 1921).	 Māori	 dependence	 on	 their	 kinship	 groups	 was	weakened	by	reducing	communication	between	actors,	imposing	a	vertical	social	structure	 in	 the	 region,	 and	 increasing	 the	 levels	 of	 economic	 and	 social	integration.	 	The	consequence	of	 this	was	 the	emergence	of	a	new	institutional	equilibrium	centred	around	legal,	political,	and	external	economic	organisations	designed	to	enforce	the	British	worldview	and	coordinate	peoples’	behaviour.				
7.2.3	 Formalising	the	new	equilibrium	Securing	control	of	water	for	agricultural,	industrial,	drainage,	access,	domestic,	and	 tourism	 purposes	 quickly	 became	 one	 of	 the	 newly	 established	 federal	government’s	 utmost	 priorities	 following	 the	 end	 of	 the	 New	 Zealand	wars	 in	1872	 (Young	 1998).	 Rivers	were	 important	 trade	 routes	 and	 offered	 strategic	access	 inland	 for	 new	 settlers.	 	 They	 also	 presented	 valuable	 tourist	 and	recreational	 opportunities,	 incentivising	 new	 settlers	 and	 travellers	 to	 New	
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Zealand.	 	 Subsequently,	 actors	 at	 the	 upper	 levels	 of	 the	 institutional	arrangement	 coordinated	 the	 systemic	 deconstruction	 of	 Māori	 control	 of	 the	Whanganui	 through	 both	 judicial	 and	 legislative	 channels	 (Waitangi	 Tribunal	1999).	 As	 early	 as	 1873,	 the	 de	 facto	 rules	 that	 had	 long-governed	 use	 of	 the	river	 were	 formally	 overridden	 by	 the	 Timber	 Floating	 Bill	 1873,	 which	permitted	the	Whanganui	River	to	be	used	for	transporting	felled	timber	to	the	coast	 from	 the	 central	 North	 Island	 without	 Māori	 consent.	 	 In	 1876,	 the	Wanganui106	Harbour	and	River	Conservators	Board	Act	1876	was	passed	which	enabled	 the	 construction	 of	 a	 port	 in	Whanganui,	 the	 vesting	 of	 control	 of	 the	harbour	in	the	Crown,	and	permitted	the	clearance	of	obstacles,	such	as	eel	weirs	and	 rapids,	 for	 ease	 of	 navigation.	 	 No	 consideration	 was	 given	 to	 the	 impact	these	actions	would	have	on	local	Iwi	customs	or	beliefs.		As	 the	national	 interest	became	more	 clearly	defined,	 shared	 individual	beliefs	held	by	the	decision-makers	at	the	upper	levels	of	the	institutional	arrangement	were	 further	 articulated	 through	 law.107	The	 Wanganui	 River	 Trust	 Act	 1891	introduced	 the	 Wanganui	 River	 Trust	 at	 the	 period’s	 equivalent	 of	 the	 lower	policy	 level.	 	The	Trust’s	 initial	mandate	was	to	conserve	natural	scenery	along	the	banks	of	the	upper	Whanganui	River	and	do	“all	things	necessary	for	opening	up	or	improving	the	navigation…of	the	Wanganui	River…”	[s5(1)],	largely	for	the	purpose	of	 improving	the	river’s	desirability	as	a	tourist	attraction.	 	To	achieve	this,	 the	 River	 Trust,	 which	 initially	 comprised	 of	 seven	 Pākehā	 (non-Māori)	members	only,	was	given	wide	 ranging	powers,	which	were	 increased	 through	the	 Wanganui	 River	 Trust	 Act	 Amendment	 Act	 1893.	 	 The	 Amendment	 Act	stipulated	 that:	 “[a]t	 any	 time	 and	 without	 giving	 any	 notice”,	 the	 Trust	 was	authorised:																																																									106	Note	the	different	spelling	of	‘Whanganui’	here.	See	the	‘acknowledgements	at	the	start	of	this	thesis’	for	an	editorial	note	on	the	spelling	of	Whanganui.	107	At	this	time,	the	decision-makers	principally	represented	European	interest	groups.		Although	Māori	were	granted	voting	rights	in	1852	through	the	New	Zealand	Constitution	Act	1852	which	made	them	eligible	to	vote	in	New	Zealand’s	first	election	in	1853,	people	had	to	be	male,	aged	21	or	over,	and	British	subjects	who	either	owned	or	rented	property	worth	a	moderate	amount	of	money.		This	restricted	the	majority	of	Māori	from	voting	as	most	Māori	land	was	owned	collectively.			When	the	government	created	four	Māori	electorates	that	covered	the	whole	country,	all	Māori	men	aged	21	or	over	became	eligible	to	vote	for	these	Māori	seats.		However,	this	was	a	poor	concession	toward	a	liberal	franchise	–	at	the	time	Pākehā	(non-Māori)	had	72	seats,	meaning	that	on	a	per-capita	basis,	Māori	deserved	around	15	seats.		The	outcome	of	this	bias	was	that	the	majority	of	decisions	made	in	the	parliament	were	to	the	benefit	of	Europeans,	with	little	consideration	or	power	given	to	Māori.	
		 157	
	
(1) To	remove	any	earth,	stone,	boulders,	or	sand	off,	from,	or	out	of	the	channel	
or	any	land	upon	the	banks	of	the	river,…	
(2) To	deposit	the	same	in	any	other	part	of	the	district:	
(3) and	for	any	of	the	purposes	of	the	trust	to	make	use	of	any	such	earth,	stone,	
boulders,	or	sand,	notwithstanding	anything	contained	in	the	said	Act,	and	
notwithstanding	any	such	earth,	stone,	boulders,	or	sand	shall	be	removed	
from	or	used	upon	land	which	is	owned	by	Natives	under	their	customs	or	
usages,	which	the	ownership	of	the	same	has	or	has	not	been	defined	by	the	
Native	Land	Court	[s.2].	
	Māori	 claiming	 an	 interest	 in	 land	 from	which	 any	 such	materials	were	 taken	could	 apply	 to	 the	 newly	 established	 Native	 Land	 Court	 for	 compensation.108		The	court	was	given	powers	to	make	orders	as	it	saw	fit,	given	provisions	of	the	Public	Works	Act	1882.109	This	made	the	court	highly	politicised	in	some	cases,	blurring	 the	 lines	 between	 the	 responsibility	 and	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	polity	 and	judiciary	in	the	case	of	the	Whanganui	(Gilling	1994).		In	1903,	the	government	passed	a	final	amended	version	of	the	Crown-mines	Act	1891,	 formalising	 the	 long-held	 official	 assumption	 that	 the	 bed	 of	 the	Whanganui	River	was,	or	should	be,	vested	in	the	Crown.		This	was	considered	to	be	 of	 national	 importance	 by	 Seddon,	 the	 then	 New	 Zealand	 Prime	 Minister	(Waitangi	Tribunal	1999).	 	Section	14	of	 the	Crown-mines	Act	Amendment	Act	1903	granted	the	Crown	formal	control	over	the	river’s	resources.	The	Wanganui	River	 Trust	 Board	was	 thus	 immediately	 granted	 concession	 to	 extract	 gravel,	
																																																								108	The	Native	Land	Court	(later	the	Māori	Land	Court)	was	part	of	the	judicial	system	established	under	the	Native	Lands	Act	1865	to	hear	matters	relating	to	Māori	land.	Through	the	1850’s	and	1860’s	collective	land	ownership	by	Māori	and	proprietary	customs	were	hindering	the	availability	of	land	for	settlement	by	Pākehā	settlers.		Subsequently,	government	policy	sought	to	introduce	a	rapid	individualisation	of	Māori	land	through	initiatives,	which,	amongst	others,	limited	to	ten	the	number	of	owners	able	to	be	issued	a	Certificate	of	Title	(Gilling	1994).		The	Native	Land	Court	was	then	employed	to	hear	all	subsequent	claims	and	grievances.	109	The	Public	Works	Act	1882	had	guaranteed	the	Crown	principal	rights	to	use	of	land	and	resources	when	needed	for	‘public	works’.		Such	rights	were	considered	important	for	the	national	interest	and	would	greatly	assist	in	the	acquisition	of	land	for	the	Tongariro	Power	Development	Scheme	almost	eighty	years	later.	
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shingle,	 and	 stones	 for	 road	 and	 railway	 construction.110		 Steamers	 carried	tourists	and	trade	 items	up	and	down	the	river	and	boats	moved	 in	and	out	of	the	busy	Whanganui	Harbour.		Saw	and	paper	mills	operated	on	the	riverbanks	and	the	bustling	township	of	Whanganui	played	a	key	role	in	the	ongoing	growth	and	development	of	New	Zealand	(Downes	1921).		Through	 the	 early	 20th	 century,	 the	 Wanganui	 River	 Trust	 continued	 to	administer	 use	 and	management	 of	 the	 river.	 	 They	were	 also	 responsible	 for	administering	 30,000	 acres	 of	 proclaimed	 domain	 land	 adjoining	 the	 river,	broadening	 their	 regional	power	and	 influence	 (Waitangi	Tribunal	2015).	 	The	primary	mandate	remained	to	provide	for	the	scenic	quality	of	 the	area	for	the	riverboat	 industry,	 but	 they	 were	 also	 charged	 with	 ensuring	 that	 resources	were	 kept	 available	 for	 the	 Crown’s	 use,	 should	 they	 be	 required	 (Waitangi	Tribunal	2015).		In	time,	management	of	the	land	passed	to	the	Wanganui	River	Reserves	 Commission,	 a	 three-man	 Pākehā	 team,	 which	 oversaw	 the	 reserves	and	 heard	Māori	 grievances	 over	 land	 that	 had	 been	 taken	 and	 allegations	 of	undue	 pressure	 from	 the	 government	 to	 sell.	 	 Overseen	 by	 the	 Department	 of	Lands	and	Survey,	they	also	considered	evidence	of	the	growing	need	to	reduce	land	 clearance	 for	 catchment	 purposes,	 although	 little	 was	 done	 to	 constrain	clearance	for	agricultural	purposes.				Until	sweeping	reforms	in	the	late	1980’s	there	were	few	further	changes	to	the	formal	 rules	 governing	 the	 Whanganui	 River	 for	 several	 decades	 –	 just	occasional	insignificant	changes	at	the	upper	policy	level.		However,	throughout	this	 period,	 repeated	 exogenous	 disruptions	 destabilised	 the	 institutional	equilibrium,	and,	although	it	remained	intact,	these	disruptions	can	be	viewed	as	contributing	to	the	resulting	instability	of	the	institutional	arrangement.	
	
	 	
																																																								110	As	the	Crown	now	had	ownership	of	the	bed,	no	provision	was	made	in	the	Wanganui	River	Trust	Amendment	Act	1920	or	1922	to	compensate	Māori	for	gravel	and	shingle	extraction.	
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7.2.4	 Institutional	disruptions	The	discussions	 in	sections	2.2	and	3.2	showed	that	exogenous	disruptions	can	puncture	 the	 institutional	 equilibrium	 path	 and	 cause	 institutional	 actors	 to	update	their	beliefs.		If	the	actors	affected	are	at	a	higher	level	of	the	institutional	arrangement,	they	may	change	formal	rules	within	the	institutional	arrangement	that	affect	actors	positioned	at	lower	levels	of	the	institutional	arrangement.		In	the	Whanganui,	from	the	1870’s	onwards,	two	sets	of	variables	exogenous	to	the	institution	 itself	 repeatedly	 disrupted	 the	 institutional	 equilibrium	 of	 state	ownership.	 First,	 Whanganui	 Iwi	 strenuously	 opposed	 the	 consolidation	 and	formalisation	of	European	beliefs,	which	failed	to	acknowledge	their	proprietary	interests	 in	 the	 river	 and	 largely	 excluded	 them	 from	 decision-making.	 	 The	consequence	of	this	is	that	from	1873	Iwi	repeatedly	challenged	decisions	of	the	Crown	pertaining	 to	ownership,	use,	 and	management	of	 the	 river	 through	 the	courts.111		 Second,	 following	World	War	 II	 (WWII)	 the	 set	 of	 individual	 beliefs	defining	New	Zealand’s	national	identity	and	the	national	interest	emerged	more	clearly	 (Kelsey	 2015).	 	 Among	 other	 things,	 this	 quest	 for	 independence	motivated	 the	 construction	 of	 new	 hydropower	 projects,	 such	 as	 the	 TPDS,	which	 diverted	 the	 headwaters	 of	 the	 Whanganui	 River.	 	 Subsequent	 conflict	over	 diversion	 imposed	 another	 set	 of	 repeated	 disruptions	 to	 the	 evolving	equilibrium	governing	the	Whanganui	from	the	1960’s	onwards.		Together	these	two	sets	of	disruptions	destabilised	the	equilibrium	and	imposed	costs	on	actors	involved	 with	 management	 of	 the	 river.	 	 Each	 of	 these	 sets	 of	 institutional	disruptions	are	now	described	in	turn.	
	
i.	 Judicial	challenges	over	ownership	of	the	river	and	its	bed	Disagreement	 between	 the	 Crown	 and	 Iwi	 over	 ownership	 and	 control	 of	 the	Whanganui	 River	 can	 be	 identified	 as	 the	 primary	 driver	 behind	 the	 shift	 to	resource	 self-determination	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	Whanganui	 River.	 	 Because	 the	formal	 rules	 governing	use	of	 the	 river	 reflected	European	beliefs,	Māori	were	constrained	by	a	formal	set	of	rules,	which	did	not	support	their	own	worldview	and	 tikanga	 (Greif	2006).	 	 Subsequently,	 as	a	minority	party	with	no	power	 to																																																									111	Both	of	these	sets	of	variables	are	considered	exogenous	because	they	are	principally	judicial	challenges	to	the	institutional	equilibrium,	a	process,	which,	as	discussed	in	previous	sections,	is	considered	exogenous	to	the	‘evolution’	of	the	institutional	arrangement	itself	(Commons	1968;	Hodgson	2004).			
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change	 the	 formal	 rules,	Māori	 expressed	 their	 objection	 to	 the	 subjugation	 of	their	 beliefs	 and	 lack	 of	 control	 over	 the	 river	 through	 the	 courts,	 imposing	significant	 litigation	 costs	 on	 the	 Crown.	 	 This	 began	 in	 1873,	 immediately	following	 the	 enactment	 of	 the	 first	 piece	 of	 legislation	 directly	 affecting	 the	Whanganui	 River,	 namely	 the	 Timber	 Floating	 Bill	 1873.	 	 It	 would	 continue	through	the	full	period	of	state	ownership	imposing	high	costs	on	the	Crown	and	causing	 the	matter	of	ownership	and	control	of	 the	Whanganui	River	 to	be	 the	longest	running	litigation	case	in	New	Zealand’s	history.112		Whanganui	 Iwi	 registered	 their	opposition	 to	 the	Timber	Floating	Act	1873	by	petitioning	the	Government	over	 ‘interference’	with	their	activities	on	the	river	(Kawepo	Tama-Ki-Hikurangi	1873).113		In	1887,	two	different	Whanganui	groups	petitioned	parliament	over	destruction	of	pā	tuna	(eel	weirs)	(Young	1998).		The	government	 took	 no	 responding	 action	 in	 any	 instance.	 	 In	 1895,	 the	 Ladies	Committee	of	the	Whanganui	people	wrote	a	letter	to	the	Premier	and	petitioned	parliament	after	an	unsuccessful	bid	to	pursue	Supreme	Court	proceedings	over	the	 damage	 to	 the	 constructions	 of	 their	 ancestors,	 namely	 eel	weirs,	 lamprey	weirs,	 and	 whitebait	 dams	 on	 the	 river,	 the	 sides	 of	 the	 river,	 and	 its	 banks	(Young	 1998).	 	 At	 the	 time,	 referring	 to	 river	 structures	 and	 their	 kaitiaki	 as	ancestors	 was	 not	 only	 foreign	 to	 the	 Crown	 and	 the	 individual	 beliefs	 of	 the	decision-making	actors	 at	 the	upper	 level	of	 the	 institutional	 arrangement,	 but	threatened	 economic	 development	 of	 the	 river.	 	 For	 this	 reason,	 although	 the	government	granted	Māori	the	retention	of	one	of	their	eel	weirs,	the	other	was	removed.				Whanganui	Iwi’s	subsequent	dissatisfaction	with	the	ruling	was	then	channeled	into	prohibiting	the	sale	of	liquor	in	the	area.	 	Not	wanting	liquor	in	the	region,	Māori	used	proprietary	rights	in	the	river	as	a	line	of	argument	in	the	Supreme	
																																																								112	The	court	case	regarding	ownership	of	the	Whanganui	riverbed	ran	from	1938-1962	and	passed	through	the	Native	Land	Court,	Native	Appellate	Court,	and	the	Supreme	Court.	The	matter	then	went	back	to	the	Court	of	Appeal,	the	Māori	Appellate	Court,	and	then	back	to	the	Court	of	Appeal.		See	main	body	of	text	for	further	explanation	of	how	events	unfolded.	113	Evidence	of	broader	concerns	can	also	be	found	in	the	petition	of	Te	Keepa	Rangihiwinui,	in	which	he	expressed	fears	of	the	Crown’s	quiet	assumption	of	what	he	saw	as	Maori	waterways:	see	‘Report	on	Petition	of	Major	Kemp	and	Others’,	LE1/1873/10,	NA	Wellington,	pp.9	(Waitangi	Tribunal	1999).	
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Court	in	1903.114			The	appeal	was	dismissed,	however,	and	the	English	common	law	presumption	of	Crown	ownership	of	navigable	rivers	reinforced	in	line	with	s.14	of	the	then	recently	legislated	Coal-mines	Amendment	Act	1903.		Petitions	 over	 land	 and	 river	 rights	 continued	 with	 little	 or	 no	 governmental	response	 or	 recompense	 for	 Māori	 over	 the	 first	 several	 decades	 of	 the	 20th	century	until,	 in	1938,	legal	proceedings	seeking	investigation	of	the	title	to	the	bed	 of	 the	 river	 formally	 began	 in	 the	 Native	 Land	 Court.	 This	 case,	 which	focused	on	vesting	legal	rights	to	ownership	of	the	river	in	Iwi,	was	to	run	until	1962,	passing	through	the	Native	Land	Court	(1938-1939),	the	Native	Appellate	Court	(1944,	1958),	 the	Supreme	Court	(1949),	and	the	Court	of	Appeal	(1955,	1960-62).				Through	the	Native	Land	Court	and	the	Appellate	Court,	 the	majority	 judgment	ruled	that,	prior	to	1840,	Whanganui	Iwi	had	owned	the	riverbed	and	that	it	had	been	unlawfully	taken	from	them	through	statutory	rulings,	principally	the	Coal-mines	Act	Amendment	Act	1903.115		In	the	Supreme	Court,	however,	Justice	Hay	presented	 a	 dissenting	 opinion,	 ruling	 that	 the	 Crown	 had	 not	 acted	 in	 a	confiscatory	 manner	 in	 acquiring	 the	 bed	 of	 the	 river.116		 Because	 of	 this,	 the	matter	was	then	referred	to	a	royal	commission	with	the	mandate	to:		 a) advise	 whether,	 but	 for	 the	 Coal-mines	 Act	 Amendment	 Act	 1903	provision,	Māori	were	owners	of	the	Whanganui	River	according	to	their	custom	and	usage;	b) inquire	whether	Māori	had	suffered	any	loss	in	respect	of	the	riverbed	as	a	result	of	the	1903	provision	that	‘in	equity	and	good	conscience’	entitled	them	to	compensation;	c) recommend	 the	 amount,	 to	 whom,	 and	 on	 what	 terms	 any	 such	compensation	should	be	paid;	and																																																									114	In	re	Wanganui	River	Packet	Licence	to	Stuart	[1903]	23	NZLR	510.	Available	at:	http://www.nzlii.org/cgi-bin/sinodisp/nz/cases/NZGazLawRp/1903/87.html.	115	In	Wanganui	River	[1939]	NZNLC	1	(Available	at:	http://www.nzlii.org/cgi-bin/sinodisp/nz/cases/NZNLC/1939/1.html)	and	Wanganui	River	[1944]	NZNAC	1	(Available	at:	http://www.nzlii.org/cgi-bin/sinodisp/nz/cases/NZNAC/1944/1.html).	116	In	The	King	v	Morison	&	Titi	Tihu	[1950]	NZLR	247.		Available	at:	http://www.nzlii.org/cgi-bin/sinodisp/nz/cases/NZGazLawRp/1949/112.html.	
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d) report	whether	any	rights	should	be	abandoned	or	surrendered	in	return	for	compensation.117	
	The	 commissioner	 ultimately	 rejected	 the	 proposition	 advanced	 by	 the	 Crown	that	 Whanganui	 Māori	 had	 abandoned	 their	 rights	 to	 the	 river	 and	 Iwi	 were	subsequently	compensated	for	gravel	extraction.118				The	 final	 judgment	had	 ruled	 that	 Iwi	were	owners	of	 the	 river	prior	 to	1840,	however,	 the	 Crown,	 unhappy	with	 the	 final	 decision,	 decided	 to	 refer	 certain	questions	to	the	Court	of	Appeal	for	determination.		The	Court	of	Appeal		(1953-54)	 again	 found	 that	 Māori	 owned	 the	 riverbed	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 Treaty	 of	Waitangi	 (although	 one	 judge	 dissented).119		 The	matters	 then	went	 on	 to	 the	Māori	Appellate	Court	(1958)	and	then	back	to	the	Court	of	Appeal	(1960-62).120		The	final	ruling	in	1962	stated	that	the	riverbed	had	passed	to	the	Crown	when	it	acquired	 adjoining	 Māori	 land	 due	 to	 a	 presumption	 of	 English	 law	 that	 the	owners	 of	 land	 abutting	 on	 a	 river	 own	 the	 riverbed	 to	 the	 river’s	 centre	 line.		This	was	the	position	held	by	the	Crown	until	the	next	major	exogenous	shock,	which	triggered	the	transition	to	resource	self-determination.121	
	
ii	 Electricity	and	the	national	interest	The	 second	 exogenous	 variable	 influencing	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 institutional	equilibrium	was	the	design,	construction,	and	operation	of	the	Tongariro	Power	Development	Scheme.	 	 In	1955,	under	s.306	of	 the	Public	Works	Act	1928,	 the	government	 commissioned	 a	 technical	 appraisal	 for	 a	 hydro	 scheme,	 which	aimed	 to	 harness	 headwaters	 of	 the	 Whanganui,	 Whangaehu,	 and	 Tongariro	River	 systems	 to	 generate	 power	 at	 power	 stations	 at	 Tokaanu	 and	 Rangipo	(map	 7.1).	 	 The	 scheme	 also	 planned	 to	 increase	 the	 flow	 of	 water	 into	 Lake																																																									117	Sir	Harold	Johnston,	‘Report	of	Royal	Commission	Appointed	to	Inquire	into	and	Report	on	Claims	Made	by	Certain	Maoris	in	Respect	of	the	Wanganui	River’,	AJHR,	1950,	G-2,	pp.1-3.	Available	at:	https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/parliamentary/AJHR1950-I.2.2.6.1.	118	It	should	be	noted	that	the	commissioner	ruled	that	no	compensation	was	due	for	loss	of	fishery	resource	to	Māori,	namely	eel	weirs.	119	In	re	the	Bed	of	the	Wanganui	River	[1955]	NZLR	419.	120	In	re	the	Bed	of	the	Wanganui	River	[1962]	NZLR	600.		121	Important	to	note	is	that	challenges	also	continued	through	the	1970’s	and	80’s.		The	Iwi	of	Whanganui	petitioned	the	Queen	over	interference	with	religious	freedoms	in	1977,	and	then	Parliament,	once	more	in	1979.		This	led	to	select	committee	hearings	and	eventually	the	Whanganui	River	Māori	Trust	Board	Act	1988,	which	established	the	Whanganui	River	Māori	Trust	Board	to	speak	with	the	Crown	on	Iwi’s	behalf.	
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Taupo	and	boost	 the	energy	generated	by	a	 further	nine	power	stations	on	the	Waikato	River.122		 The	Water	Power	Act	 1903	had	 vested	 the	 sole	 right	 to	 use	waters	 for	 electrical	 purposes	 in	 the	 Crown123	and	 thus	 Cabinet	 was	 able	 to	approve	 the	 project	 with	 limited	 public	 consultation	 and	 without	 notifying	Whanganui	Māori	(Waitangi	Tribunal	1999).		Construction	of	the	scheme	began	in	 1964	 and	 operation	 of	 the	 Western	 diversion	 began	 in	 1966	 (Waitangi	Tribunal	 2015).	 97%	 of	 the	Whanganui	 headwaters	were	 initially	 allocated	 to	the	 state-owned	 enterprise	 Electricorp	 (later	 Genesis	 Energy	 Limited)	 for	diversion	(Waitangi	Tribunal	2015).			
 In	 1983,	 Electricorp’s	 right	 to	 use	 came	 up	 for	 renewal	 and	was	 subsequently	extended	 for	 five	 years	 by	 the	 Crown.	 	 Iwi	 were	 unhappy	with	 the	 continued	diversions,	 and	 an	 announcement	 by	 the	 local	Rangitikei-Wanganui	 Catchment	Board124	in	March	1987	that	the	new	minimum	flow	regime	was	to	be	decided	by	31	October	1988	gave	them	time	to	prepare	a	case	against	Electricorp’s	right	to	use.		A	resulting	seven-day	hearing	in	July	1988	saw	one	of	the	first	blending	of	cultures	 in	 the	 history	 of	 the	Whanganui.	 	 At	 this	 tribunal	 both	Māori	 and	 the	newly	established	Department	of	Conservation	argued	that	 the	river	needed	to	be	 treated	 as	 a	 totality	 and	 that	 the	 current	 level	 of	 water	 extraction	 was	prohibitive	 of	 this.125		 It	 was	 suggested	 that	 the	 reduced	 flow	 was	 causing	 an	increase	 of	 silt,	 which	 was	 negatively	 impacting	 the	 ecological	 and	 cultural	values	of	the	river	and	a	recommendation	that	100%	of	flow	be	returned	to	the	Whanganui	 was	 subsequently	 made	 by	 the	 Catchment	 Board.	 	 Electricorp	immediately	appealed	this	decision,	to	which	the	newly	established	Whanganui	Māori	Trust	Board	and	the	Department	of	Conservation	responded	by	appealing																																																									122	As	early	as	1903,	a	visiting	Californian	electrical	engineer	had	noted	the	electricity-generating	potential	of	the	nearby	Waikato	watershed:	“In	this	region,	which	is	quite	unusual	in	many	ways,	immense	quantities	of	power	can	be	developed	and,	though	somewhat	distant	from	the	centres	of	industry,	it	will	some	day	prove	of	wonderful	value	to	the	colony…”	(Hancock	1904,	p.2).	123	This	vesting	was	made	subject	to	any	rights	lawfully	held,	a	caveat,	which	was	intended	to	provide	for	existing	Māori	interests.		The	intersection	between	customary	rights	and	British	law	remained	unclear	and	unaddressed,	however.		In	1905,	this	Act	was	repealed,	yet	the	Crown’s	right	to	waters	used	for	power	generation	was	retained	in	public	works	legislation,	namely	the	Public	Works	Act	1894,	1905,	and	its	amendment	in	1906,	which	enabled	he	Minister	of	Public	Works	to	construct	the	necessary	works;	to	raise	or	lower	the	level	of	any	lake,	river,	or	stream;	and	to	impound	or	divert	waters.		The	1928	amendment	excluded	Māori	customary	land	from	exemptions	on	compulsory	takings	and	from	other	requirements	such	as	the	requirement	to	notify	owners	(s.311).	124	The	Rangaitikei-Wanganui	Catchment	Board	was	succeeded	by	the	Manawatu-Wanganui	Regional	Council	in	1989.		It	is	now	known	as	Horizons	Regional	Council	for	trading	purposes.	125	In	Electricity	Corporation	of	New	Zealand	Limited	v	Manawatu-Wanganui	Regional	Council,	Planning	Tribunal	decision	W70/90	[1990].	Available	at:	http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZPT/1990/122.html.	
		 164	
also.	 	The	 result	of	 these	appeals	was	one	of	 the	 longest	Planning	Tribunals	 in	New	Zealand’s	history,	the	cost	of	which	has	been	estimated	at	between	NZD$5	and	NZD$10	million	(Young	1998).126				
 
  	
Map	7.1:			 The	Tongariro	Power	Development	Scheme	–	power	stations	and	diversions.		Sourced	from	Waitangi	Tribunal	(2013,	p.1078).																																																										126	Ibid.	
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Working	 under	 the	Water	 and	 Soil	 Conservation	 Act	 1967	 and	 the	Water	 Act	1953,	 the	 tribunal	 eventually	 ruled	 in	 1990	 that	 they	 could	 not	 give	 effect	 to	Treaty	 or	 ownership	 claims,	 however,	 the	 tribunal	 did	 discuss	 several	 other	points	in	its	ruling	which	differentiated	the	case	from	earlier	decisions	regarding	use	 of	 the	 river.	 	 The	 key	 points	 of	 the	 report	 concerned	 questions	 of	 flow	affecting	water	quality,	 the	 river’s	 trout	and	other	aquatic	 life,	 the	 transport	of	sediment	in	the	river,	and	the	impacts	on	recreation	and	tourism.		However,	as	a	differentiating	 feature	 the	 discussion	 also	 considered	 intergenerational	 uses,	right-holders’	priorities,	lack	of	initial	consultation,	government	policy	on	energy	conservation,	and	national	versus	regional	interests.				This	 meant	 that	 although	 a	 cost-benefit	 analysis	 commissioned	 by	 Electricorp	concluded	that	the	net	economic	cost	to	the	New	Zealand	public	of	the	catchment	board’s	1988	decision	would	be	almost	NZD$72	million	over	a	28	year	period	in	March	1989	dollar	terms127,	the	tribunal	noted	that	no	attempt	had	been	made	to	quantify	 the	majority	 of	 non-market	 values.	 	 These	 included	 other	 community	benefits,	Māori	spiritual	and	cultural	benefits,	or	intrinsic	values.		On	balance	the	tribunal	 decided,	 “…the	 present	 adverse	 effects	 are	 so	 substantial…that	 the	present	regime	should	not	be	permitted	to	continue,	even	at	the	expense	of	the	competing	claim	to	the	water	which	is	backed	by	the	perpetual	entitlement…”.128	It	 concluded	 that	 too	much	weighting	 had	 been	 attached	 to	 national	 interests	over	 regional	 interests	 and	 that	Māori	 interests	were	 such	 that,	were	 there	no	competing	claims,	 they	would	 justify	 fixing	 the	minimum	flow	“as	 the	whole	of	the	natural	 flow”.129		The	Planning	Tribunal	ended	up	ruling	that	 in	 light	of	 the	range	of	competing	claims,	a	significant	proportion	of	take	should	be	returned	to	the	river,	an	amount	more	than	what	was	offered	under	the	1983	ruling,	but	less	than	 the	 natural	 flow	 recommended	 in	 the	 previous	 tribunal	 ruling. 130		
																																																								127	Ibid.,	p.	165.	128	Ibid.,	p.182.	129	Ibid.,	p.183.	130	The	Tribunal	ruled	that	from	1	June	1991	the	new	minimum	flows	would	be	3	cumecs	at	the	Whakapapa	footbridge	throughout	the	year	(the	Whakapapa	River	is	a	tributary	of	the	Whanganui)	and	29	cumecs	at	Te	Maire	on	the	Whanganui	River	from	1	December	to	31	May	each	year.		As	a	point	of	comparison,	the	1983	ruling	that	was	extended	until	1988	ruled	that	the	minimum	acceptable	flow	at	Te	Maire	was	22	cumecs	from	1	December	to	14	February	and	at	Easter,	and	16	cumecs	for	the	rest	of	the	year.		The	Whakapapa	minimum	flows	were	0.6	cumecs.	
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Electricorp	then	appealed	to	the	High	Court,	who	upheld	the	Planning	Tribunal’s	decision.			This	 case	 was	 significant,	 not	 because	 it	 addressed	 the	 ongoing	 ownership	claims,	but	because,	for	the	first	time,	Whanganui	Iwi	and	the	Crown	(albeit	one	of	its	departments)	found	a	common	language	and	cause.		It	also	acknowledged	the	absence	of	non-market	values	in	the	presented	evidence,	and	tried	to	account	for	 them	 in	 its	 ruling,	weighing	up	both	 types	of	values	even	 in	 the	absence	of	non-market	estimates.	 	Reasons	 for	 this	 change	can	be	attributed	 to	a	growing	shift	 in	 social	 attitudes	 in	 recognition	 of	 environmental	 interests	 and	 tangata	
whenua	(first	 people	 of	 the	 land)	 rights	 taking	place	 across	New	Zealand	 from	the	1970’s	onwards.		These	are	discussed	below.				
7.3	 Stage	 three:	 A	 new	 institutional	 equilibrium	 of	 resource	 self-
	 determination	
	Throughout	 the	 early	 years	 of	 European	 settlement,	New	Zealand	developed	 a	deep	 dependence	 on,	 and	 expectation	 of,	 major	 power	 paternalism.	 	 It	 clung	closely	to	the	skirt	strings	of	Britain,	proudly	describing	 itself	as	“more	English	than	England	itself”	(Dodwell	1932,	p.3).		As	the	British	settler	population	grew,	successive	 governments	 came	 to	 regard	 British	 traditions	 and	 culture	 as	dominant.	 	 There	 was	 an	 expectation	 that	 all	 non-British	 cultures	 were	 to	 be	assimilated	 into	 the	 dominant	 Pākehā	 culture	 resulting	 in	 a	 general	 cultural	ambivalence	towards	bi-culturalism	(Visal	2000).			Although	World	War	 II	 triggered	 the	delineation	of	 a	distinct	 ‘Kiwi”	 identify,	 it	wasn’t	until	the	1960’s,	that	the	entrenched	feelings	of	paternalism	really	started	to	 change	 as	 a	 result	 of	 exogenous	 factors	 abroad.	 	 Economically,	 Britain’s	interest	 in	 building	 stronger	 trade	 relationships	 with	 the	 then	 European	Economic	 Community	 set	 New	 Zealand	 adrift	 and	 forced	 it	 to	 turn	 away	 from	traditional	 allegiances	 and	 patterns	 of	 association	 (Kelsey	 2015).	 External	international	crises	and	a	changing	international	economy	increased	demand	for	
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domestic	and	trade	liberalisation	still	further	through	the	1970’s.	Socially,	there	was	 a	 worldwide	 shift	 towards	 liberalisation	 that	 was	 also	 embraced	 in	 New	Zealand	 (King	2003).	 	Battles	over	 the	environment	and	human	rights	 came	 to	the	fore	and	there	was	a	resurgence	of	Māori	activism	centered	on	the	Treaty	as	Māori	across	New	Zealand	began	to	challenge	the	monocultural	status	quo	and	assert	their	tangata	whenua	rights	over	land	and	water	(Visal	2000).				This	resulted	in	actors	at	the	constitutional	 level	changing	the	formal	rules	and	making	 choices,	 which	 would	 directly	 influence	 the	 Whanganui	 River.	 	 For	instance,	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 Treaty	 of	 Waitangi	 Act	 1975,	 was	 able	 to	reshape	the	way	Whanganui	Iwi	would	challenge	legal	property	rights	over	the	Whanganui	River	and	shift	the	discussion	from	the	judiciary	to	the	legislature.		
	
7.3.1	 The	second	exogenous	shock:	Shifting	global	forces	Across	New	Zealand,	broad	political	 and	economic	 changes	 stemmed	 from	 this	shift	in	social	attitudes.		Most	importantly	the	shift	provided	a	launching	pad	for	a	 major	 political	 transformation,	 inspired	 by	 the	 Washington	 Consensus	(Williamson	 2009).	 	 This	 transformation,	 known	 as	 the	 Rogernomics	 era,	 is	recognised	 in	 this	 analysis	 as	 the	 second	 exogenous	 shock	 affecting	 the	institutional	equilibrium	(Kelsey	2015).				Grounded	 in	 trickle-down	 economics	 Rogernomics	 reshaped	 New	 Zealand’s	political	 structure	 and	 formal	 rules	 governing	 the	 constitutional	 and	 upper	policy	levels	(Easton	1989).	 	Trade	barriers	were	relaxed	and	most	state	assets	were	 privatised,	 resulting	 in	 significant	 social,	 political,	 and	 macroeconomic	structural	change	(Evans	et	al.	1996).				Four	important	pieces	of	legislation	were	also	introduced	over	this	period,	which	directly	impacted	the	institutional	arrangement	governing	the	Whanganui	River.	First,	the	Treaty	of	Waitangi	Act	was	extended	in	1985	to	consider	all	breaches	of	the	 Treaty	 of	 Waitangi	 post-1840.131	This	 opened	 up	 a	 new	 avenue	 for	 Māori																																																									131	The	Treaty	of	Waitangi	Act’s	extension	in	1985	to	consider	all	breaches	post	1840	would	have	one	of	the	most	pervasive	influences	on	Māori-Crown	relations	and	general	Māori	-Pākehā	relations	(King	2003).	One	of	the	most	important	rulings	of	the	Tribunal	was	its	formal	voiding	of	the	“nullity	claim”	in	the	Motunui	
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such	 as	Whanganui	 Iwi	 who	wished	 to	 challenge	 actions	 taken	 by	 the	 Crown.		Supporting	this	was	the	Waitangi	Tribunal	Act	1989	which	created	the	Waitangi	Tribunal	 -	 a	 permanent	 commission	 of	 inquiry,	 required	 to	 investigate	 claims	made	 by	 Māori	 against	 the	 Crown,	 and	 make	 recommendations	 on	 claims	relating	to	the	practical	applications	of	the	principles	of	the	treaty	(Stokes	1992).		Second,	 the	Conservation	Act	1987	was	passed	 to	promote	 the	conservation	of	New	Zealand’s	natural	and	historic	resources.		The	Act	consolidated	five	different	government	conservation	agencies	as	 the	Department	of	Conservation,	 thereby	establishing	DOC	as	the	strong	environmental	advocate	in	the	Whanganui	River	institutional	arrangement.	Initially	the	Department	upheld	its	position	as	shown	by	 the	 Department’s	 joint	 challenge	 over	 minimum	 flows	 in	 the	 Whanganui	River,	however,	a	departmental	 restructuring	 in	1989	purposefully	diluted	 this	power	 and	 mandate.	 	 As	 a	 result,	 DOC’s	 management	 mission	 became	 more	aligned	 with	 other	 government	 agencies	 and	 its	 beliefs	 more	 like	 other	constitutional	 level	actors	–	 leaving	the	responsibility	of	advocacy	to	NGOs	 like	Fish	 and	 Game	 and	 Forest	 and	 Bird.	 The	 statute	 also	 created	 the	Whanganui-Manawatu	Conservation	District,	which	rested	at	the	lower	policy	level	and	was	charged	 with	 developing	 the	 Whanganui	 National	 Park	 strategy	 following	 its	establishment	in	1986.132		Third,	this	shift	led	to	the	introduction	of	the	Resource	Management	Act	(RMA)	1991.		Operating	as	New	Zealand’s	principal	piece	of	environmental	legislation	it	provided	 a	 new	 framework	 for	 managing	 the	 environment	 and	 resources	through	 the	 identification	of	clear	environmental	bottom	 lines.133		As	discussed																																																																																																																																																															Waitara,	Manukau	and	Te	Reo	Māori	reports	(1983;	1985;	1986).		The	“nullity	claim”	had	been	upheld	since	1877	when	Chief	Justice	Sir	James	Prendergast’s	said	in	the	case	of	Wi	Parata	v	The	Bishop	of	Wellington	[1877]	3	NZ	Jur	(NS)	72	(SC),	that	the	Treaty	of	Waitangi	was	‘worthless’	because	it	had	been	signed	‘between	a	civilised	nation	and	a	group	of	savages’	who	were	not	capable	of	signing	a	treaty.	He	went	on	to	say	that	since	the	Treaty	had	not	been	incorporated	into	domestic	law,	it	was	a	‘simple	nullity’	-	a	statement	repeatedly	used	in	subsequent	cases	to	justify	the	alienation	of	significant	tracts	of	Māori	land.	The	statements	of	the	Waitangi	Tribunal	were	used	by	Sir	Robin	Cooke	to	formally	overturn	Prendergast’s	ruling	in	New	Zealand	Māori	Council	v.	Attorney	General	[1987]	NZLR	641	(Available	at:	http://www.nzlii.org/cgi-bin/sinodisp/nz/cases/NZCA/1987/60.html).	132	That	the	Whanganui	National	Park	was	also	established	around	this	time	helps	explain	why	so	many	concessions	were	made	in	the	Act	for	tangata	whenua	–	something	absent	from	all	other	National	Park	strategies	and	legislation.	133	In	Environmental	Defence	Society	Inc	v	New	Zealand	King	Salmon	Co	Ltd	&	Ors[2014]	NZSC	38	(Available	at:	http://www.nzlii.org/cgi-bin/sinodisp/nz/cases/NZSC/2014/38.html).		This	Supreme	Court	ruling	will	be	instrumental	in	creating	precedent	around	environmental	decision-making	in	New	Zealand	
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in	 chapter	 five,	 the	 RMA	 aimed	 to	 build	 linkages	 between	 actors	 at	 different	levels	of	the	institutional	arrangement,	thus	establishing	a	system	of	polycentric	multi-level	 environmental	 governance	 for	 the	 Whanganui	 region	 built	 around	the	model	of	state	ownership	of	the	river.	 	Finally,	 this	 led	 to,	 in	 2002,	 the	 Local	 Government	 Act	 (LGA)	 2002	 being	introduced	and	reshaping	the	role	and	responsibilities	of	local	government.	One	of	the	objectives	of	the	LGA	2002	was	to	empower	communities	to	participate	in	decision-making	through	the	devolution	of	power	to	local	authorities	(Thomas	et	al.	2007).		The	Manawatu-Wanganui	(later	Horizons)	Regional	Council	had	taken	over	responsibility	of	 the	river	 from	the	Wanganui	River	Reserves	Commission	in	the	1970’s	and	under	the	LGA	2002	was	granted	overarching	responsibility	to	manage	resources	in	the	Whanganui	region,	including	the	Whanganui	River	and	its	catchment.		The	Whanganui,	Stratford,	and	Ohakune	District	Councils	were	in	turn	 charged	 with	 the	 management	 of	 infrastructure	 and	 land	 use	 in	 their	respective	 districts,	 all	 of	 which	 included	 part	 of	 the	 Whanganui	 River	catchment.	 	Together	 these	 four	 councils	 coordinated	 local	management	of	 the	Whanganui	Region	through	their	respective	Regional	and	District	Plans.		As	 outlined	 in	 chapter	 five,	 under	 state	 ownership,	 property	 rights	 to	 use,	management,	 and	 excludability	 of	 the	 Whanganui	 River	 remained	 with	 the	Crown.		The	river	was	viewed	as	‘property’	and	decision-making	was	guided	by	a	belief	 in	a	distinct	dichotomy	between	man	and	nature.	 	As	the	minority	group,	Māori	were	largely	excluded	from	decision-making	and	their	beliefs	and	shared	rules	cut	out	of	the	institutional	equilibrium	(Waitangi	Tribunal	1999).		
	 	
																																																																																																																																																														(Palmer	2015).		Since	the	RMA’s	inception	there	has	been	weak	implementation	of	environmental	bottom-lines,	which	was	a	principle	component	of	the	original	Act	(Palmer	QC	2014;	2015).			The	King	Salmon	decision	endorses	the	environmental	bottom	line	approach	and	prohibits	the	use	of	the	purpose	section	of	the	RMA	when	making	operative	decisions.		This	has	the	potential	to	reduce	uncertainty	within	the	system	caused	by	the	lack	of	central	government	direction	and	the	inconsistencies	often	observed	between	different	local	government	decisions	(Brown	et	al.	2016).	
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7.3.2		 A	period	of	transition	The	changes	in	rules	through	this	period	reflected	the	changing	beliefs	of	actors	operating	 within	 the	 institutional	 arrangement	 of	 the	 Whanganui	 River.		Legislation	 such	 as	 the	 Waitangi	 Tribunal	 Act	 provided	 new	 avenues	 for	Whanganui	Iwi	to	pursue	their	interest	claims	in	the	Whanganui	River	within	the	domain	 of	 the	 institutional	 equilibrium	 itself.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 battle	 over	ownership	 shifted	 from	 the	 judiciary	 to	 the	 legislature	 to	 become	 internalised	within	 the	 equilibrium	 and	 start	 the	 transition	 to	 resource	 self-determination.		This	occurred	in	the	following	way.134		In	 1994,	 Whanganui	 Iwi	 lodged	 a	 claim	 with	 the	 Waitangi	 Tribunal	 over	 the	Whanganui	River.		The	essence	of	the	claim	was	(again)	that	Atihaunui,	for	many	hundreds	 of	 years,	 possessed	 and	 controlled	 the	 Whanganui	 River	 and	 its	tributaries,	and	they	have	never,	since	1840,	freely	and	knowingly	relinquished	their	 rights	 and	 interests	 in	 the	 river.135 		 In	 its	 final	 report,	 the	 Tribunal	supported	Atihaunui’s	claim	and	proposed	several	matters	to	be	considered	for	future	negotiation	under	the	conditions	of	the	Treaty	of	Waitangi	Act	(Waitangi	Tribunal	1999,	p.343).		These	included:			 1) legislative	 recognition	 of	 Atihaunui	 (Whanganui	 Iwi)	 authority	 in,	 and	ownership	 of,	 the	 Whanganui	 River	 in	 its	 entirety	 as	 an	 entity	 and	 a	resource;			2) that	 any	 final	 settlement	 assure	 continued	 public	 access	 and	 maintain	existing	use	rights	for	current	terms;	and			3) that	national	planning	under	the	RMA	1991	would	be	maintained	as	far	as	is	appropriate;	and																																																									134	Please	note	that	this	next	section	moves	into	a	chronological	record	of	events.		Although	not	highly	analytical,	it	provides	a	valuable	record	that	does	not	seem	to	be	collated	elsewhere.	135	In	1995,	frustrated	with	inaction	over	their	claim,	Te	Runanga	Pakaitore	began	a	79-day	protest	at	Moutua	Gardens	in	Whanganui.		Iwi	saw	the	occupation	of	Moutua	and	its	location	(Whanganui	Iwi’s	traditional	meeting	and	trading	grounds,	on,	or	near,	the	original	Pakaitore	pa	site)	as	symbolic	of	their	grievances	in	terms	of	confiscated	land	and	lost	ownership	rights.		The	protest	ended	quietly	and	peacefully,	on	the	morning	of	18	May	1995,	however,	the	issues	that	prompted	the	occupation	remained	unresolved	(Moon	1996).	
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	4) that	Atihaunui	and	the	Crown	collaborate	in	future	water	management.			To	accomplish	this	in	future	planning	or	decision-making,	two	possible	avenues	were	recommended.		The	first	proposed	that	the	river	in	its	entirety	be	vested	in	an	ancestor	or	ancestors	representative	of	Atihaunui,	with	the	Whanganui	River	Māori	Trust	Board	delegated	 the	 role	of	 trustee.	 	The	 second	option	 suggested	the	Whanganui	River	Māori	Trust	Board	be	added	as	a	 ‘consent	authority’	 and	act	severally	and	jointly	with	 local	authorities	to	approve	use	and	management	decisions.136				These	 recommendations	 guided	 the	 negotiations	 between	 the	 Crown	 and	 the	Whanganui	Māori	Trust	Board,	which	opened	in	2002	and	ended	two	years	later	without	agreement.	Reasons	for	failure	were	multi-faceted.		Firstly,	negotiations	opened	following	extended	protests	by	local	Māori	and	reoccupation	of	Moutoa	Gardens	 in	 Whanganui	 over	 the	 ineffectual	 address	 of	 claims	 (NZPA	 2002;	Wilson	2002).	 	These	protests	set	the	tone	of	negotiations,	which	were	factious	and	ineffectual.	Many	Pākehā	were	concerned	the	Crown	had	been	pushed	into	negotiations	 by	 “Ken	 Mair’s	 mob”	 at	 Moutua	 (Hansard	 Reports	 2002;	 Turia	2002),	whilst	Iwi	were	highly	resentful	the	Crown	had	appeared	so	reluctant	to	address	the	findings	of	the	Waitangi	Tribunal	decision	(TVNZ	2002).				Secondly,	 the	 negotiations	 coincided	 with	 legal	 deliberations	 over	 proprietary	rights	to	the	foreshore	and	seabed,	which	the	Court	of	Appeal	ruled	as	being	held	by	Māori	in	June	2003	(Boast	2013;	Charters	&	Erueti	2007).137		The	then	Labour	Government’s	 response	was	 to	 threaten	 to	 legislate	 against	 the	 Court’s	 ruling.		(Charters	 &	 Eruti	 2007).	 On	 a	 national	 level,	 this	 caused	 fractures	 within	 the	Labour	Party	culminating	in	the	departure	of	Dame	Tariana	Turia	of	Whanganui	from	 the	 Labour	 Party	 to	 form	 the	 Māori	 Party.	 At	 a	 local	 Whanganui	 level,	Archie	Tairoa,	then	chair	of	the	Whanganui	River	Māori	Trust	Board,	responded																																																									136	One	member	of	the	Tribunal,	John	Kneebone,	provided	a	dissenting	opinion,	unable	to	support	any	proposal	that	Atihaunui	should	own	natural	water	or	be	designated	a	consent	authority	in	respect	of	the	river	under	the	RMA	1991	(Waitangi	Tribunal	1999,	pp.345-347).	137	In	Ngati	Apa	v.	Attorney	General	[2013]	3	NZLR	643.	Available	at:	http://www.nzlii.org/cgi-bin/sinodisp/nz/cases/NZCA/2003/117.html.	
		 172	
to	 the	government’s	 threat	by	 instructing	Counsel	 to	 file	an	effect	 in	 the	Māori	Land	Court	for	claims	to	the	ownership	of	the	foreshore	and	seabed	adjacent	to	Whanganui	Iwi	territory	and	the	riverbed	itself,	the	main	stem	and	its	catchment,	as	a	tactical	keeping	position.				This	move	by	Iwi	was	inconsistent	with	the	Terms	of	Negotiation	signed	by	the	Crown	and	Whanganui	Iwi	on	6	March	2003,	in	which	both	parties	agreed	not	to	pursue	before	a	court	or	tribunal	redress	over	any	areas	subject	to	negotiations	(Wilson	2004).	 	 It	also	meant	 that,	when	Genesis’	35	year	resource	consent	 for	the	western	diversion	of	the	TPDS	came	up	for	renewal	in	2004,	the	focus	of	the	river	negotiations	for	both	Iwi	and	the	Crown	shifted	from	addressing	property	rights	claims	of	the	Whanganui	River	to	matters	of	ordinary	litigation	relating	to	the	 filed	 effect.	 Negotiations	 with	 the	 Crown	 over	 the	 Whanganui	 River	subsequently	 broke	 down	 and	 Iwi	 ended	 up	 following	 the	 matter	 of	 Genesis’	diversion	 consent	 through	 the	 Environment	 Court	 (2004)138,	 the	 High	 Court	(2006,	2007)139,	and	the	Court	of	Appeal	(2007)140.					The	most	recent	round	of	negotiations	for	the	Whanganui	then	reopened	in	2009	under	a	conservative	National	led	Government.	Broader	advances	made	through	Treaty	settlements	over	the	previous	decade	in	exogenous	domains	contributed	to	these	negotiations	reaching	a	successful	resolution	in	2014.	Since	1985,	actors	at	all	levels	of	the	institutional	arrangement	governing	the	Whanganui	River	had	watched	closely	the	progression	of	settlements	and	the	rules	used	to	redistribute	property	rights	over	water	bodies	across	New	Zealand.	 	As	a	 result,	exogenous	legislation	can	be	considered	 the	 final	 set	of	disruptions	occurring	 through	 the	
																																																								138	In	Ngati	Rangi	Trust	v	Manawatu-Wanganui	Regional	Council	A67	[2004]	NZEnvC	172.	Available	at:	http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZEnvC/2004/172.html.	139	In	Genesis	Power	Ltd	v	Manawatu-Wanganui	Regional	Council	[2006]	NZRMA	536	and	Genesis	Power	Limited	v	Manawatu-Wanganui	Regional	Council	(High	Court	Wellington,	CIV-2004-485-1139,	22	May	2007,	Judge	Wild).	Cases	unable	to	be	located	online,	but	see	Ruru	2009,	pp.37-41	for	detailed	discussion	of	decisions.	140	The	final	decision	by	the	Court	of	Appeal	in	Ngati	Rangi	Trust	and	others	v	Manawatu-Wanganui	Regional	Council	[2007]	NZCA	378	(available	at:	http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZCA/2007/378.html)	upheld	the	initial	consent	granted	to	Genesis	to	divert	82%	of	the	headwaters.		In	March	2011	Whanganui	Iwi	and	Genesis	Energy	entered	into	a	relationship	agreement,	Hei	Whakaaro	Tahi	ki	Te	Mana	o	Te	Awa,	in	which	the	parties	agreed	to	bring	an	end	to	the	litigation	between	them	and	to	progress	the	resolution	of	any	outstanding	issues	in	a	non-adversarial	environment	outside	of	the	Courts.		Unfortunately	a	copy	of	this	agreement	was	not	able	to	be	sourced.	
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period	1980-2014	which	nudged	both	actors	and	rules	closer	to	the	adoption	of	resource	self-determination.	
	
7.3.3			 Institutional	disruptions	The	 final	 set	 of	 disruptions	 impacting	 the	 slowly	 evolving	 institutional	arrangement	 governing	 the	 Whanganui	 River	 through	 its	 period	 of	 transition	from	 the	 1980’s	 onwards	 was	 the	 institutional	 equilibria	 evolving	 in	 adjacent	domains.	 	 Following	 the	 growth	 of	 Māori	 activism	 in	 the	 1970’s	 and	 the	introduction	 of	 legislation	 such	 as	 the	 Treaty	 of	 Waitangi	 Act	 1975	 and	 the	Waitangi	Tribunal	Act	1989,	policy	decisions	pertaining	to	freshwater	and	Māori	interests	 created	 precedents	 for	 resource	 self-determination.	 	 These	 adjacent	equilibria	 influenced	 the	 individual	 beliefs	 of	 actors	 interacting	 within	 the	Whanganui	River	governance	arrangement	and	provided	actors	with	new	ideas	for	developing	a	suitable	institutional	arrangement	for	governing	the	Whanganui	River.			
i.	 Institutional	equilibria	in	adjacent	domains	The	establishment	of	 the	Waitangi	Tribunal	enabled	 iwi	across	New	Zealand	to	reach	 settlement	with	 the	 Crown	 over	 historic	 Treaty	 grievances	 affecting	 the	use	and	management	of	freshwater	bodies.	In	each	case	a	settlement	resulted	in	new	formal	 legislation,	which	would	create	precedent	 for	 future	settlements.141			The	 first	 major	 settlement	 affecting	 freshwater	 was	 for	 Te	 Waihora/Lake	Ellesmere	in	Canterbury	in	the	South	Island.		Ngāi	Tahu	(the	claimant)	were,	and	had	 always	 been,	 adamant	 that	 they	 had	 not	 relinquished	 rights	 to	 the	 lake,	which	 was	 a	 valuable	 asset	 to	 iwi	 prior	 to	 European	 settlement.	 	 During	 the	negotiation	process,	Ngāi	Tahu	expressed	their	desire	to	reclaim	ownership	and	
																																																								141	Although	not	relating	to	freshwater	directly,	important	to	mention	here	is	the	Manukau	Harbour	claim	(Waitangi	Tribunal	1985),	which	laid	the	basis	for	new	relationships	between	Māori	living	near	the	harbour,	local	government	bodies,	businesses,	and	the	wider	community.		Although	the	Tribunal	made	no	findings	in	relation	to	the	Waikato	River,	which	runs	into	the	harbor,	in	its	recommendations	it	acknowledged	the	need	to	reconcile	‘Māori	sensibilities’	regarding	the	ownership	of	the	river,	with	state	ownership	(Waitangi	Tribunal	1985,	p.129).		The	report	informed	the	resulting	legislation	and	set	a	precedent	for	future	decisions	concerning	freshwater	across	New	Zealand.	
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governance	of	Te	Waihora	in	order	to	restore	the	lake	as	source	of	mahinga	kai	(food	gathering	sites	and	practices).	142		The	 resulting	Ngāi	Tahu	Claims	Settlement	Act	1998	granted	ownership	of	 the	lakebed	 (the	 Crown	 refused	 to	 grant	 property	 rights	 to	 the	 lake’s	 water)	 and	some	surrounding	lakeshore	properties,	which	were	to	be	formerly	managed	by	the	Department	of	Conservation	with	consideration	given	to	mahinga	kai	values.	The	governance	of	the	lake	has	subsequently	relied	on	a	fragmented	institutional	arrangement	 involving	 the	 local	 territorial	 authority,	 the	 regional	 council,	DOC	and	 Ngāi	 Tahu	 (Hughey	 &	 Taylor	 2008).	 More	 recently	 there	 has	 been	 an	increased	focus	on	integrated	catchment	management	with	partnerships	formed	between	Ngāi	Tahu,	DOC,	Fonterra	(New	Zealand’s	largest	dairy	company),	local	authorities,	and	community	organisations.		In	2011,	the	government	announced	a	new	NZD$11.6	million	package	 for	 restoring	and	 rejuvenating	 the	mauri	 and	ecosystem	 health	 of	 the	 lake,	 a	 process	 expected	 to	 take	 over	 35	 years	 (Te	Waihora	Co-Governance	Group	2011).		In	2004	the	Te	Arawa	Lakes	Settlement	Act	2006	established	a	co-management	framework	 for	 the	 Te	 Arawa	 Lakes,	 located	 near	 Rotorua.	 	 Similarly	 to	 Te	Waihora,	it	brought	together	local	government	and	the	tribal	confederation	of	Te	Arawa	 to	 improve	 governance	 outcomes	 for	 the	 lakes.	 	 A	 Strategy	 Group	was	formed	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 sustainable	 management	 of	 the	 Lakes,	 while	recognising	 and	 providing	 for	 the	 traditional	 relationship	 Te	Arawa	with	 their	ancestral	lakes	(s.49).	 	Recently,	the	Te	Arawa	Lakes	Trust	developed	a	cultural	values	framework,	which	identifies,	organises,	and	describes	key	Māori	values	as	a	basis	for	guiding	and	determining	management	for	the	lakes	(Te	Arawa	Lakes	Trust	 2015).	 In	 terms	 of	 property	 rights,	 the	 fee	 simple	 estate	 in	 each	 of	 the	twelve	 Te	 Arawa	 lakebeds	 was	 vested	 in	 the	 Trustees	 of	 the	 Te	 Arawa	 Lakes	Trust,	which	was	made	up	of	Te	Arawa	Iwi.143																																																											142	In	the	Ngai	Tahu	Claims	Settlement	Act	1998,	mahinga	kai	specifically	refers	to	Ngai	Tahu’s	interests	in	traditional	food	and	other	resources,	and	the	places	where	those	resources	are	obtained.	
143	It	is	explicitly	stated	in	the	Act	that	the	lakebeds	cannot	be	alienated	from	the	rest	of	the	lake	[ss.23-24];	clause	23(2),	for	instance,states	that	the	Crown	retains	ownership	of	the	stratum	under	the	Land	Act	1948,	thus	retaining	ownership	of	the	space	the	water	occupies	and	the	air	above	it.		The	Act	also	states	that	the	vesting	of	the	lakebeds	does	not	include	any	rights	in	relation	to	the	water	in	the	lakes,	or	the	aquatic	life	
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	These	two	cases	paved	the	way	for	a	more	far-reaching	co-management	solution	for	 the	 Waikato	 River.	 	 Similar	 to	 Whanganui	 Iwi,	 Waikato	 Iwi	 had	 long	maintained	 the	 importance	 of	 their	 unique	 relationship	with	 the	 river	 and	 the	need	 to	 respect	 its	mana	 and	 restore	 its	 wellbeing	 (Muru-Lanning	 2010).	 	 By	Deed	 of	 Settlement	 dated	 22	 August	 2008,	 the	 Crown	 and	 Waikato-Tainui	reached	a	settlement	promising	to	recognise	the	relationship	between	Waikato-Tainui	and	the	river	and	focus	on	achieving	improved	environmental	and	social	outcomes	 through	 co-management.	 	 Four	 other	 local	 iwi	 subsequently	 also	signed	Deeds	of	Settlement	with	the	Crown,	formalising	their	future	involvement	in	co-management	arrangements.		The	 two	 founding	 pillars	 of	 the	 subsequent	 Waikato-Tainui	 Raupatu	 Claims	(Waikato	 River)	 Settlement	 Act	 2010	 recognised	 that	 to	 Waikato	 Iwi,	 the	Waikato	River	 is	 ‘a	 tupuna144	which	has	mana	and	 in	 turn	represents	 the	mana	and	 mauri	 of	 the	 tribe’	 [Preamble]145.	 The	 second	 pillar,	 mana	 whakahaere,	‘embodies	 the	 authority	 that	 Waikato-Tainui	 and	 other	 river	 tribes	 have	established	 in	 respect	 of	 the	Waikato	River	 over	many	 generations	 to	 exercise	control,	 access	 to,	 and	management	 of,	 the	Waikato	River	 and	 its	 resources	 in	accordance	with	tikanga’	[Preamble}146.	The	subsequent	institutional	framework	developed	 for	 the	 Waikato	 River	 consisted	 of	 five	 individual	 co-management	agreements	or	Joint	Management	Plans	signed	between	each	river	iwi	and	their	respective	local	authority	(Muru-Lanning	2012).		Each	plan	was	to	be	guided	by	statements	 of	 the	 Waikato	 River	 Authority,	 however,	 each	 had	 different	objectives	 and	 approaches	 for	 improving	 ecosystem	 health	 and	 wellbeing,	making	 the	 overall	 governance	 arrangement	 somewhat	 fragmented	 (Muru-Lanning	 2012).	 	 The	 River	 Authority	 had	 five	 Crown-appointed	members	 and	one	from	each	river	iwi	designated	in	section	22.1	to:																																																																																																																																																															[s.25].		These	clauses	differentiate	the	Te	Arawa	settlement	from	the	Whanganui	River	settlement,	in	which	this	distinction	does	not	seem	to	be	explicitly	stated.	144	Note	that	in	the	Waikato	settlement,	negotiators	accepted	a	subtle	change	in	the	Waikato	River’s	definition	as	an	“awa	tupuna”	or	“ancestral	river”	rather	than	a	“tupuna	awa”	(Muru-Lanning	2010).		This	diminished	the	metaphysical	aspects	of	the	river,	something	that	the	Whanganui	River	negotiators	were	not	prepared	to	accept	when	they	entered	negotiations	some	years	later.	145	This	refers	to	the	Preamble	of	the	Waikato-Tainui	Raupatu	Claims	(Waikato	River)	Settlement	Act	2010.	146	Ibid.	
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	 a) Set	the	primary	direction	through	the	vision	and	strategy	to	achieve	the	 restoration	 and	 protection	 of	 the	 health	 and	 wellbeing	 of	 the	Waikato	River	for	future	generations:			 b) Promote	 an	 integrated,	 holistic,	 and	 coordinated	 approach	 to	 the	implementation	of	the	vision	and	strategy	and	the	management	of	the	Waikato	River:			 c) Fund	 rehabilitation	 initiatives	 for	 the	 Waikato	 River	 in	 its	 role	 as	trustee	for	the	Waikato	River	Clean-up	Trust.		
	The	Waikato	River	 co-management	 agreements	 and	 co-governance	 framework	represented	 a	 significant	 shift	 in	 the	 approach	 to	 freshwater	 management	 in	New	 Zealand	 (Te	 Aho	 2010).	 Firstly,	 the	 settlement	 acknowledged	 the	 strong	connection	 Waikato	 Iwi	 had	 with	 the	 river	 and	 the	 interconnectedness	 of	 all	things,	physical	and	metaphysical.	 	Secondly,	the	settlement	stepped	away	from	focusing	 on	 formalising	 ownership;	 instead	 emphasising	 the	 integration	 of	governance	approaches	and	incorporation	of	the	tikanga	of	the	Waikato	Iwi	into	the	decision-making	framework.		The	development	of	co-management	strategies	across	a	range	of	agencies	coupled	with	an	overarching	governance	framework,	aimed	to	achieve	intergenerational	outcomes	and	restore	and	protect	the	health	and	wellbeing	of	the	River	(Baker	2013).			Finally,	although	not	related	to	freshwater,	the	recent	Te	Urewera	settlement	is	important	 to	 mention.	 	 The	 initial	 signing	 of	 Ruruku	 Whakatupua	 between	Whanganui	Iwi	and	the	Crown	in	2012	sent	a	signal	to	other	iwi	of	the	length	the	Crown	was	 now	 prepared	 to	 go	 to	 address	 Treaty	 grievances.	 	 As	 a	 result,	 in	2014,	Tūhoe	 came	 to	 an	 agreement	with	 the	Crown	over	Te	Urewera	National	Park,	the	largest	national	park	in	the	North	Island.		Under	the	Tūhoe-Te	Urewera	Settlement	 Act	 2014,	 Te	 Urewera	 was	 made	 a	 legal	 entity	 and	 granted	 legal	standing,	transferring	legal	title	from	the	Crown	to	Te	Urewera	itself.		
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Although	 the	supporting	governance	 framework	differs	 from	that	proposed	 for	the	Whanganui,	the	Te	Urewera	case	provides	some	useful	insights	into	some	of	the	 complexity	 and	 challenges	 that	 could	 be	 faced	 for	 those	 involved	 with	governance	of	the	Whanganui	River.		As	explained	by	a	member	of	Te	Urewera’s	Board,	which	as	of	November	2016	was	made	up	of	four	members	appointed	by	the	 Treaty	 of	Waitangi	Minister	 and	 Conservation	Minister	 and	 four	members	appointed	by	Tūhoe	Te	Uru	Taumatua	 (the	Tūhoe	governance	entity)147,	 a	 key	challenge	has	been	how	to	convey	 the	notion	of	 legal	personality	 into	practical	governance	 outcomes.148		 	 Incorporating	 Tūhoe’s	 beliefs	 into	 the	 new	 sets	 of	formal	 rules	 has	 required	 a	 different	 approach	 to	management	 and	 use	 of	 Te	Urewera.	 	 Under	 the	 new	 framework,	 rather	 than	 management	 being	 built	around	a	philosophy	of	 conservation,	 the	new	management	approach	 is	one	of	sustainable	 use.	 	 As	 a	 result,	 it	 supports	 the	 active	 harvest	 of	 traditional	 food	sources,	which	 could	 include	 currently	 threatened	 species.	 	 The	 guardians	 and	supporting	 governance	 groups	 of	 Te	 Awa	 Tupua	 will	 likely	 face	 similar	challenges	when	faced	with	implementing	the	Te	Awa	Tupua	Act.		
7.3.4	 Integrating	the	Māori	worldview	with	existing	legal	frameworks	Learning	 from	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 previous	 negotiations,	 as	well	 as	 the	 broader	advances	made	through	Treaty	settlements	over	the	previous	decade,	the	2009	negotiations	 over	 the	 Whanganui	 River	 adopted	 a	 different	 approach	 to	 that	taken	 in	 the	2002	negotiations.	 	Entering	negotiations,	 the	 interviews	 revealed	that	 the	 Crown	 knew	 that	 any	 institutional	 solution	 created	 for	 governance	would	 have	 to	 be	 innovative	 and	 potentially	 work	 outside	 the	 basic	 guiding	principles	of	Cabinet’s	own	rules.		Subsequently,	rather	than	taking	the	Waitangi	Tribunal	Whanganui	 River	 Report	 as	 the	 baseline	 proposition,	 as	was	 done	 in	2002,	the	second	round	of	negotiations	began	by	identifying	the	possible	bounds	of	any	potential	settlement.																																																												147	The	Board	members	are	appointed	for	a	three-year	term.	After	the	initial	term,	the	Board's	membership	will	change	to	comprise	six	members	appointed	by	Tūhoe	and	three	appointed	by	the	Minister	of	Conservation.	The	chair	will	be	selected	from	among	the	Tūhoe	appointees.	148	One	approach	used	has	been	through	the	repeated	use	of	metaphor	on	information	panels,	presenting	Te	Urewera	as	a	marae	 (meeting	house)	 in	which	all	 can	gather	and	share	rather	 than	a	 ‘park’	or	something	similar.			
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As	 had	 occurred	 with	 Te	 Waihora,	 the	 Crown	 indicated	 that	 the	 then	 Prime	Minister,	John	Key,	would	not	support	vesting	full	ownership	of	the	river	in	Iwi	or	 an	 iwi	 ancestor,	 so	 an	 alternative	 approach	 would	 be	 needed.	 	 Several	interviewees	 explained	 that	 significant	 time	 was	 spent	 exploring	 Iwi’s	relationship	with	the	river	system	as	a	way	to	navigate	the	 issue	of	ownership.		Successive	 iterations	 of	 consultation	 revealed	 that	 ownership	 in	 the	 European	sense	would	actually	be	derogatory	of	the	river	and	it	became	clear	to	both	sides,	the	very	concept	that	 Iwi	could	own	the	Whanganui	River	was	corrosive	of	 the	river’s	mana.	 	As	one	 interviewee	stated	explicitly,	 “it	became	further	apparent	that	the	core	of	the	issue	was,	less	that	Iwi	did	not	own	the	river,	but	more	that	the	Crown	did”.		Subsequently,	drawing	on	Salmond’s	(1930)	work	on	legal	fictions,	as	well	as	the	work	 of	 Stone	 (1972),	 the	 negotiators	 developed	 the	 concept	 of	 resource	 self-determination	 as	 an	 alternative	 property	 rights	 arrangement	 to	 state	 or	 iwi	ownership.		By	identifying	Te	Awa	Tupua	as	a	legal	entity	and	vesting	ownership	of	 the	riverbed	 in	Te	Awa	Tupua	 itself,	 the	Crown	and	 Iwi	were	able	 to	ensure	that	 the	 Crown	 would	 no	 longer	 ‘own’	 the	 river,	 but	 that	 neither	 would	ownership	be	 transferred	 to	Whanganui	 Iwi.	 	Resource	 self-determination	was	an	appropriate	middle	path	 that	met	 the	needs	of	both	negotiating	parties	and	overcame	roadblocks,	which	could	have	otherwise	caused	negotiations	to	falter.			As	 already	 explained	 in	 chapter	 five,	 the	 outcome	 of	 these	 negotiations	meant	that	in	2011	a	‘Record	of	Understanding’	was	signed	between	Iwi	and	the	Crown,	acknowledging	 the	 important	 relationship	Whanganui	 Iwi	 have	 with	 the	 river	(Office	of	Treaty	Settlements	2011).	In	2012	Iwi	then	signed	a	preliminary	deed	with	 the	Crown	 that	 set	 out	 the	 conditions	 of	 resource	 self-determination	 that	would	 shape	 the	 final	 Deed	 of	 Settlement	 signed	 in	 2014	 (Office	 of	 Treaty	Settlements	2012;	2014a;	2014b).		The	Te	Awa	Tupua	(Whanganui	River	Claims	Settlement)	 Act	 2017	 outlined	 in	 chapter	 five	 was	 the	 conclusive	 piece	 of	legislation	formally	granting	the	Whanganui	River	legal	standing.	
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7.4	 Discussion	
	This	dynamic,	historical	analysis	aimed	to	answer	the	question	of	how	and	why	resource	self-determination	was	applied	 to	 the	Whanganui	River.	 	The	analysis	shows	that	the	institutional	arrangement	formally	introduced	by	the	Crown	was	never	 stable	 due	 to	 the	 challenges	 mounted	 by	 Whanganui	 Iwi	 from	 1873.		Whanganui	Iwi	were	not	motivated	to	adhere	to	the	formal	rules	which	reflected	a	set	of	beliefs	 that	were	not	 their	own.	Subsequently,	 the	state	of	 institutional	evolution	mirrored	a	punctuated	equilibrium	path	as	Iwi	repeatedly	challenged	the	 system	 of	 state	 ownership	 through	 the	 courts.	 	 It	 was	 these	 ongoing	disruptions,	 which	 increased	 costs	 within	 the	 institutional	 arrangement	 and	ultimately	 motivated	 constitutional	 level	 actors	 to	 change	 the	 rules	 and	introduce	a	system	of	resource	self-determination.				The	 analysis	 showed	 that,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Whanganui	 River,	 the	 transition	process	 towards	 resource	 self-determination	 was	 evolutionary	 rather	 than	revolutionary.	 	 It	 was	 driven	 by	 two	 primary	 factors:	 slowly	 evolving	 beliefs	coupled	with	exogenous	parameter	shocks	and	disruptions	which	punctured	the	institutional	equilibrium	path	and,	over	 time,	qualitatively	 shifted	 the	property	rights	systems	from	one	equilibrium	state	to	another.		These	 shocks	 came	 in	 the	 form	 of	 two	 major	 exogenous	 events	 and	 a	 set	 of	smaller	disruptions,	which	were	repeated	over	time.	The	 first	major	shock	was	the	 arrival	 of	 Europeans	 in	 the	 1830’s,	 which	 resulted	 in	 the	 formalisation	 of	state	ownership	of	the	Whanganui	River	in	the	1870’s.		That	the	new	ownership	model	 failed	 to	 bridge	 the	 two	 competing	worldviews	 and	 account	 for	Māori’s	existing	beliefs	caused	the	arrangement	to	be	inherently	unstable.		As	explained	by	Aoki	(2015)	for	an	institutional	arrangement	to	be	stable,	the	working	rules-in-use	must	reflect	the	majority	of	beliefs	held	by	actors	within	the	institutional	arrangement.		Although,	in	the	case	in	the	Whanganui	River,	Europeans	were	the	dominant	 group	 with	 stronger	 bargaining	 power	 (Knight	 1992),	 Māori	consistently	withdrew	their	consent	by	way	of	organised	collective	action	(Levi	1990)	 and	 challenged	 the	 belief	 of	 the	 majority	 through	 the	 courts.	 	 This	
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repeatedly	 imposed	 costs	 on	 actors	 operating	 within	 the	 institutional	arrangement	across	every	level	of	decision-making.		Between	 the	 1870’s-1980’s	 the	 exogenous	 disruptions	 to	 the	 institutional	equilibrium	 were	 centred	 around	 Iwi	 establishing	 legal	 property	 rights	 or	ownership	 over	 the	 river.	 Through	 the	 early-mid	 20th	 century,	 claiming	ownership	of	the	river	was	the	only	avenue	available	to	Māori	wanting	to	assert	their	 rights	 within	 the	 state	 ownership	 property	 rights	 system	 (Waitangi	Tribunal	 1999).	 	 The	 European	 belief	 system	 and	 the	 supporting	 formal	 rules	could	not	accommodate	the	metaphysical	and	collectivist	concepts	central	to	the	Iwi	worldview149;	while	non-market	values,	such	as	cultural	values,	struggled	to	be	 incorporated	 into	 decision-making.	 	 This	 gave	 the	more	 easily	 quantifiable	market	 values,	 most	 notably	 the	 benefits	 of	 hydropower,	 greater	 influence	 in	decision-making	in	some	cases	in	the	case	of	the	Whanganui	River.150		With	the	second	major	shock	culminating	in	the	1980’s	with	significant	political	reform,	a	new	pathway	opened	 for	 Iwi	 to	challenge	 the	status	quo	 from	within	the	 institutional	 arrangement.	 The	 growing	 acknowledgment	 of	 biculturalism	across	all	levels	of	the	institutional	arrangement	(Visal	2000)	allowed	the	focus	of	 Whanganui	 Iwi	 to	 turn	 away	 from	 questions	 about	 defining	 legal	 property	rights	 and	 towards	 the	 designation	 of	 economic	 property	 rights.	 	 This	 shift	 is	most	 evident	 in	 Iwi’s	 1994	 claim	 to	 the	 Waitangi	 Tribunal	 that	 focused	 on	establishing	Te	Atihau’s	rights	and	interests	to	the	Whanganui	River	rather	than	reassigning	ownership.	Successive	rounds	of	negotiations	and	discussions	were	then	able	to	create	a	new	property	rights	system	that	recognised	these	rights	and	interests	by	approximating	Whanganui	Iwi’s	worldview	in	law.		Over	 the	 course	 of	 this	 analysis,	 a	 process	 of	 path	 dependence	 is	 clear	(Mantzavinos	et	al.	2004;	Van	Bavel	2015).		It	was	only	because	of	existing	rules,	evolving	community	attributes	and	informal	rules,	and	material	conditions	that	a	system	 able	 to	 support	 resource	 self-determination	 could	 be	 proposed	 in	 the																																																									149	Later	attempts	by	the	RMA	and	within	local	government	plans	fell	short	of	successfully	incorporating	either	element	(Ruru	2009).	150	Ibid.	115.	
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case	 of	 the	Whanganui.	 	 In	 addition,	 formal	 rules	 in	 exogenous	domains	 had	 a	strong	 influence	 on	 the	 institutional	 arrangement	 governing	 the	 Whanganui	River	(McGinnis	2011c).		Exogenous	institutional	equilibria	played	an	important	role	 in	shifting	the	 individual	beliefs	of	actors	operating	under	state	ownership	closer	to	resource	self-determination.		Actors	interacting	under	the	institutional	equilibrium	 of	 state	 ownership	 in	 the	 Whanganui	 River	 arena	 were	 able	 to	observe	advances	in	parallel	domains	and	re-strategise	to	try	and	optimise	their	net	benefits	given	the	new	information	available.	 	 Iterations	of	policy	decisions	affecting	 freshwater	 systems	 across	 New	 Zealand	 provided	 important	 signals	about	the	type	of	system	the	broader	New	Zealand	institutional	framework	could	support	and	what	it	could	not.		This	 analysis	 also	 showed	 that	 actors	 interacting	 within	 the	 institutional	arrangement	changed	formal	rules	at	 the	constitutional	and	policy	 levels	of	 the	institutional	 arrangement.	 	 Those	 actors	 at	 the	 policy	 and	 constitutional	 levels	were	 able	 to	 craft	 rules	 that	 affected	 actors	 at	 lower	 levels	 of	 the	 institutional	arrangement.	 	Those	actors	who	chose	 to	change	 the	 formal	rules	at	 the	upper	levels	of	 the	 institutional	arrangement	were	motivated	by	their	own	utility	and	guided	by	their	own	sets	of	individual	beliefs.		For	instance,	the	belief	of	former	Prime	Minister	Richard	 Seddon	 that	 securing	 the	 Crown’s	 access	 to	 rivers	 and	waterways	was	of	primary	importance	to	New	Zealand’s	economic	development,	motivated	the	identification	of	new	sets	of	rules	that	deconstructed	Whanganui	Iwi’s	control	of	the	river	at	the	turn	of	the	20th	century	(Young	1998).		Similarly,	in	negotiating	the	Whanganui	River	claims	settlement,	much	of	the	drive	to	reach	agreement	came	from	the	Minister	of	Treaty	Settlements,	Christopher	Finlayson,	who	was	 personally	 determined	 to	 see	 the	 settlement	 completed	 and	 believed	that	 upholding	 Treaty	 principles	 and	 the	 recognition	 of	 Whanganui	 Iwi’s	connection	with	the	river	was	important.			Informal	 rules	 evolved	 gradually	 over	 time	 and	 reflected	 the	 majority	 view.		Unlike	formal	rules,	these	informal	rules	were	not	able	to	be	altered	by	a	single	individual,	 instead	 only	 changing	 gradually	 through	 critical	 mass	 or	 when	exogenous	events	caused	a	qualitative	shift	 in	equilibrium	(Greif	2006).	 	 In	 the	
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case	of	the	Whanganui	River,	exogenous	variables	such	as	the	global	social	and	cultural	 liberalisation	 of	 the	 1960’s	 and	 1970’s	 catalyzed	 a	 mass	 change	 in	behaviour	 across	 New	 Zealand	 and	 provided	 a	 platform	 for	 subsequent	 rule	changes.	 These	 belief	 changes	 ultimately	 spurred	 the	 dramatic	 reforms	 of	 the	1980’s	which	 led	 to	 a	 qualitative	 shift	 in	 equilibrium	 for	 the	Whanganui	River	(Easton	1989).			Given	 that	 this	 qualitative	 shift	 in	 equilibrium	 occurred	 at	 the	 overarching	constitutional	 and	 upper	 policy	 levels,	 it	 did	 not	 affect	 the	 governance	arrangement	 of	 the	 Whanganui	 River	 alone.	 	 An	 important	 question	 then	becomes	why	was	 this	new	system	proposed	 for	 the	Whanganui	River	but	not	other	 river	 systems?	 (Greif	 1998).	 	 Other	 rivers	 in	 New	 Zealand	 experience	similar	 challenges	 to	 the	 Whanganui	 River	 (Ministry	 of	 the	 Environment	 and	Statistics	 New	 Zealand	 2017;	 Ruru	 2010),	 but	 remain	 under	 state	 ownership.		Why	was	the	Whanganui	River	different?			The	dynamic	analysis	revealed	that	 the	deep	connection	Whanganui	 Iwi	shares	with	the	river	and	the	Iwi’s	long-standing	claims	over	legal	and	economic	rights	differentiated	the	case	of	the	Whanganui	from	other	cases	of	water	governance.	Although	this	connection	between	Iwi	and	the	river	is	not	unique	to	Whanganui	(Ruru	 2010),	 the	 costs	 Whanganui	 Iwi	 imposed	 on	 the	 Crown	 from	 1873	onwards	 is.	 	 The	 case	 over	 ownership	 of	 the	 Whanganui	 River,	 for	 instance,	remains	New	Zealand’s	longest	running	court	case	and	imposed	both	a	financial	and	political	burden	on	the	Crown.		When	it	came	to	Settlement	negotiations	in	2009,	 this	 complex	 and	 extended	 history	 potentially	 granted	 Whanganui	 Iwi	greater	 bargaining	 power	 than	 was	 held	 by	 other	 iwi	 who	 had	 previously	negotiated	with	 the	 Crown	 over	 Treaty	 claims.	 	 In	 addition,	water	 institutions	across	New	Zealand	had	been	evolving	rapidly	since	the	advent	of	the	Waitangi	Tribunal	in	the	1980’s.		Settlements,	such	as	that	for	the	Waikato	River,	set	new	precedents	 for	 property	 rights	 that	 could	 be	 advanced	 still	 further	 in	 the	Whanganui	 River	 case.	 	 Although	 future	 comparative	 work	 will	 have	 to	 be	undertaken	to	confirm	these	hypotheses,	it	can	be	surmised	that	the	application	
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of	resource	self-determination	to	the	Whanganui	River	was	a	unique	case	driven	by	exogenous	events	as	well	a	complex	history	of	costly	institutional	instability.	
	
	
7.5	 Conclusions	
	This	 chapter	 tested	 the	 dynamic	 version	 of	 the	 framework	 outlined	 in	 chapter	three	 by	 applying	 an	 historical	 lens	 to	 the	 changing	 institutional	 arrangement	governing	the	Whanganui	River.	 	 It	aimed	to	determine	how	and	why	resource	self-determination	was	identified	as	an	alternative	property	rights	arrangement	for	governing	the	Whanganui	River.	The	analysis	showed	that	in	the	case	of	the	Whanganui	River,	it	was	not	environmental	factors	that	motivated	the	search	for	an	alternative	property	rights	system,	but	diverging	beliefs	of	actors	interacting	within	the	institution.	From	the	beginning	of	European	settlement,	a	clear	divide	existed	 between	 the	 enforced	 formal	 rules	 imposed	 for	 governance	 of	 the	Whanganui	River	and	Whanganui	 Iwi’s	 collective	beliefs.	 	The	analysis	 showed	that	the	institutional	equilibrium	that	emerged	for	coordinating	use	of	the	river	was	 not	 stable,	 as	 the	 transplant	 of	 British	 rules	 did	 not	 take	 into	 account	 the	pre-existing	 institutional	 arrangements	 constructed	 from	 Māori	 beliefs	(Kingston	and	Greif	2011).	 	This	created	openings	for	exogenous	disruptions	to	puncture	 the	 institutional	 equilibrium	 and	 nudge	 the	 evolutionary	 path	 closer	towards	resource	self-determination.		Because	 those	 actors	who	were	 unhappy	with	 the	 status	 quo	were	 a	minority	group	at	 the	operational	 level	of	decision-making,	 the	only	avenue	available	 to	them	 to	 articulate	 change	 was	 through	 pathways	 outside	 of	 the	 institutional	arrangement	 itself.	 Disruptions	 to	 the	 institutional	 equilibrium	 through	 the	judicial	system	as	well	as	rule	changes	that	developed	in	domains	parallel	to	the	institution	 repeatedly	 punctured	 the	 equilibrium	 path.	 Eventually	 rules	 from	exogenous	 domains	 were	 internalised	 within	 the	 institutional	 equilibrium,	creating	new	pathways	towards	resource	self-determination.				
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The	 findings	 show	 that,	 although	 the	 adoption	 of	 legal	 standing	 presents	 a	dramatic	shift	 from	the	existing	property	rights	approach	of	state	ownership,	 it	was	only	through	a	process	of	incremental	change	and	exogenous	shocks	that	the	fundamental	 transformation	 was	 able	 to	 happen.	 	 They	 also	 show	 that	 the	institutional	arrangement	of	resource	self-determination	was	designed	because	available	 alternative	 property	 rights	 systems	 were	 not	 able	 to	 deliver	 a	 self-enforcing	 institutional	 equilibrium	 that	 suitably	 approximated	 the	 Māori	worldview	in	law.			Given	 these	 insights,	as	well	as	 those	garnered	 from	the	previous	chapters,	 the	following	 chapter	 evaluates	 and	 discusses	 the	 likely	 robustness	 of	 the	 new	institutional	equilibrium	for	governing	the	Whanganui	River	over	the	long-term.						
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8	 Evaluating	resource	self-determination	using	
Ostrom’s	design	principles		
	
	
8.0	 Introduction	
	This	chapter	aims	to	bring	together	the	results	reported	in	chapters	five,	six,	and	seven	 to	 answer	 the	 fourth	 research	 question	 which	 asked	 how	 robust	 will	resource	 self-determination	 be	 as	 an	 alternative	 property	 rights	 system	 for	governing	 the	 Whanganui	 River.	 	 So	 far,	 the	 findings	 have	 highlighted	 the	complexity	 of	 the	 institutional	 setting	 and	 the	 historical	 challenges	 associated	with	identifying	a	stable	institutional	arrangement	for	governing	the	Whanganui	River.	 	 The	 institutional	 structure	 analysed	 in	 chapter	 five	 showed	 how	 the	identification	of	resource	self-determination	will	affect	the	allocation	of	property	rights	in	the	case	of	the	Whanganui	River,	whilst	some	of	the	environmental	and	economic	effects	of	granting	a	river	legal	standing	were	then	analysed	in	chapter	six.			This	 chapter	 examines	 how	 the	 broader	 institutional	 characteristics,	 not	captured	by	the	experiment,	could	influence	the	outcomes	and	relative	long-term	‘success’	of	the	institutional	arrangement.		As	well	as	transaction	costs,	variables	such	as	 the	size	and	heterogeneity	of	 the	group	 involved,	 the	 linkages	between	actors,	 the	 type	 of	 production	 functions	 users	 are	 facing,	 how	 easy	 it	 is	 to	 get	good	 information	 about	 the	 results	 of	 past	 actions,	 how	 valuable	 solving	 the	problem	is	to	participants,	and	the	levels	of	social	capital	have	all	been	shown	to	influence	 the	 relative	 robustness	 of	 property	 rights	 systems	 (Ostrom	 2008b).		Given	 this	 taxonomy	 of	 influences,	 this	 chapter	 evaluates	 resource	 self-determination	using	Ostrom’s	design	principles	(Cox	et	al.	2010;	Ostrom	1990)	to	 determine	 the	 likely	 long-term	 robustness	 and	 resilience	 of	 the	 institution	crafted	to	govern	the	Whanganui	River.			
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The	merits	of	using	Ostrom’s	design	principles	were	discussed	in	section	3.2	and	thus	 the	 chapter	 proceeds	 as	 follows.	 Section	 one	 considers	 the	 new	 property	rights	system	in	 light	of	each	of	Ostrom’s	eight	design	principles	and	compares	the	 likely	 robustness	 of	 resource	 self-determination	 with	 state	 ownership	arrangement	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Whanganui	 River.	 Section	 two	 discusses	 the	results	and	section	three	concludes.			
8.1	 Evaluating	institutional	robustness:	Ostrom’s	design	principles		Faced	 with	 the	 complexity	 of	 institutional	 arrangements	 across	 resource	systems,	Ostrom’s	design	principles	were	delineated	from	a	set	of	considerations	that	 characterised	 robust	 common	 pool	 resource	 systems	 (Ostrom	 1990;	2008a).151		 They	 were	 identified	 as	 factors	 that	 were	 understood	 to	 affect	incentives	 in	 such	 a	way	 that	 users	would	 be	willing	 to	 commit	 themselves	 to	conform	 to	 the	 institutional	 rules-in-use.	When	 all	 of	 the	 design	 principles	 are	met,	 actors’	 best	 responses	 lead	 to	 outcomes	 that	 provide	 for	 cooperation	 and	collective	action.				In	2010,	Ostrom’s	(1990)	original	set	of	eight	principles	was	extended	to	ten	in	an	effort	to	discern	more	precisely	the	elements	of	an	institution	likely	to	affect	its	 longevity	 and	 stability	 in	 equilibrium	 (Cox	 et	 al.	 2010).	 	 As	 explained	 by	Agrawal	 (2003),	 Ostrom’s	 (1990)	 original	 list	 of	 principles	 displayed	 gaps,	particularly	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 features	 of	 particular	 resources	 on	collective	 outcomes.	 	 The	 list	 of	 ten	 principles	 does	 a	 satisfactory	 job	 in	addressing	some	of	these	shortfalls	and	thus	it	is	this	extended	list,	which	is	used	in	this	analysis	to	determine	the	likely	robustness	of	resource	self-determination	in	the	case	of	the	Whanganui	River.		A	summary	of	how	well	each	principle	is	met	under	each	property	rights	system	is	provided	in	table	8.1	and	then	discussed	in	detail	below.																																																										151	Ostrom	focused	on	common	pool	resource	systems	specifically,	rather	than	common	property	resource	systems,	which	in	this	study	have	included	systems	for	the	governance	of	both	common	pool	resources	and	public	goods.	
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Table	8.1:		 A	 comparative	 summary	 of	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 each	 property	 rights	arrangement	 governing	 the	 Whanganui	 River	 meets	 the	 requirements	 of	Ostrom’s	 design	 principles.	 	 The	 arrows	 represent	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 the	design	 principle	 is	 met	 under	 each	 property	 rights	 setting.	 	 An	 open	 circle	symbolises	 a	 situation	 in	 which	 too	 little	 information	 is	 available	 to	 make	 an	informed	assessment.		
Design	Principle	 State	ownership	
Resource	self-
determination	1a.	Clearly	defined	resource	boundaries	 ê	 é	1b.	Clearly	defined	group	boundaries	 î	 ì	2a.	Congruence	between	appropriation	and	provision	rules	and	local	conditions	 è	 é	2b.	Congruence	between	appropriation	and	provision	rules	 î	 ¢	3.	Collective	choice	arrangements	 î	 é	4a.	Monitors	are	present	 è	 è	4b.	Monitors	are	members	of	the	community	and	accountable	to	the	members	 î	 î	5.	Graduated	sanctions	 î	 î	6.	Conflict-resolution	mechanisms	 è	 î	7.	Minimal	recognition	of	rights	 î	 ¢	8.	Nested	enterprises	 ì	 ì			
8.1.1	 Principle	1A&B:	Clearly	defined	resource	and	group	boundaries.	The	 first	 design	 principle	 of	 clearly	 defined	 boundaries	 can	 be	 split	 into	 two	components:	 the	 boundaries	 of	 a	 resource	 system	 and	 the	 individuals	 or	households	 with	 property	 rights.	 When	 each	 component	 is	 well	 defined	 the	positive	and	negative	externalities	produced	by	actors	can	be	internalised	so	that	the	costs	of	appropriation	and	some	of	the	benefits	of	resource	provision	accrue	to	the	actors	themselves	rather	than	being	imposed	on	a	third	party.	 	As	Hanna	(1995,	p.20)	states:	“It	is	important	to	ensure	that	a	property	rights	regime	has	clearly	defined	boundaries,	and	that	to	the	extent	possible,	those	boundaries	are	consistent	with	the	natural	boundaries	of	the	ecological	system.”		As	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 five,	 the	 boundaries	 of	 the	Whanganui	 River	 resource	system	were	not	 clear	under	Crown	ownership.	 	Multiple	working	 rules-in-use	
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and	 legislative	 mandates	 led	 to	 jurisdictional	 overlap	 and	 conflicting	management	 priorities	 and	 incentives	 along	 the	 length	 of	 the	 river	 and	within	the	 river’s	 catchment.	 	 Although	 a	 catchment	management	 plan	was	 in	 use,	 it	wasn’t	a	strong	directive	for	integrated	catchment	management	for	actors	across	the	various	levels	of	the	institutional	arrangement.				Under	 state	 ownership,	 the	 bundle	 of	 property	 rights	 were	 clearly	 defined,	however,	 they	 failed	 to	 acknowledge	 Whanganui	 Iwi’s	 proprietary	 rights	 and	interests	in	the	river.		Further,	although	they	were	clearly	defined,	not	all	actors	operating	within	 the	 institutional	 system	observed	 the	 rights	–	 this	 caused	 the	system	 to	 break	 down.	 	 For	 this	 reason,	 despite	 their	 demarcation,	 the	 rights	failed	 to	have	 legitimacy	amongst	actors	at	 the	operational	 level	 leading	 to	 the	institutional	equilibrium	being	unstable.		The	new	arrangement	potentially	addresses	these	shortfalls.	First,	by	identifying	Te	 Awa	 Tupua	 as	 an	 interconnected	 whole,	 it	 identifies	 the	 boundary	 of	 the	catchment	 as	 the	 boundary	 of	 the	 resource	 system.	 	 All	 actors	 are	 required	 to	refer	to	the	proposed	strategy	document	and	the	values	of	Tupua	te	Kawa	when	making	 decisions	 around	use.	 	 This	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 create	 strong	 linkages	between	 actors	 and	 identify	 a	 common	 focal	 unit	 for	 management	 that	 was	lacking	under	the	state	ownership	model.				Second,	the	new	arrangement	acknowledges	Iwi’s	relationship	with	the	river	and	recognises	that	Iwi	never	willingly	relinquished	rights	to	control	or	‘ownership’	of	 the	 riverbed.	 	 Subsequently,	 under	 resource	 self-determination	 property	rights	 to	 ownership	 of	 the	 riverbed	will	 be	 shifted	 away	 from	 the	 Crown	 and	vested	 in	 the	 river	 itself.	 	These	 legal	property	 rights	are	quite	 clear;	however,	the	economic	property	rights	 to	management,	exclusion,	alienation,	access,	and	withdrawal,	are	less	clearly	defined.				As	discussed	 in	 chapter	 five,	 initially	 the	 rights	 to	management,	 exclusion,	 and	alienation	 are	 to	 remain	 with	 local	 authorities.	 	 Over	 time,	 however,	 it	 is	expected	 that	 Te	 Pou	Tupua	will	 take	 on	more	 decision-making	 responsibility,	
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making	 governance	 choices	 in	 the	 interests	 of	 Te	 Awa	 Tupua’s	 health	 and	wellbeing.	 	 This	 variability	 in	 decision-making	 responsibility	 and	 lack	 of	definition	 could	 potentially	 create	 some	 uncertainty	 around	 future	 property	rights,	 ultimately	 transferring	 decision-making	 responsibility	 to	 the	 courts	 if	agreement	 cannot	 be	 reached	 by	 negotiating	 parties.	 	 This	 could	 weaken	 the	ability	of	the	new	arrangement	to	meet	Principle	1B	in	the	case	of	the	Whanganui	River.		
8.1.2	 Principle	 2A&B:	 Congruence	 between	 appropriation	 and	 provision	
	 rules	and	local	conditions	Ostrom’s	(1990,	p.92)	second	design	principle	refers	to	the	“congruence	between	appropriation	and	provision	rules	and	local	conditions.”		Appropriation	rules	are	considered	to	be	rules,	which	restrict	the	time,	place,	technology	and/or	quantity	of	resource	units	able	to	be	used.	 	Provision	rules	refer	to	the	labour,	materials	and/or	money	 needed	 to	maintain	 resource	 systems	 over	 time.	 	 Like	 the	 first	principle,	 this	 principle	 can	 be	 divided	 into	 two	 separate	 elements:	 first,	 that	both	appropriation	and	provision	rules	conform	in	some	way	to	local	conditions,	and	second,	that	congruence	exists	between	appropriation	and	provision	rules.				Under	 state	 ownership,	 the	 governance	 system	 was	 designed	 as	 a	 top-down	arrangement	where	actors	at	 the	constitutional	and	policy	 levels	made	rules	 to	shape	the	choices	of	actors	at	the	operational	level.		Although	efforts	were	made	at	the	upper	and	lower	policy	levels	to	account	for	indigenous	worldviews,	Māori	were	 traditionally	 considered	 stakeholders	 and	 not	 actively	 included	 in	 the	decision-making	 process.	 	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	Whanganui,	 there	 was	 a	 poor	 fit	between	 the	 formal	 rules	 that	 were	 imposed	 on	 users	 such	 as	 Iwi	 and	 Iwi’s	collective	beliefs.			The	Whanganui	River	institutional	arrangement	isn’t	unique	in	facing	this	issue	of	a	lack	of	congruence	between	formal	and	informal	rules.		Other	authors	have	highlighted	the	negative	consequences	that	result	when	externally	imposed	rules	do	 not	 match	 local	 customs	 and	 livelihood	 strategies	 (Gautam	 and	 Shivatoki	2005;	Greif	2006).		Compared	with	other	cases	across	New	Zealand,	however,	the	
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disparity	between	the	demands	of	the	operational	level	actors	in	the	Whanganui	and	 the	 state	 ownership	 rules	 imposed	 by	 actors	 at	 the	 upper	 levels	 of	 the	institutional	 arrangement	 was	 more	 pronounced.	 	 Iwi’s	 contention	 over	ownership	 and	 control	 of	 the	 river	 was	 relentless,	 and	 significantly	 more	consistent	than	that	displayed	by	other	iwi	across	New	Zealand	who	had	similar	property	 rights	 issues	 (Waitangi	 Tribunal	 1999;	 2012).	 	 As	 found	 in	 chapter	eight,	 this	 continued	 disruption	 to	 the	 institutional	 arrangement	 was	 a	 major	contributor	to	the	eventual	breakdown	in	the	institutional	equilibrium.				The	 new	 institutional	 arrangement	 has	 been	 specifically	 designed	 to	accommodate	 local	 conditions.	 The	 objective	 of	 adopting	 resource	 self-determination	in	the	case	of	 the	Whanganui	River	 is	 to	 incorporate	Whanganui	Iwi’s	 beliefs	 into	 existing	 legal	 frameworks.	 Under	 the	 new	 property	 rights	system,	all	decisions	over	use	of	Te	Awa	Tupua	remain	the	responsibility	of	local	authorities,	 yet	 are	 to	be	made	 in	 light	of	 the	new	Te	Awa	Tupua	 strategy	and	Tupua	 te	 Kawa,	 which	 capture	 Māori	 tikanga	 and	 te	 ao	 values.	 	 This	 creates	consistency	 between	 the	 two	 property	 rights	 settings	 and	 will	 smooth	 the	transition	to	resource	self-determination.		Overall,	the	adoption	of	resource	self-determination	shifts	the	institutional	arrangement	from	a	top-down	to	a	bottom-up	 system	 by	 principally	 transferring	 the	 responsibility	 of	 developing	 a	catchment	management	strategy	to	actors	at	the	operational	level.			Congruence	between	appropriation	and	provision	rules	 is	 frequently	described	in	the	literature	as	congruence	between	costs	incurred	by	users	and	the	benefits	they	receive	 from	participating	 in	 the	 institutional	arrangement	 (Fennell	2011;	McGinnis	2011a).		Under	state	ownership	the	cost	of	decisions	made	over	use	of	the	river	by	actors	at	the	constitutional	and	policy	levels	were	borne	by	actors	at	the	 operational	 level,	 while	 the	 benefits	 accrued	 to	 the	 upper	 level	 actors	 or	actors	outside	of	the	institutional	arrangement	governing	the	Whanganui	River.		For	instance,	in	the	case	of	Genesis	and	the	TPDS,	policy	and	constitutional	level	actors	 made	 decisions	 over	 use,	 with	 benefits	 channeled	 back	 towards	 these	
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decision-making	and	wider	society.152		Actors	at	the	operational	 level,	however,	carried	the	cost	burden	of	diversion	and	reduced	flow.		Under	 resource	 self-determination,	 the	 distribution	 of	 costs	 and	 benefits	 is	unclear.	 	 A	 risk	 assessment	 carried	 out	 on	 the	 new	 arrangement	 stated	 that	preliminary	 work	 by	Whanganui	 Iwi,	 Crown	 agencies,	 and	 local	 authorities	 is	being	 undertaken	 to	 identify	 and	 assess	 costs	 associated	with	 the	 framework,	including	 who	 is	 likely	 to	 bear	 the	 cost	 burden	 (Office	 of	 Treaty	 Settlements	2016).153		The	results	found	in	this	research	suggest	that	the	level	of	transaction	costs	may	 increase	under	resource	self-determination,	however,	 it	 is	 important	to	 remember,	 that	 benefits	 may	 also	 increase	 and	 that	 it	 is	 the	 overall	 net	benefits,	which	are	most	important	(Krutilla	&	Krause	2011;	McCann	et	al.	2005).		The	 Te	 Pā	 Auroa	 framework	 has	 emerged	 from	 a	 long	 period	 of	 negotiation	between	the	Crown	and	Iwi	and	has	been	formalised	through	consultation	with	local	 government	 and	 relevant	 Crown	 agencies.	 As	 revealed	 in	 the	 interviews,	Genesis	Energy	Limited,	who	could	be	viewed	as	a	potential	driver	of	increased	future	 costs,	 has	 a	 well-established	 and	 ongoing	 relationship	 with	Whanganui	Iwi,	 and	 both	 it	 and	 local	 government	 have	 expressed	 their	 support	 for	 the	settlement	and	what	it	seeks	to	achieve	(Office	of	Treaty	Settlements	2016).		Further,	as	one	Ministry	official	stated,	the	Te	Awa	Tupua	framework	should	be	thought	of	 as	a	 community	 initiative	 rather	 than	an	environmental	one	 so	 that	the	 benefits	 of	 a	 community	 focused	 and	 collaborative	 approach	 could	 be	captured	 by	 the	 new	 arrangement.	 	 Important	 to	 note,	 however,	 is	 that	 if	resource	self-determination	is	going	to	develop	into	a	robust	community	based	property	 rights	 system,	 actors	 at	 the	 operational	 level	will	 need	 to	 receive	 the	benefits	of	using	Te	Awa	Tupua,	as	well	as	bearing	the	costs.																																																											152	These	benefits	can	be	viewed	in	two	ways.		First,	because	Genesis	is	a	majority	share	state-owned	enterprise,	revenue	from	electricity	sold	by	Genesis	returns	to	the	Crown	enabling	it	to	accrue	benefits	from	Genesis	diverting	water	from	the	Whanganui.		Second,	all	New	Zealanders	who	vote	for	actors	at	the	policy	and	constitutional	levels	share	the	benefits	of	electricity	production,	thereby,	lower	electricity	costs	benefit	actors	at	the	upper	levels	of	the	institutional	arrangement	through	voter	preference	and	actors	at	lower	levels	directly	through	lower	energy	prices.	153	No	details	of	the	methodology	proposed	to	be	used	for	assessing	the	distribution	of	costs	and	benefits	by	the	Office	of	Treaty	Settlements	is	provided	in	the	risk	assessment.	
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8.1.3	 Principle	3:	Collective-choice	arrangements	For	 principle	 three	 to	 be	 present	 in	 the	 institutional	 arrangement	 implies	 that	“most	individuals	affected	by	the	operational	rules	can	participate	in	modifying	the	 operational	 rules”	 (Ostrom	 1990,	 p.90).	 	 That	 this	 condition	 was	 not	 met	under	 state	 ownership	 was	 one	 of	 the	 key	 issues	 of	 the	 property	 rights	arrangement	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Whanganui.	 	 In	 contrast,	 resource	 self-determination	 and	 the	 supporting	 institutional	 framework	 should	 allow	 for	representative	 users	 to	 engage	 in	 decision-making	 by	 contributing	 to	 the	development	 of	 the	 strategy	 document	 and	 its	 ongoing	 review.	 	 That	 this	document	has	to	be	referred	to	by	all	decision-makers	at	the	upper	levels	of	the	institutional	arrangement	means	that	indirectly	most	individuals	affected	by	the	operational	 rules	 can	 participate	 in	 modifying	 such	 rules	 through	 their	nominated	representatives	on	the	strategy	group	committee.		
8.1.4	 Principle	4A&B:	Monitoring	The	principle	of	monitoring	also	gets	split	into	two	components	so	that	Principle	4A	stipulates	the	presence	of	monitors,	whereas	4B	stipulates	the	condition	that	these	 monitors	 are	 members	 of	 the	 community	 or	 otherwise	 accountable	 to	those	 members.	 	 	 As	 has	 been	 shown	 experimentally	 and	 in	 the	 field,	 the	presence	of	monitors	and	monitoring	can	have	a	significant	 impact	on	 levels	of	cooperation	 (Ostrom	 et	 al.	 1994;	 Ostrom	 et	 al.	 1992;	 Rudd	 2004).	 	 Under	 the	state	 ownership	 property	 rights	 system	 the	 responsibility	 of	 monitoring	 falls	across	 multiple	 jurisdictions	 depending	 on	 the	 resource	 being	 monitored.	 For	instance,	monitoring	of	water	quality	 is	 the	responsibility	of	Horizons	Regional	Council	under	the	RMA.		Horizons	has	three	monitoring	sites	along	the	river,	all	of	which	state	water	quality	is	satisfactory	or	better	(Horizons	Regional	Council	2016a).	 	 Monitoring	 of	 customary	 food	 gathering	 is	 the	 responsibility	 of	 the	Ministry	 of	 Primary	 Industries,	 which	 relies	 on	 users	 to	 disclose	 harvest;	 Fish	and	 Game	 has	 staff	 monitoring	 hunters	 and	 fishers;	 and	 DOC	 staff	 monitor	recreationists	using	the	river.				In	each	case	these	monitors	cannot	be	considered	members	of	the	community	as	they	 rest	 at	 the	 policy	 level	 of	 the	 institutional	 arrangement.	 	 This	 could	 help	
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explain	why	monitoring	 success	 is	 generally	 rated	 as	 poor	 in	 the	Whanganui-Manawatu	region	(McBride	et	al.	2016).		Under	 resource	 self-determination,	 unless	 specified	 in	 the	 strategy	 document,	there	 is	 unlikely	 to	 be	 a	 change	 in	 how	 resource	 use	 is	 monitored	 or	 who	undertakes	 the	 monitoring,	 at	 least	 initially.	 Should	 Te	 Awa	 Tupua	 take	 over	more	 decision-making	 responsibility	 over	 time,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 existing	legislative	frameworks	are	expected	to	remain	in	place,	implies	that,	even	in	the	long-run,	 there	should	be	 few	changes	 to	 those	responsible	 for	monitoring	and	whether	or	not	they	are	members	of	the	community.		
8.1.5	 Principle	5:	Graduated	sanctions	Principle	 five	 stipulates	 the	 efficacy	 of	 graduated	 sanctioning	 systems.	Sanctioning	 deters	 actors	 from	 violating	 rules	 and	 imposing	 costs	 on	 others	(Anderies	et	al.	2004;	Cox	et	al.	2010;	Dietz	et	al.	2003;	Gürerk	et	al.	2006),	but	ensuring	 that	 the	 type	 and	 level	 of	 sanction	 suitably	 matches	 the	 violation	 is	necessary	 to	 foster	 cooperation	 (Frey	 1993;	 Gneezy	 &	 Rustichini	 2000).	 	 For	instance,	when	 fines	are	set	 too	 low,	actors	often	choose	 to	continue	 to	violate	the	 rules	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 costs	 imposed	 (Gneezy	 &	 Rustichini	 2000),	 similarly,	when	 the	 sanctions	 are	 too	 high,	 actors	 can	 retaliate,	 increasing	 costs	 for	 the	institutional	 arrangement	 as	 a	whole	 (Cox	 et	 al.	 2010;	 Guala	 2012;	Milinski	 &	Rockenbach	2012;	Tyran	&	Feld	2006).		Further,	in	some	instances	the	presence	of	 a	 fine	 can	 crowd-out	 intrinsic	 motivations	 or	 social	 norms	 which	 may	otherwise	 encourage	 cooperation	 (Bohnet	 et	 al.	 2006;	 Bowles	 2008;	 Bowles	2014;	Cardenas	et	al.	2000;	Reeson	&	Tisdell	2008).		Subsequently,	developing	a	graduated	 sanctioning	 system	 that	 matches	 the	 severity	 of	 encroachment	 and	reinforces	 informal	 rules	 is	 central	 to	 the	 development	 of	 a	 robust	 property	rights	system.		In	the	case	of	the	Whanganui	River	governance	arrangement	Horizons	specifies	graduated	sanctions	for	rule	violations	in	the	One	Plan,	however,	its	enforcement	record	 is	 poor	 (McBride	 et	 al.	 2016).	 	 This	 is	 a	 common	 problem	 across	 New	Zealand,	with	lack	of	capacity	and	rent-seeking	often	proffered	as	reasons	for	the	
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low	 levels	 of	 sanctioning	 by	 local	 authorities	 (Brown	 et	 al.	 2016).	 	 Under	resource	 self-determination,	 there	 is	 no	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	responsibility	 of	 monitoring	 and	 enforcement	 will	 shift	 away	 from	 local	authorities,	however,	the	strategies	and	guidelines	they	are	to	adopt	and	follow	may	change	depending	on	what	is	stipulated	in	the	strategy	document,	Te	Heke.		Therefore,	much	will	again	depend	on	the	outcome	of	the	strategy	document	to	determine	 if	 any	 changes	 to	 sanctioning	 are	 likely	 to	 take	 place	 to	 allow	 for	principle	five	to	be	met.		
8.1.6	 Principle	6:	Conflict-resolution	mechanisms	In	line	with	transaction	cost	economics,	low	cost	dispute	resolution	is	preferred	to	 high-cost	 processes.	 	 Successful	 institutional	 arrangements	 have	 rapid,	 low-cost	mechanisms	to	resolve	conflict	among	users	or	between	users	and	officials	(Johnson	1992;	Ostrom	1990).		Under	state	ownership	conflict	could	be	resolved	through	 formal	 consultation	 avenues	 and	 then	 legislative	 adjustment.	 	 As	demonstrated	 in	chapter	seven,	when	consultative	mechanisms	were	 incapable	of	 resolving	 issues,	 formal	 challenges	 took	 place	 through	 the	 courts.	 	 Should	decision-making	authority	be	transferred	to	Te	Pou	Tupua	under	resource	self-determination,	 bargaining	over	use	will	 take	place	between	Te	Pou	Tupua	and	potential	 users	 with	 conflicts	 resolved	 by	 the	 judiciary.	 	 The	 discussion	 in	chapter	 five	suggested	 that	 this	has	 the	potential	 to	 increase	costs	under	some	circumstances,	 which	 could	 reduce	 the	 robustness	 of	 the	 institutional	arrangement	in	the	long-run.		
8.1.7	 Principle	7:	Minimum	recognition	of	rights	Principle	 seven	 stipulates	 that	 external	 government	 agencies	 do	 not	 challenge	the	 right	of	 local	users	 to	 create	 their	own	 institutions.	Under	 state	ownership	decision-making	 responsibility	 was	 devolved	 to	 local	 government	 under	 the	RMA	 and	 Local	 Government	 Act	 2002	 with	 guidance	 provided	 by	 central	government.	 	 Local	users	 at	 the	operational	 level	had	 little	 influence	over	how	the	 river	 was	 governed.	 The	 introduction	 of	 resource	 self-determination	 will	shift	the	arrangement	from	a	top-down	to	a	bottom-up	system.		Through	Te	Heke	representative	users	will	contribute	to	the	design	of	the	new	rules	governing	the	
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Whanganui	River	 and	 its	 catchment.	 	 The	 legitimacy	 of	 Te	Awa	Tupua’s	 rights	and	 in	 turn	those	of	Te	Pou	Tupua	will	depend	on	whether	or	not	other	actors	within	the	institutional	arrangement	and	outside	of	it	will	observe	those	rights.				The	 time	at	which	 this	will	be	 tested	 is	 likely	 to	be	when	Genesis	Energy	Ltd’s	consent	 for	 water	 take	 comes	 up	 for	 renewal	 in	 2039,	 if	 it	 is	 not	 challenged	before.	 	 Assuming	 the	 dam	 is	 still	 diverting	 water	 from	 the	Whanganui	 in	 20	years,	 a	bid	 for	 a	 renewal	of	Genesis’	 right	 to	 take	may	pit	 the	 interests	of	 the	river	against	the	interest	of	electricity	consumers.		As	previously	mentioned,	the	Whanganui	River	headwaters	deliver	5%	of	New	Zealand’s	electricity	(Office	of	Treaty	Settlements	2016);	however,	the	diversion	and	mixing	of	the	waters	is	an	affront	to	Whanganui	Iwi	and	the	river’s	mana	(Waitangi	Tribunal	1999).		Should	the	 enforcement	 decision	 be	 transferred	 to	 the	 judiciary,	 the	 decision	 of	 the	court	 to	 uphold	 Te	 Awa	 Tupua’s	 rights	 or	 otherwise	 will	 determine	 if	 this	principle	is	met.		
8.1.8	 Principle	8:	Nested	enterprises	Principle	 eight	 captures	 the	 concept	 of	 polycentralism	 within	 the	 design	principles	 suggesting	 that	 in	 successful	 systems	 “governance	 activities	 are	organised	in	multiple	layers	of	nested	enterprises”	(Ostrom	1990,	p.90).	 	Under	both	 state	 ownership	 and	 resource	 self-determination,	 smaller-scale	 systems	were,	and	are,	designed	to	be	nested	in	ever-larger	systems.		In	the	case	of	state	ownership,	linkages	between	actors	within	and	across	the	institution	were	well	established,	although	not	always	in-use.154	The	implementation	of	resource	self-determination	 is	 intended	 to	 complement,	 rather	 than	 override,	 existing	legislation.	 This	 analysis	 has	 shown	 that	 existing	 institutional	 and	 statutory	frameworks	are	to	remain	in	place,	but	will	be	influenced	by	the	Te	Awa	Tupua	‘lens’	 provided	 by	 the	 new	 framework.	 	 That	 ‘lens’	 is	 designed	 to	 change	 how	decision-makers	 and	 others	 view	 and	 understand	 the	 river,	 rather	 than	 hard-wire	prescriptive	change.																																																											154	This	was	clear	in	the	history	of	the	interactions	of	local	authorities	and	Iwi,	for	instance.	
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8.2	 Discussion		The	 first	 five	 of	 Ostrom’s	 design	 principles	 form	 a	 coherent	 theoretical	explanation	of	why	 these	 criteria	 are	 important	 for	 the	development	of	 robust	property	rights	systems:			
“When	 the	 users	 of	 a	 resource	 design	 their	 own	 rules	 (design	principle	 3)	
that	are	enforced	by	local	users	or	accountable	to	them	(design	principle	4)	
using	graduated	sanctions	(design	principle	5)	that	clearly	define	who	has	
rights	 to	withdraw	 from	 a	well-defined	 resource	 (design	 principle	 1)	 and	
that	 effectively	 assign	 costs	 proportionate	 to	 benefits	 (design	principle	 2),	
collective	action	and	monitoring	problems	tend	to	be	solved	in	a	reinforcing	
manner.”	(Ostrom	2005,	p.267).		Principle	six	is	connected	to	principle	five,	while	principles	seven	and	eight	were	included	 as	 predictors	 of	 the	 likely	 success	 of	 an	 institutional	 arrangement	 in	light	of	how	it	nests	within	broader	frameworks	(Ostrom	1990).		It	 is	 clear	 from	 the	 analysis	 above	 that	 the	 designation	 of	 resource	 self-determination	will	allow	for	many	of	the	characteristics	stipulated	as	necessary	for	sustained,	 long-term	property	rights	 institutions	to	be	 identified	 in	the	case	of	the	Whanganui	River.155		Some	of	the	biggest	changes	occurring	as	a	result	of	the	institutional	change	relate	to	design	principles	one	and	three,	which	refer	to	the	 identification	 of	 boundaries	 and	 collective	 choice	 arrangements.	 	 That	 the	new	resource	self-determination	framework	for	the	Whanganui	River	allows	for	the	 identification	 of	 a	 clear	 boundary	 around	 the	 catchment	will	 allow	 for	 the	development	 of	 a	management	 strategy,	 which	 focuses	 on	 the	 catchment	 as	 a	whole	 rather	 than	 on	 fragments	 of	 the	 river	 system	 at	 a	 time.	 	 This	 has	 the	potential	 to	 improve	 conservation	 outcomes	 for	 the	 catchment	 due	 to	catchment-style	management	being	recognised	as	the	most	effective	approach	to																																																									155	That	several	of	these	principles	were	not	met	under	centralised	ownership	is	in	some	way	no	surprise	given	that	the	design	principles	were	identified	to	help	explain	robust	community	based	collective	action	arrangements.		However,	as	evidenced	by	the	broader	governance	literature,	these	principles	are	characteristics	of	a	broad	range	of	long-lasting	property	rights	systems	–	not	just	community	based	initiatives	(Huntjens	et	al.	2012).	
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river	 management	 in	 most	 cases	 (Ching	 &	 Mukherjee	 2015;	 Davis	 &	 Threlfall	2009;	Kemper	et	al.	2007;	McNeill	2016;	Schiele	2015).				Likewise,	 that	 the	 local	 community	 is	 able	 to	 contribute	 to	 decisions	 over	management	under	the	new	institutional	arrangement	presents	an	opportunity	for	the	governance	system	to	transform	into	a	bottom-up	arrangement	in	which	the	 users	 are	 able	 to	 develop	 a	 sense	 of	 ownership	 over	 the	 river	 and	 its	catchment.	 	 Inextricably	 linked	 to	 this	 is	 principle	 seven,	 however,	 which	requires	 that	 upper	 level	 actors	 do	 not	 interfere	 with	 decisions	 made	 at	 the	lower	 levels	 of	 the	 institutional	 arrangement.	 	 This	 factor	 is	 critical	 factor	 in	determining	whether	 resource	 self-determination	 is	 able	 to	become	 something	more	than	a	paper	policy	in	the	case	of	the	Whanganui	River.		Tying	in	the	findings	of	chapter	six,	which	found	that	levels	of	transaction	costs	are	 likely	 to	 increase	 under	 resource	 self-determination	 in	 situations	 where	negotiations	occur	over	use.	 	The	analysis	here	suggests	 that	 in	 the	case	of	 the	Whanganui	 River,	 the	 broader	 institutional	 framework	 devised	 to	 support	 the	new	 property	 rights	 arrangement	 could	 mitigate	 some	 of	 these	 effects.	 	 For	instance,	 including	existing	and	 future	users	 in	 the	strategy	group	may	allow	a	range	 of	 perspectives	 and	 preferences	 to	 be	 accounted	 for	 in	 early	 stages	 of	decision-making	 –	 something	which	 is	 recognised	 as	 contributing	 to	 improved	outcomes	in	the	long-term	(Giest	&	Howlett	2014).		Much	will	depend	on	the	guidelines	provided	in	the	strategy	document,	Te	Heke,	and	the	strength	of	the	relationships	created	between	different	actors	across	and	within	different	levels	of	the	institutional	arrangement	(McNeill	2016).		Te	Heke	must	 outline	 clear	 strategies	 through	 which	 different	 institutional	 actors	 can	facilitate	 the	 development	 of	 social	 capital	 including	 the	 development	 of	 trust	and	reciprocity	(Cox	2004;	Fehr	&	Gachter	2000;	Giest	&	Howlett	2014;	Lejano	et	al.	 2014).	 	The	 strategy	document	must	 also	provide	 clear	 guidelines	 for	users	and	managers	concerning	use	and	management	of	Te	Awa	Tupua	given	its	new	status.	 	Doing	 so	will	minimise	 the	 likelihood	of	 future	 conflict	when	consents,	
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such	as	 that	held	by	Genesis,	 come	up	 for	 renewal,	 and	ensure	 the	 rights	have	legitimacy	in	front	of	the	courts.		Should	 clear	 guidance	 be	 provided	 for	 by	 Te	Heke	 for	 the	management	 of	 the	catchment	and	legitimacy	granted	to	all	rights	holders	(both	legal	and	economic),	resource	 self-determination	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 be	 a	 robust	 institutional	arrangement	 for	 governance	 of	 the	 Whanganui	 River.	 	 The	 generalizability	 of	these	findings	to	other	rivers,	is	discussed	in	the	following	chapter.			
	
8.3	 Conclusions		Ostrom’s	design	principles	have	been	shown	to	be	useful	tools	to	help	assess	the	robustness	 of	 various	 property	 rights	 systems	 (Cox	 et	 al.	 2010).	 They	 can	provide	 insights	 to	 policy	makers	 about	 the	 likely	 efficacy	 of	 different	 regimes	(Lejano	 et	 al.	 2014)	 and	 help	 inform	 policy	 decisions	 ex	 ante	 (Huntjens	 et	 al.	2012).		Initial	indicators	from	this	analysis	suggest	that	more	of	Ostrom’s	design	principles	could	be	met	under	the	new	framework	than	were	met	under	the	old	framework	in	the	case	of	the	Whanganui	River.		This	suggests	that	resource	self-determination	 could	be	 a	more	 robust	 institutional	 arrangement	 for	 governing	the	Whanganui	River	over	the	long	term	than	state	ownership.				However,	 this	 analysis	 makes	 clear	 that	 some	 central	 areas	 of	 the	 framework	remain	 uncertain	 and	 undetermined,	 particularly	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 congruence	between	 appropriation	 and	 provision	 rules	 and	 the	 recognition	 of	 rights.		Further,	 the	 transfer	of	decision-making	 from	the	 jurisdiction	of	 the	 legislature	to	 the	 judiciary	may	 have	 costs	 for	 society	 as	 a	 whole	 in	 the	 long-run,	 which	could	be	detrimental	to	the	robustness	of	the	arrangement.		Therefore,	as	actors	within	 the	 institutional	 arrangement	move	 to	 develop	 pragmatic	 strategies	 for	implementing	 the	 new	 Te	 Pā	 Auroa	 framework,	 they’d	 do	 well	 to	 heed	 the	necessary,	 but	 not	 sufficient	 conditions,	 of	Ostrom’s	 principles	 (Agrawal	 2001;	Lejano	 et	 al.	 2014;	 Ostrom	 2007).	 	 Doing	 so	 will	 help	 ensure	 that	 the	 rules	established	 as	 part	 of	 the	 framework	 support	 the	 development	 of	 a	 robust	
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property	 rights	 arrangement	 for	 governing	 the	 Whanganui	 River	 and	 its	catchment	communities.			 	
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9		 Conclusions		
	
9.0	 Introduction		In	this	chapter	the	results	presented	in	the	preceding	chapters	are	discussed	in	terms	of	policy	significance,	limitations,	and	future	research.		Recommendations	for	 policy	 makers	 interested	 in	 using	 resource	 self-determination	 as	 an	alternative	property	rights	system	for	the	governance	of	CPRs	are	offered	in	the	final	conclusions.	The	study’s	findings,	which	consider	the	institutional	economic	effects	of	granting	a	river	 legal	standing,	are	significant	 for	 the	development	of	environmental	policy	and	natural	resource	management	generally.		However,	the	conclusions	drawn	should	be	regarded	with	some	caution	due	to	the	limitations	associated	with	this	research.	In	this	chapter,	these	limitations	are	discussed	in	detail	 and	 suggestions	 offered	 for	 how	 some	 of	 these	 limitations	 can	 be	addressed	 in	 future	 research.	 The	 findings	 offer	many	 interesting,	 challenging,	and	 exciting	 potential	 developments	 for	 further	 research	 –	 some	 of	which	 are	outlined	in	this	chapter.		The	 chapter	 is	 structured	 as	 follows.	 Section	 one	 examines	 the	 policy	implications	 of	 the	 thesis’s	 results	 for	 the	 governance	 of	 rivers	 and	 common	property	 resources	 generally.	 Section	 two	 discusses	 the	 limitations	 of	 this	research	in	terms	of	the	research	design,	methodology,	and	general	 limitations.	Section	 three	 outlines	 some	 potential	 directions	 for	 further	 research.	 A	 final	conclusion	 to	 the	 thesis,	which	 includes	recommendations	and	gentle	words	of	caution	for	policy	makers	interested	in	replicating	the	approach,	is	presented	in	section	four.			
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9.1	 Policy	implications		The	research	has	examined	the	institutional	economics	of	granting	a	river	legal	standing.		The	first	general	research	question	outlined	in	chapter	three	posed	the	question	 of	 how	 resource	 self-determination	 will	 affect	 the	 distribution	 of	property	rights	in	an	institutional	arrangement	designed	to	govern	a	river.		The	results	 of	 the	 institutional	 analysis	 showed	 that	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	Whanganui	River,	resource	self-determination	is	being	implemented	through	identifying	Te	Awa	Tupua	as	a	new	legal	entity	and	vesting	legal	property	rights	to	the	riverbed	in	it.		The	new	arrangement	is	to	be	carefully	integrated	into	existing	frameworks	in	 two	stages.	 Initially,	 there	are	 few	changes	 in	economic	property	rights	with	local	authorities	retaining	daily	decision-making	authority.		Over	time,	however,	more	 decision-making	 responsibility	 and	 control	 may	 be	 transferred	 to	 the	guardians,	 shifting	 the	 priorities	 and	 preference	 structure	 of	 the	 primary	decision-maker.		If	property	rights	are	eventually	transferred	to	Te	Pou	Tupua	as	is	implied	in	the	settlement	document,	Ruruku	Whakatupua	and	 the	Te	Awa	Tupua	 (Whanganui	River	 Claims	 Settlement)	 Act	 2017,	 results	 from	 the	 evaluation	 of	 the	institutional	 analysis	 in	 chapter	 six	 suggest	 that	 the	 redistribution	 of	 property	rights	 could	 affect	 levels	 of	 transaction	 costs	 and	 resource	 allocation.	 The	legislative	mandate	 of	 Te	 Pou	Tupua	 instructs	 the	 two	 appointed	 guardians	 to	make	 choices	 to	 the	benefit	 of	 Te	Awa	Tupua.	 	 That	 this	mandate	differs	 from	that	of	the	RMA	could	cause	tension	at	a	regional	and	national	level	as	decision-making	priorities	shift.	 	This	 is	 likely	to	be	tested	when	major	water	extraction	consents,	like	that	held	by	Genesis	Energy	Limited,	come	up	for	renewal.			The	 findings	 of	 chapter	 six	 also	 highlighted	 that	 policy	 makers	 interested	 in	changing	 property	 rights	 systems	 cannot	 estimate	 the	 likely	 economic	 and	environmental	 effects	 independently	 of	 historical	 context.	 	 It	 was	 shown	 in	chapter	seven	that	Whanganui	Iwi	did	not	relinquish	their	beliefs	despite	being	forced	into	the	new	institutional	setting	and	the	results	of	chapter	six	provided	evidence	to	support	this.		In	the	case	of	the	Whanganui	River,	it	could	mean	that	
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actors	who	had	previously	been	cut	out	of	decision-making	could	become	more	self-regarding	when	suddenly	endowed	with	property	rights.				In	 the	 context	 of	 environmental	 policy	 this	 suggests	 that	 policy	 makers	interested	in	introducing	resource	self-determination	as	an	alternative	property	rights	arrangement	should	consider	the	historical	context	of	 the	environmental	good	 or	 resource	 they	 wish	 to	 manage.	 	 Laws	 that	 are	 compatible	 with	preexisting	social	norms	are	more	likely	to	be	well	received	and	thus	effectuated	than	laws	that	are	poorly	integrated	with	informal	rules	(Sunstein	1996).				Further,	 institutional	 settings	 that	 encourage	 an	 internal	 process	 of	 evolution	and	 generate	 a	 self-sustaining	 demand	 for	 innovation,	 tend	 to	 perform	 much	better	than	those	in	which	the	majority	of	rules	are	imposed	on	actors	operating	within	the	institutional	system	(Berkowitz	2003b).		The	results	of	chapter	seven,	for	instance,	showed	that	when	a	set	of	foreign	informal	rules	were	imposed	on	Iwi	 following	 European	 arrival,	 as	 a	 minority	 group	 Iwi	 destabilised	 the	institutional	 equilibrium	 through	 repeatedly	 challenging	 the	 formal	 rules	 in	court	 in	an	effort	 to	affect	change.	 	This	means	 that	although	 from	the	outside,	the	property	rights	change	appears	to	be	a	dramatic	shift	in	beliefs	and	rules,	the	dynamic	 analysis	 showed	 that	 it	 was	 an	 evolutionary	 process	 driven	 by	 a	combination	of	slowly	evolving	beliefs	and	exogenous	shocks.	This	increases	the	likelihood	that	the	property	rights	arrangement	will	be	robust	over	the	long-run.			The	results	of	each	analysis	showed	that	in	the	case	of	the	Whanganui	River,	the	introduction	of	 resource	self-determination	 is	a	 result	of	a	 range	of	 interacting	contextual	variables.		Because	of	this	the	replicability	and	generalisability	of	the	results	may	be	reduced;	however,	useful	lessons	can	be	taken	from	the	broader	institutional	 framework	 designed	 to	 support	 the	 redistribution	 of	 property	rights	under	resource	self-determination.		As	demonstrated	in	chapter	eight,	the	case	of	the	Whanganui	River	shows	that	it	is	possible	to	design	a	robust	property	rights	system	that	bridges	two	contrasting	worldviews.		This	could	be	of	special	significance	 to	 policy	 makers	 working	 with	 indigenous	 populations	 over	contested	 environmental	 goods	 and	 resources.	 	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	Whanganui	
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River,	the	Crown	and	Iwi	navigated	the	complexities	of	ownership	of	a	common	property	resource	by	exploring	Whanganui	Iwi’s	relationship	with	the	river	and	creating	a	new	property	rights	system	that	was	able	to	approximate	Iwi	beliefs	within	 existing	 legal	 frameworks.	 	 It	 proposes	 to	manage	 the	 catchment	 in	 its	entirety	 through	 an	 integrated	 framework	 that	 places	 te	ao	Māori	 values	 at	 its	core.	This	has	 the	potential	 to	address	 some	of	 the	 institutional	weaknesses	of	the	existing	state	ownership	system.156			Under	 resource	self-determination	development	of	 the	catchment	management	strategy	and	direction	for	decision-making	is	to	be	transferred	to	the	operational	level	 of	 the	 institutional	 arrangement.	 	 This	 creates	 opportunities	 for	 users	 to	take	 ownership	 over	 decision-making	 and	 to	 ensure	 congruence	 between	appropriation	and	provision	rules.157		That	the	legislation	was	introduced	at	the	upper	 policy	 level	 grants	 the	 arrangement	 legitimacy	 and	 provides	 an	overarching	 framework	 in	 which	 all	 actors	 understand	 their	 roles	 and	corresponding	duties	and	responsibilities.	 	Capacity	has	been	provided	through	financial	 redress	 and	 trust	 is	 expected	 to	 develop	 over	 time	 through	 repeated	strategic	 interactions	 (Axelrod	 1984)	 and	 ongoing	 investment	 in	 social	 capital	(Bowles	&	Gintis	2002).			Where	property	rights	systems	have	been	 introduced	elsewhere,	empirical	and	theoretical	results	suggest	that	the	resilience	and	robustness	of	property	rights	systems	 are	 dependent	 on	 a	 range	 of	 factors	 captured	 by	 Ostrom’s	 design	principles	(Cox	et	al.	2010).		What	this	research	shows,	is	that	these	lessons	can	be	incorporated	into	the	design	of	a	range	of	policy	and	property	rights	systems	to	the	possible	net	benefit	of	social,	economic,	and	environmental	outcomes.																																																										156	As	a	reminder,	although	rights	to	water	are	purposefully	excluded	from	the	transfer	of	ownership	in	the	new	 framework,	 under	 English	 common	 law,	 title	 to	 the	 surface	 of	 land	 such	 as	 a	 riverbed	 entails	proprietary	authority	to	the	space	occupied	by	the	water	column,	the	superjacent	air	space	to	a	reasonable	height,	and	the	space	comprising	the	soils	beneath	the	bed	of	the	river.		This	creates	space	for	negotiations	over	water	to	be	affected	by	the	property	rights	change	and	the	new	arrangement	to	treat	the	river	as	an	integrated	whole.			157	Important	to	note	here	is	that	allowing	for	local	or	community-based	management	does	not	always	translate	to	the	delivery	of	social	net	benefits.	Ensuring	that	resource	self-determination	will	achieve	the	objectives	of	the	designated	policy	is	a	necessary	consideration	for	policy	makers	interested	in	adopting	resource	self-determination.	
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9.2	 Limitations	of	the	research		Every	 research	project	has	 constraints.	 	 Some	can	be	navigated	and	overcome;	others	place	a	clear	boundary	around	the	nature	of	the	research	conducted	and	the	conclusions	that	can	be	drawn	from	it.	As	with	all	research	that	tries	to	create	links	 between	 multiple	 disciplines	 and	 between	 empirical	 observations	 and	complex	 theoretical	 questions,	 there	 are	 a	 number	 of	 significant	 limitations	 to	this	research.		These	limitations	have	been	grouped	in	terms	of	those	associated	with	 the	 design	 process,	 those	 associated	 with	 the	 methodology,	 and	 general	limitations.			
9.2.1	 Limitations	associated	with	the	research	design	The	 design	 adopted	 for	 this	 research	 follows	 in	 the	 theoretical	 tradition	 of	institutional	 economics.	 	 By	 bringing	 together	 the	 Bloomington	 School	 of	institutional	 analysis	 and	 transaction	 cost	 economics	 it	 recognises	 that	 a	combination	 of	 inductive	 and	 deductive	 reasoning	 leads	 to	 a	 stronger	understanding	 of	 the	 commons	 (Agrawal	 2014),	 that	 people	 are	 boundedly	rational	 (Ostrom	 1990;	Williamson	 2000),	 and	 that	 institutions	 are	 a	 result	 of	both	 purposeful	 construction	 and	 endogenous	 evolution	 (Greif	 and	 Kingston	2011).	 	 	 A	 number	 of	 limitations	 associated	 with	 the	 research	 design	 of	 this	project	 need	 to	 be	 acknowledged,	 however,	 including	 the	 limitations	 of	examining	a	single	case,	the	use	of	laboratory	experiments,	and	the	identification	of	criteria	for	evaluating	institutional	effectiveness.				First,	as	discussed	in	section	4.1,	 the	case	of	the	Whanganui	River	was	selected	because	 it	 offered	 a	 rare	 example	 of	 the	 application	 of	 resource	 self-determination	to	a	river	system.		The	advantage	of	examining	this	case	is	that	by	comparing	 the	 institutional	 arrangements	 before	 and	 after	 the	 property	 rights	change	 and	 the	 process	 leading	 up	 to	 the	 identification	 of	 resource	 self-determination	multiple	observations	within	an	individual	case	could	be	made.				Focusing	on	the	Whanganui	River	also	allowed	for	an	ex	ante	examination	of	the	proposed	application	of	a	new	property	rights	arrangement	–	an	acknowledged	
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gap	 in	 the	 literature.	 	 This	 research	 addressed	 this	 gap	 while	 simultaneously	creating	 a	 record	 of	 attitudes	 and	 expectations	 of	 actors	 prior	 to	 the	implementation	of	 resource	 self-determination,	which	 could	be	used	 for	 future	ex	post	comparisons.		This	created	some	challenges	in	the	data	collection	process	as	 some	 actors	 held	 reservations	 about	 disclosing	 information	 before	 the	enabling	legislation	was	passed.		The	result	of	this	is	that	some	perspectives	may	not	 be	 as	 strongly	 represented	 in	 this	 thesis	 as	 others	 and	 indigenous	methodologies	are	poorly	utilised	(Smith	2012).		Following	 a	 comprehensive	 literature	 review,	 general	 research	questions	were	formed	and	the	most	suitable	methods	for	answering	them	identified.	 	The	IAD	framework	 provided	 a	 strong	 basis	 for	 examining	 how	 resource	 self-determination	will	be	applied	to	the	Whanganui	River		(Aligica	2006;	Cole	2014).		It	 also	 created	 some	 limitations,	 however,	 such	 as	 those	 discussed	 in	 section	3.2.1.		Although	some	of	these,	such	as	the	inability	of	the	framework	to	capture	ecological	and	resource	characteristics	of	a	system	(Cole	et	al.	2014;	Lejano	et	al.	2014;	 Ostrom	 &	 Cox	 2010),	 can	 limit	 the	 framework’s	 applicability	 in	 some	analytical	cases,	the	IAD	framework	was	considered	the	most	suitable	for	guiding	this	analysis.		This	choice	was	made	because	the	central	focus	of	analysis	was	the	outcomes	 generated	 by	 the	 interaction	 of	 actors	 under	 different	 rule	 settings,	which	the	IAD	framework	is	able	to	capture	sufficiently.		As	 with	 all	 types	 of	 policy	 design,	 how	 alternative	 policies	 affect	 participants’	behaviours	must	be	considered.		Therefore,	the	institutional	analysis	was	used	to	generate	hypotheses	to	determine	the	environmental	and	economic	effects	of	the	new	 institutional	 arrangement.	 	 Testing	 these	 hypotheses	 required	 making	 a	decision	about	how	to	best	measure	the	effects	of	such	change.	There	are	several	potential	 candidates	 for	 evaluative	 criteria,	 which	 can	 include	 economic	efficiency,	 fiscal	 equivalence,	 distributional	 equity,	 accountability,	 conformance	to	general	morality,	and	adaptability	(Polski	and	Ostrom	1999).		However,	based	on	their	complementary	theoretical	grounding,	the	concepts	of	transaction	costs,	resource	 allocation,	 and	 Ostrom’s	 design	 principles	were	 selected	 as	 the	most	suitable	measures	for	determining	the	institutional	economic	effects	of	granting	
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a	 river	 legal	 standing	 (Cole	 2014).	 	 The	 omission	 of	 other	measures	 provides	opportunities	for	future	research.		The	 question	 raised	 by	 the	 second	 research	 question	 and	 the	 hypotheses	generated	 by	 the	 institutional	 analysis	were	 first	 tested	 in	 the	 laboratory.	 	 An	alternative	 approach	 would	 have	 been	 to	 carry	 out	 a	 field	 experiment	 or	 to	conduct	a	survey	or	non-market	valuation	study	to	quantify	actors’	expectations	of	 transaction	 costs	 and	 resource	 distribution.	 	 The	 advantage	 of	 taking	 an	experimental	 approach	 over	 a	 survey	was	 that	 it	 provided	 an	 opportunity	 for	peoples’	 strategic	 behaviour	 under	 the	 two	 property	 rights	 settings	 to	 be	examined	and	compared.	 	Further,	that	people	also	received	monetary	rewards	for	 their	 choices,	 theoretically	 incentivises	 them	 to	 respond	 to	 questions	honestly	 and	 not	 over	 or	 understate	 their	 preferences	 (Smith	 2010).	 158		Analyses	 testing	 the	 results	of	 experiments	with	observations	made	 in	 real-life	have	 generally	 upheld	 the	 results	 found	 in	 the	 lab	 (Falk	 &	 Heckman	 2009;	Janssen	et	al.	2010;	Ostrom	2006;	Tisdell	et	al.	2004;	Ward	et	al.	2006).		Carrying	 out	 the	 experiment	 in	 the	 laboratory	 was	 a	 more	 cost-effective	alternative	 to	 administering	 the	 same	 experiment	 in	 the	 field.	 	 As	 discovered	through	 this	 research,	 however,	 there	 are	 clear	 limitations	 to	 experimental	processes;	most	notably,	the	difficulties	associated	with	capturing	the	nuances	of	an	 institutional	 arrangement	 (Anderies	 et	 al.	 2011;	 Dreber	 et	 al.	 2012;	 Vatn	2009).	 	 In	 addition,	 experiments	 can	 only	 answer	 very	 tight	 questions,	 which	often	 constrains	 the	 insight	 that	 can	 be	 gathered	 about	 why	 people	make	 the	decisions	that	they	do	(Anderies	et	al.	2011).		For	these	reasons,	complementing	the	 experimental	 evaluation	 with	 a	 contextual	 evaluation	 of	 the	 changing	institutional	 arrangements	 strengthened	 the	 conclusions	 of	 the	 case	 study	analysis.		Finally,	understanding	how	and	why	resource	self-determination	was	selected	as	an	 alternative	 arrangement	 for	 governing	 the	 Whanganui	 River	 were	 useful																																																									158	Important	to	consider	here	is	also	the	counter	argument	that	paying	respondents	may	give	them	an	incentive	to	strategise	on	the	basis	of	the	payment.		If	this	payment	was	not	entirely	linked	to	their	own	utility	then	answers	could	be	biased.	
		 207	
complementary	questions	that	allowed	for	the	development	of	a	new	framework	for	 analysing	 institutional	 change	 from	 within	 the	 Bloomington	 tradition	 and	shine	light	on	the	processes	behind	the	adoption	of	resource	self-determination	in	 the	 Whanganui	 River	 context.	 	 In	 New	 Zealand,	 water	 quality	 is	 declining,	across	 the	 country	 and	 in	 some	 regions	 water	 scarcity	 is	 a	 growing	 issue	(Ministry	 for	 the	Environment	&	Statistics	New	Zealand	2017).	 	 In	 light	of	 this,	why	 was	 resource	 self-determination	 proposed	 for	 the	 governance	 of	 the	Whanganui	River	but	not	for	other	rivers?		Answering	this	question	required	an	in-depth	causal	examination	of	the	historical	context	leading	up	to	the	adoption	of	resource	self-determination.		As	Howard	Becker	explains:		
“To	understand	an	individual’s	behaviour,	we	must	know	how	he	perceives	
the	 situation,	 the	 obstacles	 he	believed	he	had	 to	 face,	 the	alternatives	he	
saw	opening	up	to	him”	(Becker	1970,	p.64).		Identifying	the	institutional	factors	central	to	the	identification	of	resource	self-determination	in	the	Whanganui	River	case	provided	an	opportunity	to	make	an	empirical	and	methodological	contribution	to	the	literature.		Institutional	theory	proffers	several	complementary	mechanisms	for	explaining	institutional	change	but	 a	 dynamic	 framework	 is	 not	 available	 for	 analysis	 of	 the	 diachronic	components	 of	 institutions	 within	 the	 Bloomington	 tradition.	 	 An	 obvious	limitation	of	designing	an	alternate	frame	is	that	there	is	no	certainty	that	it	will	hold	for	other	cases.	This	is	an	additional	opportunity	for	future	research.		
9.2.2	 Limitations	associated	with	the	methodology	For	 each	 section	 of	 this	 study	 some	 limitations	 associated	with	 data	 collection	and	analysis	are	evident.	 	The	use	of	 in-depth	 interviews	creates	opportunities	for	 gathering	 insights	 not	 able	 to	 be	 garnered	 using	 a	 survey,	 however,	drawbacks	include	the	fact	that	they	are	time	consuming,	costly,	and	physically	demanding	to	the	interviewer	(Bewley	2002).	Interview	subjects	may	have	also	chosen	 to	 be	 selective	 in	 their	 responses	 to	 suit	 their	 personal	 or	 political	purposes	(Robinson	2014).	Further,	specific	to	this	research,	by	promising	not	to	
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broach	sensitive	subjects,	the	scope	of	the	information	gathered	was	limited	and	the	use	of	intermediaries	to	identify	subjects	made	random	sampling	impossible.				There	 are	 several	 ways	 these	 qualitative	 data	 limitations	 were	 addressed	 to	ensure	 legitimacy	 and	 validity	 was	 still	 given	 to	 the	 analysis.	 	 First,	 because	multiple	 sources	 of	 evidence	were	used	 in	 the	qualitative	part	 of	 this	 analysis,	alternative	perspectives	could	be	gathered	by	document	and	archival	 research.		These	 perspectives	 were	 then	 discussed	 with	 interview	 subjects,	 who	 then	confirmed	or	 corrected	my	 interpretation	of	 the	data.	 	 Likewise,	 the	 responses	given	 by	 subjects	 were	 always	 confirmed	 and	 checked	 across	 multiple	 data	sources	whenever	possible.	 	 In	cases	where	external	sources	could	not	be	used	for	 validation	 because	 the	 subject	 area	 was	 so	 new,	 subjects’	 responses	 were	repeated	 anonymously	 to	 multiple	 interview	 subjects	 to	 confirm	 whether	 a	particular	comment	or	idea	could	be	upheld.	This	provided	the	data	with	internal	and	 external	 validity.	 Second,	 during	 the	 analysis,	 data	 from	multiple	 sources	were	coded	and	thematically	ordered	to	allow	for	patterns	to	be	identified	across	all	 types	 of	 evidence	 and	 explanations	 constructed.	 	 Third,	 in	 the	 comparative	case	 study,	 replication	 logic	 was	 adopted	 which	 provided	 the	 research	 design	with	 external	 validity.	 	 Finally,	 the	 research	 design,	modeled	 on	 standard	 case	study	 procedure	 (Yin	 2014)	 and	 standing	 on	 the	 shoulders	 of	 40	 years	 of	common	pool	resource	research	(Araral	2014;	Janssen	2015;	Lejano	et	al.	2014;	Poteete	 &	 Ostrom	 2008;	 Poteete	 et	 al.	 2010),	 was	 designed	 with	 the	 explicit	purpose	of	minimising	errors	and	biases	in	the	study.			Limitations	 were	 also	 present	 in	 the	 experimental	 design,	 which	 was	 an	approximation	 of	 the	 institutional	 setting.	 	 Designing	 a	 clean	 experiment	 that	could	 give	useful	 insights	 into	 the	 effects	 of	 resource	 self-determination,	while	still	capturing	enough	of	the	institutional	setting	governing	the	Whanganui	River,	was	complex.		The	challenge	was	to	create	an	experimental	design	that	suitably	balanced	control	and	context	while	simultaneously	engendering	confidence	that	participants	were	motivated	 to	make	 the	 choices	 that	 they	did	 for	 the	 reasons	anticipated.	 Initial	 plans	 to	 examine	 the	 problem	 from	 a	 collective	 action	
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perspective	proved	too	messy	and	thus	building	on	the	existing	bargaining	and	property	rights	literature	became	the	focus.		In	 forming	 and	 testing	 hypotheses	 some	 of	 the	 formal	 axioms	 of	 game	 theory	were	used	and	some	of	the	common	experimental	assumptions	adopted.		These	included	the	notion	that	players	engage	in	backward	induction,	that	there	is	an	independence	of	history	and	future,	that	players	have	complete	information	and	are	 self-regarding,	 and	 that	 neither	 context	 nor	 from	 whom	 players	 receive	payment	matters	(Smith	2010).		However,	it	is	unlikely	that	players	in	economic	experiments	or	in	real	life	make	decisions	aligning	with	all	of	these	assumptions	and	 therefore	care	needs	 to	be	 taken	 in	 interpreting	and	generalising	 from	the	experimental	results.			Further,	specific	 to	 this	experimental	design	the	structure	of	 the	payoffs	meant	that	the	results	of	part	one	of	the	experiment	were	not	unexpected.		What	were	more	 surprising	 were	 the	 findings	 of	 part	 two	 that	 suggested	 that	 the	assumption	of	independence	of	history	and	future	did	not	hold.		That	others	have	found	similar	results	adds	support	 to	 this	 finding	(Bednar	et	al.	2015;	Rommel	2014).		This	finding	simultaneously	upholds	the	results	of	the	diachronic	analysis	in	 chapter	 seven,	 which	 shows	 that	 actors	 placed	 in	 a	 new	 institutional	equilibrium	continue	to	be	shaped	by	their	previous	experiences	and	beliefs.			
9.2.3	 General	limitations	A	 particular	 difficulty	 of	 studying	 institutions	 is	 their	 ongoing	 definitional	 and	theoretical	ambiguities.	 	This	research	aimed	to	navigate	 these	complexities	by	choosing	a	definition	of	institutions	and	institutional	change	that	was	suitable	for	the	study	proposed	and	consistent	with	the	 literature.	 	 In	saying	this,	however,	there	 is	 potential	 that	 a	 different	 set	 of	 definitions	 of	 institutions	 could	 have	caused	a	different	set	of	conclusions	to	be	reached.		This	creates	an	opportunity	for	future	research.		This	 thesis	 also	 examined	 what	 could	 easily	 be	 considered	 a	 legal	 question	through	an	economic	lens.	 	This	means	that	there	are	significant	questions	that	
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this	 research	has	not	addressed,	 such	as	what	happens	when	 the	river	can	sue	and	be	sued.	 	An	 interesting	opportunity	 is	 to	examine	whether	 the	 findings	of	this	thesis	are	transferrable	across	disciplines	and	whether	legal	scholars	reach	similar	conclusions	in	terms	of	the	relative	merits	of	resource	self-determination.			Finally,	 findings	 are	 not	 always	 transferable	 across	 contexts.	 Even	within	New	Zealand	 itself,	 interview	 subjects	warned	 repeatedly	 against	 generalising	 from	the	case	of	the	Whanganui	River	to	hypothesise	about	the	effects	of	resource	self-determination	on	water	governance	nationally.		The	Te	Awa	Tupua	(Whanganui	River	 Claims	 Settlement)	 Act	 2017	 was	 designed	 to	 meet	 the	 needs	 of	 both	Whanganui	 Iwi	and	 the	Crown	and	was	 identified	as	a	way	of	navigating	 long-standing	ownership	concerns	and	uphold	 the	mana	of	 the	 Iwi	and	the	river.	 	 It	was	not	designed	as	a	precedent	or	a	model	to	be	used	more	widely	across	the	country.				In	saying	that,	however,	it	is	already	clear	that	across	New	Zealand	and	globally	there	 is	 real	 interest	 in	 the	 steps	 taken	 to	 grant	 the	 Whanganui	 River	 legal	standing	and	in	finding	ways	to	apply	resource	self-determination	to	other	river	systems	and	CPRs.		As	discussed,	Te	Urewera	National	Park	in	New	Zealand	was	recognised	as	a	legal	person	in	2014	and	some	interview	subjects	alluded	to	the	possibility	 that	 parts	 of	 the	 approach	 could	 be	 replicated	 to	 navigate	 other	Treaty	 claims	 in	 New	 Zealand.	 	 Two	 possible	 future	 applications	 include	 the	granting	 of	 resource	 self-determination	 to	 sacred	 mountaintops,	 and	 other	specific	 rivers,	 such	 as	 the	 Mohaka	 River,	 in	 New	 Zealand’s	 Hawkes	 Bay.		Internationally,	 five	 days	 following	 the	 Whanganui	 River	 announcement,	 the	Ganges	and	Yamuna	Rivers	were	also	granted	legal	standing,	as	well	as	parts	of	the	 Himalayas	 –	 both	 cases	 cited	 the	 Whanganui	 River	 as	 inspiration	 for	 the	decision.				In	 light	of	 this,	 it	may	be	better	 to	 think	 that	 the	 limitations	discussed	are	 less	constraints	and	more	opportunities.		One	of	the	positive	elements	of	conducting	research	 on	 a	 completely	 new	 topic	 is	 that,	 although	 the	 boundaries	 drawn	
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around	 the	 research	seem	 to	create	more	holes	with	each	attempt,	 these	holes	stand	as	openings	for	future	analysis.		This	is	now	discussed.		
	
9.3	 Further	research		This	research	has	the	potential	to	lead	to	a	number	of	promising	areas	for	future	study.		These	have	been	categorised	into	further	research	extending	the	method	and	further	research	with	respect	to	resource	self-determination.		
9.3.1	 Further	research:	Using	the	analytical	approach	The	ex	ante	study	of	policy	decisions	and	property	rights	systems	was	identified	as	 a	 gap	 in	 the	 literature.	 	 This	 thesis	 highlights	 that	 ex	 ante	 analysis	 of	 new	property	 rights	 systems	 is	 a	 feasible	 approach	 to	 analysis	 and	 it	 demonstrates	that	 it	 is	an	approach	to	research	 that	could	be	undertaken	more	 frequently	 to	the	benefit	of	policy	outcomes	(Palmer	2015;	Giest	&	Howlett	2014;	Ward	et	al.	2008).	 	 In	 such	cases,	 economic	experiments	 can	be	a	useful	 and	cost-effective	way	to	quantify	the	potential	effects	of	institutional	change,	with	the	potential	to	better	inform	policy	makers	of	the	respective	costs	and	benefits	of	undertaking	a	systems	 change	 (Janssen	 et	 al.	 2010;	 Ostrom	 2006).	 	 Replicating	 this	methodology	 to	 understand	 the	 likely	 implications	 of	 other	 proposed	 policy	changes	ex	ante	could	be	a	useful	opportunity	for	future	research.		As	part	of	this	research	a	new	framework	was	developed,	which	offers	a	way	to	examine	the	diachronic	nature	of	 institutions	within	the	Bloomington	tradition.		By	bringing	together	the	rules-of-the-game	approach	and	the	equilibrium	view	of	institutions	 it	 highlights	 the	 complementarity	 between	 the	 rules-of-the-game	and	 institutions-as-equilibria	 approaches	 for	 understanding	 institutions	 and	institutional	 change	 (Greif	&	Kingston	2011;	Hindriks	&	Guala	 2014;	 2015).	 In	the	spirit	of	 the	 IAD,	 the	new	framework	encourages	 the	researcher	 to	 identify	key	variables	and	parameters	of	 institutional	change	and	to	look	for	exogenous	variables,	which	could	trigger	a	shift	in	institutional	equilibrium.		Treating	rules	as	 endogenous	 rather	 than	 exogenous	 allows	 for	 institutional	 change	 to	 be	
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examined	 as	 an	 evolving	 process	 that	 can	 be	 driven	 forward	 by	 individual	decision-making.	 	 Next	 steps	 will	 involve	 testing	 the	 framework	 in	 other	historical	 settings	 to	 determine	 if	 the	 dynamic	 IAD	 framework	 consistently	works	 as	 a	 guide	 for	 studying	 institutional	 change.	 	 The	 strong	 theoretical	foundations	of	the	framework	mean	that	it	should;	whether	it	will	though	is	what	future	studies	can	ascertain.		
9.3.2	 Further	research:	The	study	of	resource	self-determination	The	identification	of	resource	self-determination	opens	up	new	opportunities	for	research	within	the	common	property	resource	and	institutions	literature.	 	It	is	one	 of	 the	 most	 innovative	 advances	 in	 resource	 management	 over	 the	 past	decade	 and,	 as	 indicated	 by	 the	 levels	 of	 interest	 shown	 by	 decision-makers	globally,	 after	 its	 slow	 start,	 the	 use	 of	 resource	 self-determination	 as	 an	alternative	property	rights	arrangement	is	only	likely	to	increase.		In	 terms	 of	 research,	 the	 most	 obvious	 opportunities	 include	 undertaking	broader	 comparative	work	 across	 scales	 and	 time.	 	Notable	 comparative	 cases	include	the	granting	of	 legal	rights	to	nature	in	Ecuador,	Bolivia,	Te	Urewera	in	New	 Zealand,	 and	 various	 US	 municipalities.	 	 In	 addition,	 in	 April	 2017,	 the	Ganges	 and	 Yamuna	 Rivers	 in	 India	were	 also	 granted	 legal	 standing,	 offering	additional	cases	for	future	comparative	work.159		Such	comparisons	will	allow	for	contrasts	 to	 be	 identified	 across	 scales	 and	 across	 different	 resource	 types.		Opportunities	 also	 exist	 to	 make	 comparisons	 of	 the	 Whanganui	 River	institutional	 arrangement	 ex	 post.	 	 This	 study	 has	 provided	 a	 comprehensive	assessment	 of	 the	 institutional	 environment	 preceding	 the	 identification	 of	resource	self-determination	including	offering	insights	into	actors’	expectations	of	future	institutional	change.	 	Comparing	these	expectations	with	observations	made	in	the	coming	decades	will	be	an	interesting	source	of	future	work.		There	 are	 also	 opportunities	 to	 examine	 resource	 self-determination	 through	different	 disciplinary	 lenses	 such	 as	 law	 and	 anthropology,	 sociology	 and																																																									159	In	Mohd.	Salim	v	State	of	Uttarakhand	&	others	[2017]	PIC	126.	Available	at:	http://www.livelaw.in/first-india-uttarakhand-hc-declares-ganga-yamuna-rivers-living-legal-entities/.	
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political	science.		This	will	strengthen	our	understanding	of	the	circumstances	in	which	resource	self-determination	could	be	a	robust	alternative	property	rights	arrangement	for	the	governance	of	common	pool	resources	and	public	goods.		It	is	also	potentially	useful	to	think	about	how	resource	self-determination	could	work	 with	 other	 institutional	 arrangements,	 such	 as	 environmental	 markets.		Taking	 the	 case	 of	 a	 river	 again,	 could	 the	 concepts	 of	 a	 water	 market	 be	integrated	 with	 resource	 self-determination?	 	 Could	 this	 be	 an	 alternative	mechanism	for	providing	for	instream	flow	or	does	the	presence	of	one	system	preclude	the	other?		Likewise,	how	would	resource	self-determination	work	with	a	 piece	 of	 legislation	 like	 the	 US	 Endangered	 Species	 Act	 or	 the	 Public	 Trust	Doctrine?	 	 New	 Zealand	 has	 a	 relatively	 flexible	 legislative	 setting,	 examining	whether	 a	 more	 sticky	 institutional	 setting	 would	 support	 the	 granting	 of	common	property	resources	legal	standing,	is	a	sensible	area	for	future	research.		Finally,	by	demonstrating	how	alternative	sets	of	beliefs	can	be	brought	together	in	a	single	 framework,	 this	study	also	 lays	the	groundwork	for	 further	study	on	the	effects	of	institutions	on	beliefs.	Beliefs	are	widely	recognised	as	influencing	the	 development	 of	 institutions;	 yet,	 we	 still	 have	 insufficient	 insight	 into	 the	coevolution	 of	 beliefs	 and	 institutions.	 	 Providing	 insight	 into	 this	 relationship	will	improve	decision-makers’	ability	to	craft	resilient	solutions	to	society’s	most	intractable	environmental	problems,	 including	how	to	best	coordinate	decision-making	within	the	nexus	and	the	potential	benefits	associated	with	incorporating	indigenous	worldviews	into	western	legal	systems.					
9.4	 Final	comments		Granting	a	river	legal	standing	may	sound	like	the	stuff	of	fiction,	but	the	case	of	the	Whanganui	River	in	New	Zealand	shows	that	treating	a	river	as	a	person	in	law	 is	 a	 viable	 alternative	property	 rights	 arrangement	 for	 governing	 common	property	resources.		The	findings	of	this	study	show	that	in	situations	where	the	payoffs	for	the	river	and	its	representative	differ	from	the	payoffs	for	the	existing	
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decision-maker,	the	application	of	resource	self-determination	is	likely	to	result	in	a	redistribution	of	water	within	the	system.		In	situations	where	high	levels	of	water	 extraction	 occur	 under	 existing	 property	 rights	 settings,	 resource	 self-determination	may	 result	 in	 an	 increase	 in	 instream	 flow	as	 the	new	decision-makers	place	more	value	on	ecosystem	health	and	wellbeing.		In	some	cases,	this	may	impose	increased	costs	on	property	rights	holders	as	they	bargain	over	use.		However,	 resource	 self-determination	 may	 be	 a	 robust	 property	 rights	arrangement,	 depending	 on	 the	 objectives	 of	 the	 legislation	 and	 the	 broader	framework	in	which	it	is	embedded.		The	motivation	for	applying	resource	self-determination	to	the	Whanganui	River	was	to	navigate	ownership	concerns	and	to	 ameliorate	 two	 contrasting	 worldviews.	 	 By	 integrating	 the	 new	 property	rights	 approach	 with	 existing	 formal	 and	 informal	 rules,	 the	 results	 of	 this	research	 suggest	 the	 new	 institutional	 framework	 could	 successfully	meet	 the	policy	 objectives.	 	 Constraints	 have	 been	 incorporated	 into	 the	 broader	framework,	 which	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 mitigate	 and	 control	 for	 some	 of	 the	more	obvious	potential	risks	and	costs	of	the	change,	 including	rent-seeking	by	the	 guardians	 and	 conflict	 over	 competing	 uses.	 	 Further,	 the	 new	 framework	will	develop	in	two	stages	smoothing	the	transition	and	potentially	enabling	the	majority	of	Ostrom’s	design	principles	to	be	met.		For	policy	makers	 interested	 in	replicating	the	approach,	 these	elements	of	 the	broader	 Te	 Pā	 Auroa	 framework	 are	 important	 to	 note.	 	 If	 resource	 self-determination	is	not	complemented	by	a	supportive	framework,	the	transfer	of	responsibility	from	the	jurisdiction	of	the	legislature	to	the	judiciary	could	have	unintended	 consequences.	 	 For	 instance,	 recognising	 a	 river	 as	 a	 person	 will	require	the	political	system	to	find	ways	and	means	to	deliver	and	uphold	these	new	legal	rights,	where	necessary	at	the	direction	of	the	courts.			Unlike	elected	officials,	 judges	 cannot	 foresee	 the	 consequences	 of	 their	 decrees	 and	 rulings,	and	enforcing	the	economic	right	of	the	river	may	impact	on	the	economic	right	of	another	section	or	scale	of	society	without	due	consideration	of	the	effects	on	efficiency.		
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Further,	although,	such	a	change	has	the	potential	to	benefit	some	industries	and	professionals	 who	 stand	 to	 gain	 by	 providing	 court-mandated	 goods	 and	services,	 it	also	carries	the	risk	of	 forcing	the	court	to	become	politicised.	 	This	has	 the	 potential	 to	 compromise	moral	 authority	 and	 public	 confidence	 in	 the	system.	 	 It	 also	places	 the	 responsibility	of	 looking	after,	 and	 representing,	 the	environmental	good	or	resource	in	the	appointed	guardians,	rather	than	elected	officials.	 	Without	broader	institutional	and	financial	support,	this	means	that	it	is	 only	 the	 wealthy	 or	 well-endowed	 representatives	 that	 will	 be	 able	 to	challenge	decisions	and	enter	costly	litigation	should	the	CPR	wish	to	sue	or	find	itself	the	subject	of	an	individual	or	class	action.160		In	the	case	of	the	Whanganui	River,	 a	NZD$30	million	contestable	 fund	has	been	created	 for	 the	purposes	of	improving	Te	Awa	Tupua’s	health	and	wellbeing,	as	well	as	 litigation	purposes.		Without	 such	 support,	 the	 arrangement	would	 fail	 to	 have	much	 legitimacy	 or	power.	In	the	case	of	the	Whanganui	River,	an	obvious	test	of	the	legitimacy	of	resource	self-determination	 will	 be	 when	 Genesis	 Energy	 Limited’s	 consent	 for	 water	diversion	comes	up	for	renewal	in	2039.		As	discussed,	the	diverted	headwaters	of	 the	 Whanganui	 River	 contribute	 over	 5%	 of	 New	 Zealand’s	 electricity,	potentially	pitting	the	demands	of	energy	consumers	against	the	demands	of	the	river.	 	The	results	of	the	experiment	conducted	as	part	of	this	research	suggest	that	 in	a	bargaining	situation	the	new	arrangement	may	cause	the	allocation	of	water	 to	 shift	 towards	 a	more	 equal	 division	between	 extractive	 and	 instream	uses,	reducing	the	amount	of	flow	granted	to	Genesis.		However,	the	results	also	suggested	 that	 given	 the	 long-standing	 omission	 of	 the	 river	 from	 decision-making,	 granting	 the	 river	 and	 its	 representatives	decision-making	power	may	cause	 the	 new	 guardians	 to	 be	 more	 self-regarding	 than	 if	 they	 had	 not																																																									160	Only	two	cases	have	successfully	recognised	the	rights	of	nature	in	Ecuador	–	a	country,	which	granted	all	of	nature	legal	rights	in	2008	(Daly	2012).		Perhaps	it	is	not	surprising	that	the	first	one	was	brought	against	the	Provincial	Government	of	Loja	on	behalf	of	the	Vilcabamba	River	by	two	American	residents	who	live	part-time	in	Ecuador.		The	plaintiffs	owned	property	downstream	of	a	road	that	was	to	be	widened	and	that	runs	past	the	river.		The	couple	argued	on	behalf	of	nature	that	the	new	construction	was	adding	debris	to	the	river	and	thus	increasing	the	likelihood	of	floods	that	affected	the	riverside	populations	that	utilise	the	river’s	resources.		Although	it	is	likely	that	the	courts	ruling	did	manage	to	reduce	some	erosion	into	the	Vilcabamba	River,	the	greater	victory	is	that	the	ruling	reduced	the	likelihood	of	future	flooding	events	affecting	land	owned	by	the	American	couple	on	which	they	intended	to	develop	a	‘Garden	of	Paradise	Healing	and	Retreat	Center’	with	plots	along	the	river	to	be	sold	for	between	$30,000	and	$150,000	(Fish	2013).		
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previously	 been	 cut	 out	 of	 decision-making.	 	 This	 may	 cause	 an	 even	 more	pronounced	redistribution	of	water	in	the	system	in	the	case	of	the	Whanganui	River	should	the	courts	uphold	the	guardian’s	demands.	Overall,	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Whanganui	 River	 sets	 a	 new	 precedent	 for	 water	governance	 in	 New	 Zealand	 and	 across	 the	 world.	 	 It	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	significant	changes	in	the	area	of	resource	management	in	the	past	decade.		This	research	 demonstrates	 that	 alternative	 property	 rights	 approaches,	 which	challenge	 the	 status	 quo	 can	 be	 robust,	 and	 influence	 institutional	 economic	outcomes.	 	 It	 also	 shows	 that	 treating	 a	 river	 as	 a	 person	 in	 law	 is	 a	 viable	alternative	 approach	 for	 the	 governance	 of	 a	 river	 system.	 	 However,	 it	 also	brings	attention	to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	reason	resource	self-determination	may	be	successful	 in	 delivering	 on	 the	 objectives	 of	 the	 legislation	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	Whanganui	River	is	due	to	the	broader	institutional	framework	that	embeds	the	new	 property	 rights	 system	 into	 existing	 legislative	 structures.	 	 For	 policy	makers	 interested	 in	 using	 resource	 self-determination	 as	 an	 alternative	property	 rights	 system	 for	 the	 governance	 of	 public	 goods	 and	 common	 pool	resources,	 the	results	 found	and	conclusions	drawn	 in	 this	 research	could	help	shine	 light	 on	 how	 this	 can	 be	 done	 effectively.	 	 With	 any	 luck	 this	 will	 help	reduce	 the	 risk	 of	 additional	 costs	 arising	 when	 common	 property	 resources,	such	as	rivers,	are	granted	legal	standing	in	the	future.				 	
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	 	 Appendix	i.				
Māori	terms	used	in	this	thesis	
	
Aotearoa	 land	of	the	long	white	cloud,	New	Zealand	
awa	 river	
hapū	 sub-tribe	
ihi	 power	
iwi	 tribe,	such	as	Whanganui	Iwi	
kāinga	 villages	
kaitiaki	 guardian,	caretaker	
kaitiakitanga	 guardianship,	stewardship	
kaumatua	 elders	
kawanatanga	 governance	
mahinga	kai	 food	gathering	sites	and	practices	
Matua	te	Mana	 Mt	Ruapehu	
mana	 honour,	prestige	
mana	whakahaere	 governance,	authority,	particularly	relevant	to		 Waikato-Tainui’s	relationship	with	the	Waikato		 River	
mauri	 life	force	
pā	 settlements	
pā	tuna	 eel	weirs,	used	for	catching	eels	
Pākehā	 non-Māori	
Ranginui	 the	Sky	Father	
rangatira	 leaders	
rangatiratanga	 chieftanship	 	
ripo	 rapids	
tangata	whenua	 first	people	of	the	land	
te	ao	Māori	 values,	Māori	worldview	Te	Atihaunui	a	Paparangi,		or	Te	Atihau	 Iwi	of	Whanganui	
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Te	Awa	Tupua	 River	with	Ancestral	power	
Te	Heke	Ngahuru	 the	autumn	migration	of	eels	
Te	Karewao	 the	supplejack	vine	
Te	Kōpuka	 white	mānuka,	the	timber	from	which	eel	weirs		 across	the	river	were	built	
Te	Koretete	au	Te	Awa	Tupua	 a	storage	basket	for	food	from	the	river	
Te	Pā	Auroa		 the	broad	eel	weir	
Te	Pou	Tupua	 the	sacred	and	revered	station	
taonga	 treasures,	such	as	the	Whanganui	River	
taonga	tuturu	 physical	treasures	
tapu	 sacred	
tiaki	 to	care	for,	guard,	protect	
tikanga	 the	customary	system	of	behaviour	and	practices	
tupua	 	 something	extraordinary,	from	the	ancestral	
	 	 realm	
tupuna	 ancestor	
Tupua	te	Kawa	 the	principles	of	natural	law	
uri	 descendants	
waahi	tapu	 sacred	place	
whakapapa	 genealogy	
whanau	 family	group	
whanaungatanga	 relationships	
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Appendix	ii.		
	
Participant	information	sheet	provided	to	interview	subjects		
 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
Researcher:   
 
My name is Julia Talbot-Jones and I am a PhD candidate at the Crawford School of Public Policy, in the 
College of Asia and the Pacific, at the Australian National University.  Originally from Christchurch, I moved to 
Australia in 2013 to complete my doctorate in environmental economics after living in the US for several years 
where I had been studying and working as an economist in Washington, DC. 
 
This Information Sheet gives an overall summary of the research you have been invited to participate in. It tells 
you about the research, what it means for you if you choose to take part, how the information you share is 
stored and how your identity is protected. If you have any further questions that you would like to discuss with 
me, please get in touch via the contact details provided at the end of this document. If you choose to take part 
in the research you will have a further opportunity to ask any questions about the information provided, before 
being invited to sign a consent form. 
 
 
Titles:  
 
• Thesis title: Institutions, choice, and endogenous preferences: the behavioural effects of granting 
nature legal standing 
 
• Title for this section of research: Granting nature legal rights - A new approach to resource 
management? 
 
 
General Outline of this research:   
 
• Description and Methodology: This research aims to understand how institutions affect peoples’ 
behaviour, specifically looking at the preliminary new institutional arrangement governing the 
Whanganui River, New Zealand, which has granted the Whanganui River legal standing.  This research 
will be split into two parts – the first part (which is what you are involved in) is looking to understand 
how and why this new institutional arrangement emerged as a management mechanism.  Using a 
series of interviews and a range of secondary sources this section of my research aims to answer two 
key research questions: 
o Why has this new institutional arrangement emerged for the management of the Whanganui 
River? 
o How does it differ from the traditional management approach ie the previous institutional 
arrangement? 
 
• Participants: Those contributing to this research are people involved in the management of the 
Whanganui River, both past and present.  This may include policy makers, people from the private and 
public sector, iwi representatives, government officials, and private landowners.  I am intending to 
interview around 30 key participants. 
 
• Use of Data and Feedback: The data collected through this research will form the basis of the 
institutional analysis section of my research (ie Part One).  The results will also contribute to Part Two, 
which will focus on directly testing peoples’ behavioural responses to the changing conditions using 
economic experiments.  Data may also be used in future research. 
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Data will be presented in academic journals and discussed in conference settings.  Once complete, I 
will send you a summary of the final research findings and explain how the full thesis can be accessed.  
If you would like to receive this summary and further information, please indicate your interest on the 
attached Consent Form.  
 
• Project Funding: I have received limited funding from the Australian National University to support 
research costs, such as travel. Remaining costs are self-funded. 
 
 
Participant Involvement:  
 
• Voluntary Participation & Withdrawal: Participation in this research is completely voluntary. If you do 
agree to take part you are subsequently able to withdraw from the research, without fear of penalty. 
You can withdraw at any time up until the research is published. No explanation is necessary. If you do 
decide to withdraw after the interview, any data you have provided will be destroyed. If you do agree to 
be interviewed, you can decline to answer any questions you feel uncomfortable about answering. 
 
• What will participants have to do? Your participation will involve an individual interview with me. You 
can choose whether or not to have this interview audio-recorded. The purpose of audio-recording is to 
enable me to focus on our conversation during the interview and respond to what you say, without 
having to focus on documentation. Audio records will be securely stored and only I will have access to 
them. 
 
Discussing this institutional change, particularly if you were part of the process, may be uncomfortable 
or upsetting. Please consider this as you decide whether or not to take part in an interview. If you 
become upset during the interview, we can stop for a break or reconvene at a later date. The option to 
withdraw completely from this research is also always available. 
 
• Location and Duration: The interview will take place at a private location of your choice. The interview 
will take approximately one to two hours. 
 
 
Confidentiality:  
 
• Confidentiality: Your confidentiality will be ensured, as far as the law allows, in several ways.  No-one 
other than me and my direct supervisor will have access to the material you provide.  The attached 
Consent Form allows you do indicate whether or not you wish to have your name and/or type of 
organisation you are affiliated with listed as a participant or for your name and general organisation to 
remain confidential.  You will also be able to indicate whether you are happy for me to quote you 
directly, either under your name or as a member of a particular group eg an NGO worker. 
 
If you choose to remain confidential, you can choose to be either referred in the research by a 
 pseudonym or using a code, which will only be known and understood by the researchers. 
 
 
Data Storage: 
 
• Where: Data and personal information will be stored on a password-secure computer for which I will 
only have access.  Hard copy information, such as the Consent Form, will be stored in a locked filing 
cabinet to which I also will only be able to access.  Interviews will be conducted in a private place. I will 
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transcribe interviews using headphones to ensure no other person can hear the interview.  Data will be 
stored for at least five years following publication.  At the end of five years, data may be archived to be 
used in future research or alternatively destroyed. 
 
 
Queries and Concerns: 
 
Please feel free to contact me or my supervisor directly if you, or anyone else, wishes to have more 
information about this research. 
 
Chief investigator: 
Julia Talbot-Jones 
PhD Candidate 
Crawford School of Public Policy 
The Australian National University 
 
Email: julia.talbot-jones@anu.edu.au (regularly checked) 
Phone: (+61) 424 424 814 
Mailing address:  Crawford School of Public Policy; ANU College of Asia & the Pacific; J.G. Crawford 
Building No. 132; Lennox Crossing; The Australian National University; Canberra ACT 0200; Australia  
 
Primary supervisor: 
Jeff Bennett, BAgEc, PhD, FASSA, DFAARES 
Professor 
Crawford School of Public Policy 
The Australian National University 
 
Email: jeff.bennett@anu.edu.au 
Telephone: (+61)  2 6125 0154 
Mobile: (+61) 419 232 250 
Mailing address:  Crawford School of Public Policy; ANU College of Asia & the Pacific; J.G. Crawford 
Building No. 132; Lennox Crossing; The Australian National University; Canberra ACT 0200; Australia  
 
 
Ethics Committee Clearance: 
 
The ethical aspects of this research have been approved by the ANU Human Research Ethics 
Committee.  If you have any concerns or complaints about how this research has been conducted, 
please contact: 
 
Ethics Manager 
The ANU Human Research Ethics Committee 
The Australian National University 
Telephone: +61 2 6125 3427 
Email: Human.Ethics.Officer@anu.edu.au 
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Appendix	iii.	
	
	
	
Written	consent	form	provided	to	interview	subjects	
	 	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Australian National University | Canberra ACT 0200 Australia | CRICOS Provider No. 00120C 
WRITTEN CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH ON GRANTING NATURE LEGAL RIGHTS –  
A NEW APPROACH TO RESOURCE MANAGEMENT? 
 
When you sign this form, your signature indicates you choose to participate in this research, and give your 
full consent to do so, understanding the following: 
 
• You have received written and oral information about this research, and been provided with the 
opportunity to have your questions answered; 
 
• You fully understand the aims and nature of the research; 
 
• You understand you are able to stop the interview at any time; 
 
• You understand you are able to withdraw from the research at any stage up until publication. If you 
withdraw after the conclusion of the interview and before publication, you understand the 
information you provided will be destroyed; 
 
• You understand you can request the researcher does not use particular pieces of information you 
provide, and that you can make this request up until publication; and 
 
• You understand how the information you provide will be used in the research, including in the 
publication of research findings. You understand the researcher will store all information in a secure 
manner. 
 
In the below statements, please circle the choice you consent to: 
I do / do not consent to my interview being audio-recorded. 
I do / do not consent to having my name, role, and organisation listed as an interviewee in an appendix of 
the final thesis publication. 
I do / do not consent to being quoted in research products. 
If you consent to being quoted, please tick the box of the quote attribution choice you consent to, 
from the three choices below. 
I am happy for my name and organisation to be attributed to any quotes used. 
I wish to have only the type of organisation I work for attributed to any quotes  used (for 
 example: public servant, NGO staff, business staff, parliamentarian). 
I want my quotes to remain unattributed. 
 
Signed: ________________________________________ 
 
Printed Full Name: ______________________________  Date: _______________ 
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Written	consent	forms	for	experimental	participants		
	 	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Australian National University | Canberra ACT 0200 Australia | CRICOS Provider No. 00120C 
WRITTEN CONSENT for Participants  
 
 
Testing incentives using the bargaining game 
 
 
 
I have read and understood the Information Sheet you have given me about the research 
project, and I have had any questions and concerns about the project (listed here  
  
  ) 
 
addressed to my satisfaction.  
 
I agree to participate in the project. YES NO  
 
Signature:……………………………………………. 
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Appendix	v.	
	
Instructions	for	experimental	subjects		participating	in	the	‘Changing’	
treatment
	
Instructions 
 
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment!  You receive $10 for 
having shown up on time.  If you read these instructions carefully, you can earn 
more.  The $10 and all additional money will be paid out to you privately in cash 
immediately after the experiment. 
 
It is strictly forbidden to communicate with the other participants during the 
experiment.  If you have any questions or concerns, please raise your hand and we 
will answer your questions individually.  Following this rule is very important; if not 
followed, we must unfortunately exclude you from the experiment and from all 
payments. 
 
This experiment will consist of two phases: Phase One and Phase Two.  Phase Two 
is an additional exercise that will be explained at that time.  You will be paid for your 
decisions made in one of the two phases by the determination of a coin toss at the 
end of the experiment.  Since you do not know which phases you will be paid for you 
should ensure you understand what is required in each phase.  Instructions for 
Phase Two will be given to you upon completion of the previous phase. 
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Phase One 	
Random Matching and Anonymity  
You will be assigned a letter: A or B or C. You will form a group with two other people 
of a different letter. No one will learn the identities of the people he/she is grouped 
with. You will not play with the people who you are grouped with in this game beyond 
this phase. 
 
Starting Balances 
This time the endowment of 100 tokens is given to Player C. Player B and A will have 
no endowment.   
 
As before, for each player, each set of tokens is worth a different value and can be 
represented in a choice set as shown in the table below (Rows A-G).  The value of 
each set of tokens for each player and the respective choice sets are the same as in 
Phase One and are as follows: 
 
 
Table One: Respective payoffs available to players A, B, and C dependent on the 
number of tokens Player A offers Player B. 
 
Choice 
Set 
Quantity 
of tokens 
for Player 
A 
Quantity 
of tokens 
for Player 
B 
Payoff of   
Player A 
Payoff of   
Player B 
Payoff of   
Player C 
A 100 0 $3 $0 $15 
B 83 17 $4.5 $4.5 $13.5 
C 67 33 $6 $6.8 $12 
D 50 50 $9 $9 $9 
E 33 67 $13.5 $11.3 $6 
F 17 83 $15 $13.5 $3 
G 0 100 $3 $15 $0 
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Decision Task 
Steps: 
 
1) Player C must decide how many of his/her 100 tokens he/she would like to 
offer to Player B by selecting a choice set from A-G. 
 
2) Player B will be informed of Player C’s choice on his/her computer monitor.  
Player B can then decide whether to accept or reject Player C’s offer 
 
a. If Player B accepts: both Player C and B split the 100 tokens as 
proposed giving them their respected payoffs.  Player A also receives 
the allocated payoff as per the choice set offered.  This phase will then 
end. 
 
b. If Player B rejects: players will enter another round of decision-
making.  Doing so will reduce all players’ payoffs in the table by 10 per 
cent.  There will be a maximum of 10 repeated rounds per phase. 
Each round will be identical to the round described above.   
 
3) Player A makes no decisions and will only observe the final decisions of 
Player C and B at each round 
 
A visual representation of each player’s decision task is shown below where Player A 
is endowed with tokens and can make an offer to Player B.  Player C can observe all 
offers and responses but does not make any decisions: 
 
 
 
  
Player C     Player B 
 
Player A 
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Examples: 
The diagrams illustrate the possible payoffs for players A, B, and C in round one, 
round two, and round eight as the quantity of tokens allocated to Player B increases.  
The solid line reflects payoffs in round one, the dashed line reflects payoffs in round 
two, and the dotted line: payoffs in round eight. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a) Payoff distribution of Player A b) Payoff distribution of Player B c) Payoff distribution of Player C 
 
 
 
For example, after looking at the payoff table (previous page) Player C may decide 
that he/she wants to offer Player B 33 tokens in round one.  He/she consequently 
indicates to Player B that he/she will offer them Choice set C (as shown in the payoff 
table).  If Player B accepts, Player C will receive a payoff of $12, Player B will receive 
$6.80, and Player A will get $6.  If Player B rejects, play will proceed to round two 
with reduced payoffs (as demonstrated in the diagrams above) and the process 
repeated.  This decision process can be repeated up to 10 times, at which time all 
payoffs would have fallen to zero and all tokens will be returned to Player A. 
 
Earnings  
If this task is selected for payment you will earn the payoff agreed to in addition to 
your show-up fee.  Your earnings will be collected from the experimenter 
anonymously and confidentially at the end of the experiment. 
 
Summary 
 
• Player C is endowed with 100 tokens 
• Player C must decide how much to give to Player B 
• Player B can accept or reject Player C’s offer 
• If Player C’s offer is accepted, phase one ends; if Player C’s offer is rejected 
play moves to the next round 
• Maximum of ten repeated rounds after which all tokens are returned to Player 
C and the payoffs are zero for all players 
• Player A can observe all players’ offers and responses but makes no 
decisions. 
 	 	
Total 
payoff 
Quantity 
Total 
payoff 
Quantity 
Total 
payoff 
Quantity  
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Phase Two 	
Random Matching and Anonymity  
Your letter will remain the same in this experiment, however, YOUR GROUP WILL 
CHANGE.  You will no longer be matched with any player with whom you have 
previously played.  You will all continue to remain anonymous.   
 
Starting Balances 
This time the endowment of 100 tokens is given to Player A. Player B and C will have 
no endowment.   
 
As before, for each player, each set of tokens is worth a different value and can be 
represented in a choice set as shown in the table below (Rows A-G).  The value of 
each set of tokens for each player and the respective choice sets are the same as in 
Phase One and are as follows: 
 
 
Table One: Respective payoffs available to players A, B, and C dependent on the 
number of tokens Player A offers Player B. 
 
Choice 
Set 
Quantity 
of tokens 
for Player 
A 
Quantity 
of tokens 
for Player 
B 
Payoff of   
Player A 
Payoff of   
Player B 
Payoff of   
Player C 
A 100 0 $3 $0 $15 
B 83 17 $4.5 $4.5 $13.5 
C 67 33 $6 $6.8 $12 
D 50 50 $9 $9 $9 
E 33 67 $13.5 $11.3 $6 
F 17 83 $15 $13.5 $3 
G 0 100 $3 $15 $0 
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Decision Task 
Steps: 
 
4) Player A must decide how many of his/her 100 tokens he/she would like to 
offer to Player B by selecting a choice set from A-G. 
 
5) Player B will be informed of Player A’s choice on his/her computer monitor.  
Player B can then decide whether to accept or reject Player A’s offer 
 
a. If Player B accepts: both Player A and B split the 100 tokens as 
proposed giving them their respected payoffs.  Player C also receives 
the allocated payoff as per the choice set offered.  This phase will then 
end. 
 
b. If Player B rejects: players will enter another round of decision-
making.  Doing so will reduce all players’ payoffs in the table by 10 per 
cent.  There will be a maximum of 10 repeated rounds per phase. 
Each round will be identical to the round described above.   
 
6) Player C makes no decisions and will only observe the final decisions of 
Player A and B at each round 
 
A visual representation of each player’s decision task is shown below where Player A 
is endowed with tokens and can make an offer to Player B.  Player C can observe all 
offers and responses but does not make any decisions: 
 
 
 
  
Player A                                                            Player B 
 
Player C 
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Examples: 
The diagrams illustrate the possible payoffs for players A, B, and C in round one, 
round two, and round eight as the quantity of tokens allocated to Player B increases.  
The solid line reflects payoffs in round one, the dashed line reflects payoffs in round 
two, and the dotted line: payoffs in round eight. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a) Payoff distribution of Player A b) Payoff distribution of Player B c) Payoff distribution of Player C 
 
 
 
For example, after looking at the payoff table (previous page) Player A may decide 
that he/she wants to offer Player B 33 tokens in round one.  He/she consequently 
indicates to Player B that he/she will offer them Choice set C (as shown in the payoff 
table).  If Player B accepts, Player A will receive a payoff of $6, Player B will receive 
$6.80, and Player C will get $12.  If Player B rejects, play will proceed to round two 
with reduced payoffs (as demonstrated in the diagrams above) and the process 
repeated.  This decision process can be repeated up to 10 times, at which time all 
payoffs would have fallen to zero and all tokens will be returned to Player A. 
 
Earnings 
If this task is selected for payment you will earn the payoff agreed to in addition to 
your show-up fee.  Your earnings will be collected from the experimenter 
anonymously and confidentially at the end of the experiment. 
 
Summary 
 
• Player A is endowed with 100 tokens 
• Player A must decide how much to give to Player B 
• Player B can accept or reject Player A’s offer 
• If Player A’s offer is accepted, phase one ends; if Player A’s offer is rejected 
play moves to the next round 
• Maximum of ten repeated rounds after which all tokens are returned to Player 
A and the payoffs are zero for all players 
• Player C can observe all players’ offers and responses but makes no 
decisions. 
 			
Total 
payoff 
Quantity 
Total 
payoff 
Quantity 
Total 
payoff 
Quantity  
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Appendix	vi.			
Additional	analysis	carried	out	as	part	of	the	experiment	
	
	
Table	1A:		 Choice	set	offered	by	the	proposer	in	periods	1	and	2	of	phase	2	of	the	Resource	Self-Determination	and	Changing	treatments.		
Proposers’	offers	by	choice	set	 RSD	(Phase	2)	 C	(Phase	2)	 Z-stat	
Period	1	 Choice	set	A	 0	 0.136	 1.42		 Choice	set	B	 0.071	 0.364	 1.95*		 Choice	set	C	 0.043	 0.318	 0.663		 Choice	set	D	 0.500	 0.136	 2.341**		 Choice	set	E	 0	 0	 0		 Choice	set	F	 0	 0.045	 0.79		 Choice	set	G	 0	 0	 0	
Period	2	 Choice	set	A	 0	 0.181	 1.679*	
	 Choice	set	B	 0.148	 0.091	 0.477*		 Choice	set	C	 0.071	 0.227	 1.206		 Choice	set	D	 0.214	 0.136	 0.603		 Choice	set	E	 0	 0	 0		 Choice	set	F	 0	 0	 0		 Choice	set	G	 0	 0	 0	Note:	All	tests	are	two	sided	Wilcoxon	rank	sum	tests.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1		
	
	
	
Table	2A:	 Comparison	of	offers	made	in	periods	1,	2	and	3	by	Player	C	in	phase	1	and	2	of	the	Resource	Self-Determination	treatment.			
Proposers’	offers	by	choice	set	 RSD	(Phase	1)	 RSD	(Phase	2)	 Z-stat	
Period	1	 Choice	set	A	 0	 0.0	 0		 Choice	set	B	 0	 0.072	 0.35		 Choice	set	C	 0.642	 0.428	 1.00		 Choice	set	D	 0.357	 0.500	 0.707		 Choice	set	E	 0	 0	 0		 Choice	set	F	 0	 0	 0		 Choice	set	G	 0	 0	 0	
Period	2	 Choice	set	A	 0.071	 0	 1.00	
	 Choice	set	B	 0	 0.143	 1.41		 Choice	set	C	 0.214	 0.071	 1.00		 Choice	set	D	 0.286	 0.214	 0.378	
		 264	
	 Choice	set	E	 0	 0	 0		 Choice	set	F	 0	 0	 0		 Choice	set	G	 0	 0	 0	
Period	3	 Choice	set	A	 0	 0	 0	
	 Choice	set	B	 0	 0	 0	
	 Choice	set	C	 0.071	 0.071	 0		 Choice	set	D	 0.071	 0.071	 0		 Choice	set	E	 0	 0	 0		 Choice	set	F	 0	 0	 0		 Choice	set	G	 0	 0	 0	Note:	All	tests	are	two	sided	Wilcoxon	rank	sum	tests.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1				
	
Table	3A:		 Comparison	of	offers	made	in	period	1	in	phase	1	and	2	of	the	Changing	and	Resource	Self-Determination	treatments		
Proposers’	offers	by	choice	set	 Phase	1	 Phase	2	 Z-stat	
Changing	 Choice	set	A	 0	 0.136	 1.77*		 Choice	set	B	 0	 0.364	 3.09***		 Choice	set	C	 0	 0.318	 2.85***		 Choice	set	D	 0.136	 0.136	 0.00		 Choice	set	E	 0.135	 0	 1.77*		 Choice	set	F	 0.727	 0.045	 4.59***		 Choice	set	G	 0	 0	 0	
RSD	 Choice	set	A	 0	 0	 0	
	 Choice	set	B	 0	 0.072	 0.35		 Choice	set	C	 0.643	 0.428	 1.00		 Choice	set	D	 0.357	 0.500	 0.707		 Choice	set	E	 0	 0	 0		 Choice	set	F	 0	 0	 0		 Choice	set	G	 0	 0	 0	Note:	All	tests	used	Wilcoxon	rank	sum	tests	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
												
	
